whether the foreign flag is not used to cover the violation of her own laws.

Such was the view taken by Lord Stowell on the case of The Louisa,1 and adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in The Antelope.2 Torts not amounting to piracy under the law of nations may, however, have that character conferred upon them by Congress; and the slavetrade was declared to be piratical and a capital offence at an early period, although the statute can hardly be said to have been carried into effect before the Civil War.

The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States in civil cases has, as we have seen, been carried far beyond its original bounds, and now extends to all the navigable waters of the United States which are directly, or through intermediate channels, a means of commerce among the States and with foreign nations. Should Congress at any future period arrive at the conclusion that the criminal jurisdiction is coextensive with the civil, and carry their opinion into effect by a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States will have to determine whether the inference is just.4

Two things are essential, as the law now stands, to the exercise of the power to punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas under the twelfth section of the act of April 30, 1790, chap. 36, and the Revised Statutes, section 5339. The act in question must have been done on waters which are so far connected with the sea as to be subject to the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and it must not have been committed within the jurisdiction of any particular State. If these requisites are satisfied the federal courts may take cognizance of the offence, although it was committed on a strait, bay, or sound, and not on the high seas in the full sense of the term.6

1 2 Dodson, 210.

8 See ante, p. 1004.

2 10 Wheaton, 66.

4 See the United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheaton, 76, 106, note a. 5 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheaton, 339; United States v. Furlong, 5 Id. 184.

• United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheaton, 184; see The United States v.

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FELONIES ON THE HIGH SEAS.

If the vessel be American, and the offence is committed by one of the crew or a passenger, the Circuit Court may take cognizance of it, although the murderer and the murdered man were both foreigners, and the blow was struck on board of a foreign vessel. As was observed in the case cited, no difference can be supposed to exist between a murder committed on the seas by means of a gun discharged from a vessel, and by means of a boat-crew despatched for that purpose, as in the case before the court. Felonious acts done on the high seas by persons who are not citizens or subjects of the United States, on board of a ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign State, on persons who are not American citizens or subjects, are seemingly not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, or punishable by Congress.2 But such is not the case as regards felonies committed on board of a vessel in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and acknowledging obedience to no government whatever.3

Wiltberger, 5 Wheaton, 76, for the meaning of the term "high seas as used, without explanatory or qualifying words, in the twelfth section of the act of 1789, which relates to the right of Congress to punish crimes committed on board an American vessel within the jurisdiction of a foreign State.

1 The United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheaton, 184, 194.

2 See The United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheaton, 144, 151; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheaton, 610.

8 See The United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheaton, 144, 152.

LECTURE LIII.

Criminal Jurisdiction of the United States over the District of Columbia and such other places as are ceded by the States or acquired by Treaty. -It is exclusive of the States and so far National that while the Offence must be committed within the Place, the Culprit may be arrested wherever he is found. - The Acquisition of Land within a State under the right of Eminent Domain does not confer Jurisdiction on the United States unless sanctioned by the State Legislature. — A State may reserve its Jurisdiction while ceding the Land, and when such is the case punish a Murder committed in a Fort belonging to the United States, although both Parties are in the Military Service of the Federal Government. - Congress have the Police Power in the Territories which is withheld in the States, and may enact any Law that is not forbidden by the Constitution. - The Violation of any necessary and proper Law passed by Congress may be visited with such Penalties as they choose to inflict. An act which is injurious to a State and to the United States may be punished by both. Congress cannot punish the Infraction of a State Law except by adopting it as their own, nor of any Law which is not within the Scope of the Powers conferred by the Constitution. — An Indictment involving a Federal question may be removed from a State to a Federal Court, and the accused liberated if unconstitutionally detained. — The Supreme Court has no general Authority to revise the Judgments of the Circuit Courts in Criminal Cases; but may give relief by a habeas corpus where the proceeding is without Jurisdiction or Unconstitutional.

66

LIMITED as is the power of Congress to prescribe penalties and inflict punishment within the States, it is co-extensive with the field of penal legislation in territories and places that have been ceded to the United States by the States, or by foreign nations. Article I., section 8, is as follows: Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by the cession of particular States and acceptance by Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the

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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, and other needful buildings." By Article IV., section 3, paragraph 2, "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States."

The reasons which dictated the first of the above provisions are obvious. It was essential that the United States should have exclusive jurisdiction over the seat of government, and equally plain that they should be able to acquire the entire control of places occupied for governmental purposes. It is accordingly established that on the acquisition of land within the limits of a State, with the consent of its legislature, the authority of the State ceases, and that of the United States becomes not only paramount, but absolute. The territory so obtained is thenceforth as extraneous to the State as if it were held by a foreign government. Persons residing in it are not citizens of the State, or entitled to vote at any county, township, or general election. She can no longer legislate with regard to it, nor can her courts enforce any law or police regulation that she may have made.2 It was accordingly decided in The Commonwealth v. Clary that the courts of Massachusetts could not take cognizance of offences committed upon land in the town of Springfield which had been ceded by the Commonwealth to the government of the United States, and was occupied by it as an arsenal. the United States v. Cornell, the principle was applied to a murder committed in a fort in Newport Harbor belonging to the federal government, and garrisoned by its forces. The ground had been purchased with the consent of Rhode Island, and it was held that the State had no jurisdiction, and the United States were the only power that could take cognizance of and punish the crime.

In

The jurisdiction of the United States over all places ceded by the States, or acquired with their consent, is national, and

1 Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306.

2 Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298; The Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72.

8 2 Mason, 60.

OF THE UNITED STATES.

1143

the laws passed for carrying it into effect may be enforced throughout the length and breadth of the country, and wherever the sovereignty of the general government extends. A man who is guilty of murder within a State cannot be convicted or executed beyond its limits; but the trial of offences committed in places subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States may be held, and the sentence carried into effect, in any locality which Congress may designate. As Chief-Justice Marshall observed in Cohen v. Virginia: 1

"Congress cannot punish felonies generally, and of consequence cannot punish misprision of felony except on special grounds. It is equally clear that a State, Maryland, for example, cannot punish persons who, in another State, conceal a felony committed in Maryland. And yet Congress, legislating exclusively for a fort, or for the District of Columbia, may punish those who out of that place conceal a felony committed within it. The solution is that the power vested in Congress to legislate for any place ceded by a State carries with it as an incident the right to make that power effectual. If a felon escapes out of the State in which the act was done, the governor cannot pursue him into another State and apprehend him there, but must demand him from the executive power of that other State. If Congress were to be considered merely as a local legislature for the fort, or other place where an offence is committed, the principle would apply to them as to other local legislatures, and a felon who should escape out of the fort could not be apprehended by the marshal except through a requisition on the governor of the State where he was a fugitive from justice. The principle does not apply, because Congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its other powers, in its high character as the legislature of the Union. The rule applies to civil legislation as well as criminal; and any law that Congress are competent to make for the District of Columbia is so far a law for the entire country that an attempt without the District to obstruct its operation is punishable by Congress."

It has been at the same time decided that as the States may withhold their consent to the purchase of land by the

1 6 Wheaton, 428.