It thus appears that it is now settled in this state, as it is generally elsewhere, that the rule prohibiting the delegation of its legislative powers by a state legislature, does not necessarily prohibit a conditional statute, the taking effect of which may be made to depend upon such a subsequent event as its approval by the electors of the locality specially interested. (See Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 163 to 165, and 171, 172.) It is said on the pages last referred to: "It would seem, however, that if a legislative act is, by its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not unconstitutional to make the time when it shall take effect depend upon the event of a popular vote being for or against it-the time of its going into operation being postponed to a later day in the latter contingency. It would also seem that if the question of the acceptance or rejection of a municipal charter can be referred to the voters of the locality specially interested, it would be equally competent to refer to them the question whether a state law establishing a particular police regulation should be of force in such locality or not. Municipal charters refer most questions of local government, including police regulations, to the local authorities, on the supposition that they are better able to decide for themselves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of their constituents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are therefore more competent to judge what local regulations are important, and also how far the local sentiment will assist in their enforcement. The same reasons would apply in favor of permitting the people of the locality to accept or reject for themselves a particular police regulation, since this is only allowing them less extensive powers of local government than a municipal charter would confer, and the fact that the rule of law on that subject might be different in different localities, according as the people accepted or rejected the regulation, would not seem to affect the principle, when the same result is brought about by the different regulations which municipal corporations establish for themselves in the exercise of an undisputed authority." And on pages 173 and 174, while admitting that there have been some decisions to the contrary, the learned author says: "Such laws are known, in common parlance, as local option laws. They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the

highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary power of the municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of police regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control."

On the question whether a law relating to the retailing of intoxicating liquors relates to such a subject that its taking effect in any particular locality of the state may be made to depend upon a favorable vote of the electors, without involving a forbidden delegation of legislative power, the decisions are practically unanimous. This is so declared in Joyce on Intoxicating Liquors, secs. 368 and 371. The following decisions sustain this view, viz.: State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364, [19 Am. Rep. 536]; McPherson v. State, 174 Ind. 60, [31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 188, 90 N. E. 610]; State v. Forkner, 94 Iowa, 16, [28 L. R. A. 206, 62 N. W. 772]; Stickrod v. Com monwealth, 86 Ky. 285, 290, 5 S. W. 580]; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71, [20 Am. Rep. 83]; Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 621, [6 S. W. 469]; In re O'Brien, 29 Mont. 530, [1 Ann. Cas. 373, 75 Pac. 196]; Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N. J. L. 585, [1 L. R. A. 86, 15 Atl. 272]; Gordon v. State, 46 Ohio St. 607, [6 L. R. A. 749, 23 N. E. 63]; Fouts v. City of Hood River, 46 Or. 492, [7 Ann. Cas. 1160, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483, 81 Pac. 370]; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, [13 Am. Rep. 716]; State v. Barber, 19 S. Dak. 1, [101 N. W. 1078]; State v. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92, [59 Atl. 829]; State v. Donovan, 61 Wash. 209, [112 Pac. 260]. Without any discussion of this particular question, local option laws of a similar character were sustained in Ladson v. State, 56 Fla. 54, [47 So. 517]; City of Barnesville v. Means, 128 Ga. 197, [57 S. E. 422]; Garrett v. Mayor, 47 La. Ann. 618, [17 South. 238]; Feek v. Township Board. 82 Mich. 393, [10 L. R. A. 69, 47 N. W. 37]; State v. Johnson, 86 Minn. 121, [90 N. W. 161]; Hoover v. Thomas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 535, [80 S. W. 859], and Willis v. Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475, [21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009, 64 S. E. 342]. There is now practically no state holding to the contrary with the possible exception of Tennessee (see Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, [91 S. W. 293], a few earlier decisions in Pennsylvania,

Iowa, and Indiana having been practically overruled by later decisions, as above shown.

The act involved in this proceeding is practically one prohibiting the sale, etc., of alcoholic liquor in any incorporated city or town of the state, or the portion of any supervisorial district not included within the boundaries of any such city or town, in which at least twenty-five per cent of the electors petition for an election on the question, unless a majority of the electors voting on the question declare themselves in favor of such sale, etc. By it, the legislature practically determined that it is inexpedient to allow the sale of such liquor in any such territory when the sentiment of the inhabitants thereof, as shown by the expression of its electorate, is to so large an extent opposed thereto, and denounced the sale under such circumstances as a crime. In view of what we have said on the question of delegation of power and in view of the undoubted power of the state in the matter of the regulation of the traffic in intoxicating liquors, we are satisfied that the act before us, enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its police powers, cannot be held to be in excess of its authority either on the ground of unreasonableness or on the ground that it involves the delegation of its power by the legislature.

In the light of what we have said there is no force in the claim that the act is void as to supervisor districts because a supervisor district is not a political subdivision of the state having powers of local government like a city or town, and has no power to enact legislation. The act calls for no legislation on the part of the supervisor district, and the vote of the electors thereof does not make the law at all. The electors thereof perform no legislative function whatever. The act is wholly one of the state legislature, in force all over the state so far as the right of the people of the respective localities mentioned to avail themselves thereof is concerned, the only thing left to the electors of each such locality to determine being whether they will avail themselves of the prohibitions contained therein. This, as we have seen, involves no delegation by the legislature or exercise by the electors of legislative power, or the exercise of any power of local government by the districts specified. Under these circumstances, the determination as to what subdivision of the state should be defined as the unit is entirely for the legislature, which could pre

scribe such subdivisions as it saw fit. It might have prescribed election precincts, instead of supervisor districts, as has been done in some states, and as was done by the board of supervisors of Colusa County in the county ordinance considered in Denton v. Vann, 8 Cal. App. 677, [97 Pac. 675]. It might even have created new subdivisions of its own for all the purposes of the act. It once being established that there is no delegation of legislative power by the legislature, and that the act authorizes no exercise of legislative power or any power of local government by the districts specified, the result we have stated as to the power of the legislature in the matter of prescribing the unit, necessarily follows. What we have said on this point is fully sustained by some of the authorities already cited.

In view of what we have said, the other objections to the act here involved do not require very extended notice.

We have seen that the act is clearly a general law, purporting to be applicable everywhere in the state, and as a matter of fact, applicable everywhere in the state except possibly in cities having freeholders' charters. If not applicable in such cities, a question we have not considered and on which we express no opinion, such result is due entirely to certain provisions of our constitution making such charters paramount to certain general laws. But such a result would not impair the character of the law as a general law. It is certainly applicable to all parts of the state as to which the legislature is empowered to enact legislation relative to the sale or distribution of alcoholic liquors, including all cities and towns not having freeholders' charters.

The power granted to counties and to cities and towns by the provisions of section 11 of article XI of the constitution, to make and enforce "local, police, sanitary and other regulations" is expressly limited by said section to such regulations "as are not in conflict with general laws." So far, therefore, as any authority of counties, cities, and towns in the matter of such regulations is based on the provisions of this constitutional grant, it is subject at all times to such general laws, and such local regulations must give way to such general laws so far as they are in conflict therewith.

It is claimed that the act gives the electors of the specified districts the power to suspend provisions of general laws of

the state, such as, in the case of cities and towns organized and existing under the general Municipal Corporation Act, provisions authorizing the licensing of the traffic in alcoholic liquors for purposes of revenue and regulation, and in the case of portions of supervisor districts outside of cities and towns, provisions of the County Government Act of the same charaeter. This claim rests on the same basis as that of there being a delegation by the legislature of its legislative power.

As we have shown, there is no delegation of legislative power to the electors. It is the act enacted by the state legislature that suspends the provisions referred to, and not the vote of the electors. As we have seen, the legislature has simply enacted a law applicable to the whole state, which in substance and effect prohibits the sale or distribution of alcoholic liquor in any of the districts created by the act where, twenty-five per cent of the electors insisting on an official expression of opinion thereon, a majority of the electors are not in favor of such traffic. The act constitutes a declaration by the state legislature that such traffic is inexpedient in any such district where such a large proportion of the people are opposed thereto, and denounces such traffic under such circumstances as a crime.

There is nothing in the point that by virtue of the law a different rule may prevail in one locality than prevails in another, in regard to the traffic in intoxicating liquors. As to all parts of the state as to which the legislature has the au thority to legislate on this subject, the law is uniform in its. operation, the traffic in each district being forbidden or not forbidden as the electors may indicate their desire in the matter. Even as to permissible delegation of power to municipalities or counties "a constitutional provision that 'the legis lature shall not pass private, local or special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties' is not intended to secure uniformity in the exercise of delegated police powers but to forbid the passage of a law vesting in one town or county a power of local government not granted to another." (Joyce on Intoxicating Liquors, sec. 370.) And as a matter of fact, we know that there are almost as many differences in the regulations relating to the traffic in intoxicating liquors adopted by different cities and towns of the state, as there are cities and towns, running from the imposition of a very small

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