hauled," the word "passenger" qualifies the word "coaches," but does not qualify the word "cars"; that the word "car" was added to designate any vehicle attached to the train not embraced in the term "passenger coach."

We cannot agree with this proposition. The words of a statute are to be taken in their usual, ordinary, and popular sense, unless the context shows that they are used in a technical or arbitrary sense. (People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 337, [13 Am. Rep. 143].) The provisions of the Penal Code are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. (Pen. Code, sec. 4.) This act is not a part of the Penal Code, but it may be admitted that it is governed by the same rule. According to the usual rules of grammatical construction, and in the ordinary use of the language, the two words coaches and cars, in the clause quoted, would be understood to designate and include all ordinary railroad carriages used for the transportation of passengers. The argument that this construction would have the bad effect of sanctioning the running of a train having one brakeman, with three passenger cars, and a large number of baggage, mail, and express cars attached, has little force. Such trains are seldom used. The law, itself, permits the far more frequent occurrence of a train with eight or more cars carrying passengers and several baggage, mail, or express cars, with only two brakemen, in which case the danger to human life, and the number exposed thereto, would be much greater. A passenger train with only three cars carrying passengers is not often accompanied by many baggage, mail, or express cars; usually with but one or two. It is to be presumed that the legislature had in mind the usual and ordinary mode of operation and not infrequent and occasional instances. The title of the act declares that its purpose was to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads. The subsequent sections, 2 and 3, relate to trains other than passenger trains. They are evidently directed especially to the safety of the employees. Section 1 relates only to passenger, mail, and express trains and its main object would seem to be to promote the safety of travelers. Whether the word "cars" has a broader signification than the word "coach" or not, the plain meaning of the passage quoted would confine it to cars carrying passengers, ex

cepting officers' private cars. We see nothing in the context of the statute, or in its purpose and object, that requires the clause to be given an extraordinary, unusual or technical meaning. It permits a train of three cars carrying passengers to be operated with only one brakeman, although a baggage car may also be attached thereto. The facts charged against the petitioner do not constitute a public offense within the statute.

Let the petitioner be discharged.

Angellotti, J., Sloss, J., Melvin, J., Lorigan, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 5894. In Bank.-March 18, 1912.]

WILLIAM RIGBY, Jr., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF MARIN COUNTY, Respondent.

JUSTICE'S COURT-APPEAL-TIME FOR FILING UNDERTAKING-NOTICE OF APPEAL.-Under sections 978 and 978a of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1909, the time for filing an undertaking on appeal from a justice's court does not begin to run at the time of the rendition of the judgment. It begins to run from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal and continues for five days after the filing of such notice. As such notice, under section 974 of that code, may be filed at any time within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment appealed from, it necessarily follows that the time for filing the undertaking does not stop with the expiration of such thirty days, as was held to be the case prior to such amendments, but may in some cases be filed as much as five days after the thirtyday period has elapsed.

ID. CONSTRUCTION OF CODE PROVISIONS.-As the language of those sections are clear, and admit of no other construction, the courts cannot otherwise interpret them for the purpose of obviating any of the supposed evils which the amendments were intended to cure. ID. JURISDICTION OF APPEAL NOTICE OF FILING UNDERTAKING NOT ESSENTIAL. The giving of the notice of the filing of the undertaking to the respondent, as provided for in section 978a of tha: code, is not essential to the jurisdiction of the superior court of the appeal.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Certiorari to review an order of the Superior Court of Marin County.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Wal. J. Tuska, for Petitioner.

George H. Harlan, for Respondent.

SHAW, J.-On August 31, 1910, The Mill Valley Rochdale Company recovered a judgment against L. T. Parker in the superior court of Marin County. The action was begun in the recorder's court of the town of Mill Valley, a town of the sixth class, and that court had given judgment for Parker. The Rochdale Company had appealed to the superior court. On April 22, 1911, L. T. Parker served and filed a notice of motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that the appeal from the recorder's court was not properly taken and that therefore the superior court was without jurisdiction of the case. The motion was granted and on April 29, 1911, the superior court made an order setting aside its former judgment and dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction. Rigby, the plaintiff in the present proceeding, is the assignee of the Mill Valley Rochdale Company. More than six months had passed after the rendition of the judgment before the application to set it aside was made. Therefore, unless the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction of the cause, the superior court had no jurisdiction to make the order setting it aside. Asserting that the judgment was not void, this proceeding in certiorari was begun by Rigby to annul the order on the ground that the superior court had lost power over the case and could not make a valid order setting the judgment aside.

The judgment in the recorder's court was rendered on July 8, 1910. The notice of appeal therefrom to the superior court was served on August 3, 1910, and filed in the recorder's court on August 5, 1910. The undertaking on said appeal was not filed until August 10, 1910, and no notice thereof was given to Parker or his attorney until August 12, 1910. It is claimed that the appeal was ineffectual to vest jurisdiction of the cause in the superior court for two reasons: 1. That the undertaking, although filed within five days after the filing of the notice of appeal, was filed more than thirty days after the rendition of the judgment; 2. That the giving of a notice of the filing of the undertaking is necessary to

perfect the appeal, and that it was given too late to be of any effect.

The validity of the appeal depends upon the meaning and effect of the amendment of 1909 to the provisions of the code on the subject. These provisions apply to recorder's courts. (Stats. 1905, p. 73.) Prior to 1909 section 974 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that such appeals could be taken at any time within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment appealed from, by filing a notice of appeal with the justice and serving a copy thereof on the adverse party, and section 978 provided that such appeal would not be effectual for any purpose unless an undertaking on appeal with two or more sureties be filed. These provisions were not changed by the amendment. It will be noted that the time within which the undertaking must be filed was not fixed by the terms of the code. It was silent on that point. Nevertheless, in a series of decisions it had been established that the undertaking must be filed within thirty days, or the appeal would be ineffectual and void. (Coker v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 178; Dalzell v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 454, [7 Pac. 910]; Hall v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 25, [8 Pac. 509]; Duterte v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 536, [24 Pac. 284]; McKeen v. Naughton, 88 Cal. 466, [26 Pac. 354].)

The legislature of 1909 amended section 978 and added a new section, numbered 978a, to the Code of Civil Procedure. The only material amendment of 978 consisted of the omission of the final sentence relating to the subject of exceptions to the sureties and the justification of sureties. This sentence, with some important additions on which the decision of this case depends, was re-enacted as section 978a. It reads as follows:

"The undertaking on appeal must be filed within five days after the filing of the notice of appeal and notice of the filing of the undertaking must be given to the respondent. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties within five days after the filing of the undertaking, and unless they or other sureties justify before the justice or judge within five days thereafter, upon notice to the adverse party, to the amounts stated in their affidavits, the appeal must be regarded as if no such undertaking had been given."

1. The main argument in support of the first objection is

that the clause of section 978a, declaring that the undertaking "must be filed within five days after the filing of the notice of appeal," does not enlarge the time for filing such undertaking as fixed by the decisions above cited, and that it must be filed within the thirty days, as before, regardless of the time of filing the notice of appeal. That is to say, applying this theory to the present case, as the thirty days from July 8th, expired on August 7th, the filing of the notice of appeal on August 5th, two days before the expiration of the period, did not extend the time for filing the undertaking to August 10th, but that it still remained necessary to file it on or before August 7th, notwithstanding the clause quoted.

We cannot agree to this proposition. The decisions above cited were made when the code contained no provision as to the time for filing the undertaking. It then provided only that the appeal must be taken "within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment," that an appeal "is taken by filing a notice of appeal" and serving the same (sec. 974), but that such appeal would be ineffectual unless the undertaking was filed. (Sec. 978.) As the appeal was to be taken within thirty days and could not be effectively taken without filing an undertaking, and no time was expressly fixed within which the latter must be filed, it followed as a fair inference, from the provisions as a whole, that the undertaking must be filed within the period fixed for the taking of the appeal. This at least was a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute. But if the code at that time had contained an express provision stating the period within which the undertaking "must be filed," as it now does, it cannot be doubted that the court would have followed the express and clear language, as it was bound to do, and would not have resorted to inferences contrary to that provision. The omission is now supplied, the time is stated clearly and unequivocally, and it is not for the court to enlarge or curtail it by unnecessary construction. The time for filing the undertaking does not begin to run, as before it was construed to begin, at the time of the rendition of the judgment. Another event, the filing of the notice of appeal, now fixes the beginning of the period. There being nothing to the contrary in the code, it necessarily follows that the time does not stop with the thirty days, but in all cases it continues for five days after the filing of the