Now I would like for you to either briefly testify at this time or if you prefer perhaps you can give us more testimony at a later time at greater length on the advisability or the desirablity of having the record management within this correlation of groups that we are trying to get together.

Mr. BROWN. I do not think at first blush, at least, that the record management agency should go into the supply agency that you would set up under this bill. However, I do think that there should be legislation for it so as to fit it into the Office of General Services or into some office of that type.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. What we are doing here, you see, in this chart you have Federal supply and you have public buildings and you have, of course, your function of the FWA which is included in there.

Now in the grouping of these things together as the first block, you might say, in this structure which we are trying to build, you have grouped them together.

Mr. BROWN. We have grouped them together under the general services.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is true.

Mr. BROWN. In other words, there would be bureaus, the Bureau of Supply, the Bureau of Records Management, and so forth and so on. You are setting up one agency which I hope you will call the Bureau of Supply which deals primarily and solely with the problem of products and the disposal of surplus property.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We go much further than that; we go into your whole function of FWA, the custodianship of space.

Mr. BROWN. Do you go into the public buildings?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. Well, I had not studied it. My understanding was that you had wanted me to testify on this report.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will furnish you with that analysis. We have almost the picture you have here.

Mr. BROWN. Then I would certainly change my title a little bit here and broaden sufficiently to cover the whole field.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We were certainly going to consider that, but we also have to consider the reorganization plans that will come up later that perhaps we will want to hit together and certain Presidential orders.

Mr. BROWN. I can see where you could leave out for the present at least the incorporation in here of the Smithsonian Institute and the District of Columbia and other agencies that would report through this direction.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That can be very easily added.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. There is one part that you may not want to testify on, but this question comes to my mind. This committee did pass out the Reorganization Act providing for the two-House veto. From reading the newspapers it seems that there is a division over in the other body.

Mr. BROWN. The Senate committee has reported the bill a little differently.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. With one-House veto as I understand it.
Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Would you care to comment, assuming that there will be reorganization plans come up here and on the basis on which you developed a minute ago, that if a bill of this kind did come up to the floor, it would come under closed rules unless you wanted it chopped up?

If a reorganization plan is brought up here for this committee to defend, in case it has to be defended by a resolution against it, would you care to give us your opinion as to whether this two-House veto should obtain or the one-House veto?

Mr. BROWN. Well, Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Commission when we discussed this problem I was very strongly in favor of two limitations on the President's power to reorganize. You must remember that in giving the President the reorganization power the Congress is in effect giving him the power to legislate. They are reversing the constitutional procedure. Under the Constitution the Congress is the legislative branch and the President is the executive branch. By the Reorganization Act we are saying to the President, "You can in effect legislate for us and we reserve the right to veto what you do." Whereas, the Constitution says that the Congress shall legislate and the President shall have the power to veto. So, I opposed two things I supported the thing on the floor because I thought the over-all goal to be accomplished was of such importance that I thought I should subjugate my own thoughts.

First of all I do not think the reorganization power should be a permanent power; that Congress should in its wisdom extend it or be in a position to cut it off.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am of that opinion.

Mr. BROWN. I am of the opinion that Congress very often finds it easy to give away its power and finds it difficult to get it back and that, therefore, we should be very zealous in protecting the powers, authorities, and privileges of the legislative branch.

Second, I felt that inasmuch as we were reversing the procedure that we should permit any reorganization plan to be held up or set aside if one House refuses to approve. Now there is a reason for that. Suppose the President wants to do something under the reorganization plan. He does it by sending up his program. If we were to try to do it by law, we would have to have the approval of both Houses or there would be no law, plus the approval of the President. The CHAIRMAN. That is because the Constitution requires it.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct. Therefore, I think that inasmuch as the Congress cannot do certain things except by the majority vote of both Houses we should not permit the President to do it. In other words, if one House were to reject the bill, that is the end of it. If one House should reject the reorganization plan, there should be some new reorganization. I feel rather strongly that the Congress will not reject any reorganization plan, or either branch of the House will not reject any reorganization plan, unless there is some strong compelling reason for it. It is the one check that the Congress and the public do have on the Presidential power that we confer.

Let me go a little further on that. There is a 60-day limitation on here and it takes pretty fast movement. You know, to move to vote through both Houses and get consideration in both Houses can take time. It is very easy to delay it so that if there is no rejection in both Houses within 60 days, you can go ahead.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. There will be a deadline within which these reorganization plans can be submitted. One of the reasons I brought this question up was in view of that fact.

Mr. BROWN. There should be a dead line.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Sixty days.

Mr. BROWN. Yes. But 60 days is a rather short time for your committee and the Senate committee and the House and Senate to act, and it has been easy, and in the past it has been done, where one House would show that they did not want some plan and then immediately the orders would go out to just slow down over in the other body and not consider it and therefore both Houses had not rejected it.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You see if we are going to be faced with that, one of the reasons I brought it up is because it will have a dircet bearing on the work of the committee. The theory of giving the President the reorganization plan with the disapproval of both Houses, if that is going to be changed and we put it on a one-House basis, we might just as well go into the job and try to do the whole thing on the legislative basis.

Mr. BROWN. You save a lot of time.

Mr. HOFFMAN. If you are going to get the money this committee will render many of these reorganization plans which might otherwise be unnecessary.

Mr. BROWN. A lot of it has to be done.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. May I make one suggestion and then I am through. I think that the members of the Hoover Commission, so-called, and the leadership on this committee should discuss this very problem, this very difficulty with which this committee is faced with the leaders of the House and Senate of both parties.

In other words, I think if it becomes necessary that proper staffing of your committee is of such importance that the Democratic and Republican leadership in the Congress, if necessary the policy committees of the Congress, should take action and fix what is to be done so as to expedite it.

it.

Mr. HARVEY. I think that is an excellent suggestion.

Mr. BROWN. I think the leaders on both sides would be in favor of

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I think the House should not be criticized for not allowing more money for this operation. I think if they know the importance of these things which face the subcommittee and the members are aware of the fact that you are trying to do a job there will not be any question as to the amount of money that can be made available.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to say that that matter has already been taken up with the leadership and we are assured that we will haveamounts of money as needed.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am glad to hear that assurance.

Mr. BROWN. May I make one suggestion?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. I hope that you will have these funds available as soon us possible and that before the Commission organization breaks up you will avail yourselves of their services.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to say that in regard to the $50,000 that they gave us, if necessary we will spend it in 1 month because the money will be available.

I wish to ask you this question in regard to the veto by both Houses. An Attorney General said that such a thing would be unconstitutional He based that on the fact that if you are going to delegate that power then the veto power would have to be accomplished by a legislative act and you would not have a legislative act unless both Houses acted on it; because unless both Houses acted you would have not given the President anything; the Constitution itself has already given him the power to recommend.

If you are going to give him the power to legislate, then the veto ought to be by a legislative act and a legislative act is consummated only when both Houses will have passed upon it and agreed to it; and that is why the veto power by one House would be unconstitutional. According to a former Attorney General who so ruled, that was in the days when our party was not in power, if I remember correctly. I think that was good reasoning and I think that is good law. I think to put the veto power in one House after giving the President the power to legislate, is a vain act because you have not given him anything that he does not possess now. You have not been able to do the job in the past under a one House veto, because if I read the papers accurately, President Hoover had it and was unable to effect reorganization under it.

We either have to give him the power to legislate and, after he will have legislated, let that be vetoed by legislative act and not by veto of the House.

Mr. BROWN. Of course, where this legislation was before the House I set aside my personal feeling and opinion because of the importance of giving the President power to reorganize it. But far be it from me to debate that point because it is a good many years since I left law school and I reformed and did not practice law but went into the newspaper business and politics where a man could be honest.

I would not want to set up my opinion and I would not want you to follow my opinion but I am not at all certain, Mr. Dawson, that the Congress of the United States under the Constitution can give the President the power to legislate and I do not think we are giving him the power.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Of course it cannot. Section 7 says that you have to have action of both Houses. Mr. Chairman, that is not before us this morning. And if we get into that, we will be here for 3 weeks.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thought we should allow our colleague the courtesy of replying to the learned opinion of our chairman.

Mr. BROWN. I am used to that.

Mr. HOFFMAN. We will have it up when the conferees make their reports. I am anxious to hear Mr. Brown when he comes back. The CHAIRMAN. What about transportation?

Mr. BROWN. I think it has been done. Of course we have a report on transportation and regulatory agencies whereby I dissented. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Brown. We will have you back again, I am sure.

Mr. HOFFMAN. These other witnesses, are they on this bill?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes. Mr. Gray, do you wish to make a statement on behalf of the Military Establishment?

Mr. GRAY. I have a statement to make if you wish to hear it.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I have three people listed for the Military Establishment, Mr. Carpenter, Mr. Niederlehner, and Mr. Gray. Which order would you gentlemen prefer?

Mr. GRAY. May I suggest that you hear Mr. Carpenter, Chairman of the Munitions Board, first, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. Carpenter, will you please come over to this side of the table?

STATEMENT OF DONALD F. CARPENTER, CHAIRMAN, MUNITIONS BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, in accordance with the legislative procedures in the Military Establishment, the Munitions Board has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to furnish your committee the views of the Military Establishment with reference to the bill, H. R. 2781. This bill has been presented in accordance with an administration program to coordinate procedures within the executive branch of the Government relating to the procurement, use, and disposal of property. This program contemplates certain wise exceptions to over-all coordination which are of particular interest to the Military Establishment and to which Mr. Gordon Gray, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, will address himself in some detail.

The problems of procurement and distribution of property in the Military Establishment itself are sizable and, in fact, represent the greatest portion of the over-all Government problem in these fields. The Congress has considered these problems recently in connection with the National Security Act and the Armed Services Procurement Act, and under these statutes substantial progress has been made toward the desired objectives within the Military Establishment itself. The exceptions to which I have adverted recognize the vastness of the problem within the Military Establishment and the fact that a separate means has been provided to reach the desired results consistently with the peculiar responsibilities of the armed services.

In this connection I would like to invite the committee's attention to the fact that the Munitions Board has been established under the National Security Act as a successor agency to the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board, and it is the duty of the Board to coordinate activities within the National Military Establishment in respect to all industrial matters including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies; to assign procurement responsibilities among the military services, and to allocate purchase authority on the basis of single-service procurement, joint procurement, or collaborated procurement; to plan standardization of specifications; and, perhaps most significant, to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization. This latter duty requires the implementation of planning in peacetime in order that it may be effective in time of possible future emergency.

The Munitions Board, through its cataloging agency, is presently engaged, in cooperation with the Bureau of Federal Supply, in a longterm plan to create a single catalog for the armed services and the civilian Government agencies.

The problems of the Military Establishment are not only unique, but involve the greatest amount of activity, so far as the Government is