Misc.] City Court of New York, January, 1896. the defendants upon this appeal, in view of all the circumstances attending the trial of the case in the court below. The evidence admitted tending to show the good faith of the loan was, we think, properly admitted. The defendants had attacked the good faith of the transaction, and the documents relating to the loan were certainly the best evidence that could be offered, and besides they fully corroborate the testimony of the plaintiff. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. FITZSIMONS and BOTTY, JJ., concur. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. BYRON A. BEAL, Respondent, v. THE AMERICAN DIAMOND ROCK BORING Co., Appellant. (City Court of New York - General Term, January, 1896.) MONEY LOANED. In an action for money loaned there was evidence tending to show that the alleged loan was made by an exchange of checks, the one given by the plaintiff being made to the order of, and indorsed by, the defendant, which was paid, while the one received by him was made by defendant to the order of its president individually, and indorsed by him, which was not paid, but that the president subsequently obtained possession thereof by giving bonds owned by him individually as collateral for the loan. The president testified that the loan was made to him individually, and that he took up plaintiff's check and gave the bonds in lieu thereof. Held, that a motion for a direction of a verdict for defendant was properly denied, and that a verdict for plaintiff was not against the evidence or the weight of evidence. APPEAL from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a verdict, and from an order denying the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Burton N. Harrison, for appellant. Putney & Bishop, for respondent. City Court of New York, January, 1896. [Vol. 15. Borry, J. This action was brought to recover for money loaned by the plaintiff to the defendant through its president. The defense was a general denial, and upon the trial of this action the defendant was allowed to amend its answer by setting up the further defense that the loan was not made to the defendant, but to one Charles A. Tombkins individually, and that said Tombkins paid said indebtedness. No exception was taken by either party to the admission or exclusion of evidence during the course of the trial, nor was any motion made for a dismissal of the complaint, but at the close of the case the defendant moved for the direction of a verdict in its favor, which motion was denied by the court, and an exception was duly taken by the defendant. The case was then submitted to the jury, who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $907.50. The defendant then moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence, and on the further ground that it was against the weight of evidence as well as the sufficiency of evidence and also that it was against the law. The questions to be determined on this appeal, are: First. Does the evidence show that the plaintiff established his cause of action, and Second. Whether there was a material question of fact to go to the jury. To arrive at a proper solution of these questions we must look to the evidence, which shows as follows: That plaintiff, on May 4, 1891, exchanged checks with Charles A. Tombkins, each check being for the sum of $750, The check then held by Tombkina was drawn by said C. H. Tombkins as president and Louis F. Bostelman as treasurer of defendant to the order of said C. H. Tombkins individually, and was indorsed and delivered by him to the plaintiff in exchange for a check dated May 4, 1891, drawn by the plaintiff to the order of the American Diamond Rock Boring Company, which latter check was indorsed by the defendant in the following manner, viz. : "American Diamond Rock Boring Co., C. H. Tombkins, President." Misc.] City Court of New York, January, 1896. No other indorsement appeared on said check, and the same thus indorsed was duly presented for payment and was paid, whereas the check given by Mr. Tombkins to the plaintiff, which was presented, remained unpaid. But later on, to wit, on or about May 15, 1891, Mr. Tombkins obtained possession of this check which he had thus given to plaintiff on depositing with the plaintiff some bonds of the Idaho Mining & Irrigation Company belonging to Mr. Tombkins individually as collateral security for the payment of said loan on or before June 6, 1891, which said bonds are still retained by the plaintiff. The evidence also shows that the plaintiff had other dealings with the defendant and also with Mr. Tombkins individually, consisting of loans made by him to defendant and to Mr. Tombkins, and that in the month of September, 1891, the plaintiff, with the consent of the defendant, collected money on the sale of some goods due to defendant and that he applied part of said money so received by him on account of an indebtedness for money loaned due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and that at that time the plaintiff was about to apply a portion of the surplus on account of the loan in question, to wit, the sum of $750, but upon the urgent request of Mr. Tombkins, the president of the defendant, he paid over the same to defendant, relying on Mr. Tombkins' promise to pay said sum of $750 within a week or so. Mr. Tombkins, however, testified that the loan of $750 was made to him individually, and that on May 15, 1891, he took up plaintiff's check which he had received on May 4, 1891, and which was drawn to the order of defendant, and that in lieu thereof he gave the plaintiff certain bonds belonging to him individually, and also thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents by check for interest and commissions due on said loan. We think that the evidence above referred to, as well as the other evidence adduced upon the trial, was of a conflicting character and presented material questions of fact upon the issues involved sufficient to justify a submission to the jury. Supreme Court, January, 1896. [Vol. 15. The denial of the defendant's motion for a direction of a verdict in its favor was, therefore, no error, and the verdict of the jury was in accordance with the law and evidence, and that the same was not against the weight of evidence. The judgment and order appealed from must, therefore, be affirmed, with costs. CONLAN and FITZSIMONS, JJ., concur. EDWARD C. MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM SNITZPAN et al., Defendants. (Supreme Court - Kings Special Term, January, 1896.) 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- - JUSTICES OF THE PEACE - ABRIDGMENT OF TERM. Courts of Justices of the Peace in the city of Brooklyn are embraced within the designation of "inferior local courts" in section 3 of article 12 of the Constitution of 1894, and the term of a justice thereof which would expire in 1896 was thereby abridged so as to expire with the year 1895. 2. POLICE CANNOT INTERFERE FORCIBLY BETWEEN CLAIMANTS TO AN OFFICE. The police have no right to use force in a dispute between rival claimants to an office, nor by their presence to countenance or encourage it. They have no right to meddle in such matters, or to forcibly interfere with citizens except to arrest them for crime. MOTION to continue injunction. The action was brought to restrain the defendant Snitzpan, justice of the peace elect, and Leonard R. Welles, police commissioner of the city of Brooklyn, from using force to oust the plaintiff, who claimed that his term had not expired, from the office and court room of a justice of the peace of the city of Brooklyn. James Troy, M. L. Towns and J. A. Wernberg, for plaintiff. Horace Graves and J. A. Brenner, for defendants. Misc.] Supreme Court, January, 1896. GAYNOR, J. By statute the city of Brooklyn is divided into judicial districts, with the requirement that a justice of the peace be elected in each district. They are given the same jurisdiction within the city that justices of the peace of towns have. Laws of 1850, chapter 102; Brooklyn Charter, title 21. The term of office is four years, beginning and ending at May 1. The plaintiff was elected for the third district at the general election in 1892, for a term to end at May 1, 1896. Four months of the term, therefore, remain. The defendant Snitzpan was elected to succeed him at the last general election. The new State Constitution adopted in 1894 separated city elections (except in cities of a population below fifty thousand) from national and state elections by requiring them to be held in odd numbered years. In order to conform terms of office to this system, it provided that all terms existing on January 1, 1895, which would expire thereafter in an even numbered year, and not at the end thereof, were abridged so as to expire at the end of the preceding year. Article 12, section 3. This fits the plaintiff's case, and his term thus abridged expired with the year 1895, unless the proviso at the end of the section excepts the office of justice of the peace in Brooklyn; and this brings us to the exact point of the controversy. That proviso is that the section does not apply "to elections of any judicial officer, except judges and justices of inferior local courts." The plaintiff insists that, within the meaning of this language as used in the Constitution, he was not a justice of an inferior local court. He bases this insistence upon the assertion that courts of justices of the peace of towns never came under that designation, and that therefore like courts in cities do not. It seems to me that this claim grows out of the error of supposing that this nomenclature in respect to minor courts was new to the Constitution of this state. Under the colonial government all judicial officers, beginning with justices of the peace and going up to justices of the Supreme Court, were appointed, not elected; and this method continued under the state government until the Constitution of 1846 went into effect. Street's |