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budget submission is not yet available. For example, we have not yet received the Defense Manpower Requirements Report, which we would use to help us evaluate the strength levels requested.

I make this point because I believe it is important for you to know that we will be relying heavily on the testimony we receive today to guide us in our markup of the budget authorization request.

I want to recognize the witnesses this morning. The subcommittee welcomes Mr. Grant Green, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. It is Mr. Green's first appearance before the subcommittee. Mr. Green was appointed to his position on February 8, 1988. I had the privilege of chairing his confirmation hearing at the full committee level.

During that hearing and in subsequent meetings I have had with Mr. Green, I have been impressed with his positive and cooperative attitude in getting things done.

Mr. Green, we look forward to your testimony this morning.

Accompanying Mr. Green are military personnel representatives from each of the services: Lt. Gen. Allen Ono, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for the Army; Vice Adm. Leon A. Edney, Chief of Naval Personnel; Lt. Gen. John Hudson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Marine Corps; Maj. Gen. Larry Dillingham, Assistant Deputy Chief of Personnel of the Air Force.

Gentlemen, the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel welcomes you and looks forward to your testimony this morning.

Before we have opening statements from all witnesses, I want to say just a few words about the first issue we will address. That is our favorite subject these days, and over the last year or so, of officer strength reductions that are mandated in statute for fiscal years 1989 and 1990, of 2 percent each year. The Department of Defense has requested the Congress to repeal this statute.

For just a little bit of background, the subcommittee and I personally became very concerned about the disproportionate growth in officer strength from 1980 to 1985. Over that period, officer strength in the military services grew at a rate of one officer to every 2.2 enlisted personnel added to the inventory.

Our normal ratios have been somewhere around 1:6.5 to 1:7 as officer to enlisted ratios. So this was quite a change and when we came across it, and also because the Department of Defense was unable to justify this lopsided growth in officers in this time period, we mandated a 6-percent cut in officer end strength from the fiscal year 1986 level, that would restore it to about the usual traditional ratios. That cut was to be spread out over 3 years: 1 percent in fiscal 1987, 2 percent in fiscal 1988, and 3 percent in 1989.

And I must say here, when we tried to get information on this, looking back on it, I believe even the service Chiefs agreed that we got stonewalled over here. So we dug in our heels and insisted on getting better information and better justification for why these increases occurred.

We had a few harsh words back and forth and a lot of meetings and a lot of consideration of this whole issue in the past; I guess it has been almost 3 years since we started on this.

And one of the things that was very disturbing was that the figures we were given to justify this, were given apparently hoping that the whole problem would go away. These figures turned out to be very unreliable in some cases and I would say almost bordered on being fictitious in some other cases.

Now, that is a pretty harsh charge, but I think in retrospect that is exactly what happened. But we have been making a lot of progress in this area, though and I do not want to indicate that all is lost on this or that we have not made considerable progress. We have.

Last year, after taking the 1 percent cut in fiscal year 1987, the military services put on a full court press for a repeal of the remaining 2 percent and 3 percent reductions. However, because last year they were unable to present any analytically compelling justification for the lopsided officer growth, Congress took no action to repeal the reductions.

În order to give the Department of Defense another chance to make its case, the Congress gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to spread the reduction out so that the Department of Defense could take a 1 percent reduction in fiscal year 1988, a 2 percent reduction in each of the two succeeding fiscal years.

But the Congress also required the Department of Defense to submit a comprehensive report on officer requirements by March 1 of this year. The Secretary of Defense has exercised his authority to spread out the reduction and has submitted the required report.

I do believe the Department of Defense has made much progress in getting oversight responsibility over manpower requirements under control. We are not completely satisfied, but the report is much more substantial than the meager offering we had last year.

I might just indicate this was the report we got last year. I do not say that all reports should be judged on poundage or just by volume or number of pages, but this one is as last year's. This is the one for this year. Obviously there is a little more volume here, at least, and I trust the substantive material in there will be also indicated by the comparative sizes here, we hope, Mr. Green and all of you here this morning.

So I think we are making a lot of progress in this regard.

I also think the stonewall mentality in the Department of Defense has finally been breached, because for the first time since this debate started the Department of Defense has recognized its weaknesses in this area and is doing something about it, and so I am complimentary to you all in that regard.

I know the hard feelings on this and the very heartfelt feelings on this matter, including a meeting I had with the Joint Chiefs over at the tank in the Pentagon, where we went into this in considerable detail.

So Mr. Green, I believe you and other witnesses have submitted written statements for the record. We would hope that, if there is no objection, those would be included in the record in their entirety, and we hope that you could summarize your statement, so we would ask other witnesses to do likewise.

Before we go on, we have been joined by our ranking minority member, Senator Wilson, and we will welcome any opening remarks he has.

Before turning to him, I want to say I appreciate the assistance of Sortor Wilson on this subcommittee. He has done a lot of work on this, he and his staff. And I believe we have always approached defense manpower on a bipartisan basis.

He has not come in with a Republican viewpoint, me with a Democratic viewpoint, when he was chairman or during the time when I have been chairman of this subcommittee. There is no Democratic or Republican agenda. What we try to do is what is right for the defense of this country and what is right for the men and women in uniform that we call on to make sacrifices to maintain our freedom and that of our allies.

Senator Wilson, any comments you want to make?

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for your kind words. It has been a pleasure.

Mr. Chairman, during the past 3 years, as Congress continued to insist on reducing the defense budget in real terms, I have said that we would have to decide whether we wanted a smaller military force that was well paid and well trained or whether we wanted to continue to increase our force structure, while recognizing that it would be threatened with becoming hollow because of congressional unwillingness to pay for the people and their training.

But I did not say these things because I thought that the force structure that we had was too large. To the contrary, I believed that we needed that force structure and even more to meet the threat and the commitments that we have assumed throughout the world.

Nothing has happened anywhere in the world to suggest that we can now provide for our defense with 25,000 fewer people on active duty than we needed to do that job last year.

Rather, I made these comments because I felt that it was better for the United States to have a smaller military force if it was to have a fully manned, fully equipped, well trained, well paid fighting force than to continue to try to maintain a larger force inadequately when Congress was not willing to pay for it.

Congress' action on the continuing resolution last year finally brought this matter to a head. In the CR, the Congress essentially referred to provide sufficient funds to pay for the pay raise for military personnel authorized by this committee and by the full committee and authorized by law.

Additionally, Congress did not appropriate sufficient funds to pay for the GI bill and several other entitlements required by the law to be paid to military personnel. The refusal by Congress to appropriate the funds needed for that pay raise and other entitlements resulted in the Department of Defense manpower accounts being underfunded by almost $1 billion.

At the same time Congress refused to pay for people we had already on our force structure, Congress was able to appropriate in excess of $5 billion more than were requested for programs and projects within the defense budget. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I have to say that, although I do not believe we should be reducing our force structure, I congratulate Secretary Carlucci and Assistant Secretary for Force Management, Secretary Green, for facing up to the fact that Congress would simply not pay for a larger force structure and for bringing us a request reducing that structure in a time when budget constraints compel us to choose the lesser of


evils, to try to make a decision as to which are the less unwise options.

I reluctantly must concur with him that it is better that the troops that we have be smaller in number and that they be adequately trained, adequately compensated, and that they have sufficient equipment and training to be prepared and ready to go to war if in fact they must.

But I want the record to be clear: The request for reduced force structure in fiscal year 1989 is not the result of any determination that we no longer need the force structure that we had last year. The request for reduced force structure in fiscal year 1989 is not the result of the All Volunteer Force's failure to recruit and retain sufficent numbers of the highest quality personnel ever to serve in our armed services.

The decision of the Armed Forces to begin early separation of thousands of enlisted personnel and the plan to lay off thousands of civilians are not the result of a determination that those personnel are not needed. They are not the result of a determination that they are not required to perform the missions this Congress continues to ask the services to perform.

Mr. Chairman, we need our large force structure. The services could still recruit and retain all the volunteers we need to maintain that structure. Those volunteers would be very high quality personnel, and the thousands of enlisted personnel now being separated early and the civilian employees being laid off are still needed to perform military missions, important missions.

So Mr. Chairman, all of the difficult decisions that have been dictated have been dictated and driven by one fact, and that is that the Congress is not willing to pay for a robust, fully manned force structure.

Now that the administration has faced up to this fact and made the difficult decisions to reduce the size of our military forces, the subcommittee must ensure that the young men and women that continue to serve are properly paid, are properly trained, and are aware that we in Congress care about their welfare.

I think it imperative that we work together this year to obtain the authorization and appropriation funds sufficient to pay for the requested 4.3 percent pay raise, to retain the level of the variable housing allowance to that provided, and to overcome the mass exodus of experienced pilots from the Air Force and Navy.

If we did not prove by our actions this year that we truly care for the well-being and the quality of life of our military personnel, I fear that by next year it will be too late.

It would be an absolute disgrace if Congress sits by and watches while the finest military force this Nation perhaps has ever fielded deteriorates to conditions that existed in 1979. It would be all the more disgraceful because we in Congress know better, or at least should. We should have learned during the past several years how to avoid those conditions.

I think we have, and we have it in our power to prevent a repetition.

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your leadership on the subcommittee. You have demonstrated your concern for the well-being and for the quality of life, the quality of life of our armed services. And I look forward to working with you again this year.

I know that you have an intense concern, and I share that concern. I only hope that we can impress on our colleagues the real need to prove this year that we really mean it when we say that the people are the invaluable ingredient and there comes a point past which you cannot cut without doing serious damage, not only to our readiness but to our credibility.

And having said that, Mr. Chairman, I am here to hear from the witnesses.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Green, go ahead with your statement. We will have the others in turn. And we would hope, rather than to read very long prepared statements, we will submit them for the record.

We assure you we will go through them in detail, and we hope you can summarize your statement so that we can have the most time for discussion this morning.


DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wilson, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate your kind remarks concerning renewed cooperation. I hope we can live up to your expectations.

I also hope from this hearing that we may reach some agreement and find a common ground from which to manage our scarce resources. Together, we must enhance our national defense to the best use of our total force manpower, and at the same time meet the personal needs of our military and civilian members.

As Secretary Carlucci has stated repeatedly, people are our most important asset. The number one priority for the Department of Defense are budget proposals for the compensation and quality of life initiatives required to attract and retain the best people.

Through the partnership of the Department of Defense and the Congress, we have built a highly motivated military force made up of individuals of unprecedented quality, skill, and motivation. With your support of our manpower programs in this budget, we can continue this success.

As I look to the most important and difficult tasks that lie ahead, I see two jobs that we, working as partners in a bipartisan way, must accomplish: first, we must maintain the quality of our volunteer force in the face of declining budgets. To do this, we must provide adequate compensation and quality of life measures for our defense family.

Second, we must ensure that manpower matches the force structure requirements and fits within fiscal constraints.

In my prepared statement which you have been provided, I discuss how we can accomplish these tasks and briefly describe some of the challenges we face. These include determining manpower requirements, managing the force (including how to handle joint officers), compensating our personnel (including pay raises), special pays and bonuses, and dealing with some special issues, such as

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