The net result of such a reduction would bring the below that programmed for fiscal year 1990, with forc ready approved by this Congress. This would leave the fewer officers than it had in 1985, despite the addition and 12 aircraft squadrons. Accommodating these reductions in fiscal year 1987 while simultaneously bringing the additional ships and on the line, has drained the shore establishment and flexibility for further officer reductions. Additional cuts to come out of combat essential, combat and other supp as in the individual training accounts. Manpower reductions, both officer and enlisted, have ble impact on our people. Navy operational tempo has ished. On the contrary, it has increased. Changes in th tional scene going on today, as most clearly exemplif presence in the Persian Gulf, have sharply increased requirements around the world. We currently have 100 ships forward deployed in t Gulf, Indian Ocean, the western Pacific, and the Med Sea. Faced with current and projected worldwide commit the intended tempo of naval operations, current combat and adequate officer and enlisted manning of those forc maintained. We also face additional demands for officers to me creased requirements for joint OSD assignments, such a unified transportation, space, and special operating comn There is also a need to protect the officer growth to critical wartime medical specialties and meet the b peacetime health care needs of the Navy and the Marine you are well aware, this is a very serious issue and we the power curve on that issue. These considerations in my judgment dictate that fur dated officer cuts be repealed. I agree with General Ono. point, we have got it, and we are taking it on board, a working very hard to meet your requirements. If we were to take further reductions in 1989 and 199 are now on the books, the immediate impact would be ance in the unrestricted line population between comba forces and other support areas. We would have and do flicting demands between the warfare officer requirer pulling between longer joint staff requirements. This would increase our sea time for officers, which clines in retention. Degraded depot and intermediate lev nance of ships and aircraft would be associated with los shore establishment. As we draw down further on esse tics, supply, personnel, management and intelligence fo will also start to impact readiness. Minimal new officer appointments and promotional opp would be available and would also affect the morale of Those nearing completion of a career in the affected offic nities, if we go further, will have to be involuntarily ret ing additional turbulance, with a ripple effect on out y tion. Navy 6,118 e levels alNavy with of 56 ships and 1988, squadrons exhausted will have rt, as well direct visinot dimin e interna ed by our aval force e Persian terranean ments and rce levels s must be t the inthe new ands. meet our rgeoning Corps. As e behind er manou had a d we are as they n imbalessential ave con nts and uses demaintes in the al logises, they tunities e force. commu d, caus- reten support substitution an unattainable near term alternative, the money simply is not available. The net result is a se impact on our operational readiness should we proceed fu down this line, and it will be at great personal expense to the cated men and women in our officer corps which you have sper entire career and life supporting. I therefore urge your support in cancelling the requirement any further officer reductions and encourage that we work to er to resolve any remaining issues. Mr. Chairman, we have our best to lean out the Navy's officer corps, as well as our enlisted end strength. But we have run out of flexibility and a the point where further cuts will head us back to the turbul and reduced combat readiness of a decade ago. Our Navy and our Nation cannot afford to relive that tra and the follow-on costs which we have just gone through, which would be required, to shift the balance back to the readiness of today's Navy. It is one lesson that we should not r and relearn. Thank you very much. [See prepared statement of Admiral Edney on page 141.] Senator GLENN. General Dillingham. STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. DILLINGHAM, U.S. AIR FOR General DILLINGHAM. It is a pleasure to be here with the mittee. We have provided our written statement. As we are well aware, the issues are tough in this time and forecast is to be just as tough. I think it is difficult to assess impact on the Air Force in fiscal year 1989 without taking int count the 1988 severe budget reduction both in O&M and the account. These actions that we have taken are not actions we pleased with or proud of, but they are actions that the only sa grace is the alternatives we could have taken in the MPA acco for reductions were worse. Congressionally mandated officer cuts of 2 percent for DO sulted in 3.2 percent for the Air Force, with loss of growth and 4,100 officer authorizations cut. We will accomplish this redu through a balance of reduced accessions, voluntary releases, an lected involuntary actions. Enlisted man years have been reduced, and they are bein complished by DOS rollback and selected early releases. The way the Air Force found to cut dollars is to cut man years in MPA account. Strength changes will effectively be done by the of May of 1988. Total military strength reductions from 1987 to 1988 will be 31,000 personnel. The inventory for both the officers and the e ed, as I stated, will be accomplished before the end of fiscal 1988. Both are level in 1988 and 1989, and manpower document will catch up, but the people are gone. O&M insufficiency caused adverse civilian impacts. You are well aware of the re of temporary overhires, hiring and promotion freezes, e ments, and finally consideration for furloughs-not b want to, but because, as I said before, we ran out of oth The year 1989 does not offer that much relief, but ther significant issues that we must deal with prudently; 198 ductions will cause slowdown in promotions, underman working in some areas, and general turbulence-proba important, fear for what is next. It has some grave implications, and we have taken tions and our concern at this moment is for the retenti top quality people that we have left. The other critical item for the troops, of course, as y ed, the 4.3 percent pay raise. For the first time since eighties, the troops actually lost ground with inflation cent. I think General Hickey had surmised before that we ate being behind the civilian community maybe even as or 11 percent, but the troops cannot lose buying power, what they are doing now. Variable housing allowance, also mentioned as a ke The troops have lost 8.5 percent over the past 2 years. Air Force families, somewhat like the Army, had a low paycheck than December. The 2 percent pay raise disapp the variable housing allowance cut. Sixty-four percent of the variable housing allowance had a decline in their variable housing allowance. It seems foolhardy to spend over a billion dollars for and then destroy its impact trying to save $100 million. get back to covering 85 percent of our people's housing c And we also need, as was mentioned strongly by the stabilize the MWR program. We at DOD have gotten DOD presented their completely revised program and C proved it just 3 months ago. The Air Force believes it is to implement that program and resist temptation to fur and revamp until we have been able to adjust to the ma we have already made. Resist the temptation to make arbitrary senior grad cause of the apparent shift that always comes with a r tion like we were forced to make this year. Early outs freezes on the civilian side will cause higher percent of s ian grades temporarily. Our legislative proposals will help reduce the righ senior officers, but not as rapidly as we would like. The big concern in the Air Force is the NCO corps. T valuable to us. They will be the capability that pulls the austere times we have at this time. Real numbers five grades are reducing at a rate of 2,000 per year. But in the short term, the percentage of the top f higher. If you force us to remove them from the Air F that we will lose faith, morale, and motivation, and m tantly, we will lose the valuable asset we have left. We must protect the NCO force. Finally, special attention in the Air Force must be pilot retention. If we do nothing more than we have al The Navy shares our problems and has been working with u this, and we will be shortly presenting you with a bonus prop for aviators. The Air Force is still not enamored with pilot bonuses, bu have exhausted all other options and actions we can think of. bonus may not solve the entire pilot problem, but it will certa reduce our deficit. In the coming year we face some of the most troubling issu have seen in my career. But we still have a strong Air Force dedicated people. We expect to be a smaller Air Force in future, but if we make the right choices I think that we can viable ready force for defense and freedom. As you said, Mr. Chairman, we need to do the right thing for Nation and our military personnel. I stand ready, sir, to answer your questions. [See prepared statement of General Dillingham on page 225.] Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. PILOT TRAINING COSTS Just a comment before we go on to General Hudson. What it cost these days to train a pilot? The old rule of thumb used about a million dollars by the time you got a person to the so ron. General DILLINGHAM. Sir, about $1.8 to $1.9 million. That is a pilot has gone through the advanced training in the F-15/ Senator GLENN. Nugget to squadron is about? General DILLINGHAM. About $460,000 is our estimate, thr the undergraduate pilot training program, for that year of t ing. Mr. GREEN. Sir if I may, the cther thing that is important i the time this person reaches the 6-year point where he is ma the tough decision on staying or leaving, the service has s about $6 million on him or her. General DILLINGHAM. If I may make one correction, I thi said our Air Force reduction was 3,100, and it was 31,000 from to 1988. Senator GLENN. General Hudson. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN I. HUDSON, U.S. MARINE COR General HUDSON. It is an honor for me to address the Ma Corps manpower readiness, our needs for fiscal year 1989, and pects for the future. As you are aware, manpower is the Marine Corps' most valu and most dynamic asset. There are many very important man er-related programs that I have addressed in a prepared staten sir, which you said would be entered into the record. I would like to briefly mention just three of these which a primary importance. These key issues are end strength, offi and compensation. To meet the congressional budget reduction fiscal year 1988, and to comply with the decision of the bu reduce end strength in both years. In fiscal year 1988, we reduced 2,500 enlisted marine authorized end strength. Our fiscal year 1989 end stren has now been amended to 197,200, which is 2,900 below which was requested last year for fiscal year 1989. I need to make clear the fact that these reductions we that we would not have to completely destroy progran the discretionary portion of the PCS and the selective re bonus, which are essential to maintaining a quality force They are reductions which we cannot afford to take. T impact is decreased combat capability. The Commandan likelihood have to reduce current active force struct equivalent of three reinforced infantry battalions in ord erly man the other units. Mr. Green has covered in some detail Marine Corps and I will not repeat that. But I must say, if the Marine to absorb a portion of the remaining 4 percent reduction cer manning of Fleet Marine Forces will be severely re our ability to man joint and external billets will decrea tion, we will have empty school seats that will in the l verely decrease the professional knowledge of our officer Finally, sir, I would like to address compensation. W enjoy the highest quality force in the history of our Cor however, in constant competition with the civilian con attract and maintain that quality. If we are to continue petitive, pay must be set and maintained at a level con the civilian sector. We strongly urge passage of the p percent pay raise for fiscal year 1989. The high level of Marine Corps manpower readiness result of long term planning, aggressive recruiting, effi management, and vital professional backing. As we these years of fiscal uncertainty, we must mutually ensu readiness and quality in which we have invested do not e Thank you, sir. [See prepared statement of General Hudson on page 20 Senator GLENN. Thank you all, gentlemen. OFFICER STRENGTH REDUCTIONS Mr. Green, we will start off with questioning. In hi March 1 this year transmitting the officer requirement us, Secretary Carlucci indicated that he was issuing g Military Departments to execute the active duty stren tions program for fiscal year 1989 in a balanced manner. I read this to mean proposed officer strength reducti fiscal year 1988 that would be consistent with your stud fiscal year 1989 force structure changes. Although the cated this issue would be addressed in your summary re services' program objective memorandum for developm fiscal year 1988 budget, I had indicated to you in a meeti had that we needed this officer strength plan before sub markup. Do you have such a plan by service? What is it? |