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Fiscal constraints make government civilian or even contractor support substitution an unattainable near term alternative, since the money simply is not available. The net result is a serious impact on our operational readiness should we proceed further down this line, and it will be at great personal expense to the dedicated men and women in our officer corps which you have spent an entire career and life supporting.

I therefore urge your support in cancelling the requirements for any further officer reductions and encourage that we work together to resolve any remaining issues. Mr. Chairman, we have done our best to lean out the Navy's officer corps, as well as our total enlisted end strength. But we have run out of flexibility and are at the point where further cuts will head us back to the turbulence and reduced combat readiness of a decade ago.

Our Navy and our Nation cannot afford to relive that trauma and the follow-on costs which we have just gone through, and which would be required, to shift the balance back to the high readiness of today's Navy. It is one lesson that we should not relive and relearn.

Thank you very much.
[See prepared statement of Admiral Edney on page 141.]
Senator GLENN. General Dillingham.

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STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. DILLINGHAM, U.S. AIR FORCE,

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL General DILLINGHAM. It is a pleasure to be here with the committee. We have provided our written statement.

As we are well aware, the issues are tough in this time and the forecast is to be just as tough. I think it is difficult to assess the impact on the Air Force in fiscal year 1989 without taking into account the 1988 severe budget reduction both in O&M and the MPA account.

These actions that we have taken are not actions we were pleased with or proud of, but they are actions that the only saving grace is the alternatives we could have taken in the MPA accounts for reductions were worse.

Congressionally mandated officer cuts of 2 percent for DOD resulted in 3.2 percent for the Air Force, with loss of growth and over 4,100 officer authorizations cut. We will accomplish this reduction through a balance of reduced accessions, voluntary releases, and selected involuntary actions.

Enlisted man years have been reduced, and they are being accomplished by DOS rollback and selected early releases. The only way the Air Force found to cut dollars is to cut man years in the MPA account. Strength changes will effectively be done by the end of May of 1988.

Total military strength reductions from 1987 to 1988 will be over 31,000 personnel. The inventory for both the officers and the enlisted, as I stated, will be accomplished before the end of fiscal year 1988.

Both are level in 1988 and 1989, and manpower documentation will catch up, but the people are gone. O&M insufficiency has caused adverse civilian impacts. You are well aware of the release

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we estimate that the pilot inventory will be 2,500 short by 1993, with only 19,500 left of our current 23,000 inventory:

The Navy shares our problems and has been working with us on this, and we will be shortly presenting you with a bonus proposal for aviators.

The Air Force is still not enamored with pilot bonuses, but we have exhausted all other options and actions we can think of. The bonus may not solve the entire pilot problem, but it will certainly reduce our deficit.

In the coming year we face some of the most troubling issues I have seen in my career. But we still have a strong Air Force and dedicated people. We expect to be a smaller Air Force in the future, but if we make the right choices I think that we can be a viable ready force for defense and freedom.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, we need to do the right thing for our Nation and our military personnel.

I stand ready, sir, to answer your questions.
[See prepared statement of General Dillingham on page 225.]
Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

PILOT TRAINING COSTS

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Just a comment before we go on to General Hudson. What does it cost these days to train a pilot? The old rule of thumb used to be about a million dollars by the time you got a person to the squad

General DILLINGHAM. Sir, about $1.8 to $1.9 million. That is after a pilot has gone through the advanced training in the F-15/F-16.

Senator GLENN. Nugget to squadron is about?

General DILLINGHAM. About $460,000 is our estimate, through the undergraduate pilot training program, for that year of training.

Mr. GREEN. Sir if I may, the cther thing that is important is, by the time this person reaches the 6-year point where he is making the tough decision on staying or leaving, the service has spent about $6 million on him or her.

General DILLINGHAM. If I may make one correction, I think I said our Air Force reduction was 3,100, and it was 31,000 from 1987 to 1988.

Senator GLENN. General Hudson.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN I. HUDSON, U.S. MAKINE CORPS,

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MANPOWER General HUDSON. It is an honor for me to address the Marine Corps manpower readiness, our needs for fiscal year 1989, and prospects for the future.

As you are aware, manpower is the Marine Corps' most valuable and most dynamic asset. There are many very important manpower-related programs that I have addressed in a prepared statement, sir, which you said would be entered into the record.

I would like to briefly mention just three of these which are of primary importance. These key issues are end strength, officers, and compensation. To meet the congressional budget reduction for fiscal year 1988, and to comply with the decision of the budget summit conference for fiscal year 1989, the Marine Corps had to reduce end strength in both years.

In fiscal year 1988, we reduced 2,500 enlisted marines from our authorized end strength. Our fiscal year 1989 end strength request has now been amended to 197,200, which is 2,900 below the 200,100 which was requested last year for fiscal year 1989.

I need to make clear the fact that these reductions were taken so that we would not have to completely destroy programs, such as the discretionary portion of the PCS and the selective reenlistment bonus, which are essential to maintaining a quality force.

They are reductions which we cannot afford to take. The obvious impact is decreased combat capability. The Commandant will in all likelihood have to reduce current active force structure by the equivalent of three reinforced infantry battalions in order to properly man the other units.

Mr. Green has covered in some detail Marine Corps officer cuts and I will not repeat that. But I must say, if the Marine Corps has to absorb a portion of the remaining 4 percent reductions, our officer manning of Fleet Marine Forces will be severely reduced, and our ability to man joint and external billets will decrease. In addition, we will have empty school seats that will in the long run severely decrease the professional knowledge of our officer corps.

Finally, sir, I would like to address compensation. We presently enjoy the highest quality force in the history of our Corps. We are, however, in constant competition with the civilian community to attract and maintain that quality. If we are to continue to be competitive, pay must be set and maintained at a level comparable to the civilian sector. We strongly urge passage of the proposed 4.3 percent pay raise for fiscal year 1989.

The high level of Marine Corps manpower readiness today is a result of long term planning, aggressive recruiting, efficient force management, and vital professional backing. As we move into these years of fiscal uncertainty, we must mutually ensure that the readiness and quality in which we have invested do not erode.

Thank you, sir.
[See prepared statement of General Hudson on page 209.]
Senator GLENN. Thank you all, gentlemen.

OFFICER STRENGTH REDUCTIONS Mr. Green, we will start off with questioning. In his letter of March 1 this year transmitting the officer requirements report to us, Secretary Carlucci indicated that he was issuing guidance to Military Departments to execute the active duty strength reductions program for fiscal year 1989 in a balanced manner.

I read this to mean proposed officer strength reductions beyond fiscal year 1988 that would be consistent with your study and with fiscal year 1989 force structure changes. Although the letter indicated this issue would be addressed in your summary review of the services' program objective memorandum for development of the fiscal year 1988 budget, I had indicated to you in a meeting that we had that we needed this officer strength plan before subcommittee markup.

Do you have such a plan by service? What is it?

Mr. GREEN. We do have a sense of what the services are doing for fiscal year 1989 based on the additional cuts that came out of the officer requirements study. I do not know whether the services have finalized those or not.

Senator GLENN. What is the status of those plans and when will we get them? We would like to have those plans.

Admiral EDNEY. In the Navy, sir, plans for fiscal year 1989 have been finalized for the budget and, as I mentioned in my statement, they include leveling off, no futher growth.

As you recognize, we had additional enlisted and officer growth coming on the line to fill out the ships that will come on the line in the latter part of this decade. That means that we have eliminated 9,600 enlisted growth and we have eliminated 727 officer growth.

By the way, the officer growth and the enlisted are at the same ratio of 1 to 7. So the officer and enlisted ratio are being reduced.

Senator GLENN. When, Mr. Green, can we expect to get all of your reports?

Mr. Green, when will they be available to us?

Mr. GREEN. In the case of the Air Force and the Army cuts, we already have those, as I mentioned in testimony. I do not know that there should be any delay in getting those up. As I said, the Air Force is going to convert 500 in 1989 and the Army will cut 500 in 1989, and then they have some additional cuts in 1990.

Senator GLENN. Do we have any particular date that you plan to get all those reports together and send them over to us?

Mr. GREEN. We will have them to you before markup.

Senator GLENN. We would like to have them as soon as possible, so that we can review them before markup. We would like to have the earliest possible date we could expect to receive these reports.

Could you get them to us now or possibly later in the day?
Mr. GREEN. I will call Fred and give you the date.

Senator GLENN. Secretary Carlucci also indicated in his transmittal letter he is directing permanent improvements of the OSD manpower oversight process. We talked about that at considerable length. I talked with Secretary Carlucci about it also.

That is what got us into some of the altered ratio problems that caused us turmoil over the past couple of years. He indicates that he is directing permanent improvements.

You addressed this in your opening statement; can you give us any more specifics as to what is going to be done?

Mr. GREEN. As I said, in the near term, I am going to increase the size of my staff, probably to the consternation of the services. But we have got to be able to more carefully look at the requirements submitted during the budget development process, and we have got to be able to compare the consistency of those requirements with force structure.

We also have to ensure that the services are assessing what they are budgeting for. These are the kinds of things we need to oversee. In some cases, the services need to get their own internal systems talking to each other, so that we can ensure that what we are taking aboard agrees with the requirements.

Further, we need to clarify our policy guidance to the services and tighten up on our POM Evualuaton. guidance.

Senator GLENN. Evaluation process?

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