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IT'S BEEN SAID THAT PREPAREDNESS IS PEACE'S GUARANTOR; ITS
FAILURE IS WAR'S PRECURSOR.
THE PEACE WE NOW ENJOY IS THE FRUIT
OF YESTERDAY'S SACRIFICES AND TODAY'S READINESS.
BUT THERE ARE
NOT GUARANTEES THAT THIS PEACE WILL BE A PART OF OUR FUTURE.
STRONG DEFENSE MADE UP OF QUALITY FORCES IS THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENT IN THE EQUATION THAT ASSURES PEACE.
ALL ARMY LEADERS HAVE DEDICATED THEMSELVES TO PRODUCING AN
ARMY OF EXCELLENCE.
AND, I BELIEVE THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE TO
DATE SHOWS WE ARE NOT JUST PAYING LIP SERVICE TO THESE IDEALS.
SOLDIERS AND UNITS NEED CONTINUITY, STABILITY, ASSURANCE OF
ADEQUATE RESOURCES AND INSPIRED LEADERSHIP.
SOLDIERS YEARN FOR A CLIMATE OF COMMAND WHERE LEADERS TEACH,
WHERE THEY KNOW THEIR NEEDS FOR BOTH THEMSELVES AND THEIR
FAMILIES ARE CONSIDERED AND ADDRESSED AND WHERE RECOGNIZED
ACHIEVEMENT AND TOLERANCE FOR HONEST MISTAKES FOSTERS PERSONAL
AND PROFESSIONAL GROWTH.
SOLDIERS WANT "STANDARD BEARERS";
LEADERS WHO INSIST ON AND MEET HIGH STANDARDS OF TRAINING,
MAINTAINING, CARING, AND LEADING.
THE ARMY"S LEADERSHIP IS FOCUSED ON THESE REQUIREMENTS AND
CONTINUES TO ACCEPT THESE CHALLENGES IN THE "YEAR OF TRAINING."
AND I ASK FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT AND SENSITIVITY AS WE ENTER
THIS MOST TRYING PERIOD WHEREIN HARD FISCAL DECISIONS MUST BE
MADE AS WE TACKLE THE NEEDS OF THIS COUNTRY.
I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE AND SHALL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE
ON ARMY PERSONNEL PROGRAMS.
Senator GLENN. Thank you, General, very much.
And with regard to pay, I will not address each one of the items you brought up, but with regard to pay, I fought for it and I lost. I fought for it in the budget summit that we had before the holidays and I lost.
And I can assure you that I am very much aware of how much it lags, how much military pay on the average lags behind civilian pay, civil service pay. And we have to redress that.
We have been talking about it for the last 2 years. You cannot go on living on promises forever and seeing people scaled back in their total compensation package and still expect them to be happy in the service.
And I agree with you to the utmost extent on that. And I would have liked to have been able to get it through, not only this subcommittee, but the full committee and the Congress, but we just have not been able to do that, I can assure you that, because I think it is very important. Admiral Edney, please go ahead. STATEMENT OF ADM. LEON A. EDNEY, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF
NAVAL PERSONNEL Admiral EDNEY. Good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss Navy manpower requirements. I have provided a written statement for the record and I will not address the important issues of retention and compensation this morning because I understood that will be the subject of the hearing on the 24th of March.
I would like to highlight a few manpower points. In developing the manpower and personnel program for fiscal year 1989 and in executing our fiscal year 1988 program, we have been driven by internal and external pressures to the limits of manpower efficiency.
The fact is our manpower has not been allowed to increase to match our growing force structures over the last several years, and we are drawing from our shore and support establishments to keep our fleet properly manned. We have eliminated the planned 9,600 enlisted growth for fiscal year 1989, and have reduced planned enlisted end strength by 20,000 across the 5-year defense plan.
We have reached the point where further reductions in strength will have a significant adverse impact on fleet readiness. In reviewing our officer growth of 8,342 from 1980 to 1986, it was mentioned by Mr. Green that OSD determined that 631 billets could not be validated. In most cases, these billets did not meet the military essentiality test and were considered convertible to civilian billets.
The fiscal year 1987 and 1988 congressionally mandated officer reductions, combined with fiscal year 1989 budget adjustment or budget summit requirements, have deleted 2,817 billets from officer strength presented in the fiscal year 1988–1989 biannual summary to Congress in January 1987.
Executing the remaining 4 percent officer reduction would result in an additional loss of 2,500 officers by the end of 1990. Mr. Green has already testified that the Navy is unable to sustain that without a significant impact on readiness.
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cent officer reduction would result cers by the end of 1990. Mr. Green Ivy is unable to sustain that withiess.
ARMY'S QUALITY OF LIFE PRSIANS.
The net result of such a reduction would bring the Navy 6,118 below that programmed for fiscal year 1990, with force levels already approved by this Congress. This would leave the Navy with fewer officers than it had in 1985, despite the addition of 56 ships and 12 aircraft squadrons.
Accommodating these reductions in fiscal year 1987 and 1988, while simultaneously bringing the additional ships and squadrons on the line, has drained the shore establishment and exhausted flexibility for further officer reductions. Additional cuts will have to come out of combat essential, combat and other support, as well as in the individual training accounts.
Manpower reductions, both officer and enlisted, have direct visible impact on our people. Navy operational tempo has not diminished. On the contrary, it has increased. Changes in the international scene going on today, as most clearly exemplified by our presence in the Persian Gulf, have sharply increased naval force requirements around the world.
We currently have 100 ships forward deployed in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, the western Pacific, and the Mediterranean Sea. Faced with current and projected worldwide commitments and the intended tempo of naval operations, current combat force levels and adequate officer and enlisted manning of those forces must be maintained.
We also face additional demands for officers to meet the increased requirements for joint OSD assignments, such as the new unified transportation, space, and special operating commands.
There is also a need to protect the officer growth to meet our critical wartime medical specialties and meet the burgeoning peacetime health care needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps. As you are well aware, this is a very serious issue and we are behind the power curve on that issue.
These considerations in my judgment dictate that further mandated officer cuts be repealed. I agree with General Ono. You had a point, we have got it, and we are taking it on board, and we are working very hard to meet your requirements.
If we were to take further reductions in 1989 and 1990, as they are now on the books, the immediate impact would be an imbalance in the unrestricted line population between combat essential forces and other support areas. We would have and do have conflicting demands between the warfare officer requirements and pulling between longer joint staff requirements.
This would increase our sea time for officers, which causes declines in retention. Degraded depot and intermediate level maintenance of ships and aircraft would be associated with losses in the shore establishment. As we draw down further on essential logistics, supply, personnel, management and intelligence forces, they will also start to impact readiness.
Minimal new officer appointments and promotional opportunities would be available and would also affect the morale of the force. Those nearing completion of a career in the affected officer communities, if we go further, will have to be involuntarily retired, causing additional turbulance, with a ripple effect on out year reten