invective. No fraud is shown. Whatever representations were made were only the legal opinions of the appellee's counsel. Those same representations were made to the court when the pleas were filed originally in this case. They were not sustained by the court but there was no fraud in making them. There is nothing to indicate they were not honestly made, and it is no fraud in a negotiation to contend for one's own view of the law. No fact is alleged to have been misrepresented, but only the legal result of facts equally open to the knowledge of the city and of the appellee and equally well known to each.

The seventh replication states that the People ought not to be barred of their action because, while it is admitted that the city notified the appellee to place its wires in certain districts underground, it is averred that the appellee did not place its wires underground. The sixth plea, to which the demurrer was overruled, contained no averment of such notice or placing the wires underground. The replication was therefore no answer to anything in that plea, though it purported to answer it. A pleading must answer all it professes to answer or it will be bad. People v. McCormack, 68 Ill. 226; People v. McClellan, 137 id. 352.

The twelfth replication is a denial of actual knowledge on the part of the city of the bond issues by the appellant of $400,000 and $750,000, and is immaterial. The estoppel is based upon the acts of the city recognizing the appellee's occupation of the streets as lawful and acknowledging the validity of its claim of right to occupy them, and upon the appellee's actions, the incurring of liabilities and the expenditure of money in reliance upon the rights so recognized and acknowledged. The city's knowledge of the extent to which the appellee had relied upon the former's acts or the manner in which it had so relied is not important, if, in fact, it had so acted that it would now be unjust to permit the city to change its attitude,

The fourth replication admits the acts out of which the estoppel is alleged to have arisen, and avers that by virtue of the negligent and insufficient way in which the business of the company was managed its service became unsatisfactory and dangerous to life and property by reason of the variation in the pressure of gas; that the quality of the gas was so poor as to be unsuitable for cooking and to require from one hundred to three hundred per cent more than was reasonably necessary for domestic use, and that the city council deeming it for the public good and safety to terminate all right and claim to right by the appellee to prosecute its business in the city of Bloomington and to use the streets, alleys and public places in the city of Bloomington therefor, on November 19, 1909, passed an ordinance whereby all the alleged rights of the appellee, and of any person, firm or corporation through which the appellee claimed rights to the use of the streets, alleys and public places of the city of Bloomington for the purpose of the manufacture, sale and distribution of gas for commercial purposes, were repealed and terminated.

The sixteenth replication pleads in bar of the action an ordinance passed by the city council on May 1, 1908, repealing the ordinance of September 15, 1883, granting to the Citizens' Gaslight and Heating Company the right to lay gas mains and pipes in the streets and alleys of the city of Bloomington for the purpose of conveying gas for heating and illuminating purposes, and to operate, use, repair, maintain and extend the same.

As was stated in the beginning of this opinion, the information contained two counts, one charging the unlawful exercise of the privilege of using the streets, alleys and public places for laying mains and pipes for the sale and distribution of gas, the other charging the unlawful exercise of the privilege of using the streets, alleys and public places for the erection and maintenance of poles and wires for the sale and distribution of electricity for commercial

purposes. The defense of estoppel was alleged to the whole information, and that defense has been held to have been sufficiently alleged. The fourth and sixteenth replications purport, each, to be a complete answer to that defense. Each begins with the statement that the People, "as to the said pleas of estoppel of the defendant above pleaded, further say, precludi non," etc. Each concludes with the prayer of judgment "if the defendant ought to have or maintain its aforesaid defense to this action," and yet neither contains any allegation in regard to the use of the streets and alleys for the erection and maintenance of poles and wires for the sale and distribution of electricity or attempts in any way to meet the defense so far as that branch of the case is concerned. The rule in regard to the replication is similar to that in regard to the plea,-it must answer so much of the plea as it professes to answer, and if it is bad in part it is bad for the whole. (1 Chitty's Pl. 643.) If the replication should be held good it would constitute a complete answer to the defense alleged, and the People would be entitled to a judgment of ouster from the privileges for both gas and electricity, although the ordinances referred to in the replications have nothing to do with the latter. This particular objection to these replications was specifically stated in the demurrer and it was properly sustained.

Complaint is made of the refusal of the court to permit the filing of a general replication to the pleas of estoppel. It appears from the abstract that replications were filed and that later leave was given to file additional replications. A demurrer to the replications was sustained, and afterward the plaintiff was given leave to withdraw its general replication and to file amended replications, and a jury was waived. Later a demurrer was sustained to all replications and the plaintiff elected to stand by its replications. Then a motion was made to file a general replication, and the replication was tendered for filing and is set forth in

the bill of exceptions. These proceedings were had at various dates from October 7, 1912, to January 11, 1913. It was discretionary with the court to allow the replication to be filed at that time. A general replication had been filed and withdrawn. Whether it was the same as the one proposed to be filed we do not know, for it is not before us. At any rate, the plaintiff voluntarily abandoned and withdrew it. The bill of exceptions contains no explanation of the reason for withdrawing the general replication and three weeks later, after demurrers had been sustained to all other replications, asking leave to file another. The burden rested upon the plaintiff to show some reason for such action and also to show some injury resulting from the refusal of the request. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion, under the circumstances, in denying the motion. Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76; Fisher v. Greene, 95 id. 94.

Finally, it is claimed that it was error to render judgment for costs against the relator. While this suit is prosecuted in the name of the People it is substantially a suit by the city for the protection of its property in the streets. It is not within the principle which exempts a municipal corporation from liability for costs in quasi criminal actions for the enforcement of its ordinances. In so enforcing local government the city performs a public function and acts as the agent of the State. In this case the people of the State at large have no special concern, and the controversy is practically about the contractual or quasi contractual rights of the city and the appellee. The judgment for costs was not erroneous. Judgment affirmed.

JANE C. VANSANT et al. Defendants in Error, vs. ALVIDA A. ROSE et al. Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913-Rehearing denied Dec. 3, 1913.

I. DEEDS-restrictive covenants in a deed are valid unless contrary to public policy. A restrictive covenant in a deed by which the grantee agrees not to erect a flat-building upon the lot for a period of twenty years unless the grantors consent thereto is not against public policy or public interest and is valid.

nants.

2. SAME-wife taking title from husband is bound by his coveA wife who acquires title from her husband through an intermediary is bound by restrictive covenants in the deed to him, which was recorded, and she is in no better position than he to resist the enforcement of such covenants.

3. SAME-right to enforce restrictive covenant does not depend upon whether complainants own any property. The right of the grantors to enforce a restrictive covenant against the erection of a flat-building on the lot does not depend upon whether they own any property in the vicinity, as such right does not depend upon whether the grantors will be damaged by a breach of the covenant. (Hays v. St. Paul M. E. Church, 196 Ill. 633, explained.)

4. PLEADING-equivocal allegations are taken most unfavorably against the pleader. Allegations in a pleading which are in any degree equivocal must be taken in the sense most unfavorable to the pleader.

5. SAME what must be averred where it is sought to avoid the effect of a restrictive covenant. A party who seeks to avoid the effect of a restrictive covenant in a deed under the rule that such a covenant will not be enforced where the conditions have so changed as to render its enforcement inequitable, must aver, in unequivocal terms, that the changes relied upon have occurred since the execution and delivery of the deed, as changes occurring prior to that time cannot be availed of.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon ADELOR J. PETIT, Judge, presiding.

LEE & LEE, (Albert M. KalES, of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.