this case the petition of Walsh & Masterson alleged there was a balance due them, under their contract, of $6000, and $815.13 for extra material furnished and extra labor performed, for which they claim "a lien upon the said premises and the buildings and improvements thereon, pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided." The prayer of the petition is that they may be decreed to have a lien upon the premises for "the amount so due and owing them as above set forth." The cross-petition of the bridge company alleged there was a balance due it, under the contract, of $16,000, and $477.02 for extra work and material, and the prayer of the petition is that cross-petitioner be decreed "a lien upon the premises for the sum of $16,477.02.❞

Mills v. Heeney, 35 Ill. 173, was a petition to enforce a mechanic's lien. The petition alleged there was due petitioner $535.20 and prayed a decree making the same a lien on the premises described. The decree found there was due petitioner $649.10, which was made a lien against the premises. On appeal to this court by defendant below it was insisted, among other errors assigned, that the court erred in decreeing a greater sum than was claimed in the petition. The court said: "A decree in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien should not be rendered for a larger sum than is claimed by the petition, and interest from the time it was filed, where it asserts no claim for interest."

Prescott v. Maxwell, 48 Ill. 82, was a mechanic's lien case, and there was a decree for a larger sum in favor of the petitioner than was claimed in his petition. This was assigned as error upon the appeal to this court, and upon this question the court said: "Against this objection it is urged by appellee that interest legitimately followed on the presentation and refusal of defendant to pay the claim. If this were so it should have been claimed in the petition. The whole amount demanded was $239, and beyond that there could be no recovery." While it is not so stated, we

think it apparent from a careful examination of the opinion that the trial court computed interest from the time of the completion of the work and not from the time the petition was filed. No reference is made in the opinion to Mills v. Heeney, supra, and it was never intended by the court. to overrule that case. The decree was erroneous under the authority of Mills v. Heeney, but the court failed to mention the rule announced in that case that the petitioner might recover interest from the date of filing the petition without specifically claiming interest therein. When understood, the two cases are not in conflict upon this question and are in harmony upon the proposition that interest prior to filing the petition cannot be recovered unless claimed. therein.

Heiman v. Schroeder, 74 Ill. 158, was also a mechanic's lien case, and this court affirmed the decree allowing interest on the amount due under the contract from the time it was agreed to be paid though it does not appear to have been claimed in the petition. The decree was, however, for a less sum than was claimed in said petition to be due. The court referred to Mills v. Heeney and Prescott v. Maxwell, and said they were not applicable because in those cases the recovery was for a larger sum than was claimed in the petition to be due, and that unless interest on such amount was claimed in the petition none could be recovered thereon.

While in the case of Heiman v. Schroeder interest was allowed, the decree was for a less sum than was claimed by the petition, and the claim for a greater sum than the amount due under the contract was construed to include interest though interest was not specifically mentioned. We do not regard any of the cases as overruling or impairing the rule announced in Mills v. Heeney, supra. The rule there announced should have been applied in this case, and defendants in error, Walsh & Masterson and the American Bridge Company of New York, should have been allowed

interest on the amounts found due them, from the date their respective petitions were filed.

The plaintiff in error also contends that as the petitions of defendants in error did not ask for costs no costs should have been awarded against it, and cites Carter v. Lewis, 29 Ill. 500, as supporting that contention. We think this an entire misapprehension of the case relied upon. In that case several judgment creditors filed a bill seeking to have the judgments decreed to be a lien against and satisfied out of certain real estate alleged to be the property of the judgment debtor. The bill set up the amount for which each of the judgments was rendered and prayed a sale of the property to satisfy the respective amounts mentioned. No claim was made in the bill for interest on the judgments or for costs paid in obtaining them. This court held complainants were entitled to a decree only for the amounts alleged in their bill, and as there was no claim for interest "or costs in the original suits" set up in the bill none could be recovered. It is perfectly clear the costs referred to were the costs of the suits in which the judgments sought to be enforced were rendered, and not the costs of the suit seeking to enforce those judgments as liens against the judgment debtor's property. It was not necessary that defendants in error should have asked that costs be awarded them to entitle them to a decree for their costs if they were entitled to a decree for the relief prayed.

The decree was right in all respects except as to the allowance of interest, and for the error pointed out in that respect the judgment of the Appellate Court and the decree of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court, with directions to render a decree for the amounts found due defendants in error by the decree of said circuit court, with interest thereon from the date of the filing of their respective petitions. As the principal part of the costs of this writ of error was incurred for the purpose of defeating any liability of plaintiff in error to defendants

in error, the costs of the suit in this court will be apportioned two-thirds to plaintiff in error and one-half of onethird to each of defendants in error, Walsh & Masterson and the American Bridge Company of New York.

Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.

THE BORAH DRAINAGE DISTRICT, Defendant in Error, vs. MICHAEL ANKEN BRAND et al. Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913-Rehearing denied Dec. 3, 1913.

1. DRAINAGE when signature to a petition, is sufficient. The signature "Summers & Dickey," attached to a drainage district petition, is sufficient, where it is shown that C. W. Summers and T. L. Dickey were tenants in common of a tract of land in the proposed district; that Summers authorized Dickey to sign his name to the petition; that Dickey attached the signature in question, intending to sign for himself and his co-tenant, and that no other person by the name of Summers or Dickey owned land in the proposed district.

2. SAME a misrepresentation as to the law is not ground for withdrawing signature. A representation by one having charge of a drainage petition to induce a land owner to sign the same, as to what the signer's rights would be with respect to tiling his outlet to another person's land and compelling that person to take care of the water, is merely a representation of law, and though untrue is not ground for withdrawing the signature.

3. SAME-when land lying in different watersheds cannot be included in one district. Lands lying in different watersheds, a portion of which cannot be benefited by the main system of drainage but must be drained by an independent system of ditches having no connection whatever with the main system, cannot be included in one district.

4. SAME-petition should specify whether lateral is to be an open ditch or tile. A petition for the organization of a drainage district should specify whether a certain proposed lateral is to be an open ditch or tile.

WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of Wayne county; the Hon. VIRGIL W. MILLS, Judge, presiding.

BONHAM & MCLIN, BOGGS, BOGGS & HEIDINGER, and GEORGE W. JOHNS, for plaintiffs in error.

THOMAS H. CREIGHTON, for defendant in error.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the

court:

On March 11, 1911, a petition was filed in the county court of Wayne county for the organization of the Borah Drainage District. Numerous persons owning lands within the boundaries of the proposed district appeared and interposed objections to the petition, contending that the petitioners were less than a majority of the adult land owners and owned less than a major portion, in area, of the lands to be reclaimed or benefited, and that certain signatures to the petition were purchased and others were obtained by fraud; also contending that the proposed district included lands in two distinct watersheds, and that there was no community of interests with respect to drainage between the lands in the two watersheds. After hearing the testimony the court overruled the objections, found that the petition was signed by more than one-third of the adult land owners and that the petitioners owned more than onehalf of all the lands within the boundaries of the proposed district. The court further found that the drains and ditches were necessary and would be useful for the drainage of the lands to be drained thereby for agricultural and sanitary purposes, and appointed commissioners to lay out and construct the proposed work. The commissioners reported that the district should be organized and that a system of drains similar to that proposed in the petition was proper and feasible. Upon the filing of the commissioners' report the objections above mentioned were renewed and were again overruled, and an order was entered approving the report of the commissioners, defining the boundaries of the district, and declaring the Borah Drainage District duly es