axles, &c. together with the various connexions and adjustments of each part, whence the exact and uniform motion of the index is derived, which oints to the minute or the hour. So when a cominon understanding reads Virgil's Eneid, he has but a vulgar idea of that poem, yet his mind is naturally entertained with the story, and his ears with the verse but when a critic, or a man who has skill in poesy, reads it, he has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties, he tastes and relishes a superior pleasure; he admires the Roman poet, and wishes he had known the Christian Theology, which would have furnished him with nobler materials and machines than all the heathen idols.

It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-court, and every one feels his share of pleasure and entertainment: but a painter contemplates the wonders of that Italian pencil, and sees a thousand beauties in them which the vulgar eye neglected his learned ideas, give him a transcendent delight, and yet, at the same time, discover the blemishes which the common gazer never observed.

III. Ideas are either perfect or imperfect, which are otherwise called adequate or indequate.

Those are adequate ideas which perfectly represent their archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred.

All our simple ideas are, in some sense, adequate or perfect, because simple ideas, considered merely as our first perceptions, have no parts in them so we may be said to have a perfect idea of white, black, sweet, sour, length, light, motion, rest, &c. We have also a perfect idea of various figures, as a triangle, a square, a cylinder, a cube, a sphere, which are complex ideas: but our idea o image of a thousand sides, our idea of the city of London, or the powers of a loadstone, are very imperfect, as well as all our ideas of infinite length or breadth, infinite power, wisdom or duration for the idea of infinite is endless and ever growing, and can never be completed.

Note 1. When we have a perfect idea of any thing in all its parts, it is called a complete idea; when in all its properties, it is called comprehensive. But when we have but an inadequate and imperfect idea, we are only said to apprehend it; therefore we use the term apprehension, when we speak of our knowledge of God, who can never be comprehended by his creatures.

Note 2. Though there are a multitude of ideas which may be called perfect, or adequate, in a vulgar sense yet there are scarce any ideas which are adequate, compresensive, and complete in a philosophical sense for there is scarce any thing in the world that we know, as to all the parts, and powers, and properties of it, in perfection. Even so plain an idea as that of a triangle bas, perhaps, infinite properties belonging to it, of which we know VOL. VII. Y

but a few. Who can tell what are the shapes and positions of those particles, which cause all the variety of colours that appear on the surface of things? Who knows what are the figures of the little corpuscles that compose and distinguish different bodies? The ideas of brass, iron, gold, wood, stone, hyssop, and rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden mysteries contained in the shape, size, motion, and position, of the little particles, of which they are composed; and perhaps also, infinite unknown properties and powers, that may be derived from them. And if we arise to the animal world, or the world of spirits, our knowledge of them must be amazingly imperfect: when there is not the least grain of sand or empty space, but has too many questions and difficulties belonging to it, for the wisest philosopher upon earth to answer and resolve.

IV. Our ideas are either true or false; for an idea being the representation of a thing in the mind, it must be either a true or a false representation of it. If the idea be conformable to the object or archetype of it, it is a true idea; if not, it is a false one. Sometimes our ideas are referred to things really existing without us as their archetypes. If I see bodies in their proper colours I have a true idea; but when a man under the jaundice sees all bodies yellow, he has a false idea of them. So if we see the sun or moon rising or setting, our idea represents them bigger than when they are on the meridian; and in this sense it is a false idea, because those heavenly bodies are all day and all night of the same bigness. Or when I see a straight staff appear crooked while it is half under the water, I say, the water gives me a false idea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer to the ideas of other men, denoted by such a particular word, as their archetypes: so when I hear a protestant use the words church and sacraments, if I understand by these words, a congregation of faithful men who profess christianity, and the two ordinances, baptism and the Lord's-supper, I have a true idea of those words in the common sense of protestants: but if the man who speaks of them be a papist, he means the church of Rome and the seven sacraments, and then I have a mistaken idea of those words, as spoken by him, for he has a different sense and meaning: and in general, whensoever I mistake the sense of any speaker or writer, I may be said to have a false idea of it.

Some think that truth or falsehood properly belongs only to propositions, which shall be the subject of discourse in the second part of Logic; for if we consider ideas as mere impressions upon the mind, made by outward objects, those impressions will ever be conformable to the laws of nature in such a case: the water will make a stick appear crooked, and the horizontal air will make the sun and moon appear bigger. And generally where there is falsehood in ideas, there seems to be some secret or latent

proposition, whereby we judge falsely of things: this is more obvious where we take up the words of a writer or speaker in a mistaken sense, for we join his words to our own ideas, which are different from his. But after all, since ideas are pictures of things, it cannot be very improper to pronounce them to be true or false, according to their conformity or nonconformity to their examplars.

CHAP. IV.-Of Words and their several Divisions, together with the Advantage and Danger of them.

SECT. I.-Of Words in general, and their Use.

THOUGH our ideas are first acquired by the perceptions of objects, or by various sensations and reflections, yet we convey them to each other by the means of certain sounds, or written marks, which we call words; and a great part of our knowledge is both obtained and communicated by these means, which are called speech or language.

But as we are led into the knowledge of things by words, so we are oftentimes led into error, or mistake, by the use or abuse of words also. And in order to guard against such mistakes, as well as to promote our improvements in knowledge, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves a little with words and terms. We shall begin with these observations:

1. Words (whether they are spoken or written) have no natural connexion with the ideas they are designed to signify, nor with the things which are represented in those ideas.There is no manner of affinity between the sounds white in English, or blanc in French, and that colour which we call by that name; nor have the letters, of which these words are composed, any natural aptness to signify that colour rather than red or green. Words and names therefore are mere arbitrary signs invented by men to communicate their thoughts or ideas to one another.

2. If one single word were appointed to express but one simple idea, and nothing else, as white, black, sweet, sour, sharp, bitter, extension, duration, there would be scarce any mistake about them.

But alas! it is a common unhappiness in language, that different simple ideas are sometimes expressed by the same word; so the words sweet and sharp are applied both to the objects of hearing and tasting, as we shall see hereafter; and this, perhaps, may be one cause or foundation of obscurity and error arising from words.

3. In communicating our complex ideas to one another, if we could join as many peculiar and appropriated words together in one sound, as we join simple ideas to make one complex one,

we should seldom be in danger of mistaking; when I express the taste of an apple, which we call the bitter-sweet, none can mistake what I mean.

Yet this sort of composition would make all language a most tedious and unweildly thing, since most of our ideas are complex, and many of them have eight or ten simple ideas in them; so that the remedy, would be worse than the disease; for what is Bow expressed in one short word, as month, or year, would require two lines to express it. It is necessary therefore, that single words be invented to express complex ideas, in order to make language short and useful.

But here is our great infelicity, that when single words signify complex ideas, one word can never distinctly manifest all the parts of a complex idea; and thereby it will often happen, that one man ineludes more or less in his idea, than another does, while he affixes the same word to it. In this case there will be danger of mistake between them, for they do not mean the same object, though they use the same name. So, if one person or nation, by the word year mean twelve months of thirty days each, that is, three hundred and sixty days, another intend a solar year of three hundred and sixty-five days, and a third mean a lunar year, or twelve lunar months, that is, three hundred fifty-four days, there will be a great variation and error in their account of things, unless they are well apprized of each other's meaning beforehand. This is supposed to be the reason, why some ancient histories and prophecies, and accounts of chronology, are so hard to be adjusted. And this is the true reason of so furious and endless debates on many points in divinity; the words church, worship, idolatry, repentance, faith, election, merit, grace, and many others which signify very complex ideas, are not applied to include just the same simple ideas, and the same number of them, by the various contending parties; thence arise confusion and contest.

4. Though a single name does not certainly manifest to us all the parts of a complex idea, yet it must be acknowledged, that in many of our complex ideas, the single name may point out to us some chief property which belongs to the thing that the word signifies; especially when the word or name is traced up to its original, through several languages from whence it is borrowed. So an apostle signifies one who is sent forth.

But this tracing of a word to its original, (which is called etymology) is sometimes a very precarious and uncertain thing; and after all, we have made but very little progress towards the attainment of the full meaning of a complex idea, by knowing some one chief property of it. We know but a small part of the notion of an apostle, by knowing barely that he is sent forth.

5. Many (if not most) of our words which are applied to

moral and intellectual ideas, when traced up to the original in the learned languages, will be found to signify sensible and corporeal things; thus the words apprehension, understanding, abstraction, invention, idea, inference, prudence, religion church, adoration, &c. have all a corporeal signification in their original. The name spirit itself signifies breath or air, in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew; such is the poverty of all languages, they are forced to use these names for incorporeal ideas, which thing has a tendency to error and confusion.

6. The last thing I shall mention that leads us into many a mistake is, the multitude of objects that one name sometimes signifies; there is almost an infinite variety of things and ideas, both simple and complex, beyond all the words that are invented in any language; thence it becomes almost necessary that one name should signify several things. Let us but consider the two colours of yellow and blue, if they are mingled together in any considerable proportion, they make a green; now there may be infinite differences of the proportions in the mixture of yellow and blue; and yet we have only these three words, yellow, blue, and green, to signify all of them, at least by one single

term.

When I use the word shore, I may intend thereby a coast of land near the sea, or a drain to carry off water, or a prop to support a building; and by the sound of the word porter, who can tell whether I mean a man who bears burdens, or a servant who waits at a nobleman's gate? The world is fruitful in the invention of utensils of life, and new characters and offices of men, yet names entirely new are seldom invented; therefore old names are almost necessarily used to signify new things, which may occasion much confusion and error in the receiving and communicating of knowledge.

Give me leave to propose one single instance, wherein all these notes shall be remarkably exemplified. It is the word bishop, which in French is called eveque; upon which I would make these several observations:-1. That there is no natural connexion between the sacred office hereby signified, and the letters or sound which signify this office; for both these words eveque and bishop signify the same office, though there is not one letter alike in them; nor have the letters which compose the English or the French word any thing sacred belonging to them more than the letters that compose the words king or soldier.2. If the meaning of a word could be learned by its derivation or etymology, yet the original derivation of words is oftentimes very dark and unsearchable; for who would imagine that each of these words are derived from the Latin Episcopus, or the Greek ETICKOTOS? Yet in this instance we happen to know certainly the true derivation; the French being anciently writ evesque,