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That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought, to wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c.

It is not the outward object, or thing which is perceived, namely, the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the very perception or sense and feeling, namely, of hunger, or cold, &c. which is called the idea; but it is the thing as it exists in the mind by way of conception, or representation that is properly called the idea, whether the object be present or absent.

As a horse, a man, a tree, are the outward objects of our perception, and the outward archetypes or patterns of our ideas; so our sensations of hunger, cold, &c. are also inward archetypes, or patterns of our ideas: but the notions or pictures of those things, as they are considered, or conceived in the mind, are precisely the ideas that we have to do with in Logic. To see a horse, or to feel cold, is one thing; to think of, and converse about a man, a horse, hunger, or cold, is another.

Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies, are generally called images, especially if the idea of shape be included. Those inward representations which we have of spirit, thought, love, hatred, cause, effect, &c. are more pure and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, and carry nothing of shape or sense in them.But I shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the origin and distinction of ideas in the third chapter. I proceed therefore now to consider the objects of our ideas.

CHAP. II.-Of the Objects of Perception.

SECT. I.-Of being in general.

THE object of perception is that which is represented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern, according to which the idea is formed: and thus judgments, propositions, reasons, and long discourses, may all become the objects of perception; but in this place we speak chiefly of the first and more simple objects of it, before they are joined and formed into propositions or discourses.

Every object of our idea is called a theme, whether it be a being or not-being, for not-being may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But let us first treat of beings, and that in the largest extent of the word.

A being is considered as possible, or as actual.

When it is considered as possible, it is said to have an essence or nature; such were all things before their creation: when it is considered as actual, then it is said to have existence also; such are all things which are created, and God himself the Creator.

Essence therefore is but the very nature of any being whe ther it be actually existing or no. A rose in winter has an essence, in summer it has existence also.

Note, There is but one being which includes existence in the very essence of it, and that is God; who therefore actually exists by natural and eternal necessity: but the actual existence of every creature is very distinct from its essence, for it may be, or may tot be, as God pleases.

Again, Every being is considered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is called a substance; or it subsists in and by another, and then it is called a mode or manner of being. Though few writers allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance is; and some modes have evidently more of real entity or being than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. These things will furnish us with matter for larger discourse in the following sections.

SECT. II.-Of Substances and their various Kinds.

A Substance is a being which can subsist by itself without dependance upon any other created being. The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logicians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called substances, because they depend on nothing but God for their existence.

It has been usual also in the description of substance to add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents; a body is the substance or subject, its shape is the mode.

But lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, that when a substance is said to subsist without dependance upon another created being, all that we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to that of our Creator; though its present particalar form, nature and properties may be altered and destroyed by many inferior causes; a horse may die and turn to dust; wood may be turned into fire, smoke, and ashes; a house into rubbish, and water into ice or vapour; but the substance or matter of which they are made still remains, though the forms and shapes of it are altered. A body may cease to be a house, or a horse, but it is a body still; and in this sense it depends only upon God for its existence.

Among substances some are thinking or conscious beings, or have a power of thought, such as the mind of man, God, angels. Some are extended and solid, or impenetrable; that is, tlfey have dimensions of length, breadth and depth, and have also a power of resistance, or exclude every thing of the same kind from being in the same place. This is the proper character of matter or body.

As for the idea of space, whether it be void or full, that is,

a vacuum or a plenum, whether it be interspersed among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long and too hard to be disputed in this place what the nature of it is: it has been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind, whether it be the immensity of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-existent beings, whether it be the manner of our conception of the distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first essay among the Philosophical Essays, by I. W. published

id 1733.

Now, if we seclude space out of our consideration, there will remain but two sorts of substances in the world, that is, matter and mind; or, as we otherwise call them, body and spirit; at least we have no ideas of any other substances but these *.

* Because men have different ideas and notions of substance, I thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them isto the margio.

Some philosophers suppose that our acquaintance with matter or mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance or the subject by which these properties of solid extension and of cogitation are supported, and in which these properties inhere or exist. But perhaps this notion rises only from our turning the mere abstracted or logical notion of substance or self-subsisting into the notion of a distinct physical or natural being without any necessity. Solid extension seems to me to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies; and a power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the very substance of all spirits; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty power; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and unknown being, or abstracted substance entirely distinct from these, in order to support the several modes or properties of matter or mind, for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose; therefore I rather think these are substances.

It must be confest when we say, spirit is a thinking substance, and matter is an extended solid substance, we are sometimes ready to imagine that extension and solidity are but mere modes and properties of a certain substance or subject which supports them, and which we call body; and that a power of thinking is but a mere mode and property of some unknown substance or subject which supports it, and which we call spirit: but I rather take this to be a mere mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical form and use of words; and perhaps our logical way of thinking by substances and modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by substantives and adjectives, help to delude us into the suppostition.

However, that I may not be wanting to any of my readers, I would let them know Mr. Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the present age, and it is this: "That our idea of any particular substance is only such a combina❝tion of simple ideas as represents that thing as subsisting by itself, in which "the supposed or confused idea of substance (such as it is) is always ready to "offer itself. It is a conjunction of ideas co-existing in such a cause of their "union, as makes the whole subject subsist by itself, though the cause of their "unian be unknown; and our general idea of substance arises from the self"subsistence of this collection of ideas."

Now, if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely as an unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much more easy to be admitted; but if we proceed to support a sort of real, substantial, distinct being, different from solid quantity or extension in bodies, and different from a power of think ing in spirits, in my opinion it is the introduction of a needless scholastical no❤ tion into the real nature of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence.

Among substances some are called simple, some are compound, whether the words be taken in a philosophical or a vulgar sense.

Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are either spirits, which have no manner of composition in them, and in this sense God is called a simple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded: elements are such substances as cannot be resolved, or reduced, into two or more substances of different kinds.

The various sects of philosophors have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The peripateticks or followers of Aristotle made fire, air, earth and water, to be the four elements of which all earthly things were compounded; and they supposed the heavens to be a quintessence, or a fifth sort of body distinct from all these; but since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The chemists make spirits, salts, sulphur, water, and earth to be their five elements, because they can reduce all terrestrial things to these five; this seems to come nearer the truth; though they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements. In short, our modern philosophers generally suppose matter or body to be one simple principle, or solid extension, which being diversified by its various shapes, quantities motions, and situations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe; and therefore they make little use of the word element.

Compound substances are made made up of two or more simple substances; so every thing in this whole material creation, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more different principles or substances, is a compound body in the philosophical sense.

But if we take the words simple and compound in a vulgar sense, then all those are simple substances, which are generally esteemed uniform in their natures. So every herb is called a simple; and every metal and mineral, though the chemist perhaps may find all his several elements in each of them. So a

Mr. Locke in his Essay of Hum. Und, Book II. Chap. 22. § 2. seems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which men have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. Chap. 3. § 6. he seems to suppose there may be some such unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the properties both of matter and mind, namely, extension, solidity, and cogitation; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation to that substance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If this be true, then spirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal beings, or thinking bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the soul. But I leave these debates to the philosophers of the age, and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse, subject.

See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays, before cited, Essay 2

needle is a simple body, being only made of steel; but a sword or a knife is a compound, because its haft or handle is made of materials different from the blade. So the bark of Peru, or the juice of sorrel is a simple medicine: But when the apothecaries' art has mingled several simples together, it becomes a compound as diascordium or mithridate.

The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies, are much a-kin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothing but gold in it, without any alloy, or baser metal; but if any other mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixt substance or body.

Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate. Animate substances are either animal or vegetable.*

Some of the animated substances have various organical or instrumental parts fitted for a variety of motions from place to place, and a spring of life within themselves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects; these are called animals. Other animated substances are called vegetables, which have within themselves the principles of another sort of life and growth, and of various production of leaves, flowers, and fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs and trees.

And there are other substances, which are called inanimate because they have no sort of life in them, as earth, stone, air, water, &c.

There is also one sort of substance or being, which is compounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit united to an animal; such is mankind. Angels, or any other beings of the spiritual and invisible world, who have assumed visible shapes for a season, can hardly be reckoned among this order of compounded beings, because they drop their bodies, and divest themselves of those visible shapes when their particular message is performed, and thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their

natures.

SECT. III.-Of Modes in their various Kinds and first of essential and accidental Modes.

THE next sort of objects which are represented in our ideas are called modes or manners of being.†

A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the help of

*Note, Vegetables as well as animals, have gotten the name of animated substances, because some of the ancients supposed herbs and plants, beasts, birds, &c. to have a sort of souls distinct from matter or body.

Note, The term mode, is by some authors, applied chiefly to the relations of relative manners of being. But in logical treatises it is often used in a larger sense, and extends to all attributes whatsoever, and includes the most essential and inward properties, as well as outward respects and relations, and reaches to actions themselves as well as manners of action.

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