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their proper officers exercised such power and given a notice thereof in writing posted on the premises, the lot or lots so entered upon, with all improvements thereon, are to be considered at the expiration of ten days thereafter as absolutely revested in the corporation, and the conditional estate therein determined, to all intents and purposes, as fully as if the same had not been bargained for or purchased, any sale or incumbrance or other act, made or suffered by the purchaser or purchasers or others under him, her or them, to the contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding."

Pursuant to such ordinance the lands were sold and the purchasers of many of the lots elected to hold their purchases on ground rent payable quarterly, as stated in the ordinance. Deeds were thereupon executed on the part of the city and also were signed by the respective purchasers. Lands have been sold from time to time under ordinances of substantially the same character and containing language in substance the same up to 1872, since which time conditional sales have been abandoned.

the said

The deeds contained a provision that "In consideration of the rent to be paid, and of the several covenants and agreements to be performed, (mayor and aldermen,) have bargained and sold, and by these presents do bargain and sell, unto the said all that lot of land (describing it) . . unto the said executors, administrators and assigns, forever, on this express condition. Nevertheless, that executors, and administrators and assigns," shall pay rent as covenanted; and "in case of failure herein for the space of twenty days after any of the said quarterly payments shall become due, that then the said lot and premises shall revert to the corporation of the said city, who shall immediately thereafter possess the power of reentry; and having, by means of their proper officers, exercised such power, and given a notice thereof in writing, posted on the premises, the said lot, with all improvements thereon, shall be considered, at the expiration of ten days thereafter, as absolutely revested in the corporation, and the estate by these presents created determined to all intents and purposes as fully

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as if the same had not been bargained for or purchased; any sale or incumbrance, or other act made or suffered by the said executors, administrators or assigns, or others under him or them, to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding."

The purchaser also covenanted to pay the annual rent, and that in case of failure the city should have the lawful right of reëntry as already provided for.

The deed also contained the following provision:

"And it is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of these presents, and all parties to the same, that, on payment of the said ground rent, at the times and after the manner herein before directed, the said heirs, executors,

and

administrators and assigns, shall and may from time to time, and at all times hereafter, peaceably and quietly have, hold, use, occupy, possess and enjoy the said lot and premises, and receive and take the rents, issues and profits thereof, and of every part thereof, to o.vn use, absolutely, without the let, suit, trouble, eviction or denial of the said corporation or of any person whatsoever acting under them or by virtue of their authority, subject only to such assessments and burthens as shall be in common with other lotholders in the said city."

It was also provided in the deed that the purchaser, his heirs, executors or administrators or assigns, might at any time pay into the city treasury the valuation money and the rent then due, in full discharge and extinguishment of such rent, and in that case there should be an acknowledgment of such payment under the seal of the city, signed by the mayor and a majority of the aldermen and attested by the city clerk, and indorsed on the deed, "which shall then and from thenceforth vest an absolute estate, in fee simple, of and in the said lot and premises, in the said heirs and assigns to

and

their only proper use and behoof forever." It is admitted that the same character of deed has been executed for lots sold under other sales since 1790.

Extracts from the minutes of the proceedings of the common council of the city, in regard to meetings of that body in 1790

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and thereafter, were put in evidence, from which it appeared that the ordinance for the sale of these lots was induced by the fact that the expenses of the city government were more than its revenues, and these sales were provided for in the hope that the condition of the city's finances might thereby be improved. There was also put in evidence a notice of sale of lots, advertised in The Georgia Gazette of June 13, 1799, in which were specified the terms contained in the ordinance for the sale of the lots, and the advertisement contained the statement that the "purchasers are at liberty to take a lease to him or her or his heirs and assigns forever of the lots so purchased, at a ground rent of five per cent on the valuation," etc.

An ordinance for laying off into city lots what was called the "Springfield Plantation," and providing for the sale of the same, passed in the year 1851, was also put in evidence, which contained substantially the same plan as that provided for in the ordinance of September 28, 1790, except that the conditional sale was to be for twenty-four years only. Although the lots mentioned in the petition of the plaintiffs in error in this case are not situated within the Springfield Plantation, the ordinance and the deed thereunder regarding those lots were put in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the ordinance of 1790, and the deeds executed thereunder, in order to show that the same language, except as to the term, was used in the instrument which granted a lease for but twenty-four years as was used in the other granting a perpetual term. There were also ordinances of February 27 and July 31, 1851, put in evidence, the former of which permitted one of two or more tenants in common or joint tenants to pay his proportion of the purchase money, and, upon such payment, he should receive a deed in fee, and any lessee of a city lot might, on application, have it divided into two or more parts and receive a lease for the same; and the other ordinance provided for increasing the depth of certain lots, at an increased rent therefor, payable at the same time that the regular ground rents on these lots fell due.

A report of the mayor in 1854, to the common council, was put in evidence, in which was a statement of the resources of

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the city of Savannah, among which were designated 643 lots in 22 wards "under lease;" also two reports of the mayor, the one on October 31, 1855, and the other a year later, both containing similar statements as to the number of lots belonging to the city, which were "under lease," and similar reports from and including 1857, up to and including 1877, with the exception of the years 1864 and 1865, when no report was made by the mayors of the city. This class of evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that the title conveyed to the purchasers was under a lease, and that it was not a conditional estate subject to be terminated by a breach of a condition subsequent, and that the city recognized the conveyance as a lease and not in truth as a conditional estate.

On April 7, 1806, an ordinance was passed by the city council for raising a fund for the support of a "watch" in the city, which provided that a tax should be levied on property therein, "including all lots held by lease from the corporation,” but on November 24, 1806, an ordinance was passed providing "that so much of the first section of the aforesaid ordinance as imposes a tax on lots held by lease from the corporation be and the same is hereby repealed."

It was admitted that every annual tax ordinance to raise revenue for the city passed by the mayor and aldermen from the above date, November 24, 1806, up to and including the ordinance of January 22, 1857, used the words "excepting lots held by lease from the corporation." On December 11, 1857, the tax ordinance provided as follows:

"SEC. 4. The following real property shall be exempt from taxation, to wit: each lot of land held at the time of the pas sage of this ordinance upon the payment of ground rent to the mayor and aldermen, of the class commonly called city lots."

The annual report of the mayor for the year 1871 was also put in evidence, in which the following language occurs: "It is not known to the foreign public that a very large part of the real estate in the city consists of lots sold on condition of the payment of ground rent, and are, therefore, not the subject of taxation, and are not included in the assessments."

It was also admitted that lots known as "ground rent lots"

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were never in fact assessed for taxation from 1790 until some time after the passage of the ordinance of May 29, 1878, and that those lots were omitted from the assessment books made in 1807 and every year thereafter down to the assessment book made out in the year 1878, and that in fact no city taxes were ever levied on them until after the resolution of the common council of November 17, 1889, under which they have been for the first time assessed for city taxation for the year 1890.

It was also admitted that no taxes were in fact assessed or levied under the ordinance of April 7, 1806, above mentioned. The holders of these city lots have always paid state and county taxes and street improvements and assessments for sidewalks and all other assessments and burdens common to lot owners in the said city, except city taxes. A report of the finance committee made in 1872, and signed by the chairman, was also put in evidence, in which it was stated as follows:

"The reason why city lots are not taxed beyond the ground rent is that the city is understood to have bound itself not to tax them.

"The ordinance of 1790, which was the first to provide for the sale of lots on these terms, contains a stipulation that the purchaser of such a lot, and all claiming under him, shall have the use, etc., upon paying the ground rent. This ordinance has been followed either in terms or substance by all succeeding ordinances providing for such sale.

"It is of no moment that the stipulation does not appear in the deeds; the ordinances contain the real terms of the contracts and control the deeds whenever the latter depart from them or conflict with them. And as the city has never taxed such lots, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that such was the design when the ordinance of 1790 was framed."

The ordinance of May 29, 1878, provided that—

"Every person and corporation owning real property in said city, including improvements, shall pay a tax upon said property of two and one half per centum of the value thereof, including ground-rent lots, except on such property as may be exempt from taxation under the laws of this State."