73, states the rule, as it has often been applied by the courts, and as we find it our duty to apply it in this case, in these words: "When a rule relates to the nature of things, as such nature existed at a former period, and the reason of the rule corresponds with that nature, then at an after time, if the nature of the things is altered, and, by this alteration, the rule is become too general, and the reason given for it fails, the rule in a case of this 78 kind is no longer binding. In Davies v. Powell, Willes, 46, Willes, C. J., giving the opinion of the court, says: 'When the nature of things changes, the rules of law must change too."" Nor do we think the rule, "Actio personalis moritur cum persona," should be applied. It has long been in force, both in England and this country, and in this state has received. legislative approval in so far as causes of action for libel, slander, and assault and battery are concerned, but our decisions have not extended the rule to the civil death of either persons or corporations. Nor has the language of our statute, which authorizes the continuance of certain actions for moneys against the executors and administrators of wrongdoers, but excepts actions for libel, slander, assault, and battery, and false imprisonment, been held to include the civil death of either individuals. or corporations, and it is sufficient for our present purpose to say that such an intent on the part of the legislature cannot be spelled out of the language employed by it. It is said that the rule of the common law, which has not been interfered with by statute, so far as actions for libel are concerned, may, by a process of analogical reasoning, be so extended as to include artificial "persons," and death resulting from an act of God to embrace death of a corporation by execution or other operation of law, and, further, that such reasoning has led learned judges to assume it to be the law that the dissolution of a corporation relieves its assets from that which would otherwise constitute a legal burden-that of responding for the damages occasioned to others through the misconduct of its representatives or agents. If it be true that, reasoning by analogy, but a single advance step need be taken in order to support the defendant's position, that step should not be taken, however short it may be, inasmuch as the result reached would be without support in the elements of justice, as we have already attempted to show. It is not a short step, however, for the reason of the rule preventing suit against an executor for the wrongs of his testator is stated to be that as neither the executors of the plaintiff nor those of the defendant have committed in their own personal capacity any manner 79 of wrong or injury, they should not be prosecuted for torts in actions which were originally designed for the punishment of the wrongdoer. On the other hand, the object of actions ex contractu being to reach "the property rather than the person, in which the executors now have the same interest that their testator had before," it was decided that they should be revived and continued against the executor: 1 Woerner's American Law of Administration, secs. 290-292, and notes; Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 24 Ch. D. 457; Finlay v. Chirney, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 502-504. The remedy of a plaintiff, in an action for libel to recover damages, is against the property of the corporation solely. Whether his judgment be rendered against the corporation or against the trustees after dissolution, he can have satisfaction only out of the assets of the corporation. The object of his action, therefore, is to reach the property of the corporation, and, hence, it is in all respects within the very reason assigned in support of the right of a creditor to bring actions ex contractu against the executor. Our conclusion is that as the plaintiff could have had satisfaction of his claim-if he have one out of the assets of the defendant corporation, had he prosecuted his action to judgment before the termination of the latter's corporate life, so should he now have satisfaction, as he has taken no step which either forfeits or affects his right, unless some rule of law stands across the pathway leading to justice for him, and after a careful examination of the subject we have been unable to find any such rule of law in this state. The question certified to this court by the appellate division should be answered in the affirmative, its order reversed, and that of the special term affirmed, with costs. Bartlett, Haight, Vann, Landon, Cullen, and Werner, JJ., concur. Abatement of Action by Dissolution of Corporation.-At the common law a corporation, after its dissolution, could not sue or be sued, and all pending suits by or against it were abated. This doctrine has been recognized in some of the American states, but repu diated in others: See the note to May v. State Bank, 40 Am. Dec. 738-740. It has been held that the plea that a corporation has ceased to exist in law is insufficient, but that the plea must further aver that it had ceased to exist in fact at the time when the cause of action arose: Miller v. Newburg etc. Coal Co., 31 W. Va. S36, 13 Am. St. Rep. 903, 8 S. E. 600. A suit pending against a railway company when its franchises and property are sold may be continued against its directors or managers: Texas Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1, 26 Am. St. Rep. 776, 16 S. W. 647. But it has been held that a judgment rendered against a corporation after its dissolution, or after a surrender by it and an acceptance by the state of its corporate rights and franchises, is void: Combs v. Keyes, 89 Wis. 297, 46 Am. St. Rep. 839, 62 N. W. 89; Merrill v. Suffolk Bank, 31 Me. 57, 50 Am. Dec. 649. Compare Hunt v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290, 92 Am. Dec. 292. MATTER OF CHAPMAN v. NEW YORK. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A STATUTE IMPOSING A LIABILITY UPON A CITY for the reasonable expenses or counsel fees paid or incurred by any of its officers in successfully defending against a proceeding to remove him from office, or to convict him of a crime, violates that provision of the constitution declaring that no county, city, town, or village shall give any moneys or lend its name or credit in aid of any individual or corporation, nor be allowed to incur any indebtedness except for a county, city, town, or village purpose. (pp. 661, 665.) A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION IS NOT UNDER ANY MORAL OBLIGATION to pay the expenses incurred by any of its officers in successfully resisting a proceeding to remove him from office, and hence the legislature cannot impose on it a liability to pay such expenses after they have been incurred. (p. 663.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CITY OR COUNTY PURPOSE, WHAT IS NOT.-The expenses incurred by a municipal officer in the successful resistance of a proceeding to remove him from office cannot be chargeable against the city on the ground that they were incurred for a city purpose. (p. 665.) William F. S. Hart, for the appellant. John Whalen, corporation counsel, and Theodore Connoly, for the respondent. 83 VANN, J. The statute under which this proceeding was instituted provides for the appointment of a referee "to hear, examine into, and report" the amount of reasonable counsel fees and expenses paid or incurred by a city or county officer in successfully defending himself in any trial or proceeding "to remove him from office, or . . . . to convict him of any crime" alleged to have been committed "in the performance of, or in connection with, his official duties," and that the amount allowed by the referee, when confirmed by the court, be paid by the issue of revenue bonds to be included in the taxes levied for the following year in the city or county affected: Laws 1899, c. 700. Another part of the act provides for the payment of similar claims by the state; but, as the validity of that part is not involved in this appeal, no further allusion need be made to it. While other questions have been discussed before us, the main question is whether the legislature had power, under the constitution of our state, to pass this statute. That question has been passed upon several times by the supreme court, and the conclusion reached by every judge who considered it is that the statute is unconstitutional: Matter of Straus, 44 App. Div. 425, 61 N. Y. Supp. 37; Matter of Jensen, 28 Misc. Rep. 379, 59 N. Y. Supp. 653; affirmed, 44 App. Div. 509, 60 N. Y. Supp. 933; Matter of Chapman, 57 App. Div. 582, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1135; Matter of Fallon, 28 Misc. Rep. 748, 59 N. Y. Supp. 849; Matter of Labrake, 29 Misc. Rep. 87, 60 N. Y. Supp. 989. Our examination has led us to the same result, and, as the discussion of the subject has been so thorough and able in the courts below, it is necessary for us to do little more than announce our conclusion. In a case which arose under the constitution of 1846, before it was amended, expressions were used by learned judges of this court which went beyond the requirements of the decision they made: Guilford v. Board of Supervisors of 84 Chenango Co., 13 N. Y. 143. All that was actually decided was that the legislature had power to require a board of supervisors to assess upon the taxable property of a town the amount which highway commissioners had been compelled to pay for costs in an action commenced by them pursuant to the direction of the voters of the town. The payment of such a claim was not an act of charity, as it rested on a strong moral obligation. It was, however, declared in one of the opinions that "the legislature has the right to appropriate the public moneys for local or private purposes, and to impose a tax upon the property of the whole state, or any portion of the state, or any particular or specified kind of property." In another opinion it was said: "The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys or of the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals to cases in which a legal demand exists against the state. It can thus recognize claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of those terms or in gratitude or charity." Subsequent cases, following the dicta rather than the decision, led to results which, as it is said, induced the people, in 1874, to amend the constitution by adding sections 10 and 11 to article 8. Section 11 was amended in 1884 by adding further provisions, and the substance of both sections appears in the revised constitution of 1894: Const., art. 8, secs. 9, 10. Section 9 is not now important, as it relates to the giving or lending of the credit or money of the state, but section 10 makes it a part of our fundamental law that "no county, city, town, or village shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan its money or credit to, or in aid of, any individual, association, or corporation, . . nor shall any such county, city, town, or village be allowed to incur any indebtedness, except for county, city, town, or vil lage purposes." It has been held that this provision does not prevent the legislature from authorizing the payment by a municipal corporation of a claim which, although it could not be enforced by the courts is founded in justice, supported by a moral obligation, and could have been legally created if the proceedings of the 85 local authorities had been regular: Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, 119 N. Y. 204-211, 23 N. E. 542. So it may be argued that payment of a claim otherwise valid, but against which the statute of limitations had run in favor of a municipal corporation, or of one for money expended or services performed for the benefit of a city without lawful authority, might be authorized or required by the legislature: New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; Friend v. Gilbert, 108 Mass. 408; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Brown V. Mayor etc. of New York, 63 N. Y. 239; Mayor etc. of New York v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 111 N. Y. 446, 18 N. E. 618. If a legal liability to pay once existed, but has been suspended or barred in some technical way short of substantial satisfaction, a moral obligation to pay still exists, which is recognized both by statute and common law: Code Civ. Proc., sec. 395; Tebbetts v. Dowd, 23 Wend. 379-382; Buswell's Statute of Limitations, sec. 36. In the case before us, however, no benefit was conferred upon the city, and there was never a legal or moral obligation on the part of the city to pay the claim in question. For time out of mind, in all governments where the common law prevails, a person prosecuted for crime has been compelled to pay his own expenses when he had the means of doing so: People v. Board of Supervisors, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 102; affirmed, 102 N. Y. 691. If without means, the counsel assigned by the court served without pay, except under a recent statute a moderate allowance may be made in a capital case: Laws 1897, c. 427; Code |