166, 74 Am. St. Rep. 680, 44 Atl. 252. See, further, Eddy v. Coldwell, 23 Or. 163, 37 Am. St. Rep. 672, 31 Pac. 475; Rain v. Young, 61 Kan. 428, 78 Am. St. Rep. 325, 59 Pac. 1068; Davis v. Comer, 108 Ga. 117, 75 Am. St. Rep. 33, 33 S. E. 852. Statutes of Limitations are Laws of Process, and if they do not extinguish the right itself, are deemed to operate on the remedy merely, and all questions arising under them must be determined by the law of the forum, and not by the law of the situs of the contract: Lamberton v. Grant, 94 Me. 508, 80 Am. St. Rep. 415, 48 Atl 127; Wright v. Mordaunt, 77 Miss. 537, 78 Am. St. Rep. 536, 27 South, 640. In an action on a judgment obtained in another state, the plea of statute of limitations is a plea to the remedy, and the lex fori governs: Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N. C. 190, 80 Am. St. Rep. 791, 37 S. E. 212; Van Santvoord v. Roethler, 35 Or. 250, 78 Am. St. Rep. 472, 57 Pac. 628, EXEMPTIONS.-DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR CONVERSION OF EXEMPT PROPERTY may be reached by trustee process, in the hands of the judgment debtor. (p. 595.) One Gleason recovered a judgment against a deputy sheriff for attaching goods exempt from attachment, and then, as a creditor of the plaintiff in attachment, and not as a party to the prior proceedings, sued him and summoned the defendant in attachment as trustee, moving for a stay of execution until his action against such plaintiff should be determined. Execution was stayed and exceptions taken. W. W. Forbes, for the plaintiff. Andrews & Andrews and D. W. Perkins, for the defendants. 2 YOUNG, J. All property which can be taken on execution can be attached on mesne process: Pub. Stats., c. 220, sec. 1. At common law, all the debtor's property, with a few trifling exceptions not material in this case, could be taken on execution, and it follows that all of his property which is not exempted by statute can be taken now. Damages recovered for the conversion of property exempt from attachment are not themselves exempted by statute (Pub. Stats., c. 138, sec. 1; Pub. Stats., c. 220, sec. 2; Pub. Stats., c. 245, sec. 20), and can be reached in the hands of the judgment debtor by trustee process, unless they so far partake of the nature of such property as to be ex empt for that reason. Generally, the proceeds of such property are not exempt from attachment: Morse v. Towns, 45 N. H 185; Manchester v. Burns, 45 N. H. 482, 488; Wooster v. Page, 54 N. H. 125, 20 Am. Rep. 128; Currier v. Sutherland, 54 N. H. 475, 487, 20 Am. Rep. 143; Hall v. Johnson, 64 N. H. 481, 14 Atl. 24; Brookfield v. Sawyer, 68 N. H. 406, 39 Atl. 257. This case is no exception, for no good reason can be given why one rule should be applied to damages recovered for the conversion by third parties of property exempt from attachment, and another rule to damages recovered upon a policy of insurance covering such property: Wooster v. Page, 54 N. H. 125, 20 Am. Rep. 128. 3 The reason why the plaintiff in the original action against Robinson cannot take the proceeds of this judgment to satisfy his debt is that no one will be allowed to profit by his own wrong, and do by indirection that which he could not do in a direct proceeding, and not be cause the judgment so far partakes of the nature of the property as to be itself exempt from attachment. Exception overruled. Peaslee, J., did not sit; the others concurred. Exemptions.-A judgment obtained for the conversion of exempt property is also exempt: Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. Dak. 455, 66 Am. St. Rep. 670, 75 N. W. 908. See the discussion of this question in the monographic note to Cullen v. Harris, 66 Am. St. Rep. 383-385. SMITH V. BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD. NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY-CUSTOM OF PERSON INJURED.-Evidence that it was the uniform habit of a person to slacken the speed of his horse and look and listen for the approach of a train before attempting to pass over a certain railway crossing is competent as tending to show that he did so on the trip when he was injured by a passing train, and is also competent to show the exercise of due care on that occasion. (p. 597.) NEGLIGENCE - RELYING ON PERFORMANCE OF A DUTY.-A person about to drive over a railway crossing with which he is familiar is justitied in assuming that the railway company will perform its statutory duty, and warn him of an approaching train by sounding a whistle. Whether he is at liberty to rely upon such warning altogether is a question of fact. (p. 597.) NEGLIGENCE RAILROADS DUTY TO STOP, LOOK, AND LISTEN.-The fact that a person does not entirely stop, look, and listen for the approach of a train before attempting to drive over a crossing with which he is familiar is not conclusive of a want of due care. (p. 600.) F. M. Beckford and Stone & Shannon, for the plaintiff. F. S. Streeter and Jewett & Plummer, for the defendants. 82 CHASE, J. Cate's uniform habit of slackening the speed of his horse to a walk at the Waukewan crossing, and looking and listening for the approach of a train before attempting to pass the crossing, tended to show that he did so on his fatal trip. It was substantial evidence of the exercise of care on that occasion: Davis v. Concord etc. R. R. Co., 68 N. H. 247, 248, 44 Atl. 388, and authorities cited. But it is said that this evidence proves too much to be of benefit to the plaintiff; that if Cate did exercise care to that extent, he must have discovered the approach of the train, and consequently must have been guilty of negligence in attempt ing to pass over the crossing ahead of it; that this evidence in connection with the other evidence bearing on the question is so uniform and weighty that impartial and reasonable men could not arrive at different conclusions upon it, but must agree that Cate's death was caused by his own negligence. This makes it necessary to examine the evidence sufficiently to ascertain whether it possessed uniformity and weight to the degree alleged. The elevated land between the highway and the railroad track, with the house and fence upon it, obstructed the view of the track from the highway more or less. The obstruction was greater at some points than others. The defendants' experiments showed that, with the conditions as they were on the evening when the experiments were made, the light from the locomotive and cars could be seen above the fence, or through cracks in it, the most, if not all, of the distance between the house and the crossing. This night was cloudy, but there was a moon, while on the night of the accident it was cloudy, misty, and dark. The persons observing the experiments knew that the train was on the track, and it 83 is fair to presume were specially alert in their efforts to see the light. They were there to make observations with a view of testifying in the case, and their attention was fixed upon the matter. Whether a man of average prudence, about to pass over a grade crossing, would take the same pains in attempting to discover the lights of an approaching train, and whether the lights would be discovered without such pains, were pure questions of fact. These differences in the conditions between the night of the experiment and the night of the accident affect the weight of the testimony. It was also necessary to determine whether the lights of the train were in the same places and of the same intensity as those of the colliding train. When Cate got opposite the end of the fence he could see down the railroad for some distance the distance increasing as he approached the track. The engineer of the train, who was looking ahead, did not see Cate's team until he was within three or four rods of it, and then saw only the horse's head and forward parts. They came from behind the fence, "right out of the darkness." The curve in the road caused the headlight to send its rays to the westerly side of the track, until it came near the crossing. It would not be contrary to reason to conclude from this evidence, accompanied with a view, that Cate by his sense of sight did not discover, and by the exercise of ordinary care would not have discovered, the approach of the train in season to avoid the collision. If he saw the train at the moment when the engineer first saw his horse, it would not follow, as a matter of law, that he was in fault for not stopping, although his horse was gentle and not afraid of cars: Folsom v. Concord etc. R. R. Co., 68 N. H. 454, 38 Atl. 209. But Cate was not called upon to rely upon the sense of sight alone. It was the duty of the defendants to give two long and two short whistles when their locomotive was eighty rods distant from the crossing: Pub. Stats., c. 159, sec. 6. Cate was justified in relying upon a performance of this duty: State v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 58 N. H. 408, 410; Nutter v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 60 N. H. 483. Whether he was at liberty to rely upon it altogether is a question of fact, and not of law: Mitchell v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 68 N. H. 96, 116, 34 Atl. 674. It must be regarded as a fact that the whistle was not sounded on this occasion. There was competent evidence before the jury tending to establish this fact. The weight of the evidence depended largely upon the situations of the witnesses relative to the crossing at the time the whistle should have been sounded, their intelligence, their habits of observation, their candor, and their appearance generally-matters of which the jury had advantages for judging which the court do not have. Even |