Third Department, November, 1916. [Vol. 175. to use, for it includes no action of the Legislature, or of any person, prior to the final passage of the act by the Legislature, and it includes the whole of the act, nothing more and nothing less. The word 'law' is probably the worst word to use, for a portion of any act may be law, as well as the whole of the act. 'Law,' however, as here used, is intended to be synonymous with act."" (See Wahl v. Holt, 26 Wis. 703; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446.) No one ever refers to an ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation of a municipal corporation as an act; certainly no one ever used the expression in a statute to convey the idea of an ordinance or other local law, and in section 288 of this very statute* we find references to ordinances, rules and regulations of municipal corporations wherever it has these in view; it does not call them "any act," but refers to them in the usual terminology of the law in reference to such local enactments. The rule is well settled that words having a precise and well-settled meaning in the jurisprudence of a country have the same sense when used in its statutes, unless a different meaning is plainly intended (Perkins v. Smith, 116 N. Y. 441), and certainly the expression "an act," as used in the Constitution and laws of this State, and as recognized throughout the jurisprudence of the country, cannot be held to mean ordinances, rules and regulations of a municipal corporation when appearing in a general statute, without anything in the context to indicate that they are used in any different sense from that which usually prevails. If we are right in this view, it follows that the contention of the plaintiff is without force, for there is no other language in the act which undertakes to make it the duty of municipal corporations to turn over the fines and penalties collected for violations of their own ordinances, and this view is strengthened by the fact that section 288 of the act limits generally the prohibition against making ordinances to cities other than those of the first class, among which is the defendant. It may be, of course, that the general act has operated to prevent cities other than those of the first class making ordinances which are intended to regulate the speed of motor vehicles, except under * Added by Laws of 1910, chap. 374, as amd. by Laws of 1915, chap. 487. Since amd. by Laws of 1916, chap. 579. [REP. Third Department, November, 1916. App. Div.] the special conditions named in section 288, and that the courts, judges, magistrates, etc., who are called upon to enforce the general law are required to turn over the funds collected for violations of the act, but we are clearly of the opinion that where a municipality has the right to enact ordinances upon the question of motor vehicles, their rate of speed, etc., there is nothing in the act here under review which makes it the duty of the courts to turn over the fines and penalties collected for a violation of such ordinances. "Any act in relation to the use of the public highways by motor vehicles now in force or hereafter enacted," means an act of the Legislature, not the ordinances or rules and regulations of municipal corporations. This view is in harmony with the provisions of section 280 of the act (as added by Laws of 1910, chap. 374), which provides that "except as herein otherwise expressly provided, this article shall be exclusively controlling," not upon the disposition of the fines and penalties, but "1. Upon the registration, numbering and regulation of motor vehicles, and the licensing and the regulation of chauffeurs; 2. On their use of the public highways, and 3. On the accessories used upon motor vehicles and their incidents and the speed of motor vehicles upon the public highways; 4. On the punishment for the violation of any of the provisions of this article." And it is the fines, penalties and forfeitures growing out of the punishment of the violation of any of the provisions of this article which are dealt with in the provisions of section 291 of the act, while section 288 relieves cities of the first class from the inhibition against the passage of special ordinances governing the operation of motor vehicles. (See People v. Untermyer, 153 App. Div. 176.) The judgment appealed from should be affirmed. Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs. Third Department, November, 1916. [Vol. 175. Before STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Respondent. In the Matter of the Claim of CLINTON D. FOWLER, Respondent, for Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, v. RISEDORPH BOTTLING COMPANY, Employer, and ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, Insurance Carrier, Appellants. Third Department, November 15, 1916. Workmen's Compensation Law - right of employee suffering from result of cerebral hemorrhage to compensation. A person employed as a bottler, seized with a stroke of apoplexy by reason of the strain occasioned by lifting a barrel which he was assisting another in placing on the third tier, which resulted in a cerebral hemorrhage, suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, within the intent and meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law, especially where it appears that it was usual to pile the barrels only two tiers high; that said employee had always been in good health; that while raising the barrel he felt dizzy, and had severe pains in the head. The statute does not require that the nature of the injury shall be such as to present a visible or external sign. APPEAL by Risedorph Bottling Company and another from an award of the State Industrial Commission, entered in the office of said Commission on the 12th day of November, 1915, which said award was reaffirmed on the 14th day of March, 1916. Alfred W. Andrews [John N. Carlisle and Charles B. Sullivan of counsel], for the appellants. Egburt E. Woodbury, Attorney-General [E. C. Aiken, Deputy Attorney-General, of counsel], for the respondents. LYON, J.: The question involved upon this appeal is the right to compensation of an employee suffering from the result of a cerebral hemorrhage induced by over-exertion while engaged in an occupation designated as hazardous by the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 67; Laws of 1913, chap. 816; re-enacted by Laws of 1914, chap. 41, as amd. by Laws of 1914, chap. 316). App. Div.] Third Department, November, 1916. The State Industrial Commission has found as conclusions of fact that in November, 1914, the claimant was employed as a bottler by the Risedorph Bottling Company, which was engaged in the manufacture of mineral waters at Kinderhook, N. Y.; that while claimant "was working for his employer at his employer's plant, and was assisting another employee in lifting a barrel weighing about 200 lbs. for the purpose of tiering for storage in the cooler, he was seized with a stroke of apoplexy by reason of the strain occasioned by the lifting of the heavy barrel. By reason of this apoplexy, that portion of the brain in which the apoplexy was seated became degenerated, and while Fowler gradually recovered from the motor paralysis of the left side which immediately followed the apoplexy, there remained a deterioration of his mental faculties due to the above-mentioned degeneration, by reason of which apoplexy and degeneration Fowler was disabled from working from the date of the accident to the date hereof, and is still disabled. * **The injuries to Clinton D. Fowler were accidental injuries, and arose out of and in the course of his employment. This claim comes within the provi * * * sions of chapter 67 of the Consolidated Laws." There was much testimony given before the Commission by medical experts as to the cause of claimant's enfeebled condition. The experts called by the insurance carrier ascribed it to cerebral thrombosis, resulting from arterial sclerosis. The experts called by the claimant supported the theory that such condition resulted from embolism, and one of them testified that he found no evidence of arterial sclerosis. However, it is not for us to determine which theory seems to be better supported by the facts. The Commission has done that, and its decision, which finds justification in the evidence, is binding upon us. As the appellants' counsel state in their brief the case must be viewed as one of cerebral hemorrhage. So considered, I think, the award made by the Commission was fully warranted. The Workmen's Compensation Law does not require that the nature of the injury shall be such as to present a visible or external sign. The act simply says (§ 2): "CompenAPP. DIV.- VOL. CLXXV. 15 Third Department, November, 1916. [Vol. 175. sation provided for in this chapter shall be payable for injuries sustained or death incurred by employees engaged in the following hazardous employments." It may well be doubted whether the beneficent purposes of the law, which have repeatedly been the subject of consideration by both the Court of Appeals and this court, would be fully subserved if its application were limited to accidents of which there appeared an external or visible sign. No good reason for such limitation is apparent. Certainly the statute has not seen fit to prescribe it, and it is not for this court to write it into the law. Appellant's main contention is that claimant's condition was the natural progress and result of disease, and not of accidental personal injury arising out of his employment. This contention was disposed of by the decision of the State Industrial Commission made upon conflicting testimony mainly of medical experts. That the cerebral hemorrhage, if resulting from strain in lifting while the claimant was engaged in his usual employment, constituted an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law is denied by the appellants who, in their carefully prepared brief, cite many cases in support of their contention. These cases in effect hold that where the death of the employee occurs from heart failure or from inherent internal weakness or disease while the employee is doing his ordinary work in the ordinary way and not as the result of sudden or extra exertion, his death cannot be said to be accidental. In one of the cases cited (Barnabas v. Bersham Colliery Co., 103 L. T. [N. S.] 513) it was held that a stroke of apoplexy which may or may not have been brought on by a strain or over-exertion, is not an injury suffered by accident where there is no evidence that the work subjected the workman to any serious strain. In the case at bar there was testimony that the claimant, who was fifty-two years old, and for twenty-two years had been in the service of the defendant employer, had always been in good health, and in fact had never up to the time of sustaining the apoplectic stroke been attended by a physician. Of the occurrence itself the claimant testifies that while raising the barrel he felt a sensation, "I had a dizzy head. It came on me suddenly." His brother, who was assisting claim |