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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Jurisdiction, 2.

I. Commerce Clause.

State statute prohibiting display of state grade of apples-Burden on
interstate commerce.-North Carolina statute requiring that all apples
sold or shipped into State in closed containers be identified by no grade
other than applicable federal grade or a designation that apples are not
graded, violates Commerce Clause by burdening and discriminating against
interstate sale of Washington apples. Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver-
tising Comm'n, p. 333.

II. Due Process.

1. Admissibility of identification evidence-State criminal trial.-Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment does not compel exclusion, at
respondent's state criminal trial on charge of possession and sale of heroin,
of identification evidence consisting of police photograph of respondent,
testimony of undercover police officer that person shown in photograph
was suspect from whom officer had purchased heroin, and officer's posi-
tive in-court identification. Reliability is linchpin in determining admis-
sibility of identification testimony for confrontations occurring both prior
to and after Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, wherein it was held that de-
termination depends on "totality of circumstances." Manson v. Braith-
waite, p. 98.

2. Murder prosecution-Burden of proving affirmative defense-Retro-
activity of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684.-North Carolina Supreme
Court, on appeal from petitioner's conviction for second-degree murder,
erred in declining, with respect to erroneous jury instruction as to burden
on petitioner to prove self-defense, to hold retroactive Mullaney rule,
which required State to establish all elements of a criminal offense beyond
a reasonable doubt and which invalidated presumptions that shifted bur-
den of proving such elements to defendant. While in deciding whether
a new constitutional rule is to be applied retroactively it is proper to
consider State's reliance on old rule and impact of new rule on adminis-
tration of justice if degree to which new rule enhances integrity of fact-
finding process is sufficiently small, "where the major purpose of new
constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that
substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious
questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule
[is] given complete retroactive effect." Hankerson v. North Carolina,
p. 233.

3. Murder prosecution-Fair trial-Jury selection-Pretrial news cov-
erage. Absent anything in record, in particular with respect to voir dire
examination of jurors, that would require a finding of constitutional unfair-
ness as to method of jury selection or as to character of jurors actually

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

selected, petitioner has failed to show that under "totality of circum-
stances" extensive pretrial news media coverage of his case denied him a
fair trial on a charge, inter alia, of first-degree murder of one of his
children. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.

4. Murder trial-Burden of proving affirmative defense.-New York
law requiring that defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder
prove by a preponderance of evidence affirmative defense of extreme emo-
tional disturbance in order to reduce crime to manslaughter does not vio-
late Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Patterson v. New
York, p. 197.

III. Equal Protection of the Laws.

1. Barring resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher edu-
cation-Strict scrutiny.-New York statute that bars certain resident
aliens from state financial assistance for higher education violates Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Statute discriminates
against a class and is subject to strict scrutiny since it is directed at
aliens and only aliens are harmed by it even though its bar against them
is not absolute in that those who have applied for citizenship or those not
qualified to apply who have filed statements of intent may participate in
assistance programs. Nyquist v. Mauclet, p. 1.

2. Changes in death penalty statute.-Imposition of death sentence upon
petitioner for first-degree murder pursuant to new Florida death penalty
statute did not deny him equal protection of laws. Having been neither
tried nor sentenced prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, he was
not similarly situated to those prisoners whose death sentences under
old statute were commuted to life imprisonment after Florida Supreme
Court had invalidated old statute under Furman, and it was not irra-
tional for Florida to relegate petitioner to class of those prisoners whose
acts could properly be punished under new statute that was in effect at
time of his trial and sentence. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.

3. City funding of childbirth but not nontherapeutic abortions.-City
of St. Louis, in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed
hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions,
does not violate any constitutional rights. Poelker v. Doe, p. 519.

4. Independent candidate-Access to ballot.-In appellees' action chal-
lenging constitutionality of Maryland statute requiring an independent
candidate for statewide or federal office, in order to qualify for a position
on general election ballot, to file 70 days before date of party primaries,
nominating petitions signed by at least 3% of State's registered voters,
three-judge District Court was not warranted in holding, on basis of this
Court's summary affirmance in Tucker v. Salera, 424 U. S. 959, that

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

Maryland statute's early filing deadline was an unconstitutional burden on
an independent candidate's access to ballot. Rather than relying on Salera
as controlling precedent, District Court should have conducted an inde-
pendent examination of merits under constitutional standards set forth
in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 742, for determining extent of burden
imposed on independent candidates. Mandel v. Bradley, p. 173.

5. Medicaid program-State funding of childbirth but not nonthera-
peutic abortions.-Equal Protection Clause does not require a State par-
ticipating in Medicaid program to pay expenses incident to nonthera-
peutic abortions for indigent women simply because it has made a policy
choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth. Maher v. Roe, p. 464.
IV. Ex Post Facto Laws.

1. Changes in death penalty statute.-Changes in Florida's death pen-
alty statute between time of first-degree murder for which petitioner was
convicted and sentenced to death and time of trial are procedural and on
whole ameliorative, and hence there is no ex post facto violation. New
statute simply altered methods employed in determining whether death
penalty was to be imposed, and there was no change in quantum of pun-
ishment attached to crime. New statute provides capital defendants with
more, rather than less, judicial protection than old statute. Dobbert v.
Florida, p. 282.

2. Changes in death penalty statute-Increased burdens on life sen-
tence under new statute.-Petitioner, having been sentenced to death for
first-degree murder under new Florida death penalty statute, may not
complain of burdens attached to a life sentence under that statute which
may not have attached to old statute which was in effect at time murder
was committed. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.

3. Changes in death penalty statute-Warning of death penalty.—
Existence of earlier Florida death penalty statute at time of first-degree
murder for which petitioner was convicted and sentenced under changed
statute served as an "operative fact" to warn petitioner of penalty which
Florida would seek to impose on him if he were convicted of first-degree
murder, and this was sufficient compliance with ex post facto provision
of Constitution, notwithstanding subsequent invalidation of earlier stat-
ute. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.

V. Fifth Amendment.

1. Double jeopardy-Conviction of lesser included offense-Bar to sub-
sequent prosecution.-Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment, ap-
plied to States through Fourteenth, bars prosecution and punishment for
crime of stealing an automobile following prosecution and punishment

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

for lesser included offense of operating same vehicle without owner's
consent. Brown v. Ohio, p. 161.

2. Double jeopardy-Multiple prosecutions-Accused's opposition to
consolidated trial.-Court of Appeals' judgment that although offense
under 21 U. S. C. § 846 (conspiracy to distribute drugs) was a lesser
included offense of 21 U. S. C. § 848 (conducting a criminal enterprise
to violate drug laws), §§ 846 and 848 were not "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes and therefore petitioner's conviction under § 846 did
not bar prosecution under § 848, petitioner having opposed a consolidated
trial, is affirmed. Jeffers v. United States, p. 137.

3. Double jeopardy-Retrial after dismissal of information.-Petitioner's
retrial for theft in violation of Assimilative Crimes Act and applicable
Indiana statute after dismissal of defective information at his request did
not violate Double Jeopardy Clause. Proceedings against petitioner did
not terminate in his favor, dismissal clearly not being predicated on any
judgment that he could never be prosecuted for or convicted of theft.
Lee v. United States, p. 23.

VI. Right of Privacy.

Medicaid abortion benefits—Limitation to "medically necessary" abor-
tions.-Connecticut regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits for first
trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary," does not
impinge upon fundamental right of privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade,
410 U. S. 113, that protects a woman from unduly burdensome interfer-
ence with her freedom to decide whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. That right implies no limitation on a State's authority to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and to implement that
judgment by allocation of public funds. An indigent woman desiring an
abortion is not disadvantaged by Connecticut's decision to fund child-
birth; she continues as before to be dependent on private abortion
services. Maher v. Roe, p. 464.

COURTS OF APPEALS. See Investment Company Act of 1940.
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE IN VIOLATION OF DRUG LAWS. See
Constitutional Law, V, 2; Criminal Law.

CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, II; III, 2; IV; V.

Cumulative fines.-Court of Appeals' judgment imposing cumulative
fines for petitioner's separate convictions for violation of 21 U. S. C.
§ 846 (conspiracy to distribute drugs) and 21 U. S. C. § 848 (conducting
a criminal enterprise to violate drug laws), is vacated, and case is re-
manded. Jeffers v. United States, p. 137.

CUMULATIVE PENALTIES OR FINES. See Criminal Law.

DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law, II, 3; III, 2; IV.

DEFENSES TO MURDER. See Constitutional Law, II, 2, 4.

DELAY OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
IN BRINGING ENFORCEMENT ACTION. See Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 2-4.

DENIAL OF STAY. See Jurisdiction, 2; Stays.

DEPENDENT CHILDREN. See Social Security Act, 2.

DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE UNDER VOTING RIGHTS ACT
OF 1965. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1.

DISCLOSURE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD'S FATHER. See Social
Security Act, 1.

DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Intervention; Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965.

DISMISSAL OF INFORMATION. See Constitutional Law, V, 3.
DISMISSAL OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS IMPROVIDENTLY
GRANTED. See Certiorari.

DISPLAY OF SWASTIKA. See Jurisdiction, 2.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY. See Constitutional Law, V.

DRUG OFFENSES. See Constitutional Law, V, 2; Criminal Law.

DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.

EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. See Constitutional Law,
III, 1.

ELECTIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 4.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1, 5;
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964;
Intervention.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY COMMISSION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See Constitutional Law, III.
EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, II, 1, 2, 4.

EX POST FACTO LAWS. See Constitutional Law, IV.

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