United States Reports

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
Maryland statute's early filing deadline was an unconstitutional burden on
an independent candidate's access to ballot. Rather than relying on Salera
as controlling precedent, District Court should have conducted an inde-
pendent examination of merits under constitutional standards set forth
in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 742, for determining extent of burden
imposed on independent candidates. Mandel v. Bradley, p. 173.

5. Medicaid program-State funding of childbirth but not nonthera-
peutic abortions.-Equal Protection Clause does not require a State par-
ticipating in Medicaid program to pay expenses incident to nonthera-
peutic abortions for indigent women simply because it has made a policy
choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth. Maher v. Roe, p. 464.
IV. Ex Post Facto Laws.

1. Changes in death penalty statute.-Changes in Florida's death pen-
alty statute between time of first-degree murder for which petitioner was
convicted and sentenced to death and time of trial are procedural and on
whole ameliorative, and hence there is no ex post facto violation. New
statute simply altered methods employed in determining whether death
penalty was to be imposed, and there was no change in quantum of pun-
ishment attached to crime. New statute provides capital defendants with
more, rather than less, judicial protection than old statute. Dobbert v.
Florida, p. 282.

2. Changes in death penalty statute-Increased burdens on life sen-
tence under new statute.-Petitioner, having been sentenced to death for
first-degree murder under new Florida death penalty statute, may not
complain of burdens attached to a life sentence under that statute which
may not have attached to old statute which was in effect at time murder
was committed. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.

3. Changes in death penalty statute-Warning of death penalty.-
Existence of earlier Florida death penalty statute at time of first-degree
murder for which petitioner was convicted and sentenced under changed
statute served as an "operative fact” to warn petitioner of penalty which
Florida would seek to impose on him if he were convicted of first-degree
murder, and this was sufficient compliance with ex post facto provision
of Constitution, notwithstanding subsequent invalidation of earlier stat-
ute. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.
V. Fifth Amendment.

1. Double jeopardy-Conviction of lesser included offense-Bar to sub-
sequent prosecution.-Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment, ap-
plied to States through Fourteenth, bars prosecution and punishment for
crime of stealing an automobile following prosecution and punishment

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
for lesser included offense of operating same vehicle without owner's
consent. Brown v. Ohio, p. 161.

2. Double jeopardy-Multiple prosecutions-Accused's opposition to
consolidated trial.- Court of Appeals' judgment that although offense
under 21 U. S. C. $ 846 (conspiracy to distribute drugs) was a lesser
included offense of 21 U. S. C. $ 848 (conducting a criminal enterprise
to violate drug laws), 88 846 and 848 were not "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes and therefore petitioner's conviction under 8 846 did
not bar prosecution under $ 848, petitioner having opposed a consolidated
trial, is affirmed. Jeffers v. United States, p. 137.

3. Double jeopardyRetrial after dismissal of information.-Petitioner's
retrial for theft in violation of Assimilative Crimes Act and applicable
Indiana statute after dismissal of defective information at his request did
not violate Double Jeopardy Clause. Proceedings against petitioner did
not terminate in his favor, dismissal clearly not being predicated on any
judgment that he could never be prosecuted for or convicted of theft.
Lee v. United States, p. 23.
VI. Right of Privacy

Medicaid abortion benefits-Limitation to "medically necessary" abor-
tions.-Connecticut regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits for first
trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary," does not
impinge upon fundamental right of privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade,
410 U. S. 113, that protects a woman from unduly burdensome interfer-
ence with her freedom to decide whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. That right implies no limitation on a State's authority to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and to implement that
judgment by allocation of public funds. An indigent woman desiring an
abortion is not disadvantaged by Connecticut's decision to fund child-
birth; she continues as before to be dependent on private abortion
services. Maher v. Roe, p. 464.
COURTS OF APPEALS. See Investment Company Act of 1940.
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE IN VIOLATION OF DRUG LAWS. See

Constitutional Law, V, 2; Oriminal Law.
CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, II; III, 2; IV; V.

Cumulative fines. Court of Appeals' judgment imposing cumulative
fines for petitioner's separate convictions for violation of 21 U. 8. C.
8 846 (conspiracy to distribute drugs) and 21 U. 8. C. 8 848 (conducting
a criminal enterprise to violate drug laws), is vacated, and case is re-
manded. Jeffers v. United States, p. 137.
OUMULATIVE PENALTIES OR FINES. See Oriminal Law.

DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law, II, 3; III, 2; IV.
DEFENSES TO MURDER. See Constitutional Law, II, 2, 4.
DELAY OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

IN BRINGING ENFORCEMENT ACTION. See Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 2-4.

DENIAL OF STAY. See Jurisdiction, 2; Stays.
DEPENDENT CHILDREN. See Social Security Act, 2.
DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE UNDER VOTING RIGHTS ACT

OF 1965. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1.
DISCLOSURE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD'S FATHER. See Social

Security Act, 1.
DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Intervention; Vot-

ing Rights Act of 1965.
DISMISSAL OF INFORMATION. See Constitutional Law, V, 3.
DISMISSAL OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS IMPROVIDENTLY

GRANTED. See Certiorari.
DISPLAY OF SWASTIKA. See Jurisdiction, 2.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. See Constitutional Law, V.
DRUG OFFENSES. See Constitutional Law, V, 2; Criminal Law.
DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.
EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. See Constitutional Law,

III, 1.
ELECTIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 4.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1, 5;

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964;

Intervention.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-

TUNITY COMMISSION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972. See Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 24.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION. See Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See Constitutional Law, III.
EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, II, 1, 2, 4.
EX POST FACTO LAWS. See Constitutional Law, IV.

EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE AS DEFENSE TO MUR-

DER. See Constitutional Law, II, 1.
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. See Constitutional Law, II, 1.
FAILURE TO PRESENT QUESTION IN PETITION FOR CERTIO-

RARI. See Certiorari.
FAIR TRIAL. See Constitutional Law, II, 3.
FATHERS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. See Social Security

Act, 1.
FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 1.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Intervention.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Banks; Civil Rights Act of

1964, 2–4; Constitutional Law, I; III, 5; Social Security Act.
FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, V.
FINAL JUDGMENTS. See Jurisdiction, 2.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION. See Con-

stitutional Law, III, 1.
FINES. See Criminal Law.
FIRST AMENDMENT. See Jurisdiction, 2.
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER. See Constitutional Law, II, 3; III, 2; IV.
FLORIDA. See Constitutional Law, II, 3; III, 2; IV.
FORECLOSURES OF MORTGAGES. See Banks.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II, 1, 2, 4;

III, 1-3, 5; V, 1.
FUNDING OF ABORTIONS. See Abortions; Constitutional Law, III,

3; Social Security Act, 3.
“GOOD CAUSE" FOR NOT DISCLOSING ILLEGITIMATE CHILD'S

FATHER. See Social Security Act, 1.
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE SECRETARY. See Social

Security Act, 2.
HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. See Constitu-

tional Law, III, 1.
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, II, 1.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. See Social Security Act, 1.
IMPROVIDENT GRANT OF CERTIORARI. See Certiorari.
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FOR POLITICAL OFFICE. See Con-

stitutional Law, III, 4.

INJUNCTIONS. See Banks; Jurisdiction, 2; Stays.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, I.
INTERVENING LEGISLATION. See Social Security Act, 1.
INTERVENTION.

Timeliness—Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24.-Motion of respondent former
stewardess for petitioner airline, who had been discharged because of
petitioner's no-marriage rule, to intervene in action under Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 challenging legality of that rule was "timely"
filed under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 and should have been granted, not-
withstanding it was not filed until after District Court had entered final
judgment dismissing action following its determination that plaintiffs were
entitled to reinstatement and backpay and parties' agreement on amounts
to be awarded each plaintiff. Respondent sought to intervene, not to
litigate her individual claim based on no-marriage rule's illegality, but to
obtain appellate review of District Court's denial of class-action status of
action. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, p. 385.
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940.

Approval of merger-Securities and Exchange Commission's discre-
tion—Judicial review.-In approving merger of a closed-end investment
company (Christiana), 98% of whose assets consisted of Du Pont Co.
common stock, into an affiliate company (Du Pont), SEC reasonably
exercised its discretion under § 17 (b) of Act in valuing Christiana es-
sentially on basis of market value of Du Pont stock rather than on lower
basis of Christiana's outstanding stock. Since record before SEC clearly
reveals substantial evidence to support its findings and since that agency's
conclusions of law were based on a construction of statute consistent with
legislative intent, Court of Appeals erred in rejecting SEC's conclusion
and substituting its own judgment for that of SEC. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Collins, p. 46.
JOYRIDING. See Constitutional Law, V, 1.
JUDICIAL REVIEW. See Investment Company Act of 1940; Voting

Rights Act of 1965.
JURISDICTION.

1. Action by state agency in representational capacity-Requisite
amount in controversy.—Requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1331 are satisfied
in action by appellee (a statutory agency for promotion and protection
of Washington State apple industry and composed of 13 state growers
and dealers chosen from electoral districts by their fellow growers and
dealers, all of whom by mandatory assessments finance appellee's opera-
tions) challenging constitutionality of North Carolina statute requiring
that all apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed containers

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United States Reports: Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court at ..., Volume 432