312

BLACKMUN, J., dissenting

In short, in over a century of the application of the statute by this Court and others, no distinction has been drawn between suits by debtors and suits by creditors, and no limitation to bank insolvency has been imposed. And, of course, Congress' continued acquiescence in this interpretation of the statute only reaffirms the correctness of the longsettled construction.

III

Even if the legislative history in the cases were less clear, I could not accept the distinction the Court today draws between applications for prejudgment writs by creditors and those by debtors. If the purpose of the provision is to protect the bank's property, no such distinction logically follows. Surely, it must be acknowledged that an injunction interfering with a bank's security interest in mortgaged property is as much an action against its assets as an attachment of its funds or property. And a debtor's injunction directed at a bank's security interest in a building is just as harmful as an attachment of bank property of comparable value by a creditor.3

construction" of the statute. 198 U. S., at 559. And as to the "contrary approach" of Earle, I note that the Van Reed Court stated: "We find nothing in the case of Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449, which qualifies the decision announced in the Mixter case." 198 U. S., at 559.

3 Thus the Court's first reason for its construction of the statute, ante, at 322—the protection of national banks from insolvency-in fact supports the application of the statute to bar prejudgment state-court writs by both creditors and debtors. The other justifications offered fare no better. The second reason, ante, at 322-323—the failure to include garnishment among the prohibited writs-is easily explained by the fact that the seizure of property in which the bank has no interest does not adversely affect it. See Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449, 454 (1900). Thus the absence of mention of garnishment hardly justifies a construction that would allow interference with a bank's property by a debtor. The third reason, ante, at 323-the alleged absence of an interest supporting the natural reading of the statute-is also easily answered. The statute's obvious purpose

BLACKMUN, J., dissenting

432 U.S.

I suspect that the only justification for the Court's decision today is its belief that the statute is unfair in its application. It should be noted in that regard, however, that any unfairness can be traced at least as much to the Tennessee procedure governing foreclosure as to the federal provision barring prejudgment writs in state courts. For if Tennessee law required judicial approval for a foreclosure, any perceived need for the instant preliminary injunction would be eliminated. But even if any unfairness were attributed solely to the federal law, the decision whether to alter the statute remains with the Congress, not with this Court. Since I do not feel free to amend the statute, I respectfully dissent.

of protecting the property of a national bank requires that interference with that property by all, both debtors and creditors, be treated alike.

Syllabus

HUNT, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON STATE APPLE ADVER

TISING COMMISSION

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 76-63. Argued February 22, 1977-Decided June 20, 1977 Appellee, a statutory agency for the promotion and protection of the Washington State apple industry and composed of 13 state growers and dealers chosen from electoral districts by their fellow growers and dealers, all of whom by mandatory assessments finance appellee's operations, brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute requiring that all apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed containers be identified by no grade on the containers other than the applicable federal grade or a designation that the apples are not graded. A three-judge District Court granted the requested injunctive and declaratory relief, holding that appellee had standing to challenge the statute, that the $10,000 jurisdictional amount of 28 U. S. C. § 1331 was satisfied, and that the challenged statute unconstitutionally discriminated against commerce insofar as it affected the interstate shipment of Washington apples. Held:

1. Appellee has standing to bring this action in a representational capacity. Pp. 341-345.

(a) An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of each of the individual members. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490. Pp. 342-343.

(b) The prerequisites to associational standing described in Warth are clearly present here: (1) At the risk of otherwise losing North Carolina accounts, some Washington apple growers and dealers had (at a per-container cost of 5 to 15¢) obliterated Washington State grades from the large volume of North Carolina-bound containers; and they had stopped using preprinted containers, thus diminishing the efficiency of their marketing operations; (2) appellee's attempt to remedy these injuries is central to its purpose of protecting and enhancing the Washington apple market; and (3) neither appellee's constitutional claim nor the relief requested requires individualized proof. Pp. 343–344.

(c) Though appellee is a state agency, it is not on that account precluded from asserting the claims of the State's apple growers and dealers since for all practical purposes appellee performs the functions of a traditional trade association. While the apple growers are not "members" of appellee in the traditional trade association sense, they possess all the indicia of organization membership (viz., electing the members, being the only ones to serve on the Commission, and financing its activities), and it is of no consequence that membership assessments are mandatory. Pp. 344-345.

(d) Appellee's own interests may be adversely affected by the outcome of this litigation, since the annual assessments that are used to support its activities and which are tied to the production of Washington apples could be reduced if the market for those apples declines as a result of the North Carolina statute. P. 345.

2. The requirements of § 1331 are satisfied. Since appellee has standing to litigate its constituents' claims, it may rely on them to meet the requisite amount of $10,000 in controversy. And it does not appear "to a legal certainty" that the claims of at least some of the individual growers and dealers will not come to that amount in view of the substantial annual sales volume of Washington apples in North Carolina (over $2 million) and the continuing nature of the statute's interference with the Washington apple industry, coupled with the evidence in the record that growers and dealers have suffered and will continue to suffer losses of various types from the operation of the challenged statute. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283. Pp. 346-348.

3. The North Carolina statute violates the Commerce Clause by burdening and discriminating against the interstate sale of Washington apples. Pp. 348–354.

(a) The statute raises the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for Washington growers and dealers while leaving unaffected their North Carolina counterparts, who were still free to market apples under the federal grade or none at all. Pp. 350–351.

(b) The statute strips the Washington apple industry of the competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself by an expensive, stringent mandatory state inspection and grading system that exceeds federal requirements. By requiring Washington apples to be sold under the inferior grades of their federal counterparts, the North Carolina statute offers the North Carolina apple industry the very sort of protection against out-of-state competition that the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit. Pp. 351–352.

(c) Even if the statute was not intended to be discriminatory and was enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and fraud because of the multiplicity of state grades, the statute does remarkably little to further that goal, at least with respect to Washington apples and grades, for it permits marketing of apples in closed containers under no grades at all and does nothing to purify the flow of information at the retail level. Moreover, Washington grades could not have led to the type of deception at which the statute was assertedly aimed, since those grades equal or surpass the comparable federal standards. Pp. 352–354.

(d) Nondiscriminatory alternatives to the outright ban of Washington State grades are readily available. P. 354.

408 F. Supp. 857, affirmed.

BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except REHNQUIST, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

John R. Jordan, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Millard R. Rich, Jr., Deputy Attorney General.

Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Edward B. Mackie, Deputy Attorney General, and James Arneil, Special Assistant Attorney General.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1973, North Carolina enacted a statute which required, inter alia, all closed containers of apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the State to bear "no grade other than the applicable U. S. grade or standard." N. C. Gen. Stat. § 106189.1 (1973). In an action brought by the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a three-judge Federal District Court invalidated the statute insofar as it prohibited the display of Washington State apple grades on the ground that it unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce.