In the language of MERCUR, J., in McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Penn. St. Rep. 223," What is and what is not negligence in a particular case, is generally a question for the jury, and not for the court. This arises from the fact that the question of ordinary and rea

Penn. St. (13 Wright), 186; North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Heileman, 49 Penn. St. 60; Lackawanna & Bloomsburg R. R. Co. v. Doak and another, 52 Penn. St. 379; Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & 1 Chi. R. R. Co. v. Evans, 53 Penn. St. 250, 254; Glassey v. The Hestonville, Mantua & Fairmount Passenger R. W. Co., 57 Penn. St. 172; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Penn. St. 259; Penn. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Penn. St. 30; West Chester & Phila. R. R. Co. v. McElwee, 67 Penn. St. 311; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Ackerman, 74 Penn. St. 265; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Penn. St. 218, 223; North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 Penn. St. 15; S. C., 1 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cas. 45; Union Pacific R. W. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kansas, 167; Tyrrell v. Eastern R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 546, 551; French v. Taunton Branch R. R. Co., 116 Mass. 537; Allender v.,Chi., Rock Island & Pacific R. R. Co., 37 Iowa, 264; Johnson and wife v. Winona & St. Peter R. R.Co., 11 Minn. 296; Donaldson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 293, 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 15; Detroit & Mil. R. R. Co. v. Curtis and wife, 23 Wis. 152; Butler, admx., v. Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 28 Wis. 487; Hunkins v. Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 30 Wis. 559; Duffy v. Chicago & N. Western Ry. Co., 32 Wis. 269; Patten v. Chi. & N. Western Ry. Co., 32 Wis. 524; Oldfield v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. (4 Kernan), 310; Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & Newtown R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. (9 Tiffany), 39; Nichols r. Sixth Avenue R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. (11 Tiffany), 131; Filer r. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 47; Eaton v. The Erie Ry. Co., 51 N. Y.

544; Pelton v. Rensselaer & Saratoga R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 214; Weber v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 451, 7 Am. Ky. Rep. 188; Cent. R. R. Co. of New Jersey v. Moore, 4 Zabr. (N. J.), 824; Brooke v. Grand Trunk R. W. Co., 15 Mich. $32: Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. (4 Jennison), 99; Lake Shore & Mich. S. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274; Cumberland & Penn. R. R. Co. v. The State, for use, etc., 37 Md. 156; Same v. State, use of Moran, 44 Md. 283; State, use, etc., v. Phil., Wilm. & Balt. R. R. Co., 47 Md. 76, 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 253; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Young, 62 Ill 238, 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 230; Smith v. Hannibal & St. Jos. R. R. Co., 37 Mo. 287; Meyers v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. Co., 59 Mo. 223, 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 473; Fletcher r. Atlantic & Pacific R. R. Co.,64 Mo. 484, 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 303; Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati & Indianapolis Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St. 340, 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 123; Directors, etc.. of Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Jackson, Law Rep., 3 App. Cas. 193, 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 621; Hobbs v. Eastern R. R. Co., 66 Me. 572, 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 210. But if a person sees, or might see, cars approaching, it is negligence to get on or remain on the track: Butler, admx., v. Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., supra; and so the court will charge. And whether the negligence of the superintendent of a repair shop is the negligence of the company, is also a question for the jury, under instruction: Potter v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 46 la. 399, 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 57.

sonable care is generally involved.' The degree of care required is changed by the circumstances of the case. Some circumstances require a higher and some a lesser degree of care. Hence generally negligence is a mixed question of law and fact. Under proper instructions it should usually be submitted to the jury, to find whether proper care has been exercised under the particular circumstances." But in no case is it a question of fact exclusively for the jury, for there is some principle of law always

applicable to the particular state of facts, which must be laid down by the court, and by which the jury are to be guided.'

In West Chester & Phila. R. R. Co. v. McElwee, just cited, the court say: "It is always a question for the jury when the measure of duty is ordinary and reasonable care. In such cases the standard of duty is not fixed, but variable. Under some circumstances a higher degree of care is demanded than under others. And when the standard shifts with the circumstances of the case, it is in its very nature incapable of being determined as matter of law, and must be submitted to the jury to determine what it is, and whether it has been complied with." So where the measure of duty is not unvarying, and where both duty and a party's conformity thereto are to be ascertained as facts, a jury alone are proper to determine what constitutes negligence in the particular case, and whether it has been proved.

R. R. Co., 43 Ia. 662, 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 575; Bessex r. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 45 Wis. 477, 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 58; Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Evans, 88 Ill. 63, 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 284; Cohen v. Eureka & P. R. R. Co., 14 Nev. 376; Cent. Branch Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Hotham, 22 Kans. 41; Kans. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, Id. (86; Houston & Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Miller, 51 Tex. 270. Whether blows given while expelling one rightfully from the cars were necessarily given, is a question of fact for the jury: Coleman r. The N. York & N. Haven R. R. Co., supra. But if the facts are undisputed, then the court is to decide: Cent. R. R. Co. v. Moore, supra.

1 Lake Shore & Mich. S. R. R. Co. v. Miller. 25 Mich. (3 Post), 274, 294, 295. What is proper care is a question of law; whether it has been exercised is a question of fact: Stratton v. Central City Horse Ry. Co., 95 Il. 25; S. C., 1 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cas. 115.

267 Penn. St. 315; Glassey v. The Hestonville, Mantua & Fairmount Passenger R.W. Co., 57 Penn. St. 172;

Penn. R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Penn.
St. 259; Crissey v. Hestonville, M. & F.
P. Ry. Co., 75 Id. 83; State v. Man-
chester & L. R. R. Co., 52 N. H. 563.

3 North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Heileman,
49 Penn. St. (13 Wright), 60; Glassey
v. The Hestonville, Mantua & Fair-
mount Passenger Ry. Co., 57 Penn.
St. 172; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Barnett,
59 Penn. St. 259; West Chester &
Phila. R. R. Co. v. McElwee, 67
Penn. St. 311, 315; Phil. & Reading
R. R. Co. v. Killips, 88 Penn. St. 405;
Gaynor v. Old Colony & Newport Ry.
Co., 100 Mass. 208; Coleman v. N.
York & N. Haven R. R. Co., 106
Mass. 160; Chaffee v. Boston & Lowell
R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 108; Bayley v.
Eastern R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 62; Lin-
nehan v. Sampson, 126 Id. 506; Ed-
son v. Central R. R. Co., 40 Ia. 47, 8
Am. Ry. Rep. 412; Henry v. Southern
Pacific R. R. Co., 50 Cal. 176, 12 Am.
Ry. Rep. 168; Fernandes v. Sacramen-
to City Ry. Co., 52 Cal. 45, 9 Am.
Ry. Rep. 352; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
. Murphy, 46 Tex. 356, 13 Am. Ry.
Rep. 319; Bonnell v. Delaware, Lack-
awanna & Western R. R. Co., 39 N.

"The rule is well settled," says MASON, J., " that it is a matter of right in the plaintiff to have the issue of negligence submitted to the jury, when it depends upon conflicting evidence, or on inferences to be deduced from a variety of circumstances in regara to which there is room for fair difference of opinion among intelligent men."

The prevailing rule in Missouri is, that where there is any conflict of evidence in regard to the issues involving negligence, the question of negligence is to be left to the jury upon the evidence, under instructions from the court.2

The safer way, however, in cases involving the question of negligence, is to take a special verdict, finding all the material facts of the case. The question of negligence then becomes a question of law, and may be dealt with accordingly. The rule in Kansas is, that negligence, if there is controversy about the facts, or inferences to be drawn from the evidence, is a question of fact for the jury; but if the facts be all one way, or there is no controversy about them, then negligence is a question of law, for the court to determine. So, also, it is matter of law for the

J. 189, 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 220; Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442, 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 245; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Twombly, 3 Col. 125; Ditberner v. Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 47 Wis. 138, 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 37; Hartwig v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 49 Wis. 358; S. C. 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 65; Hackford v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 654, 43 How. Pr. 222; Belton v. Baxter, 54 N. Y. 245, 58 N. Y. 411; Massoth v. Del. & H. C. Co., 64 N.Y. 524; Wood v. N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 195, 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 548; Leonard v. N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R. R. Co., 42 N. Y. Superior, 225; Bait. & Ohio R. R. Co. r. Whittaker, 24 Ohio St. 642; Same v. Whitacre, 35 Id. 627; Carrington v. Ficklin, 32 Gratt. 670; Hawker v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 623; Solen v. Virginia & Truckee R. R. Co., 13 Nev. 106; State v. Manchester & L. R. R. Co., 52 N. H. 528;

Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 35 Md. 32; McMahon v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 39 Md. 438.

Wolfkiel v. Sixth Avenue R. R. Co.. 38 N. Y. 50, 51. And to same point, see Ernst v. The Hudson River R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9.

2 Schultz v. Pacific R. R. Co., 36 Mo. 13; Smith v. Hannibal & St. Joe R. R. Co., 37 Mo. 287; Tarwater v. Hannibal & St. Joe R. R. Co., 42 Mo. 193; McPheeters v. Hann bal & St. Joe R. R. Co., 45 Mo. 22; Tabor v. The Missouri Valley R. R. Co., 46 Mo. 353; Burns v. Bellefontaine R. W. Co. of St. Louis, 50 Mo. 139; Brown v. Hannibal & St. Joe R. R. Co., 50 Mo. 461.

court to determine what degree of care on one side, and of negligence on the other, will enable the plaintiff to recover.'

But when there is no conflict of testimony, and the existence of a certain state of facts is clearly proven, the court is to hold that such state of facts is established; it is error to refer the same to the jury for their finding." And where all the material facts, when found, admit of no rational inference but that of negligence, then the question of negligence becomes a matter of law merely. It is said, in an English case, that whether there. is reasonable evidence of negligence to be left to the jury, is a question for the court; it is for the jury to say whether, and how far, the evidence is to be believed.*

The instructions should refer to the circumstances of the case, and be so given as to secure the fair consideration and judgment of the jury upon the points at issue. A charge which consists mainly of extracts from reported cases, having no special reference to the circumstances of the case on trial, is objectionable; and if the jury have been misled thereby, a new trial will be granted."

Northwestern Ry. Co., 41 Wis. 44;
Kearney v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ry. Co., 47 Id. 144, 21 Am. Ry.
Rep. 43. And see, as to when the an-
swers of the jury will be deemed eva-
sive: Urbanek v. C., M. & St. P. Ry.
Co., 47 Wis. 59, 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 58.
1 Union Pacific R. W. Co. v. Rollins,
5 Kansas, 177, 181, 182.

Langhoff v. Mil. & Prairie du Chien
Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 43; Spaulding v.
Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 582,
591; Storey v. Brennan, 15 N. Y. 524;
White v. Stillman, 25 N. Y. 541;
Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 359.

3 Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631, 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 172.

Directors, etc., of Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Jackson, Law Rep., 3 App. Cas. 193, 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 621. And see Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. r. Estes, 96 III. 470; S. C. 1 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cas. 622; Nagle v. Alle

gheny Valley R. R. Co., 88 Penn. St. 35.

5 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Whittaker, 24 Ohio St. 642, 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 182; Marietta & Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Picksley, 24 Ohio St. 654, 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 186. Where the evi dence is conflicting, the jury should be accurately instructed: Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Freeman, 6 Bradw. (Ill.), 608; Stratton v. Central City Horse Ry. Co., 95 Ill. 25; S. C. 1 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cas. 115. But all the law of negligence is not required to be embodied in one instruction, nor all the exceptions to the general rule stated: Stratton v. C. C. H. Ry. Co., supra.