been treated in conjunction with the analogous topics of cH. XVIII. private law, as, for instance, by von Bar in his Internationales Privat- und Strafrecht.' They have indeed much in common, and the title of von Bar's work would be objectionable only on the ground of ambiguity, if it did not seem to lend itself to the support of statements by other writers which involve the whole subject in hopeless confusion.

It may perhaps be assumed that the reader who has followed the argument of the last few pages will at once detect the astonishing inconsistency of view which is betrayed by the following extract from a work of deservedly high authority. On appelle,' says M. Fœlix, droit international privé l'ensemble des règles d'après lesquelles se jugent les conflits entre le droit privé des diverses nations; en d'autres termes, le droit international privé se compose des lois civiles ou criminelles d'un état dans le territoire d'un état étranger 1.'

It would not be too much to say that 'Private International law,' if thus conceived of, is neither 'private' nor 'international' in the sense in which either of those terms are usually and properly employed in Jurisprudence.

III. What was said of the interpretation' of private, Interpretawill apply also to that of public law.

§ 3. International Law.

I. No question of Forum' can arise in International law, of which it is an essential principle that each nation is the

1 Droit International Privé, § 1. M. von Bar, who defends his combination of the two topics by the authority of R. von Mohl, Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht u. Politik, p. 682, endeavours to avoid the difficulties which his title raises by distinguishing between 'Internationales Recht' and 'Völkerrecht.' The former term he employs to signify a genus, of which the two species are respectively Völkerrecht,' by which he means Public International law, and • Internationales Privatrecht.' Mr. Westlake, who follows Fœlix, frankly admits, in his new edition, that he is using the term 'private' in a sense which has no relation to the division of law into 'public' and 'private.'

tion.

CH. XVIII. judge of its own quarrels, and the executioner of its own

The appli- decrees.

cation of International law.

The Lex.

Interpretation.

6

If

II. The question of 'Lex' does indeed arise, but in a way that presents but a slight analogy to anything in either department of Municipal law. It is merely whether a given set of circumstances comes, or does not come, within the operation of international law at all. In other words, whether the States between which a controversy has arisen are, or are not, members of the family of Nations1.' not, the principles to be applied to the facts are derivable not from international law, but from views of national interest tempered by general morality. Much confused reasoning has resulted from forgetfulness of the limited area within which it is possible or desirable to apply the rules of International law, as such.

III. What has been said upon the subject of Interpretation' with reference to municipal law, applies mutatis mutandis to International law also.

The axioms of the science and the doctrines of received text-writers will be susceptible in general only of 'logical interpretation,' but something analogous to authentic interpretation' would be quite possible in the case of such quasi-legislative expressions of international opinion, as, for instance, the Geneva Convention, or the Declaration of Paris.

1 Supra, p. 322.

INDEX.

да

INDEX.