This case was tried on the 5th and 6th days of May and was submitted to the court, who, on the 21st day of June, made and filed findings and entered judgment. From the foregoing it appears that this case was not tried at a time when the court was legally in session. For want of a session being held on April 19th, or of an adjournment as by law provided, that term failed and ended. Nor can the setting of the trial of this case be held to have been made or conducted at a time to which the November term was adjourned. That term ended on the 10th day of December, 1904, at which time the court adjourned, not from day to day, or to a future day certain, as under the law it might do, but adjourned "subject to call," which was an adjournment without day, and ended the term. Thereafter the court could not legally convene, nor could a session of court be held in Garfield county, till the next regular term time, which was fixed for April 19th. The sessions attempted to be held in March were illegal, and the proceedings attempted to be transacted by the court in pursuance thereof were without authority. An adjournment without fixing any special time ends the term, and the law determines the time at which the court shall convene to be at the beginning of the next term; but an adjournmnt of the term to a day certain leaves it intact. The failure of the judge of the district to attend and open court upon the appointed day, the 19th day of April, or of adjourning the term as by law provided, operated to end that term, and no further session of the court could be held until the next regular term. Terms of the district court can only be held at the times fixed, as by law provided, and if not held in accordance with the statute the proceedings will be void. A meeting together of the judge and the of ficers of the court at the place, but not at the time fixed as provided by law for holding court, is not a court, and their acts as such must be regarded as coram non judice. The views herein expressed are amply supported by the following authorities: Irwin v. Irwin, 2 Okl. 180, 37 Pac. 548; In re Terrill, 52 Kan. 29, 34 Pac. 457, 39 Am. St. Rep. 327; McCool v. State, 7 Ind. 378; Cain et al. v. Goda, 84 Ind. 209; Brumley v. State, 20 Ark. 77; Insurance Co. v. Pappe, 4 Okl. 110, 43 Pac. 1085; Goodall v. People, 123 Ill. 389, 15 N. E. 171; White v. Riggs, 27 Me. 114; 1 Pl. & Pr. 243; Stovall v. Emerson, 20 Mo. App. 322. The contention, made by respondent, that the appearance of the defendant and its counsel at the setting of the case, and of their proceeding to trial without objection, precluded the appellant from raising the question that the court was not legally in session and was without authority to try the case, is not tenable, and is fully answered in the cases of Insurance Co. v. Pappe, supra, and White v. Riggs, supra, where it is held that if terms of court are fixed at stated periods, and the court fails to convene at the time so fixed, and by reason thereof the court is not legally in session, the parties to the action cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdic tion upon the court to render a judgment binding upon the parties. The judgment of the court below is therefore vacated and set aside, and a new trial granted; costs to appellant. MCCARTY, C. J., and FRICK, J., concur. JONES v. OGDEN CITY et al. No. 1817. Decided April 16, 1907 (89 Pac. 1000). PLEADING 1. DAMAGES ISSUES EXTENT AND DURATION OF PERSONAL INJURIES. Where, in a personal injury action, the complaint alleged "that plaintiff was injured by reason thereof, that his right arm and right leg were badly bruised and sprained, . and that he was otherwise made sick, sore, and lame and was thereby detained from his business for thirty days," the allegations are broad enough to admit proof of the extent and duration of the injuries therein alleged. 2. PLEADING SUBJECT-MATTER. AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT Where after objections to questions as to the length of time before plaintiff could work were sustained on the ground that the allegation fixed the time at thirty days, it was error to refuse plaintiff leave to amend by substituting the word "ninety" for "thirty," since the amendment did not raise any new issue or inject any new element into the case. 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -- NOTICE OF OBSTRUCTION OBSTRUCTIONS IN STREETS NOTICE OF OBSTRUCTION QUESTION FOR JURY. In a personal injury action, whether a city had notice of an obstruction in a street held under the evidence to be a question for the jury. 4. SAME FACTS DETERMINING NOTICE. In an action for damages sustained from obstructions in a street, the question of notice to the city is not alone determined from the length of time a defect existed, but also from the nature and character of the defect, the extent of the travel, and whether it is a populous or sparsely settled part of the city.1 5. SAME NEGLIGENCE. Whether defendant's negligence, in allowing obstructions to remain in a street unguarded, caused plaintiff's injury, held, under the evidence, to be a question for the jury. APPEAL from District Court, Second District; J. A. Howell Judge. Action by Charles A. Jones against the city of Ogden and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff ap peals. REVERSED AND REMANDED. N. J. Harris for appellant. W. L. Maginnis, Jno. E. Bagley, and Joseph Chez for respondent. APPELLANT'S POINTS. Notice to the police department of the existence of such obstructions constituted actual notice thereof to the city. (Denver v. Dean, 10 Col. 375, 3 Am. St. 594; Farley v. Mayor of New York, 152 N. Y. 222, 57 Am. St. 511; Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 58 Am. Rep. 108; Rehberg v. Mayor of New York, 91 N. Y. 137, 43 Am. Rep. 657.) Moreover the questions as to whether the municipality had notice, and if so, whether it had sufficient time to remove the obstructions or to guard them before the accident, are questions of fact for the jury to determine, and not for the 1 Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 39 Pac. 481. court. (Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, and cases cited on page 65; Rehber v. Mayor of N. Y., supra.) RESPONDENT'S POINTS. Notice must be brought home to a proper officer charged with the maintenance and supervision of the streets. (Elliot on Roads and Streets [2 Ed.], sec. 629; Hines v. Fond Du Lac, 71 Wis. 74; Warsaw v. Dunlap, 112 Ind. 576; Mayor of Franklin v. House [Tenn.], 55 S. W. 153; Madison v. Baker, 103 Ind. 41; Chicago v. McCarthy, 75 Ill. 602; Carrington v. St. Louis, 88 Mo. 208; Littlefield v. Norwich, 40 Conn. 406; Chapman v. Mayor, 55 Ga. 566.) "It is the settled law of this court that when the evidence given at the trial with all the inferences that the jury could justifiably draw from it is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such verdict if returned must be set aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct a verdict for the defendant." This rule is supported by Pleasant v. Fant, 22 Wal. (U. S.) 116; Herbert v. Butler, 97 (U. S.) 319; Bowditch v. Boston, 101 (U. S.) 16; Greggs v. Houston, 101 (U. S.) 553. In the following cases held that the time was too short to impute notice, in the absence of express notice, and did not afford evidence of negligence such as would warrant the judges in submitting the matter to the jury. (Breil v. Buffalo, 144 N. Y. 163, 38 N. E. 977; Carey v. Ann Arbor, 124 Mich. 134, 82 N. W. 804; Warsaw v. Dunlap, 112 Ind. 579, 14 N. E. 568; Lewisville v. Boston, 29 Ind. App. 21, 63 N. E. 861; Leipsic v. Gerdeman, 68 Ohio St., 67 N. E. 87; Breil v. Buffalo, 144 N. Y. 163, 38 N. E. 977; Carey v. Ann Arbor, 124 Mich. 134, 82 N. W. 804; Smith v. Walker Twp., 117 Mich. 14, 4 Am. Rep. Neg. 500; Klatt v. Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 196; Ince v. Toronto, 20 Occ. N. 300; O'Connor v. New York, 29 N. Y. St. 502; Franklin v. House, 104 Tenn. —, 55 S. W. 153.) STATEMENT OF FACTS. Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for per sonal injuries alleged to have been received by him through the negligence of defendants. Each of the defendants filel a separate answer, and a trial was had to a jury. When the evidence was all in and each of the respective parties had rested, the court, on motion of defendants, directed a verdict in their favor, "No cause of action," on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff. From the judgment entered on the verdict, plaintiff has appealed to this court. The facts, as disclosed by the record, are about as follows: On August 3, 1904, defendant Louis J. Bucher was constructing a sidewalk in front of a building owned by de fendant George E. Maule, and located on the east side of Washington avenue, which is one of the principal business streets and the main thoroughfare of Ogden City, Utah. Bucher had collected and placed on the street a large pile of building material, consisting of sand, gravel, cement, and lumber, the same extending out into the street from the curbing of the sidewalk, a distance variously estimated at from twelve to twenty feet. The lumber and cement were piled next to the sidewalk, and the sand and gravel were piled just outside of the cement and lumber. On the third day of the work, August 3, 1904, defendant Maule, for whom the work was being done, purchased two large iron beams from the George A. Lowe Company, and instructed said company to deliver them in front of his residence, where the walk was in course of construction. The beams were delivered in accordance with the directions given at about 4:30 o'clock p. m. of that same day, and were laid on the edge of the gravel and parallel with the street. These beams and the other building material were left in the street, where they had been unloaded and deposited, until the following day, when they were used and placed in the sidewalk by defendant Bucher. About midnight of the same day on which the material was placed in the street plaintiff, while driving along Washington avenue with a horse and buggy, ran upon the pile of gravel, and, in turning so as to avoid further contract with the obstruction, the horse stepped on the two iron beams and became frightened and started to run. Plaintiff was thrown from the |