headed and disembowelled, and that not only were we free to come and go as we chose, but that we were welcome to visit their city. Mr. Wade declined this offer. In a few minutes more we were safely past all the batteries, and next evening reached the Retribution.

On the 29th the three ships reached Nankin, and Mr Wade landed, charged with a similar message, and accompanied by Messrs. Oliphant, Lay, and Wylie. These gentlemen, after a long ride of five or six miles, reached the residence of Le, the third rebel chief in command. They describe the same scene of ruin and desolation to exist inside the walls of Nankin as we had witnessed in other cities of rebel occupation; and, from proclamations and other sources, gathered the impression that the besieged were becoming very hard pressed. They were confirmed in this suspicion by the secret proposal made by a rebel of some standing to take advantage of our visit to desert his colours under our safe conduct.

The same expressions of regret for what had taken place when we passed Nankin were also made use of by this chief, and the same assurances given that those who were not killed by our shot were beheaded. He stated that the number of killed on that occasion amounted to twenty, besides three officers and a good many wounded. Arrangements were further made for safe and uninterrupted communication with the ships up the river. It is not too much to assert that these arrangements could in all probability not have been made so satisfactorily had not the rebels furnished us with an opportunity of proving our power to punish any breach of faith.

After leaving Chinkiang the Lee, with the mission still on board, pushed on in advance, and reached Shanghai on New Year's-day, having accomplished the voyage from the Furious in eight days.

North China Herald.

DEEP SEA SOUNDINGS.

One of the most interesting branches of hydrographic research in these days is that of deep sounding, presenting a wide field of investigation, and no very expensive one when carried on by the system adopted by the United States Government. For seamen, it has the advantage of refuting the existence of reported rocks. Thus it has shown that the rock reported East of Malta was an idle fabrication; one which has cost this country a considerable sum in the expenses of ships sent to look for it.

Another rock which it has blown out of water is the Devil Rock, in the Bay of Biscay, a very old offender in the same way; and the Dolphin's voyage served some others in the same manner, that we need not now stop to name.

In the first volume of this journal we inserted a report of Lieut.

Sainthill, R.N., to the late Hydrographer, Sir Francis Beaufort, on a cast of a hundred fathoms which he found between the Azores and Newfoundland, that has remained in the chart ever since. The deep soundings made for the Atlantic Cable by Commander Dayman would seem to throw doubt on the existence of this bank, for we find this officer saying in his report printed by the Admiralty, in allusion to the space which he had examined between Newfoundland and the Azores,

"In this space and near the Newfoundland Bank is a narrow belt of water of unknown depth, in which was obtained one cast of 3,000 fathoms without bottom. This sounding having been made very near the spot in which 100 fathoms are marked on the chart, on the au thority of Lieut. Sainthill, R.N., would appear to disprove the existence of this vigia, as well as of one or two others noted in Purdy's Directory for the Atlantic Ocean as having been reported near the same position."

The distance of the 3,000 cast without bottom does not appear, but from the positions we have inferred it to be about thirty-two miles, and this may be more or less, owing to error in reckoning. However this may be, the following extract of a letter on the subject has been sent to us in reference to the above observation:

"I delayed acknowledging the receipt of the pamphlet in hopes of finding my log-book with the particulars of our soundings in the Beaufort, in 1832. But I have been unsuccessful, and can only tell you that I am perfectly convinced we touched bottom; which Captain Dayman would call an excellent up and down cast. And as my chief mate, W. Whiteley, when we saw the lead was on the ground, jumped over into the main chains and hauled up the slack, the 100 fathom mark was just awash, and the line so nearly perpendicular that we considered that the true depth.

"The arming of the lead showed sharp rocky bottom of fine bluish ashes. The water was very much discoloured, which induced me to try for soundings; and my opinion is that we were over a submarine volcano in a state of eruption. My chronometer may have been half a degree wrong, and if Captain Dayman happened to have an error the other way, there would be plenty of room for the mountain and the valley as, for instance, from the peak of Tenerife to the deep sea is a smaller distance.

"In twenty-six years also the levelling power of oceanic currents would reduce the height of my mountain very considerably; but of course not to destroy the lofty lump which I expect will be found somewhere thereabouts when the Atlantic is thoroughly examined."

Now, the nearest distance of the peak of Tenerife from the sea is not nine miles, by Admiral Vidal's survey; which peak rises in that short distance to 12,180 feet above its level. It therefore appears to us that Lieut. Sainthill's observation is fully justified. If an actual rise of more than 12,000 feet can take place in nine miles, how easy does a change of more than 3,000 feet appear to be in thirty, setting aside error in position, alluded to by him. Without, therefore, quesNO. 4.-VOL. XXVIII.

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tioning in the slightest degree the authenticity of Captain Dayman's soundings—in which we have as much confidence as himself,-we are inclined to agree with Lieut. Sainthill that his "bluish ashes" are not to be set aside, and that somewhere near the position he has given, his mountain will be found "when the Atlantic Ocean is thoroughly examined."

Nautical Notices.

THE GULF OF MARTABAN-Maulmain-Sittang River: Deficiency of the Charts.

Maulmain, December 20th, 1858. Dear Sir, Supplementary to the list of disabled ships at Maulmain lately furnished, I have to add the ship Otahah, lost a few days since on the sands lying off the Sittang River, immediately North of Amherst. There have been several other vessels wrecked on these sands, of which I only recollect the Henzai Queen, the Clarissa, and the steam frigate Muzuffer. The latter vessel was wrecked about twenty miles eastward of Rangoon Bar, but may justly be placed in the same catalogue, for the whole coast between Rangoon River and Amherst is lined with sand banks of the same dangerous character to which the motto "Nemo me impune lacessit," may be aptly applied.

I have on several occasions noticed the dangerous character of these sands in the pages of the Nautical Magazine, and do so again in the hope that some account of them may be published in Horsburgh's or other reliable Directory. For at present any sailing directions for this part of the coast that I have seen are singularly vague. Horsburgh's directions for Rangoon have, since the establishment of a lightship and pilots outside, become obsolete; while those for Maulmain are summed up in a few lines and not much to the purpose. I should think the entrance to Maulmain and Rangoon Rivers, and the coast between them, entitled to a chapter to themselves, considering the importance they have arrived at. In the meantime, and until the subject be taken up and clear directions published, I would suggest a line in red being drawn on the chart, say from about China Bakeer on the West side to Double Island on the East, to warn ships not to cross to the northward of it but on their peril until the pilot or pilots' ground be fairly in sight, or they are otherwise perfectly certain of their position, and the state of the tide is known, not guessed at, which is a very different thing.

Lest it should be thought that I am making more of these sands and tides than they deserve, I can assure you that all the vessels I have named were commanded by skilful seamen, who were well acquainted with the coast, but they have probably under estimated the strength of the tides. This of course is conjecture, but naturally

occurs to me, as the same thing had nearly happened with myself on one occasion, which I may mention, by way of bearing out my opinion of these dangers.

On a voyage, some twenty-five years ago, from the isle of France to Rangoon, I had reached soundings, thick weather, no land in sight, no observations; but trusting to local acquaintance I ran in until I got into 4 fathoms, where I ought to have seen something if in the right place; but seeing nothing, I suspected we were not right, and anchored. Found a strong flood tide running, while by my calculation it should have been turned to ebb. I further began to suspect we might be driving, and as the lead was of no use, let go another anchor to make sure, when the very disagreeable fact that we were driving proved itself by the water rushing in at the hawse holes whenever the second anchor had cable enough out to make it bite the ground, and I fancy we even then drove slowly, with both anchors ahead; for such a tide I had never dreamed of before. We got out safely on the ebb, with a good fright and a firm resolution never again to tamper with the sands at the head of the gulf of Martaban. This happened near about the place where the Muzuffer was lost.

By the way, I was a passenger in the barque Coll Bunney when she went to the Muzuffer's assistance by order of Commodore Lambert. Much to my disgust it was neap tides then, and we managed to lie at anchor for a few days, and received a quantity of her stores on board, but at great risk to her crew, in the boats. We left on the first spring tide, and I believe the Muzuffer rolled over and disappeared shortly after.

Connected with the same subject, although not strictly with the nautical part of it, I beg also to state what I saw of the bore of the Sittang River from the shore. Travelling in the Pegu country some eighteen years ago for pleasure, I arranged and timed my journey so as to reach the bank of the Sittang River at full moon in April, when the tides run at the strongest. Pitching my tent (a covered cart drawn by two buffaloes) at I suppose five miles from the mouth of the river, I saw right out to seaward, and at low water it was all dry sand, excepting a narrow channel here and there where the river found its way out among the sands. The first indication I observed of the flood coming, was a distant haze and a low noise out to seaward. This rapidly thickened to a light brown smoke, and as it came nearer a dash of foam broke out of the smoke here and there, and presently the first wave came distinct in view, standing erect like a wall, broken into foam at the top. This was followed by others less and less in height, and when the whole rushed past, the river, which just before had been nearly all dry, was full from bank to bank. It was a very grand sight viewed on shore, but what could ship or boat do if caught on such a tide?

Commodore Lynch, during the war with Burmah, had been informed that this river was "not so bad as was supposed," and that it was quite practicable to send troops and stores to the interior by it. On being applied to for information, I stated to the commodore what I

had seen, leaving him to judge for himself. The question being one of importance, he very properly settled it himself by going round in a steamer in the neaps and judging on the spot. I do not know how far up he went, but on the first rise of the springs the steamer had to clap on full power to enable her to hold on against the flood. Since which no more has been said about "navigating the Sittang."

To conclude, and draw a moral out of this tale about these sands, let us point out the mode of keeping clear of them, confining our remarks to approaching Maulmain. From what is above stated it will be seen that those acquainted with the coast, shall we say too well acquainted, myself included, are more apt to tamper with them than strangers; but to all I would say, that in approaching Maulmain from the westward, do not come under 15 fathoms until the eastern coast is made, and Calegouk or Double Island in sight and known. The Zingat Hills will probably be seen before, but they are not a good mark, lying so far inland that a ship may alter her position a good deal before any perceptible difference of their bearing is observed. Besides, they lie so far North that using them for a mark to steer by brings you too near the tail of the sands. The lead will then be the best guide, with a wholesome dread of the flood tide as your greatest enemy. For the same reason I object to placing a light on Amherst Point, as being too far North, and a ship steering for it would be skirting the sands. I can easily imagine a ship coming from the westward, either by day or night, and steering as she would be most likely to do for the light, a spring flood tide setting her right across her course at a rate faster than she was sailing, and getting aground on the sands before the light was seen, and further I argue that the fact of a light being there would induce ships to steer for it instead of steering a safer course more to the southward.

For these reasons I think if we are to have a light it should be so placed as to draw ships away from the dangers instead of leading them into their vicinity. But as I have stated before, I see no need for a light for Amherst at all. The place is perfectly safe to approach, by doing so from the southward, and no ship has any business to the northward of it; nor I imagine, are strangers likely to go there, unless they are induced to do so by this ill advised intended light.

I am, &c.,

To the Editor of the Nautical Magazine.

J. H. MILLER.

DALHOUSIE AND BASSEIN.

Sailing Directions for Entering the Harbour of Dalhousie.

Lat. 16° 7' N., long. 94° 27′ E.

Vessels of 14 feet draught and upwards should on no account attempt the passage to the westward of Negrais Island.