Forfeiture of Shares.-Although a provision, that the shares of a borrowing member should be forfeited on his failure to pay interest or premium, or dues has been upheld (Southern, etc. Co. v. Armston, etc. Co. [Ala., January, 1894], 15 South. Rep. 123), yet it is generally held that he is entitled to be credited on his loan with the value of his shares. Rowland v. Old Dominion, etc. Co., 116 N. C. 882; Rowland v. Old Dominion, etc. Co., 115 N. C. 825; Watkins v. Workingmens', etc. Assn., 97 Pa. St. 514.

Withdrawal of Members.-The laws always provide that a member of such a corporation may withdraw therefrom, and the corporation is powerless to prevent it. Granite, etc. Assn. v. Lloyd, 145 Ill. 620; Holyoke, etc. Assn. v. Lewis, 1 Colo. App. 127. Where by the rules of the association, the grounds for withdrawal are to be submitted to the board of directors for their approval, they cannot withhold their ap proval without reasonable cause. Wetterwulgh v. Knickerbocker, etc. Assn., 2 Bos. (N. Y.) 381. Such right of withdrawal, does not, however, exist in favor of a member who has pledged his stock to secure a loan. State v. Redwood, etc. Assn., 45 Minn. 154; Watkins v. Workingmen's, etc. Assn., 97 Pa. St. 514; Anderson, etc. Assn. v. Thompson, 88 Ind. 405.

Payment of Withdrawing Members.-The association cannot prefer in an arbitrary manner one withdrawing member to another (Pawlick v. Homestead, etc., Assn., 37 N. Y. Sup. 164); but it is proper to pay these in full in the order of their withdrawal. Hoyt v. Interocean B. Assn., 58 Minn. 345. Where the association is insolvent, the outside creditor should be paid first in full (Maloney v. Real Estate, etc. Assn., 57 Mo. App. 384; Christain's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 188), and then the stockholders pro rata, whether their shares have matured or not. Towle v. American, etc. Assn., 75 Fed. Rep. 938; Criswell's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 488.

Waiver of Rights.-Parties cannot make a contract whereby the requirements of a statute which is made in pursuance of a general policy can be evaded. Phinney v. Mutual, etc. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 493. This rule has been frequently invoked relative to policies of insurance (Liverpool, etc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397; Dugger v. Mechanics', etc. Co., 95 Pick. 245; Havens v. Germania, etc. Co., 123 Mo. 403; Queen Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 47 Ohio St. 409), also to the statute of limitations (Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503), and to stay an execution. Carl's Assignment, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 143. Where, however, the law is intended merely to be a personal privilege, its provisions may be waived (Camington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208; Squires v. Chillicothe, 89 Mo. 226; Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249; Cahen v. Continental, etc. Co., 41 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 296; Grand Rapids, etc. R. R. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667), and this may be done by contract, (Adreveno v. Mutual, etc. Assn., 34 Fed. Rep. 870), but the better opinion is that such contract cannot be made prior to the occurrence relative to which it might be invoked (Green v. Coos, etc. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 67); otherwise the law would generally be rendered nugatory by contract. St. Louis, Mo.

S. S. MERRILL.

discussed the question and reached the conclusion that such statutes are clearly contrary to the organic law of the State. The reasons given for reaching this view of the law are interesting and worth reciting. The section under consideration, 7032a, provided that "whoever on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, participates in or exhibits to the public, with or without charge for admittance, in any public room, ground, garden or other place in this State any base ball playing, he or she shall, on complaint made within twenty days thereafter, be fined in any sum not exceeding $100, or be confined in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, at the discretion of the court." This statute, the court says, must rest for its validity on one of two predi cates, to-wit: It must be either unlawful or an of fense to play or exhibit base ball on Sunday, because it is Sunday, or it must rest, in order to be an offense, upon the fact that it is an immoral game or exhibi tion, falling clearly within the police power or regula tion, and, therefore, a crime. It is not a crime to play base ball on Monday or any other day of the week, says the court; hence, if it rests upon the fact, or is made a crime because it is played on Sunday, then it is clearly in conflict with the con stitution and cannot be upheld, because the doe trine is well settled, and especially in Ohio, that all statutes which inhibit common labor, statutes that refer to the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, are not enacted or enforced to compel the observance of that day as a day of re ligious worship, but as a day of rest. Therefore, for the legislature to enact a statute prohibiting the play ing of base ball on Sunday, because it was Sunday, would be unconstitutional and void. Another fats objection is found in the fact that the act in question makes no exception in behalf of that class of people who conscientiously observe the seventh day of the week as Sunday or Sabbath, the Supreme Court of Ohio having, on two or three occasions, distinctly de clared that a statute providing for the observance of the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, as a day of rest, is void and unconstitutional unless it contains such an exception. Next, examining the question whether the statute can be upheld because the act inhibited falls within the police power, the court points out that it is fundamental that all acts falling within the broad power of police regulation under the constitution must be something in the n ture of a nuisance, or in fact immoral, or having immoral tendency, or detrimental to the good or wel fare of the whole people. The court is clearly of the opinion that to play or exhibit base ball does not fall within the provision of the general definition above given as to police regulation. Whether the legisl ture of Ohio may or may not enact a statute that would be constitutional and valid as inhibiting the playing of base ball on Sunday the court does not feel called upon to decide, but clear it is to the mind of the court that the statute as enacted, grouping base ball playing among a lot of immoral games, such as gambling, etc., is unconstitutional and void.-Albany Law Journal.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF SUNDAY BASE BALL. Statutes prohibiting the playing of the game of base ball on Sunday have been, as is well known, declared unconstitutional by the courts of several of the States. Among these in the Cuyahoga County (Ohio) court, which recently, in the case of State v. Powell, carefully

BOOK REVIEWS.

GILLETT ON INDIRECT AND COLLATERAL EVIDENCE. A valuable contribution to legal literature has been recently offered to the bar by the Bowen-Merrill Co., publishers, in the work of Hon. John H. Gillett on "Indirect and Collateral Evidence." It is pub

4. CONTRACT-Alteration.-Plaintiff, by written agree. ment, licensed defendant company to use certain machines in consideration of paying royalty, and defendant gave bond, with sureties, conditioned for the performance of the contract. Afterwards the president of defendant company interlined in the contract a provision as to the time of delivery of the machines, which was accepted and acquiesced in by plaintiff: Held, that this interlineation was an alteration of the contract so far as the sureties in the bond were concerned. -UNITED STATES GLASS Co. v. WEST VIRGINIA FLINT BOTTLE CO., U. S. C. C., D. (W. Va.), 81 Fed. Rep. 993. 5. CONTRACTS-Construction-Arbitration Clause.-A contract for the construction of buildings provided that, if alterations were made in the plans, "the value of the work added or omitted shall be computed by the architects, and the amount so ascertained shall be added to, or deducted from, the contract price. In the case of dissent from such award by either party hereto the valuation of the work added or omitted shall be referred to three disinterested arbitrators, the decision of any two of whom shall be final and binding:" Held, an agreement to submit certain definite controversies to arbitration, and hence it was legal and binding.WEGGNER V. GREENSTINE, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 179. 6. CONTRACT-Statute of Frauds.-Where defendant received a letter from plaintiff, stating that a third person stated that defendant would pay for lumber furnished him by plaintiff, and requested defendant to advise plaintiff if such were not the fact, and defendant made no reply, but verbally promised to pay for the lumber after plaintiff delivered it to said third person, defendant is not bound, as the contract, being one to answer for the debt of another, was not in writ ing, as required by 2 How. Ann. St. § 6185, subd. 2.FULLER & RICE LUMBER & MANUFACTURING Co. v. HOUSEMAN, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 187.

7. CONTRACTS-Validity-Restraint of Trade.-Where the seller of stock in an ice company doing an ice busi. ness at P agreed with the purchaser not to engage in the ice business at P, nor adjacent thereto, at any time, the agreement was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, and void as against public policy.-UP RIVER ICE CO. V. DENLER, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 157.

8. CORPORATIONS-Powers-Authority of Officers.-A treasurer of a manufacturing corporation has no au thority, by virtue of his office alone, to indorse its note for discount of sale.-BLAKE V. DOMESTIC MANUFG. CO., N. J., 38 Atl. Rep. 241.

9. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Assault With Intent to Murder. On a trial for an assault with intent to murder, it was shown that defendant shot a man, and that two police officers went to defendant's saloon to watch him, while the sergeant was getting information about the shooting; that defendant knew that he was to be arrested, because he was questioned by the officers; that the sergeant, having learned that defendant did the shooting, afterwards came in, and ordered defendant's arrest without a warrant, and that defendant then fired on the officers, and wounded one of them: Held, that evidence of the first shooting was properly admitted, as tending to prove the motive with which defendant fired on the officers.-PEOPLE V. WILSON, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 1054.

10. EVIDENCE-Admissions in Court.-Admissions of parties in open court that their claims have been paid and their liens satisfied form evidence of an extremely satisfactory character.-LITTLE V. SLEMP, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 808.

11. EVIDENCE-Parol Evidence.-Where written instruments do not purport to contain the entire agreement between the parties thereto, nor to have been intended as a complete statement or performance of the whole contract, and such papers were executed in pur. suance of a parol agreement, and in part performance thereof, parol evidence of the verbal agreement is admissible in all cases where such evidence is consistent with, and not contrary to, such written instruments. -CHAMBERLAIN V. LESLEY, Fla., 22 South. Rep. 736.

12. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS-Conflicting Juris diction. When the State court has acquired jurisdiction in a case, entered judgment, and is proceeding to its enforcement, the appointment of a receiver by the United States court to the defendant corporation can not devest the jurisdiction of the State court, and stay the execution issued to enforce the judgment.-LAKE BISTENEAU LUMBER CO. V. MIMMS, La., 22 South. Rep.

730.

13. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Part Performance.-How. Ann. St. § 5569, provides that when a grant shall be made to one person, and the consideration therefor shall be paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the latter, but that the title shall vest in the person named as alienee. Section 6183 provides that nothing in the chapter shall abridge the powers of the court of chancery to compel specific performance c! agreements in cases of part performance: Held that, where a husband purchased land in his wife's name, with the parol agreement that it was to be occupied as a home by them so long as each should live, and the wife devised the property to others, section 6183 did not apply, and the husband was precluded by section 5569 from enforcing the trust against the deviseesCHAPMAN V. CHAPMAN, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 181.

14. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Waiver.-The defense of the statute of frauds, to be effective against an ori contract, must be urged when such contract is t tempted to be proved.-PIKE V. PIKE, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 265.

15. HABEAS CORPUS-Grounds of Remedy.-Where is conceded, in a habeas corpus proceeding, that the commitment emanated from a court of competent thority, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and person, the only question is whether the process void for illegality.-EX PARTE TICE, Oreg., 49 Pac. Bep 1038.

16. HOMESTEAD Acquisition Mortgages. - Act March 13, 1895, changing the method of selecting homestead, did not repeal 2 Hills' Ann. Code, § 4 providing that the selection may be made at any time before sale. Where separate property of the husban was impressed with the homestead, and was afterwards mortgaged by him without the wife's consen the wife might have the mortgage declared vo under 2 Hill's Ann. Code, § 483, providing that "nothing herein shall be construed to prevent t owner of a homestead from voluntarily mortgag ing the same," and that "no mortgage shall be a against the wife of the mortgagor, unless she sh sign and acknowledge the same;" and this whether not the wife was precluded by 1 Hill's Ann. Code, 1404, from selecting a homestead from the husband' separate property.-ANDERSON V. STADLMANN, Wast 49 Pac. Rep. 1070.

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17. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Antenuptial Agreements An antenuptial agreement provided that the propert of the intended wife should remain in her, and that a might dispose of the same "by deed, grant, bargain sale, gift, desire, will, or otherwise, as she (might sire, without the consent" of the prospective husband Held, that the word "desire" was a mistake for "de vise," and that the word "will" was used in its te nical sense.-COOK V. ADAMS, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 6. 18. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Original Packag Liquors. An original package, within the meaning the law of Interstate commerce, is the package delin ered by the importer to the carrier at the initial poli of shipment, in the exact condition in which it w shipped. In the case of liquors in bottles, if the b tles are shipped singly, each is an original packa but if a number are fastened together, and marked, are packed in a box, barrel, crate, or other receptan such bundle, box, barrel, crate, or receptacle stitutes the original package.-GUCKENHEIMER V. 53. LERS, U. S. C. C., D. (S. Car.), 81 Fed. Rep. 997.

19. JOINT CONTRACT- Liability of Survivor.action on a demand due plaintiff personally, defes ant may set off a note (otherwise a proper demand

set-off) executed by plaintiff and another jointly, where the other maker is dead.-MCCARTHY V. ŠLEIGHT, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 165.

20. JOINT TRESPASSERS-Authority of Agent.-An attorney for a plaintiff in execution placed in the hands of a constable the execution, and in the hands of an agent a chattel mortgage lease, and the three took possession of the entire stock of goods of the defendant in execution. The amount of the mortgage was tendered to each of them. The non-exempt property was sold under the execution before the hour adver tised, and the three set apart and held the exempt property under the mortgage: Held, that a joint action could be maintained against them, as they were joint trespassers.-WEINSKAWSKI V. WISNER, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 177.

21. JUDGMENT-Jurisdiction.-When an action in the circuit court to recover the possession of land situated in another district is joined with an action for rents, issues, and profits of the land, that part of the judgment rendered for the value of the rents is within the jurisdiction of the court, and is valid.-HEALEY V. HUMPHREY, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 81 Fed. Rep. 990.

22. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Estate from Year to Year-Holding Over.-A landlord who allowed a tenant for years by lease to hold over for a year and one month, and accepted monthly payments of rent for the time, sufficiently recognized the tenant as such; and the latter thereafter held as a tenant from year to year, although he had paid only eleven months' rent after the expiration of the lease.-AMSDEN V. ATWOOD, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 263.

23. LIFE INSURANCE-Cancellation of Policy.-Where the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, which had lapsed, except for its paid up value, procured its re-instatement through false and fraudulent representations, equity may compel the surrender and decree the cancellation thereof, and enjoin an action at law thereon, though the alleged fraud might defeat such action at law.-JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. Co. v. DICK, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 179.

24. MANDAMUS-Teacher's Salary - Remedy at Law.Mandamus to compel the payment of the salary speci fied is not the proper remedy of a school teacher for the enforcement of a contract of employment where it is claimed that such teacher was discharged for sufficient cause, as the law affords a plain, direct, and adequate remedy in its ordinary course, if such discharge was wrongful.- COFFIN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF DETROIT, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 156.

Defective Appliances.-It a brakeman is aware, on entering the railroad's em. ploy, that he will be constantly obliged to perform the dangerous task of coupling together mismatched couplers, and continues in the service, and frequently performs that task, without making complaint to the master, or making request that the danger be lessened, he assumes the risk.-MCDONALD'S ADMR. V. NORFOLK & W. R. Co., Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 821.

26. MECHANIC'S LIEN Statement for Lien.-Under Pub. Acts 1891, No. 179, § 4, requiring original contractors to furnish the owner of the building a statement under oath of the number and names of the subcontractors or laborers under them, and of the persons furnishing materials, with the amount due each, and providing that until such statement is furnished the contractor shall have no right of action and lien on account of the contract, such statement is a prerequisite to the right to enforce a lien.-WILTSIE V. HARVEY, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 134.

Agreement

27. MORTGAGES Contemporaneous Trusts.-B executed a mortgage to C, and at the same time deeded him certain lands in W, under an agreement reciting that: "I, the said C, hereby agree to sell said lands in W for the best price that I can obtain, and, after deducting costs and expenses and reasonable charges for selling the same, to apply the pro

ceeds upon said mortgage; said sales subject to the advice and consent of said B:" Held, that the deeds and agreement back constituted C trustee of the lands in W for the benefit of B.-A. P. COOK Co. v. BELL, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 174.

28. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Subordinate Interests -Adverse Title.-A complaint for mortgage foreclosure alleged that defendant C (not the mortgagor) "claims some interest in or title to said property inconsistent with the rights of plaintiff, and that the lien of plaintiff is prior to any lien of said C against the said described lots, or either of them." C moved to strike out the phrase "inconsistent with the rights of plaintiff," as presenting an Issue of adverse title: Held, that plaintiff intended to allege merely that the interest of C, whatever it might be, was subordinate to that of plaintiff.-KIZER V. CAUFIELD, Wash., 49 Pac. Rep. 1064.

29. MORTGAGE-Foreign Corporations ContractsValidity.-A person became a stockholder of a foreign building and loan association, and applied for a loan before the passage of the statute prescribing terms upon which foreign corporations might do business in the State. After such enactment, and without the association's having complied therewith, the loan was made, and a mortgage given as security: Held that, conceding that the borrower had acquired a vested right to the loan, and that the association had become obligated to make it, before the statute was passed, the making of the loan and the giving of the mortgage were not merely a winding up of unfinished business, and accordingly the mortgage was illegal and unenforceable.-NEW YORK NAT. BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. V. CANNON, Tenn., 41 8. W. Rep. 1055.

30. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure-Venue.-An action by a mortgagor to recover of a mortgagee for an unau. thorized sale of the mortgaged premises for an alleged breach of condition, when in fact no breach had been made, is a transitory action.-ROGERS V. BARNES, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 602.

31. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements -Negligence.—If a town, in exercising its authority to improve a street, fails to do the work in a proper and skillful manner, a common-law liability arises for all damages not necessarily incidental to the work, and chargeable to the unskillful and improper mode of executing it.-POWELL V. TOWN OF WYTHEVILLE, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 805.

32. NEGLIGENCE.-In an action by a fireman to recover for injuries by a collision, where the evidence showed that plaintiff was asked by the engineer if he could see a switch which they were approaching, and he reported that he could not, and that it was impossible to see it because of the very heavy snowstorm raging at the time, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the fireman was negligent in not seeing the signal for the switch.-FAIRMAN V. BOSTON & A. R. Co., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 613.

36. PLEADING.-The defect of a misspelled name of a party defendant is cured by serving process upon the proper party, and by amending the bill by inserting the correct name.-MARTIN V. MARTIN, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 810.

37. PLEADING — Cross-complaints.-The cause of action which one defendant may set up against his codefendant by a cross complaint must be one arising out of, or having reference to, the subject of the origi. nal action: Held, accordingly, that the cross-complaints interposed by two of the defendants herein against their co-defendants were rightly struck out as irrelevant. - AMERICAN EXCH. BANK V. DAVIDSON, Minn., 72 N. W. Rep. 129.

38. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Limitations.-The statute of limitations does not commence to run against claims for funds of the principal in the hands of the agent until a demand is made.-EWERS V. WHITE'S EsTATE, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 184.

39. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Powers-Evidence.-Upon the question of authority of an agent to act for his principal in making a contract with a purchaser of goods, evidence is admissible to show that the agent made contracts for his principal with other purchasers.-H. C. MAHRT CO. V. HYMAN-HALL CO., Wash., 49 Pac. Rep. 1063.

40. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Rights and Liabilities of Co-sureties. If one of the sureties on a guardian's bond obtains from the guardian the ward's money for his own use, as in payment of a debt owing him by the guardian personally, and such fact causes the guardian to default, as between such surety and his co-surety, the former is liable for the entire sum defaulted, especially where he has indemnified himself; and this whether or not the latter knew, when he be came surety, that the former had received the money, and acquiesced therein. - PILE V. MCCOY, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1053.

41. PROCESS Service-Non-resident Corporations.Under Pub. Acts 1895, No. 61, providing that "suits may be commenced at law or in equity in the circuit court where the plaintiff resides against any corporation not organized under the laws of this State, in all cases where the cause of action arose in the State of Michi. gan, by service upon any officer or agent of the corporation," etc., service on the traveling salesman of a Massachusetts corporation, through whose agency its business was done in Michigan, was good. - RYERSON V. STEERE, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 131.

42. RAILROAD COMPANY-Occupancy of Street.-Where a railroad company, without condemnation proceed. ings, builds its road in the street, after a license from the city so to do, subject to the rights of adjacent owners, an abutting owner may recover the amount of damages accruing year by year, though he did not own the property when the railroad was built, and no rights against the railroad were assigned by the one who did then own it. HOFFMAN V. FLINT & P. M. R. Co., Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 167.

43. RELEASE AND DISCHARGE-Settlement of Claim.Where relator, an employee of the board of health, presented a bill for extra services, which was allowed, and for which he gave a receipt, it was a settlement of all his claims for such services prior to that time where he neither did nor said anything to indicate that this was to be a partial payment, or that he had any other claim.-GOODSON V. BOARD OF HEALTH OF CITY OF DETROIT, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 185.

44. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Non-resident DefendantJurisdiction.-A suit commenced in a State court, by a British subject, against a non-resident corporation, to recover $20,000 damages for personal injuries, is removable to the circuit court on the application of the defendant.-STALKER V. PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR CO., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 81 Fed. Rep. 989.

45. TAXATION-Deeds-Limitation.-Pol. Code, § 8788, as amended in 1885, provided what should be done with deeds to the lands sold to the State for delinquent taxes, how the lands should again become subject to

entry and sale, and closed with the general provision that "in all cases where land has been heretofore sold for delinquent taxes the deed therefor must be made within one year and three months after this act takes effect, and, unless so made, the purchaser shall be deemed to have relinquished all his rights under such sale:" Held, that the limitation did not apply to the State.-Z. RUSS & SONS Co. v. CRICHTON, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 1043.

46. VENDOR AND PURCHASER - Equity.-Where there is a material deficiency in the amount of land mertioned in a deed, and neither grantor nor grantee knew of it, a case of mutual mistake is made, against which a court of equity will, at the instance of the grantee, give relief by a decree for the value of the de ficiency.-HULL V. WATTS, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 829.

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47. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Title Waiver of ObJections. A company purchased lands with notice that trees growing thereon had been previously sold to another, though no mention of the fact was made in its deed, and without objection it paid part of the price in cash, and gave two notes for the balance. The first note it paid, and it obtained an extension on the other, and paid part of it. When pressed for final pay. ment, it demanded an abatement of the price on cer tain grounds, but not until after suit brought, five years after sale, did it claim an abatement on account of not having received the trees with the land: Held, that it had waived any right to abatement on such ground.-SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA MINERAL LAND CO. V. CHASE, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 826.

48. WATERS-Riparian Rights-Navigable Waters.-A person cannot anchor his boat in the shallow waters between an island, owned by a riparian proprietor. and the channel of a navigable stream, and engage in shooting wild fowl from such boat, with the aid of de coys anchored in such waters, against the protests of such proprietor. - HALL V. ALFORD, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 137.

49. WATER COURSES - Mill Site - Diversion of Head Waters.-The owner of a mill site on a stream fed by lakes and surrounding marsh may enjoin a township, not a riparian owner, from diverting the head waters by cutting a ditch along the highway, even though his resulting loss would be small in comparison w benefits accruing to the public and owners of lowlands.-STOCK V. JEFFERSON TP., Mich., 72 N. W. Rep.

132.

50. WILLS Power of Disposition. A will made a residuary devise to a sister for life, "to be disposed of at her discretion; at her decease to go to my nearest c kin:" Held, that the sister's power of disposition wi limited to transfer during life, and not by will.-KENISTON V. MAYHEW, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 612.

51. WILLS- Rule in Shelly's Case.-Testator gave his estate to his wife and two daughters, absolutely, share and share alike, and then declared that, if h daughters should marry, his will and desire was that the property given to them should not in any instance be liable for the debts of their husbands, but should descend from his daughters to "their children;" and that, should either of his "children before mentioned" die without a child, the property given to it should descend to that which may be living, "in the manner above specified:" Held, that the devises to th daughters did not fall within the rule in Shelley's Case. -COLLINS V. WILLIAMS, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1056.

52. WILLS-Vesting of Estates.-A will provided, “Ou the decease of my son D the principal sum held trust for him shall be paid to his son D, if then living, and, in case of his previous decease, the trustees sha.. pay over said principal sum to my daughter and to my other sons, to be equally divided among them." Held, that the interests of the sons and daughters of testa trix other than D in the remainder after the life estate vested on the death of testatrix, and not on the deat of the grandson D. -SHAW V. ECKLEY, Mass., 47 N. E Rep. 609.