goods as they saw fit on arriving at Matamoras, but the real intention of all parties was that at Matamoras the goods should be transhipped into lighters and proceed thence to a point in Texas, there to be delivered to the Confederate government, in pursuance of a contract made between that government and one M. The goods were insured on their voyage to Matamoras by a policy which contained a warranty against contraband of war. While on its way to Matamoras the ship was seized by a United States cruiser and condemned. In an action on the policy by the insurance agent on behalf of the shippers:

Held, that the goods being, from the time they left this country, really bound to Texas, were contraband of war, so that the warranty was broken and plaintiff could not recover. Seymour v. London and Provincial Marine Ins. Co., 27 L. T. R. (C. P.) 417.

2. Duty of master: evidence. After a vessel is stranded, there is still an obligation upon the master to take all possible care of the cargo. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Wis., Home Ins. Co. v. Ocean Wave.

3. Where a barge is made leaky by an effort to remove her from a sand-bar, it is the duty of the master to stop the leak and secure the cargo from the flow of water. Ib.

4. A shipper should not be required to prove negligence on the part of a master until evidence is given tending to show that the injury complained of came within an excepted clause in the bill of lading. Ib.

AN EXTRAORDINARY SUIT.

to have been born on the 29th of March, 1797. As to this entry, it was alleged by the plaintiff that the register had been tampered with and that the date of the birth was added sometime after the original entry. The bill then stated that Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane brought up Francis Fletcher Vane, the child thus born, as his legitimate heir. After the marriage two other children were born, i. e., a daughter and the plaintiff, who was born on May 10th, 1807. Francis Fletcher Vane married in 1823, and upon the death of his father in 1832 assumed the title and the family estates. He died in 1842, and the defendant, Sir Henry Ralph Vane, who was his eldest son, and consequently the nephew of the plaintiff, succeeded him.

Lady Vane, the widow of Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane, did not die until 1866, and the plaintiff accounted for the length of time which had elapsed before he attempted to assert his rights by the statement that, from the year 1826, when at the age of nineteen he obtained a commission in the Twelfth Lancers, down to the year 1866, he had only been for a few days at a time at the family place in Cumberland, and that in that year he, for the first time, became aware through inquiries made in consequence of some remarks let fall by the widow of Sir Francis and of a subsequent conversation with the widow of Sir Frederick before her death, that there was any doubt as to the legitimacy of his elder brother. The plaintiff further charged that the illegitimacy of Sir Francis was not only known to Sir Frederick and his wife, but also was disclosed by Sir Frederick to Sir Francis, and was known by Sir Francis' wife and her father, and was fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff.

To this bill two demurrers were put in-one by Lady Diana Vane, widow of Sir Francis, and the other by Sir Henry Ralph Vane, the present baronet - —on the ground that the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitation and by his own laches. The statute, after direct

The object of this suit, which was instituted by Sir Frederick Henry Vane, Bart. (heretofore commonly called Frederick Henry Vane), against Henry Ralph Vane (heretofore commonly called Sir Henry Ralph Vane, Bart.), and others, was to obtain a declaration that the plaintiff, as the eldest son of Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane, deceased, is entitled to the family estates in Cumberland and Westmoreland, and to have an account taken of the rents and profits received by the defendant, with an order for payment to the plaintiff of what should be found due.

The case made by the bill was, that Sir Frederick Fletcher Vane, the father of the plaintiff, before his marriage cohabited with, and had three children by Miss Hannah Bowerbank, the lady whom he subsequently married, the first of such children having been born in 1794 and the second in 1795. It was upon the legitimacy of the third of these children that the question turned. The plaintiff alleged that, pending arrangements for his father's marriage with Miss Bowerbank, she was prematurely confined of a third child, a son, and that the marriage did not in fact take place until nearly three weeks after her confinement, viz., on March 9, 1797.

The child thus born, as the plaintiff alleged, about three weeks before the marriage on the 9th of March, was baptized by the name of Francis Fletcher Vane, at St. George's, Bloomsburg, on the 19th of April 1797, and in the entry of his baptism he was stated

which the possession of land could be recovered, provided that in case of "concealed fraud" the right of a person to bring a suit for the recovery of land should accrue at the time at which such fraud should or with "reasonable diligence," might have been first known or discovered. The vice-chancellor held, assuming the bill to be true, that there had been "concealed fraud," and that the plaintiff had used reasonable diligence. and therefore overruled the demurrers.

The main issue of course is, whether Francis Fletcher Vane was born before or after March 9, 1797; the other important question is, whether Lady Diana was a party to the fraud alleged to have been practiced on the settlement of the estate in consideration of her marriage.

The plaintiff, Mr. Frederick Henry Vane, resided for some time in Boston several years ago, and won an enviable name there for his noble qualities of mind and heart. The title and estates in question could not fall into worthier hands, and if the case shall be finally decided in his favor we may congratulate the cause of humanity, as Mr. Vane's desire to do good to his fellow creatures is only limited by his ability to gratify that desire. The value of the estate in question is between £10,000 and £20,000 a year.

Twenty thousand dollars, so far, has been paid by Comptroller Green, of New York city, for legal services in the trial of Mayor Hall.

NOTES.

Mr. R. H. Chittenden proposes to publish a monthly Civil Law Journal devoted to a discussion of the principles of the Roman law as taught in the universities and applied in the courts. Some of the most distinguished civilians of Europe and America will contribute to it. The first number will appear in January. The study of the Civil law is beginning to attract considerable attention in this country, and the Civil Law Journal will help to foster the good tendency.

was

Two weekly law periodicals have recently sprung up which, we believe, we have not noticed. The first "The Law News," published in St. Louis, by Benjamin Hunter and W. G. Myer, editors and proprietors, and the other the “American Law Reporter," published at Davenport, Iowa, and of which L. G. Johnson is the editor. Both content themselves-as do most of the weekly law periodicals published in this country with reproducing in full the recent decisions of the courts in their locality, the editorial work being limited to preparing the head notes. We wish them abundant success.

Orlando F. Bump is preparing a work on "Fraudulent Conveyances," designed as a companion volume to his work on Bankruptcy.

The value of Mr. Hough's "American Constitutions," which we noticed at page 302, ante, is rapidly being acknowledged. The Constitutional Convention of Pennsylvania has procured a copy for each of its members, and the Constitutional Commission of this State has done likewise. For one interested in the study and comparison of American Constitutions, no better work can be found.

BOOK NOTICE.

An Index to and an Analysis of the New York Statutes at Large, comprised in the contents of the first seven volumes, by John W. Edmonds. Weed, Parsons & Company, Albany, 1872, pp. 313.

The accuracy and value of Mr. Edmonds' edition of the statutes are too well known to the bench and bar of the State to need any present commendation. It has most completely supplanted the old "Fifth Edition," a hotchpotch of all sorts of statutes, without accuracy, intelligible plan or arrangement. The first two volumes of Mr. Edmonds' edition contains the revised statutes in their integrity; the succeeding three contain the general public statutes in force on the 1st of January, 1867. The sixth contained the general statutes from 1863 to 1866, both inclusive, and the seventh brought the work down to the end of the session of 1870. There were thus four separate divisions of the work, and four separate indexes, leading to some inconvenience in an examination of the work. A number of inaccuracies also existed in the indexes to the last two volumes which occasioned annoyance. The present volume will remedy both the inconvenience and the annoyance. It contains in a compact form an index to the entire seven volumes, and as great pains have been taken in its preparation, of its accuracy we feel assured. The court of appeals of the State have paid the learned author a very graceful compliment in sending to him a letter signed by all the judges, of which the following is a copy, omitting the formal part:

In the examination we have made of the eighth volume of "The New York Statutes at Large," we are satisfied it will be found of very great convenience in the necessary daily reference to the other seven volumes.

Consisting, as it does, of a full index to, and an elaborate analysis of, the contents of the other volumes, it saves labor, insures accuracy and facilitates research by obviating the necessity of consulting on every occasion several separate indices contained in as many separate volumes.

The analysis is an important and valuable part of the work, grouping as it does, under appropriate and familiar heads, all the legislation upon the different topics and thus simplifying a search of the statutes. The volume is a necessary accompaniment to the other volumes.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

We have received the following new books, which will be noticed at the earliest opportunity: “Hilliard on New Trials," 2d ed., revised and greatly enlarged; Kay & Brother, Philadelphia. Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. 1. This volume is complete in itself, and treats of mental unsoundness and psychological law. It is not a new edition of the former work by these authors, but is, substantially, a new treatise; Kay & Brother, Philadelphia. Vermont Reports, vol. 44; J. & J. M. Poland, Montpelier. New Hampshire Reports, vol. 50; B. W. Sanborn & Co., Concord, N. H.

LEGAL NEWS.

Mr. Dudley, late United States consul at Liverpool, is employed by the department of justice to assist in the settlement of the claims of American citizens in England, arising under the treaty of Washington.

Robert Lincoln, son of the late president, has just returned from his European trip, accompanied by his wife, much improved in health, and will at once resume the practice of law in Illinois.

Hon. Thomas Settle, president of the Philadelphia national republican convention, has been appointed associate justice of the supreme court of North Carolina, in place of H. P. Dick, resigned. Judge Settle held the place from 1868 to 1871.

The library of congress has received a complete set of all the documents, opinions, arguments and papers connected with the Geneva arbitration. They include the leading articles of the European press on the Alabama case, and are magnificently bound.

Twenty-nine divorces were granted in St. Louis on the 22d ult., according to the Democrat of that city. Since the supreme court of Missouri decided that parties to a divorce suit were competent witnesses in their own behalf, the number of applications has greatly increased.

The members of the bar of Philadelphia have tendered to the Hon. James Thompson, who is about to retire from the seat of chief justice of the supreme court, a dinner as an expression of their high estimate of his worth and services as a judge, and his ability as a jurist. Judge Thompson has accepted, and the dinner will take place next Thursday.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, DECEMBER 21, 1872.

CONCERNING THE READING OF MANY

BOOKS.

Hobbes, of Malmesbury, used to say: "If I had read as many books as other persons I should, probably, know as little;" and the saying had a sermon in it which we have, most of us, been very slow to learn. We read too many books, and especially is this true of lawyers and law students. We remember to have seen a “course of law reading for students," recommended in some old book which, it was remarked, "could be accomplished in about ten years," and to an edition of Wynne's Eunomus there is prefixed a "plan of reading for special pleaders" that makes one's head ache simply to contemplate. Such a legal ground plan is not unlike Robinson Crusoe's goat pen, so large as to give him as little property in his flock as though he had no pen at all.

And the worst of it is that most law students pursue their studies, or rather reading, for it is not study, much on the same principle. One book after another is gone through hastily, mechanically, little remembered and less understood, and after a certain time they come to the bar with no clear, well-defined knowledge of any thing. In thinking of the average law students' career, one is reminded of Swift's witty remark, that the reason a certain university was a learned place was, that some persons took some learning there and few brought any away with them, so it accumulated.

A late learned professor in a law school used to remark to his classes that any man who knew the contents of three books, which he named, would be a better lawyer than there was in the State; and we do not doubt he was correct. The usual method of a law student is to read seriatim Blackstone, and Kent, and Greenleaf, and Washburn on Real Property, and Parsons on Contracts, and works on Practice, Bills and Notes, Partnership, Easements, Domestic Relations, Pleadings, Commercial Law, Agency and whatnot, until he has a sufficient smattering to enable him to pass a meagre examination and take his place at the bar. But after all this, how much does he really know, as a rule, on any one of the subjects named. Certainly, not much. Now, had he devoted all this time to carefully reading and re-reading Blackstone or Kent, can there be a reasonable doubt that his knowledge on all or nearly all the subjects would have been ten or twenty fold? Mr. Warren tells, in his admirable work on "Law Studies," that he once asked one of the most eminent political writers of the day, one who had been, on several occasions, signally successful in attacking the opinions of lawyers in parliament, how it was that, not being a lawyer, he was so com

pletely at home on legal subjects. "Why," was the reply, "I study a book which you lawyers only talk about or look down upon, Blackstone's Commentaries."

It is a conceded fact in military science, that a few disciplined forces are far more efficient than a much larger number of undisciplined men, and the same is true in the law. A few books, thoroughly mastered, will furnish a knowledge that will make one stronger and better able to cope with difficulties, than any number of books but half understood or remembered; or, as the Germans put it—and none better understand practical education - "nothing is so prolific as a little known well." The old Latin proverb reminds us of this fact-Cave ab homine unius libri— beware of the man of one book. He will always be found to be a formidable antagonist. His intimate knowledge of one great author will saturate his mind with the excellencies of that author's genius, will shape and sharpen his faculties, and he will be like a man who sleeps with armor on, ready at the moment. While, of course, in the law it is impossible to be a "man of one book" literally, yet, in its spirit and true meaning, it is not only possible, but desirable; that is, to pursue one system, to choose a few authors and to be thorough in a limited sphere, rather than superficial in one more extended. Sir William Jones, it is said, invariably read through every year the works of Cicero; Demosthenes copied and re-copied the history of Thucydides eight times; Montesquieu was a constant student of Tacitus; Chatham read Barrow's sermons until he could repeat most of them from memory; Webster read Plutarch's lives every year. These are but few of the hundreds of worthy witnesses who have, by example, testified to the value of iteration and reiteration. Each had his particular object, and how well he accomplished it we know. If logic or style or diction can be thus best acquired, so can the law. The student who shall take Blackstone or Kent and make that his book, who shall have it ever at hand, read, re-read, "marked and quoted;" who shall make incursions into other treatises and the reports, only to illustrate it and trace its doctrines, will have a more thorough, practical and comprehensive knowledge of the law than though he had gone through the entire curriculum of the law schools. In re-reading a book a man does not get precisely the same information that he did on the first reading, for the interval between the readings will call attention to a new order of facts, and, like the bits of glass in the kaleidoscope, they will assume new combinations and make new impressions.

There are very few legal text-books that should be read through, "from cover to cover." The others ought to be studied on particular topics in connection with the few aforesaid. It is a well-known fact that Dr. Johnson said he never read any book through but the Bible, yet Adam Smith said, "Johnson knew more books than any man alive." The secret of this

is easily found in Boswell's remark: "He had a peculiar facility in seizing at once what was valuable in any book without submitting to the labor of perusing it from beginning to end."

This faculty of getting directly at what one desires in a book is of supreme value to the law student, and one which he can cultivate and greatly improve by confining his chief attention to a few books and using the others only as adjuncts. We are not speaking of the reports, for to them the student should constantly turn, but, as a rule, only in connection with the particular topic that he is pursuing in his text-book. He should carefully examine the authorities cited by his author and what later leading cases he can find on the subject, should master the facts and the reasons on which the decisions are based, and should then write out his results as a kind of annotation to his treatise. This process will make "every man his own author," will train his intellect, develop his reasoning powers, fix legal principles in his memory and make him a more thorough lawyer than any number of years' careless, half-interested, reading "by course' could do. He will have the substance instead of the shadow of real knowledge.

THE LAW'S DELAY, AND HOW TO AVOID IT. Litigants in the courts in New York city justly complain of the great delay in reaching causes for trial. In some of the courts a period of about two years elapses after filing the note of issue before the cause is reached, and in none of them is it less than from six to eight months. The witnesses during this long interval cannot be kept together; they become scattered or they die; their recollection of the facts grows indistinct; their interest as well as that of the parties is lost, as new and more engrossing matters occupy their attention; and finally, when the cause is reached, it is postponed from term to term, and either abandoned because material witnesses cannot be produced, or tried and lost for want of the evidence which, at the outset, was readily attainable. The result is prejudicial to lawyers as well as clients. Many men, especially merchants, having had experience at what they term "the law's delay," submit to ruinous sacrifices, or absolute loss, rather than commence actions.

It is needless to examine, at any great length, the causes of this delay. Judges blame the lawyers, and complain that they are never ready with their cases; lawyers blame the judges, and say they do not sit as long as they might, or give their full time to judicial duties; or that they are too willing to listen to excuses; and litigants blame both judges and lawyers, holding them at fault all around. None of these censures are fairly deserved. No fair-minded man aware of the immense volume of business before the New York courts, and the time actually employed by the judges in performing their judicial functions, would

make a charge of laziness against them. As a class they are obliged to work very hard, not only during the hours of ordinary labor, but when other men are enjoying their leisure. Apart from the time actually spent upon the bench, each of the judges must devote several hours to the examination of cases, or questions reserved for decision, and the writing of opinions. Even the summer holiday is not always a period of mere recreation. It would be very unfair to conclude that when a judge leaves the bench his day's work is done; practitioners in the courts know such is not the fact. As for the lawyers they too have a great deal of labor to perform; if in active practice much of their time must be spent in the courts, or in conferences with their clients, and the needful study in the preparation of their causes must necessarily be done elsewhere than in their offices when constant interruptions break the steady current of thought; no sweeping charge can be brought against the lawyers of doing less than their fair share of work.

The fault is rather in the system than in individuals, and has been of gradual growth. The calendars by a faulty system of arrangement, by the cumbrous methods of disposing of cases, and the facility allowed in obtaining postponements, have been allowed to grow too heavy, and the evil complained of is daily increasing. We may need some little addition to the present judicial force, but, even without extra judges, we are satisfied a remedy exists.

Various expedients have been devised from time to time with only partial success. The referee system has been tried, but found too tedious and expensive; cases are spun out to great length, and large bills of costs incurred. Besides, many abuses have crept into the system, impairing its value as a relief to the courts.

The last, and so far the best, experiment has been in the making up of what is commonly called the "railroad calendar," which needs no explanation to our professional readers; but even this is beginning to be of small practical value. In the supreme court this calendar is called but once in each week, and in the other courts twice each term. The accumulated causes, sometimes amounting to a large number, are all placed upon this calendar for one day, producing an inevitable result. Those whose cases are not near the head do not get ready for trial, assuming, as they fairly may, that the parties in the earlier causes will be ready and consume all the time of the court. There being but one day set apart for this calendar few causes can be disposed of, and it generally happens that, apart from inquests, not more than one or two cases are tried. Moreover, by reason of the ease with which causes may be postponed, growing out of the laxity of practice, it is now a fact that cases on the railroad calendar drag along for weeks and months before being finally tried. Another defect in this, as a system of relief, is found in the shortness of the time allowed for a trial. One hour is too little. Few con

tested cases, in which witnesses are to be examined and questions of fact presented to a jury, can be disposed of within that limit. Even if they could be it is a not uncommon expedient among lawyers of a certain class, when their cases have been placed on this calendar, needlessly to protract a trial, so as to consume over the hour and throw the cause to the foot of the calendar, to the great expense, inconvenience and delay of the plaintiff. By frivolous objections, tedious arguments and extended examinations upon immaterial points this is not difficult for an unscrupulous advocate "fighting for time," and the judges do not seem made of stern enough stuff to repress the practice. As the law stands now it can be done without incurring any penalty, except, perhaps, the contempt of the judge and of right-minded lawyers. For this, any man who will resort to such a practice cares but little, so long as he carries his point and his client pays him liberally. Of course no honorable attorney would resort to such disreputable conduct, but the fact may as well be faced, that at the bar in the great city, there are some lawyers not above such "tricks;" it may often happen that the honorable lawyer finds himself pitted against the "shyster," and is no match for him in his peculiar style of warfare.

There is little utility of complaining of evils unless we are prepared to suggest some practical remedy. We think there is a remedy for this evil, and one of easy application. We will throw out a few hints for consideration, trusting, if they are deemed of value, they will be incorporated in some legislation, to be passed upon by the next legislature.

Let a law be passed, providing, in substance, that all causes arising on contract, which either party will swear can be tried within two hours, or in which defenses have been interposed for delay, be placed upon a special calendar, this calendar to be taken up in one part of each court, and the causes on it disposed of in their numerical order, where not specially preferred by existing statutes. We will thus have a court constantly sitting for the trial of these causes. In order to strengthen the hands of the judges, the law should provide that no cause, after reaching the day calendar, should be postponed, unless for good cause, shown by affidavit; that, where more than two hours are actually consumed, the judge should have power to strike the cause from the special calendar; and, most important of all, where the trial has been manifestly protracted (as is too often the case now), by the defendant's counsel, so as to make it consume more than the two hours, the court should have power to impose costs upon the defendant, and enforce payment of the same by proceedings as for contempt.

With such a court, sitting day after day, and holding a strict rein, an immense number of causes could be disposed of annually, and cases would be better tried than at present. The general calendar of the

court would be greatly relieved, litigants get their rights without delay, and dilatory defenses cease to be interposed. If the present force of judges is not sufficient, let it be increased. We feel satisfied that tax payers would not complain of a few more salaries where such beneficial results would be secured. The scandal which now attaches to the New York courts, by reason of the "law's delay," would soon be removed.

A large majority of cases arising upon promissory notes or simple contracts could unquestionably be tried within the time we have fixed, provided the judges would confine the testimony to the questions at issue, and require celerity from counsel. As matter of calculation, we will assume that there are nine terms of each court, sitting for four weeks each term, and excluding Saturdays. This will give us nearly five hundred working days, and we can safely say that at least five causes could be disposed of on an average, which would give us about twenty-five hundred annually, at which rate present arrearages would be soon worked off, and new issues reached for trial within a few weeks. We do not mean that the judge should sit for ten hours; professional readers will understand that we contemplate many cases being tried in less than the prescribed time, and others disposed of by settlement; inquest or dismissal.

The matter is well worthy of consideration, and if this scheme be regarded as impracticable, let some better plan be devised.

EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS-THE VOGT

CASE.

In the closing number of volume five, the Law JOURNAL took occasion to discuss the general subject of the "extradition of criminals," and particularly the Vogt case, which had then been recently decided in the superior court of New York city. That decision being averse to the right of the governor of New York to surrender a criminal under the law of 1822, the case was appealed, and finally reached the court of appeals, where it was recently decided, and the unconstitutionality of the act of 1822 affirmed. This statute provides that the governor may, in his discretion, deliver over to justice any person found within the State who shall be charged with having committed, without the jurisdiction of the United States, any crime except treason, which, by the laws of this State, if committed therein, is punishable by death or by imprisonment. Vogt, the criminal whose rendition was demanded, was concededly within the provisions of this statute, and his delivery was duly required, in accordance with the terms of the statute, by the authorized officer of the Belgian government, within whose limits the crime was committed. The LAW JOURNAL, at that time, could see no plausible or constitutional, or even strictly legal reason why the State