J.-Mr. Rogers, p. 257, cites the Coventry Case, 1708, 16 Journ. 129. "The right of election was held to be in persons who have served apprenticeship for seven years within the city to one and the same trade, not receiving alms or constant charity. The petitioners ought to disqualify those voters who had received Sir Thomas White's gift (which is a gift of 40s. annually to each of the objects of his charity); and, the question being put in the House, that they were disabled by receiving it, it passed in the negative."] It would be a strong thing to call that alms.

ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that the decision of the revisingbarrister in this case was right, and that the votes in question are good. The parties claiming the franchise are freemen of the borough, and as such entitled to be registered, unless disqualified by the 36th section of the Reform Act, which enacts that no person shall be entitled to be registered in any year as a voter in the election of a member or members to serve in any future parliament for any city or borough, who shall within twelve calendar months next previous to the last day of July in such year have received parochial relief or other alms which by the law of parliament now disqualify from voting in the election of members to serve in parliament." I can[*498 not find that the recipients of the proceeds of these lands were disqualified by the law of parliament at the time the Reform Bill passed. In the Sandwich Case referred to by my Brother Williams, the House negatived the qualification, and yet decided that the member for whom the almsmen voted should keep his seat. That leaves the matter doubtful: and we should always incline to favour the qualification, unless the law compels us to decide against it. If we are to resort to conjecture as to the meaning of the legislature,-which evidently was that persons so placed by their indigence as to be presumably subservient and destitute of all freedom of mind, should not be permitted to exercise the franchise,-I must own I should think that these freeren, by reason of their having a house, and a share in the profits of the land belonging to the hospital, for life, are gifted with a far greater probability of independence than those who have nothing to rely on but the precarious proceeds of their own labour. The recipients of these funds may at the time of their admission have a prospect of many years of active and profitable labour before them: and I see nothing to justify me in holding that the advantages they enjoy operate any disqualification on the score of alms.

WILLIAMS, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. I think it is not made out that the circumstances under which these freemen participate in the revenues of these hospitals show them to be in the receipt of disqualifying alms within the meaning of the statute. There certainly does seem to be a great conflict of decisions so far as the committees of the House of Commons are concerned. I find it laid down in Heywood on County Elections,-a book of very high authority, p. 278, that "a distinction may be made between *charities which are of such a nature as to imply that the par[*499 taker of them is in a state of indigence and abject dependence, and those which afford no such inference, or from which a contrary one may be drawn." It seems to me to be quite out of the question to hold that these parties are in such a state of indigence and abject

dependence as that they ought to be disqualified from being on the register.

BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. I collect from the statements in the case, that these hospitals are corporations by prescription, and that the occupants of the houses and participators in the revenues are members of the respective corporations. The case also finds that the property of the hospital consists in landed estates and houses; the income arising from the former being divisible annually among the brethren in equal proportions, and a house being assigned to each of the brethren wherein to live, each house being kept in repair by the brother who lives in it. These persons, therefore, are each residing on his own property, and entitled by law to continue to reside there for life, and receive his share of the revenues of the corporation. Independently, therefore, of the decisions, I should have thought these parties not disqualified. But, comparing the cases cited on the part of the appellant with the Bedford Case, the Coventry Case, and the cases of the Greenwich and Chelsea pensioners, the result would seem to be that the brethren of these foundations cannot be said to be in the receipt of alms when what they receive, whatever be its amount, is received as a matter of right. Upon that view of the cases, these parties are not disqualified. The Sandwich Case, referred to by my Brother Williams, is a singular one. The voters there were members of these very corporations: and the result leaves the right in some *doubt. Upon the whole, therefore, I think the decision of the revising-barrister was right.

*500]

KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. These brethren, as freemen of the borough, were primâ facie entitled to vote. The question is, whether they are disqualified by the receipt of alms. The parish officers have never interfered in the distribution of the funds of these corporations. Each of the brethren is entitled to a share of the revenues of the land and to a house to live in: and the usage is in favour of their qualification. For these and the reasons given by the other members of the court, I am of opinion that the objection is not well founded. Decision affirmed, with costs.

City of LONDON.

PETER HENRETTE, Appellant; THOMAS WOODZELL BOOTH, Respondent. Nov. 21.

The occupation of "part of a house" may confer a right to vote for a city or borough, under the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27, if there be independent occupation and actual severance from the rest. A. occupied the upper floor of a house, consisting of two rooms, an inner and an outer room, opening the one into the other, and communicating with the landing on the staircase by one outer door, over which A. had exclusive control. The floors below were occupied by other tenants, and all had access to their several holdings from the street through a doorway at the entrance of a passage leading to the common staircase. At this entrance was a door open all day, but generally, but not invariably, allowed to swing to at night, but having no lock or fastening of any kind, nor any means of being so closed as to secure the premises from intrusion from the street:-Held, that the subject of occupation was a "house" within the meaning of the 27th section of the Reform Act.

AT a court held for the revision of the lists of voters for the city

of London, Thomas Woodzell Booth, on the list of voters of the livery of the company of distillers, duly objected to the name of Peter Henrette *being retained on the list of persons entitled [*501 to vote in the election of members for the city of London, in the parish of St. Giles-without-Cripplegate, under the following cir

cumstances:

It was contended by the objector, and proved before the revisingbarrister, that the qualification of Peter Henrette (hereinafter termed the appellant) fulfilled all the conditions precedent to registration required by the Reform and Registration acts, with the exceptions, if such the court shall adjudge them to be, hereunder detailed.

The appellant occupied for the statutory period, as tenant, the whole of the upper floor, consisting of two rooms, of a tenement in No. 4, Honeysuckle Square. He uses one room as a tailor's shop, and the other as a sitting and bed-room. His only residence is in the premises, which, taken together, are of the requisite value to confer a qualification; but neither of the rooms taken singly is of the requisite value. They consist of an inner and outer room opening the one into the other, and communicating with the landing on the staircase by one outer door, over which the tenant occupier has exclusive control.

The floors below are occupied by other tenants; and all have access to their several holdings from the street through a doorway at the entrance of a passage leading to the common staircase of the building. At the entrance is a door open all day, but generally, although not invariably, allowed to swing to at night, and having no lock or fastening of any kind, nor any means of being so closed as to secure the premises from intrusion from the street.

It was under this state of circumstances contended for the appellant, -first, that the subject of occupation was a house,-secondly, that, if not a house, it was a "building" within the meaning of the qualify. ing *clauses of the Reform Act,-thirdly, that, if not a house [*502 or building, the use for commercial or business purposes as a workshop of one of the two rooms not severed in any way from the rest of the premises, constituted the whole subject of occupation a "shop," within the meaning of the qualifying clauses of the Reform Act.

On the other hand, it was contended by the objector,-first, that the facts did not show such a severance of the qualifying premises from the rest of the tenement of which they formed the upper floor, as to constitute them a house,-secondly, that the one room used as a workshop was not of sufficient value to confer the franchise,-thirdly, that the use of one of the rooms for the purposes of trade, did not impart the character of a "shop" to the whole premises the subject of Occupation,-fourthly, that the nature of the occupation did not warrant their designation as a "building" within the meaning of the Reform Act,-fifthly, that the use of one of the rooms for habitation rendered the whole premises a residence insufficient to confer a qualifi cation, because not a "house" within the meaning of the Reform Act. The revising-barrister sustained the objection, and expunged the name of the appellant from the list of voters, on the ground that the whole premises the subject of occupation did not constitute in law a house or building, or a shop, within the meaning of the Reform Act.

If the court should be of opinion that the decision was erroneous, the name of the appellant Peter Henrette was to be re-inserted in the list of voters in the parish of St. Giles-without-Cripplegate.

Kinglake, Serjt. (with whom was Underdown), for the appellant.The question is whether the premises *described in this case *503] constitute a "house" or "building" within the 27th section of the Reform Act. It is not proposed to dispute the well-considered judgment of this court in Cook, app., Humber, resp., 11 C. B. N. S. 33 (E. C. L. R. vol. 103); but it is submitted that the present case is not within it. In that case the court had to consider the propriety of some former decisions, viz. Score, app., Huggett resp., 7 M. & G. 95 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 8 Scott N. R. 919, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 198, and Toms, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. 23, 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 19, on the one side, and Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., 7 M. & G. 85, 8 Scott N. R. 907, i Lutw. Reg. Cas. 168, and Wansey, app., Perkins, resp., (Hill's Case), 7 M. & G. 151, 8 Scott N. R. 978, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 252, on the other. The result, as it now stands, seems to be, that, if the premises in respect of which the right to be registered is claimed are so severed from the rest of the house that the occupier has complete control, the fact of there being an outer door does not interfere with the franchise. In Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., there was an outer door which the court considered as the outer door of the entire house, and so there was no severance. In delivering the judgment of the court in Cook, app., Humber, resp., Erle, C. J., says: "In these four cases the subject of occupation was in substance the same, namely, a part of a house let for lodgings: but the occupation itself was made the subject of distinction. In two of them, the lodger was held to be qualified, because his occupation was as tenant: in the other two, the lodger was held not to be qualified, because his occupation was as lodger. lodger. In the present case, we rest our judgment, not upon the kind of occupation described in the statement, but upon the subject of occupation. We consider that the qualification fails, because the subject of occupation was, not a house, but only a part of a house, without any actual sever

ance from the residue." After going into detail through the *504] four cases above referred to, his Lordship proceeds," There

fore we think that the true question in the cases cited, and in the present case, turns on the nature of the tenement occupied. Is it such property as the legislature intended to make a qualification? Now, the statute required some permanent occupation of, and some independent interest in, the property. The permanence prevents the sudden creation of votes. The ownership or the tenancy, with rating, indidates some independence: in other words, the requirement of at least a tenancy excludes some occupations of less independence; such as the occupations of servants for their service; for example, porters of the lodge, gardeners of the dwelling in the garden; and also such as that of the surgeon for the hospital of the rooms therein (Dobson, app., Jones, resp., 5 M. & G. 112 (E. C. L. R. vol. 44), 8 Scott N. R. 80, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 105); also the occupation of premises by objects of charity occupying under the permission of the trustees of the charity, -Davis, app., Waddington, resp., 7 M. & G. 37, 8 Scott N. R. 807, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 159; Heartley, app., Banks, resp., 5 C. B. N. S. 40 (E. C. L. R. vol. 94), K. & G. 219. These and the other cases of occupation

inferior in right to a tenancy are excluded by the requirement that the occupier must be at least the tenant. But, if he is tenant, he occupies as tenant, and this part of the qualification is complete and it is immaterial as to this under what denomination of tenant he is classed, whether as lodger, termor or lessee, or other name." In a subsequent part of the judgment, his Lordship says: "In Judson, app., Luckett, resp., 2 C. B. 197 (E. C. L. R. vol. 52), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 490, the claimant occupied the upper part of the house and the kitchen, having a distinct and separate entrance thereto. The landlord occupied the ground-floor, having a distinct and separate entrance thereto. The *claim in the list was for part of a house. The [*505 judgment is, that the claimant was qualified, because a part of a house in one sense may be so completely separated from the residue as to constitute a house in another sense. The description 'part of a house' might be true according to the common understanding of the word 'house,' and yet may denote such a house in another sense as will qualify. In this judgment, the qualification is made to turn on the actual severance." The description of premises here plainly conveys the notion of complete and actual severance. "They consist," says the case, "of an inner and outer room opening the one into the other, and communicating with the landing on the staircase by one outer door, over which the tenant occupier has exclusive control." The access is from the street "through a doorway at the entrance of a passage leading to the common staircase of the building. At the entrance is a door open all day, but generally, though not invariably, allowed to swing to at night, and having no lock or fastening of any kind, nor any means of being so closed as to secure the premises from intrusion from without." The question is, whether the subject. of occupation here is not different in point of severance from the premises in Cook, app., Humber, resp. In Bryan Kearney's Case, Alcock's Reg. Cas. 22, the claimant occupied the ground front apartment. of a house as a shop, at a rent of 201.; the entrance to the shop was through the hall of the house; into that hall there were three doors, -the hall-door opening into the street, the shop-door a few feet from the hall-door, and a door opening to the staircase. The landlord did not reside in the house; and the other apartments were let to lodgers. The street or hall-door lay open all day, and was locked at night; and the claimant and one of the lodgers had each a key for it. The [*506 *taxes were paid by the landlord; and the claimant, in common with the lodgers, had the use of the kitchen and of the water coming to the house. It was held,-upon the authority of all the judges,that the claimant was entitled to be registered as a householder. Crompton, J., in giving his reasons for the judgment, says: "It appears to me that we should take, not the street-door, but the shopdoor opening into the hall, to be the claimant's outer-door; and for these reasons, had the shop-door in this case opened, not into the hall, but into the street immediately, the claimant's right would be conceded. Were the hall into which the shop-door opens an entry or passage at all times open, it can scarcely be disputed that such a hall would be for the inmates of No. 59, Fleet Street, as a street, and that the claimant's case would be like the .case of the tenants of chambers in the Inns of Court, where each chamber is held to be a separate C. B. N. S., VOL. XV.-20