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Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. InU. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Com- terstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. mission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803; Gulf, etc., (1897) 167 U. S. 510; U. S. v. Missouri R. Co. v. Miami Steamship Co., (C. C. Pac. R. Co., (1894) 65 Fed. Rep. 905; A. 1898) 86 Fed. Rep. 407; Interstate U. S. v. Hanley, (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. Commerce Commission v. Louisville, 673; Kinnavey v. Terminal R. Assoc.,' etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409. 897) 81 Fed. Rep. 803.

But regard must be had to the disThe Act has no relation to and was similarity of legislation and methods not intended to reinforce the provi- of trade and transportation prevailing sions of the tariff laws. Texas, etc., in England. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. InR. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com- terstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. mission, (1896) 162 U. S. 221.

A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 832; Lindquist The causes and reasons which led V. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., (1901) to the enactment of the Act are dis- 121 Fed. Rep. 918. cussed at length in Texas, etc., R. Co. CONSTRUCTION AGAINST CARRIER. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, The Act was not primarily intended (1896) 162 U. S. 197.

for the benefit of the carrier. KenCONSTITUTIONALITY.—The Act is a tucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, constitutional exercise by Congress of etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. its power to regulate interstate and In cases of doubt, where relief is foreign commerce. Interstate Com- sought in the interest of the carrier, merce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) the construction will be against the 154 U. S. 448; Bullard V. Northern carrier. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Pac. R. Co., (1890) 10 Mont. 168, 45 Louis Southwestern R. Co., (C. C. A. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234.

1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 775; Kentucky, CONSTRUCTION OF ACT.-The Act will etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. be construed, if possible, so as to Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. facilitate and promote commerce, and But the Act will not be construed so not to hamper or destroy it. Texas, as to abridge the common-law rights of etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce carriers further than its terms and Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. purposes require. Interstate Com

The Act applies only to matters in- merce Commission v. Louisville, etc., volved in the regulation of commerce. R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 448.

Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. The Act should be broadly construed. Rep. 51. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. Interstate Commerce Commission v. V. Osborne, (C. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) Rep. 914. 85 Fed. Rep. 107.

CONSTRUCTION AS A WHOLE.--" The The interests of the seller, the con- intent of Congress is to be gathered sumer, and the carrier must all be from a consideration of the entire Act, considered in construing the Act. In- and not solely from detached portions terstate Commerce Commission V. thereof, and the familiar rule of conLouisville, etc., R. (1896) 73 Fed. struction is to be followed, to wit, that, Rep. 409; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Inter- in determining the meaning of the state Commerce Commission, (1896) words employed, the general purpose 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce of the Act and the evils sought to be Commission V. Alabama Midland R. remedied must be always kept in mind, Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 165; Reagan v. and, furthermore, parts of the Act are Farmers' L. & T. Co., (1894) 154 U. S. not to be so construed as to defeat 412.

other important features of the same; CONSTRUCTION OF ENGLISH TRAFFIC nor is such a construction to be given ACTS ADOPTED.--So far as the Act to the Act, in whole or in part, as may adopts the provisions of the prior Eng- tend to prevent the proper enforcelish railway acts, the construction ment of the legislative purpose.” Van given to such acts by the English Patten v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1897) courts must be adopted as incorpo- 81 Fed. Rep. 547. rated into the Act. Interstate Com- ACT IN PART DECLARATORY OF THE merce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., COMMON LAW.-In many of its feaR. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263, affirming tures the Interstate Commerce Act has (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37; McDonald v. been held to be simply declaratory of Hovey, (1883) 110 U. S. 619; Inter- the pre-existing common law, its office state Commerce Commission v. Ala- to that extent being to make such prebama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. existing law applicable to a commerce 144; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate which otherwise would be free. U. S. Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 V. Hanley, (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 673,

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citing Interstate Commerce Commis- (C. C. A. 1899) 92 Fed. Rep. 1022; sion v. Baltiinore, etc., R. Co., (1892) U. S. v. Morsman, (1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 145 U. S. 263.

448. * This Act of Congress, in so far as A railroad company conducting an it inhibits carriers from the imposi- express business is subject to the Act. tion of unjust and unreasonable rates, Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, (1890) is an express adoption by the national '44 Fed. Rep. 310; U. S. v. Morsman, legislature of the principles of the (1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 448. common law on this topic.” Tift v. Bridge companies.-A bridge comSouthern R. Co., (1903) 123 Fed. Rep. pany owning no cars and making no 792.

charge for transporting freight but CONSISTENT WITH ANTI-TRUST ACT.- merely charging toll for transferring The above Act to regulate commerce cars of railway companies over the is not inconsistent with the Anti-trust bridge is not subject to the Act. KenAct of July 2, 1890, as it does not con- tucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, fer upon competing railroad companies etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. power to enter into a contract in Stock yards companies.--A stock restraint of trade and commerce. yards company not engaged in transU. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., portation is not subject to the Act. (1897) 166 U. S. 290.

Cotting v. Kansas City Stock-Yards EFFECT ON STATE STATUTES.-State Co., (1897) 82 Fed. Rep. 839. statutes regulating the same matters TRANSPORTATION WHOLLY as are regulated by the federal statute ONE STATE does not fall within the are void so far as they affect inter- scope of the Act. Interstate Comstate commerce. Houston, etc., R. Co. merce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) V. Peters, (1897) 15 Tex. Civ. App. 154 U. S. 457; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. 515. For a full discussion and illus- V. Interstate Commerce Commission, tration of this proposition, see Am. (1896) 162 U. S. 184. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), vol. The mere fact that goods are in17, p. 34, title Interstate Commerce. tended for an ultimate destination be

CARRIERS SUBJECT ACT.-Only yond the state does not subject the railway carriers are included in the initial carrier to the operation of the Act. U. S. V. Morsman, (1890) 42 Act where he receives, transports, and Fed. Rep. 448.

delivers such goods wholly within the The Act is not applicable to inde- one state and has nothing to do with pendent carriers by water.

their transport beyond the state. Er Koehler, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 869. p. Koehler, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 869;

Ocean carriers engaged in transpor- Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead, tation between foreign ports and ports (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595; New of entry are not subject to the pro- Jersey Fruit Exch. v. Central R. Co., visions of the Act. Texas, etc., R. Co. (1888) 2 Int. Com. C. Rep. 142. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, The fact that the goods began their (1896) 162 U. S. 197.

transit at a point outside of the state Where a railway company by con- does not alone render their carriage tract with a bridge company acquires by the carrier within the state subthe right to use a bridge for the trains ject to the Act. Ft. Worth, etc., R. of the railway company, the railway Co. v. Whitehead, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. company must be considered as the

App. 595. owner or operator of the bridge for COMMON CONTROL, MANAGEMENT, OR the time being as to all freight trans- ARRANGEMENT.-A railroad company ported by such company over the operating between two points in the bridge, and as to such traffic the rail- same state which carries goods from way and not the bridge company is one of its termini to the other without the common carrier and subject to any understanding or arrangement the Act. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. that it would become a link in a v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 through line of transportation be. Fed. Rep. 567.

tween points in different states is not Transfer and switching companies.- engaged in interstate commerce so as Transfer and switching companies are to subject the company to the operanot subject to the Act. Kentucky, tion of the Act merely because freight etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. carried began its journey at a point Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567.

in another state and the initial carExpress carriers.-Express compa- rier undertook to ship it to its ultinies not operating railway lines are mate destination. Ft. Worth, etc., R. not subject to the Act. Southern In- Co. v. Whitehead, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. diana Express Co. v. U. S. Express App. 595. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 659, affirming Connecting carriers whose lines

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form a continuous line of transporta- into a common control, management, tion between two states are not sub- or arrangement such as will subject ject to the Act where each is operated them to the operation of the Act. under a separate and distinct conrol, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) each making its own rates and each 10 U. S. App. 430, distinguished in liable only for the carriage and de- Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate livery of the goods at the end of its Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 own route. Ex p. Koehler, (1887) 30 U. S. 184. Fed. Rep. 869, holding that to render PARTICIPATION THROUGH BATES a railway and a vessel operated as AND THROUGH BILLS OF LADING renders connecting carriers subject to the Act a carrier whose lines are wholly withthey must be operated and used under in one state subject to the operation

common control to which each is of the Act with respect to goods from alike subject and by which rates are other states. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. prescribed and bills of lading given Interstate Commerce Commission, for the carriage of goods over both (1896) 162 U. S. 184, affirming (1893) portions of the route as one. See also 56 Fed. Rep. 925, and distinguishing Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595.

(C. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912. Where there is no agreement on the This rule applies to a terminal or part of the last connecting carrier for belt line in or around a city, and it is any such joint tariff as implies a re- immaterial that the common arrangeduced rate to its local stations, but, on ment or control for a continuous shipthe contrary, such company collects ment is imposed upon such line by and retains its entire local rates on all local statute instead of voluntary freight shipped to its local stations, agreement with connecting lines. Inover its own lines by connecting car- terstate Stock-Yards Co. v. Indianapriers, there is no such arrangement olis Union R. Co., (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. for a continuous carriage or shipment 472. existing between such company and JUST AND REASONABLE RATES.-In de its connections as to bring the rates termining whether a particular rate is which are charged to said local sta- just and reasonable all the circumtions within the first section of the stances affecting the welfare of the Act to regulate commerce. Interstate carrier, the producer, and the conCommerce Commission V. Cincinnati, sumer must be considered. Interstate etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925, Commerce Commission V. Alabama citing Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, Midland R. Co., (C. C. A. 1896) 74 (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 10 U. S. App. Fed. Rep. 715; Interstate Commerce 430.

Commission v. Southern R. Co., (1900) The fact that a railroad lies wholly 105 Fed. Rep. 703. within one state does not exempt it The greatest weight should be given from the obligations imposed by the to the following considerations: the Interstate Commerce Act, if the trans- opinions of expert witnesses ; the efportation over it is part of a shipment fect of the rates charged on the growth from one state to another, or to or and prosperity of the city; the cost of from foreign country. Augusta transportation as compared with the Southern R. Co. v. Wrightsville, etc., rates charged, and the rates in force R. Co., (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 522.

at numerous other cities, where the A railroad wholly within a state circumstances are as nearly similar which enters into arrangements with as may be to those prevailing at such connecting carriers for the carriage of city. Interstate Commerce Commisinterstate freights becomes subject to sion v. Southern R. Co., (1902) 117 the operation of the Act and the con- Fed. Rep. 741. trol of the commission, and cannot The interests of the carrier, the limit that control in respect to certain shipper, and the public must all be conpoints on its road and exclude other sidered. Interstate Commerce Com. points by requesting the connecting mission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., carriers not to fix any rates for that (1897) 167 U. S. 511 ; Covington, etc., part of the transportation within the Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, (1896) state to certain points. Cincinnati, 164 U. S. 578; Texas, etc., R. Co. etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce V. Interstate Commerce Commission, Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184, af- (1896) 162 U. S. 197. firming (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925 ; Failure of the carrier to secure a Lousiville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, profit is not conclusive that the tariff (1900) 175 U. S. 648.

of rates is unjust and unreasonable. Railroads operating wholly within Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., (1894) one state cannot be compelled to enter 154 U. S. 362.



REASONABLENESS A QUESTION in itself. Interstate Commerce ComFACT.-Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate mission v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., (C. Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 O. A. 1903) 120 Fed. Rep. 934. U. S. 197; Cincinnati, etc., Ř. Co. The fact that a joint through rate V. Interstate Commerce Commission, over the entire length of the joint line (1896) 162 U. S. 184.

is less than the rate to intermediate A finding of fact by the commission points is insufficient to show that the as to the reasonableness of the rate, intermediate rate is unjust or unreawhich has been approved by the Cir- sonable. Allen v. Oregon R., etc., Co., cuit Court, will not usually be re- (1899) 98 Fed. Rep. 17. viewed by the Supreme Court. Cin- EQUALITY OF RATES THE OBJECT cinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Com- SOUGHT.—Interstate Commerce Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. mission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 184.

(1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107. “The question of reasonableness of PARTY-RATE TICKETS for the transthe rate charged for transportation portation of several persons may be by a railroad company is peculiarly a issued for a less proportionate rate question for judicial investigation and than individual tickets without renderdecision.” Tift v. Southern R. Co., ing the individual rate unjust or un(1903) 123 Fed. Rep. 795, citing Chi- reasonable. Interstate Commerce Comcago, etc., R. Co. v. Minnesota, (1890) mission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 134 U. S. 418; U. S. v. Missouri Pac. (1897) 168 U. S. 165, citing Interstate R. Co., (1894) 65 Fed. Rep. 903; Inter- Commerce Commission V. Baltimore, state Commerce Commission v. West- etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263, ern, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. which affirmed (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37. 186.

LOWER SUMMER RATES NOT UNLAWRATES UNBEASONABLY LOW.-Rates FUL where such rates are necessary to may be unreasonable because too low keep cars employed and are offered all as well as because too high. Inter- persons on equal terms. Interstate state Commerce Commission V. Cin- Commerce Commission V. Louisville, cinnati, etc., R. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409. 511.

LONG AND SHORT HAUL RATES.—The But the carrier may reduce its rates charge for a longer haul may be conas far as it pleases below what is rea- sidered in determining whether or not sonable and a fair compensation for the short haul rate is reasonable and the services rendered, without violat- just. Interstate Commerce Commising the Act; and such reduction com- sion v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., pels no change by its competitor or (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107. any other company. Chicago, etc., R. But a higher short haul rate is not Co. v. Osborne, (C. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. necessarily unreasonable. Interstate Rep. 914.

Commerce Commission v. Western, etc., COMPARISON OF BATES.—The particu- R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186. lar rate may be compared with the THE AVERAGE COST OF CARRIAGE UPON rate charged elsewhere for a similar THE ENTIRE SYSTEM is an insufficient service in determining whether or not basis for concluding that the rate such rate is reasonable and just. In charged upon a particular portion of terstate Commerce Commission the system is unjust or unreasonable. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Interstate Commerce Commission V. Fed. Rep. 107.

Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1896) 74 Fed. But such other rates are merely evi- Rep. 784. dence of reasonableness and are not BURDEN OF PROOF.-The burden of conclusive that a different rate is showing that a particular rate is uneither unreasonable or unjust. Inter- reasonable or unjust is upon the comstate Commerce Commission v. Louis- plainant. Van Patten v. Chicago, etc., ville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. R. Co., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 545; In409.

terstate Commerce Commission The rates at competitive points may Nashville, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1903) be compared in determining what are 120 Fed. Rep. 935. reasonable rates at noncompetitive EFFECT OP PUBLISHED SCHEDULE points. Van Patten v. Chicago, etc., RATE.—The rate adopted, printed, and R. Co., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 545.

posted as required by section 6 is Evidence merely tending to show prima facie a reasonable rate. Kinthat a rate is too high as compared navey v. Terminal R. Assoc., (1897) 81 with the rate to other points is insuffi- Fed. Rep. 802. cient to sustain a finding that the for- And it has been held that in an acmer rate is unjust and unreasonable tion for damages for charging unrea



sonable rates, the published schedule rate is conclusively taken as a reasonable rate, and if no more is charged there can be no recovery. Van Patten

v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 545, holding that courts and juries cannot resort to any other standard.

Sec. 2. [Special rates, rebates, etc., prohibited.] That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this act, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful. [24 Stat. L. 379.]

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION IN relates to unjust discrimination in GENERAL.

rates; the latter is comprehensive

enough standing alone to include every SECTION MODELED ON ENGLISH ACT.- form of unjust discrimination not only This section is modeled on section 90, in rates but also in the conveniences known as the “ equality clause " of the and facilities supplied to shippers in English Act of 1845. Texas, etc., R. any of the details of the carrying seryCo. v. Interstate Commerce Commis- ice. U. S. v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., sion, (1896) 162 U. S. 197.

(1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101. PURPOSE IS TO PREVENT DISCRIMINA- ONE ACT MAY VIOLATE EACH OF FIRST TION BETWEEN SHIPPERS.—The purpose FOUR SECTIONS.-See Interstate Comof the second section of the act is to merce Commission v. Western, etc., euforce equality between shippers over R. Co., (C. C. A. 1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 83. the same line, and to prohibit any re- ACT INVALIDATES EXISTING CONTRACTS bate or other device by which two ship- which create unjust discriminations in pers, shipping over the same line, the contravention of its terms. Southern same distance, under the same circum- Wire Co. v. St. Louis Bridge, etc., R. stances of carriage, are compelled to Co., (1889) 38 Mo. App. 191, quoting pay different prices therefor. Inter- Rothschild v. Wabash R. Co., (1884) state Commerce Commission V. Ala- 15 Mo. App. 242, reviewing Christie v. bama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (1887) 94 Mo. 144; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate 453; Bullard v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. (1890) 10 Mont. 168, 45 Am. & Eng. R. S. 197; Wight v. U. S., (1897) 167 Cas. 234; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, etc., U. S. 512; Interstate Commerce Com- Constr. Co., (1894) 41 Neb. 376; Fitzmission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) gerald v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (1890) 88 Fed. Rep. 186; Kinnavey v. Ter- 63 Vt. 169; Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. minal R. Assoc., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1888) 34 804 ; Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Swanson, Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 653. (1897) 102 Ga. 758.

But existing contracts are not inCOMMON LAW CHANGED BY SECTION.- validated to such an extent as to reThis section changes the common law lieve the carrier of liability for goods which did not forbid discrimination carried thereunder. Merchants' Cotin rates. U. S. v. Delaware, etc., R. ton Press, etc., Co. v. Insurance Co. of Co., (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101 ; Inter- North America, (1894) 151 U. S. 368, state Commerce Commission v. Balti- (distinguishing Interstate Commerce more, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 263; Lundquist v. Grand Trunk West- (1892) 145 U. S. 263) ; Insurance Cos. ern R. Co., (1901) 121 Fed. Rep. 915. V. Carrier Cos., (1892) 91 Tenn. 537.

DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN LOCALITIES See also Pond-Decker Lumber Co. v. OR IN FACILITIES FURNISHED NOT IN- Spencer, (C. C. A. 1898) 86 Fed. Rep. CLUDED.-Interstate Commerce Com- 846. mission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) CONTRACT IN VIOLATION OF STATUTE 88 Fed. Rep. 186.

VOID.—A special contract for a disUnjust discrimination is prohibited criminating rate in violation of the by both sections 2 and 3. The former statute is void as to both parties, and

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