FEDERAL STATUTES ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. The following title from "Federal Statutes Annotated-Evidence to Interstate Commerce "is reprinted as a part of the hearings before the Interstate Commerce Committee of the United States Senate, by permission of the publishers, The Edward Thompson Company, of Northport (Long Island), N. Y., in accordance with the following message: NORTHPORT, N. Y., May 18, 1905. Hon. S. B. ELKINS, Chairman Interstate Commerce Committec, Senate, Washington, D. O.: It is a pleasure to grant your committee the privilege of printing in your hearing and without charge the title "Interstate Commerce from volume 3, Federal Statutes Annotated, providing credit is given that publication and the copyright notice is repeated. EDWARD THOMPSON COMPANY. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. Act of February 4, 1887, ch. 104, SEC. 1. Common carriers in interstate traffic-Railroad and transportation defined-Charges to be reasonable and just, 2. Special rates, rebates, etc., prohibited, 3. Undue preferences prohibited-Equal facilities except in terminals to connecting lines, 4. Long and short haul charges-Exceptions authorized, 5. Pooling agreements prohibited, 6. Printed schedules of rates to be posted-Notice of advance and reduction-Joint-rate tariffs-Effect of failure to publish or file sched ules, 7. Combinations to prevent continuous carriage of freight to destination prohibited, 8. Liability to persons injured by violation of act, 9. Persons damaged may complain to Commission or sue personally, 10. Punishment for violation or evasion of the act, 11. Interstate Commerce Commission created-Eligibility and appointment-Term of service, etc., 12. Scope of Commission-Prosecution of proceedings-Witnesses-Depositions-Self-criminating testimony, 13. Petitions as to violations of law-Notice to carrier of charges-Investigations, 14. Written reports of investigations-Reports and decisions may be 15. Notice to carrier of violation-Record of compliance with report. 17. Proceedings of Commission-Rules-Quorum-Appearances - Rec- 18. Salaries of Commissioners, secretary, and employees-Offices-Witness fees-Expenses, 19. Office and sessions, 20. Annual reports from carriers to Commission-Contents-Uniform system of accounts, 21. (Annual reports to Congress, see Estimates, Appropriations, and Reports, vol. 2, p. 934), 22. Free carriage or reduced rates, when allowed, 23. (Makes appropriations-Temporary), 24. When law takes effect-Appointment of Commissioners, Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 382, SECS. 1-9. (Amend secs. 6, 10, 12, 14, 16. 17, 18, 21, 22), 10. Mandamus to compel equal facilities to shippers-Questions of fact, Act of August 8, 1890, ch. 728, Intoxicating liquors shipped in original packages subject to State laws, Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, Self-incriminating disclosures by witnesses in proceedings-Refusal to testify, Act of March 2. 1889, ch. 411, Auditing of Commission's expenses, AN ACT To regulate commerce. [Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. L. 379.] [SEC. 1.] [Common carriers in interstate truffic-railroad and transportation defined--charges to be reasonable and just.] That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a common control, management, or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of transshipment, or shipped from a foreign country to any place in the United States and carried to such place from a port of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country: Provided, however, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from or to any State or Territory as aforesaid. The term "railroad" as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease; and the term "transportation " shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage. All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. [24 Stat. L. 379.] Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. 510; U. S. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (1894) 65 Fed. Rep. 905; U. S. v. Hanley, (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 673; Kinnavey v. Terminal R. Assoc., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 803. The Act has no relation to and was not intended to reinforce the provisions of the tariff laws. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 221. The causes and reasons which led to the enactment of the Act are discussed at length in Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. CONSTITUTIONALITY.-The Act is a constitutional exercise by Congress of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 448; Bullard v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1890) 10 Mont. 168, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234. CONSTRUCTION OF ACT.-The Act will be construed, if possible, so as to facilitate and promote commerce, and not to hamper or destroy it. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. The Act applies only to matters involved in the regulation of commerce. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 448. The Act should be broadly construed. Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107. The interests of the seller, the consumer, and the carrier must all be considered in construing the Act. Interstate Commerce Commission V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 165; Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., (1894) 154 U. S. 412. CONSTRUCTION OF ENGLISH TRAFFIC ACTS ADOPTED.-So far as the Act adopts the provisions of the prior English railway acts, the construction given to such acts by the English courts must be adopted as incorporated into the Act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263, affirming (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37; McDonald v. Hovey, (1883) 110 U. S. 619; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Miami Steamship Co., (C. C. A. 1898) 86 Fed. Rep. 407; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409. But regard must be had to the dissimilarity of legislation and methods of trade and transportation prevailing in England. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 832; Lindquist v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., (1901) 121 Fed. Rep. 918. CONSTRUCTION AGAINST CARRIER.The Act was not primarily intended for the benefit of the carrier. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. In cases of doubt, where relief is sought in the interest of the carrier, the construction will be against the carrier. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 775; Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. But the Act will not be construed so as to abridge the common-law rights of carriers further than its terms and purposes require. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 51. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (C. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 914. CONSTRUCTION AS A WHOLE." The intent of Congress is to be gathered from a consideration of the entire Act. and not solely from detached portions thereof, and the familiar rule of construction is to be followed, to wit, that, in determining the meaning of the words employed, the general purpose of the Act and the evils sought to be remedied must be always kept in mind, and, furthermore, parts of the Act are not to be so construed as to defeat other important features of the same; nor is such a construction to be given to the Act, in whole or in part, as may tend to prevent the proper enforcement of the legislative purpose." Van Patten v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 547. ACT IN PART DECLARATORY OF THE COMMON LAW.-In many of its features the Interstate Commerce Act has been held to be simply declaratory of the pre-existing common law, its office to that extent being to make such preexisting law applicable to a commerce which otherwise would be free. U. S. v. Hanley, (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 673, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263. 46 This Act of Congress, in so far as it inhibits carriers from the imposition of unjust and unreasonable rates, is an express adoption by the national legislature of the principles of the common law on this topic." Tift v. Southern R. Co., (1903) 123 Fed. Rep. 792. CONSISTENT WITH ANTI-TRUST ACT.The above Act to regulate commerce is not inconsistent with the Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, as it does not confer upon competing railroad companies power to enter into a contract in restraint of trade and commerce. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., (1897) 166 U. S. 290. EFFECT ON STATE STATUTES.-State statutes regulating the same matters as are regulated by the federal statute are void so far as they affect interstate commerce. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Peters, (1897) 15 Tex. Civ. App. 515. For a full discussion and illustration of this proposition, see Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), vol. 17, p. 34, title Interstate Commerce. CARRIERS SUBJECT ΤΟ ACT.-Only railway carriers are included in the Act. U. S. v. Morsman, (1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 448. The Act is not applicable to independent carriers by water. Ex P. Koehler, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 869. Ocean carriers engaged in transportation between foreign ports and ports of entry are not subject to the provisions of the Act. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. Where a railway company by contract with a bridge company acquires the right to use a bridge for the trains of the railway company, the railway company must be considered as the owner or operator of the bridge for the time being as to all freight transported by such company over the bridge, and as to such traffic the railway and not the bridge company is the common carrier and subject to the Act. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. Transfer and switching companies.— Transfer and switching companies are not subject to the Act. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. Express carriers.-Express companies not operating railway lines are not subject to the Act. Southern Indiana Express Co. v. U. S. Express Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 659, affirming (C. C. A. 1899) 92 Fed. Rep. 1022; U. S. v. Morsman, (1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 448. A railroad company conducting an express business is subject to the Act. Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, (1890) 44 Fed. Rep. 310; U. S. v. Morsman, (1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 448. Bridge companies.-A bridge company owning no cars and making no charge for transporting freight but merely charging toll for transferring cars of railway companies over the bridge is not subject to the Act. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. Stock yards companies.-A stock yards company not engaged in transportation is not subject to the Act. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co., (1897) 82 Fed. Rep. 839. TRANSPORTATION WHOLLY WITHIN ONE STATE does not fall within the scope of the Act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 457; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184. The mere fact that goods are intended for an ultimate destination beyond the state does not subject the initial carrier to the operation of the Act where he receives, transports, and delivers such goods wholly within the one state and has nothing to do with their transport beyond the state. Er p. Koehler, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 869; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595; New Jersey Fruit Exch. v. Central R. Co., (1888) 2 Int. Com. C. Rep. 142. The fact that the goods began their transit at a point outside of the state does not alone render their carriage by the carrier within the state subject to the Act. Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595. COMMON CONTROL, MANAGEMENT, OR ARRANGEMENT.-A railroad company operating between two points in the same state which carries goods from one of its termini to the other without any understanding or arrangement that it would become a link in a through line of transportation between points in different states is not engaged in interstate commerce so as to subject the company to the operation of the Act merely because freight carried began its journey at a point in another state and the initial carrier undertook to ship it to its ultimate destination. Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595. Connecting carriers whose lines form a continuous line of transportation between two states are not subject to the Act where each is operated under a separate and distinct conrol, each making its own rates and each liable only for the carriage and delivery of the goods at the end of its own route. Ex p. Koehler, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 869, holding that to render a railway and a vessel operated as connecting carriers subject to the Act they must be operated and used under a common control to which each is alike subject and by which rates are prescribed and bills of lading given for the carriage of goods over both portions of the route as one. See also Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead, (1894) 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595. Where there is no agreement on the part of the last connecting carrier for any such joint tariff as implies a reduced rate to its local stations, but, on the contrary, such company collects and retains its entire local rates on all freight shipped to its local stations, over its own lines by connecting carriers, there is no such arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment existing between such company and its connections as to bring the rates which are charged to said local stations within the first section of the Act to regulate commerce. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925, citing Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 10 U. S. App. 430. The fact that a railroad lies wholly within one state does not exempt it from the obligations imposed by the Interstate Commerce Act, if the transportation over it is part of a shipment from one state to another, or to or from a foreign country. Augusta Southern R. Co. v. Wrightsville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 522. A railroad wholly within a state which enters into arrangements with connecting carriers for the carriage of interstate freights becomes subject to the operation of the Act and the control of the commission, and cannot limit that control in respect to certain points on its road and exclude other points by requesting the connecting carriers not to fix any rates for that part of the transportation within the state to certain points. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184, affirming (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925; Lousiville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648. Railroads operating wholly within one state cannot be compelled to enter into a common control, management, or arrangement such as will subject them to the operation of the Act. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) 10 U. S. App. 430, distinguished in Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184. PARTICIPATION IN THROUGH BATES AND THROUGH BILLS OF LADING renders a carrier whose lines are wholly within one state subject to the operation of the Act with respect to goods from other states. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184, affirming (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925, and distinguishing Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (C. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912. This rule applies to a terminal or belt line in or around a city, and it is immaterial that the common arrangement or control for a continuous shipment is imposed upon such line by local statute instead of voluntary agreement with connecting lines. Interstate Stock-Yards Co. v. Indianapolis Union R. Co., (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 472. JUST AND REASONABLE RATES.-In determining whether a particular rate is just and reasonable all the circumstances affecting the welfare of the carrier, the producer, and the consumer must be considered. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 715; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern R. Co., (1900) 105 Fed. Rep. 703. The greatest weight should be given to the following considerations: the opinions of expert witnesses; the effect of the rates charged on the growth and prosperity of the city; the cost of transportation as compared with the rates charged, and the rates in force at numerous other cities, where the circumstances are as nearly similar as may be to those prevailing at such city. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern R. Co., (1902) 117 Fed. Rep. 741. The interests of the carrier, the shipper, and the public must all be considered. Interstate Commerce Com. mission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. 511; Covington, etc., Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, (1896) 164 U. S. 578; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. Failure of the carrier to secure a profit is not conclusive that the tariff of rates is unjust and unreasonable. Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., (1894) 154 U. S. 362. |