I find myself concerned in the late considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the trinity-in a letter to H. H. The author is pleased to give me the honour of a name, a lank, unvocal one. It is so contrived, that one may easily guess whom he means; but the reason of his doing so I cannot guess; it is because he knew himself, what he would have others believe.

But since he expressly says, (and I think for the most | less required my time and thoughts, than my other affairs; part truly,)" that the three persons or subsistences, in the and so little, that I was almost indifferent whether I took ever blessed trinity, are three real, substantial subsistences, any notice thereof or no. There is really nothing of argueach of which hath entirely, all the perfections of the Di- ment in what I have seen, but what I had suggested before, vine nature, divine wisdom, power, and goodness; and and objected to myself, in those very discourses of mine, therefore each of them is eternal, infinite mind, as distinct now animadverted on; which not having prevented, with from each other as any other three persons; and this he me, the opinion I am of, can as little alter it, and should believes the Dean will no more recant, than he will re- as little any man's else. But a little leisure, as it can, nounce a trinity; for all the wit of man cannot find a me- without extortion, be gained from other occasions, I do not dium between a substantial trinity and a trinity of names, much grudge to bestow on this. or a trinity of mere modes, respects, and relations in the same single essence, which is no trinity at all." As also he had said much to the same purpose before, "that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract, without three that subsist, or of one single nature which hath three subsistences, when it's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence," &c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is, that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person; not the very same common nature, for the persons cannot be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all. Therefore the divine nature which is common to the three, must according to him comprehend three single natures, and not be absolutely simple. Hither must be his resort at last, after all his earnest disputation against it. And these he will have to be parts, which because they are undivided, impartible, inseparable, everlastingly and necessarily united, I do reckon, the inquirer did with very suficient reason, and with just decency, and doth still continue very peremptorily to deny.

And whereas he contends that the whole divine nature is entirely in each subsistence, (as he does again and again,) I think the term whole improper, where there are no proper parts. And I doubt not, when he gives place to cooler thoughts, he will see cause to qualify that assertion. For if he strictly mean that every thing that belongs to the Godhead is in each person; I see not how he will fetch himself from the Socinian consequence, that then each person must have a trinity subsisting in it, and be Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For I doubt not he will acknowledge that the entire divinity includes in it the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And therefore he must be beholden to an inadequate notion in this very case, when all is done, how much soever he hath contended against it. I do however think it safe and free from any other difficulty, that we unavoidably have in conceiving intinites, to say, That all perfection is in each subsistent (which I like better than subsistence, as more expressive of the concrete) as far as their natural, necessary, eternal order, towards one another, as the first is the fountain or radix, the second from that, and the third from both, can possibly admit. All must be originally in the Father, with whom the other two have that intimate, vital, eternal union, that what is in him the other communicate therein, in as full perfection as is inconceivable, and more than it is possible for us or for any finite mind to conceive. Therefore since that difference which only proceeds from that natural, eternal order, is conjecturable only, but is really unknown, unrevealed, and inscrutable; it is better herein to confess the imperfection of that knowledge which we have, than to boast that which we have not, or aspire to that which we cannot have.

But I suppose he as well knew his own name. If he knew not the former, he ran the hazard of injuring either the supposed author, or the true, or both. I could, I believe, make as shrewd a guess at his name, and express it as plainly. But I think it not civil to do so; because I apprehend he hath some reason to conceal it, whereof I think he hath a right to be the judge. But I will not prescribe to him rules of civility, of which that he is a great judge, I will not allow myself to doubt.

Yet I will not suppose him to have so very diminishing thoughts of our Saviour, as not to acknowledge and reverence the authority of that great rule of his, which he knows gained reverence with some who called not themselves Christians, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you-&c." Nor can divine what greater reason he should have to hide his own name, than to expose mine, or make the person he indigitates be thought the author of the discourse he intended to expose; since no man can imagine how, as the Christian world is constituted, any one can be more obnoxious for denying three persons, than for asserting three Gods: which latter his impotent attempt aims to make that author do.

For his censures of that author's style, and difficulty to be understood, they offend me not. But so I have known some pretend deafness, to what they were unwilling to hear. There is indeed one place, Sober Inquiry, in the end of sect. 8. where must should have been left out, upon the adding afterwards of can, that might give one some trouble. In which yet, the supposal of an (not unusual) asyndeton, would, without the help of magic, have relieved a considering reader. And for his compliments, as they do me no real good, so, I thank God, they hurt me not. I dwell at home, and better know my own furniture than another can. For himself, I discern and readily acknowledge in him, those excellent accomplishments, for which I most heartily wish him an advocate in a better cause, without despair he will yet prove so; when I take notice of some passages which look like indications of a serious temper of mind, as of choosing God, and the honour of his name, for our portion and design: and that he lives in vain, who knows not his Maker, and his God: with the like.

But on the other hand, I was as heartily sorry to meet with an expression of so different a strain, on so awful a subject, of "making a coat for the moon." That precept which Josephus inserts among those given the Jews, doth for the reason it hath in it, abstracting from its authority, deserve to be considered. It seems to import a decency to the rest of mankind, whose notions of a Deity did not argue them sunk into the lowest degrees of sottishness and stupidity. Good Sir, what needed (think you) so adventurous boldness, in so lubricous a case? It gains nothing to a man's cause either of strength or reputation with wise and good men. A sound argument will be as sound without it. Nor should I much value having them on my side, whom I can hope to make laugh at so hazardous a jest. I can never indeed have any great veneration for a morose sourness, whatsoever affected appearance it may have with it, of a simulated sanctimony or religiousness; but I should think it no hardship upon me to repress that levity, as to attempt dancing upon the brink of so tremendous a precipice. And would always express • Βλασφημείτο δε μηδεις Θεούς ους πολεις αλλαι νομίζουσι. Lib. 4. Jud. Antiq.

myself with suspicion, and a supposed possibility of being | (and I believe he knows not) what gross ideas, as he ro mistaken, in a case wherein I find many of noted judg-mances, belonging to this hypothesis. Because from those ment and integrity, in the succession of several ages, differ- words, Prov. viii. Then was I by him, as one brought up ing from me. But go we on to the cause itself, where he with him, and daily his delight; the author speaks of the pretends, delicious society, which these words intimate, the eternal Wisdom, and the prime Author and Parent of all things, to have each with other.

1. First to give a view of the sober inquirer's hypothesis; 2. And then to argue against it.

As to the former. He doth it, I am loath to say, with less fairness than from a person of his (otherwise) appearing ingenuity, one would expect. For he really makes me to have said more than I ever did, in divers instances; and much less than I have expressly said; and that he cannot have so little understanding as not to know was most material to the cause in hand.

He represents me, p. 40. col. 1. saying: The persons are distinct essences, numerical natures, beings, substances; and col. 2. That I hold them to be three spirits; when in the close of one of those paragraphs, I recite the words of W. J. "In the unity of the Godhead 'there must be no plurality or multiplicity of substances allowed; and do add, Nor do I say that there must.' And I do not positively say there are three distinct substances, minds, or spirits." I would ask this my learned antagonist, Have saying and not saying the same signification? And again, when my words are: I will not use the expressions, as signifying my formed judgment, that there are three things, substances, or spirits in the Godhead, how could he say, I hold the three persons to be three spirits? Is any man, according to the ordinary way of speaking, said to hold what is not his formed judgment? If he only propose things whereof he doubts, to be considered and discussed by others, in order to the forming of it, and by gentle ventilation to sift out truth, it the rather argues him not to hold this or that.

And I think much service might be done to the common interest of religion, by such a free mutual communication of even more doubtful thoughts, if such disquisitions were pursued with more candour, and with less confidence and prepossession of mind, or addictedness to the interest of any party whatsoever. If it were rather endeavoured, to reason one another into, or out of, this or that opinion, than either by sophistical collusions to cheat, or to hector by great words, one that is not of my mind. Or if the design were less to expose an adversary, than to clear the matter in controversy..

For my part, I have little doubt but this ingenious writer is so well acquainted with the gust and relish of intellectual delight, that he chose to expose his adversary by using that odd expression of gross idea so causelessly, in accommodation only to the genius of some other men, whom he thought fit to humour, rather than his own. Nor can he be so little acquainted with the paganish theology, as not to apprehend a vast disagreement between this and that, and a much greater agreement between the paganish notion of the Deity, and his own.

For the questions which he supposes me to put, and makes me answer as he thinks fit, by misapplied passages of that discourse, I hope it will appear they were either prevented, or answered at another rate. At length he says, "The butt-end of this hypothesis," &c. I like not that phrase the worse for the author's sake, of whom it seems borrowed, whose memory greater things will make live, when we are forgot. But let him proceed-The butt-end of this hypothesis is the true strength of it. But that true strength he hath either had the hap not to observe, or taken the care not to represent, i. e. from what is so often inculcated in that discourse, the necessary existence of two hypostases of, and in the first, and of an omnimodous simplicity groundlessly supposed in the Divine Being, he hath kept himself at a wary cautious distance, when he might apprehend there was its strength. Therefore I cannot also but observe, that as he hath marked this hypothesis, with (most undue) ill characters; so he hath maimed it too, of what was most considerable belonging to it, that he might expose it by the former means, so as to make it need much defence; and that by the latter it might seem quite destitute of any defence at all,

And now when (not without some untoward disfigura. tions) it hath thus far escaped his hands, and is (in none of the best shapes) set up only to be beaten down; the argument he first attacks it with, is the inartificial one of authority. And yet his argument from this topic, is only negative, that the opinion he would confute wants autho Besides, that if such equanimity did more generally ap-rity, "that the inquirer was the first that ever dreamt of it, pear, and govern, in transactions of this nature, it would and that no learned divine of any persuasion will subproduce a greater liberty in communicating our thoughts, scribe to it:" q. d. 'Tis false, and impossible to be true. about some of the more vogued and fashionable opinions, The inquirer only proposing what he offered, as possible by exempting each other from the fear of ill treatment in for ought we know, is not otherwise opposed than by asthe most sensible kind. It being too manifest, that the serting it to be impossible. This therefore he must say, or same confident insulting genius, which makes a man think he saith nothing to the purpose. And why now is it impos himself competent to be a standard to mankind, would sible? Because no body said it before. So, then, was also make him impatient of dissent, and tempt him to do every thing that any man first said; but afterwards, by being worse, than reproach one that differs from him, if it were often spoken, it might, it seems, at length become true. in his power. And the club or faggot arguments must be For any learned divines subscribing to it, I suppose he inexpected to take place, where what he thinks rational ones, | tends that in the strict sense. And so the inquirer never did not do the business. This only on the by. said he would subscribe it himself, otherwise than that his judgment did more incline to it, as liable to less exception than other ways of defending the doctrine of the trinity, or than denying it, which he thought least defensible of all.

In the meantime, that there is a trinity in the Godhead is no matter of doubt with me; but only whether this be the best way of explaining and defending it. If this be not the best, or sufficient, some other will, I believe, or hath been found out by some other. Of which I have spoken my sense not only indefinitely, but particularly of the more common way; not that I did then, or have yet thought it the best, but not indefensible.

And I must now sincerely profess, that the perusal of these very considerations gives me more confidence about this hypothesis, than I allowed myself before; finding that the very sagacious author of them, of whose abilities and industry together, I really have that opinion, as to count him the most likely to confute it of all the modern antitrinitarians, hath no other way to deal with it, than first, both partially and invidiously to represent it, and then, rather to trifle than argue against it. He first paints it out in false and ugly colours, before he comes to reasoning; and then, when he should reason, he says nothing that hath so much as a colour. It seems to me an argument of a suspected ill cause on his side, that he thought it needful to prepossess the reader with the imagination of I know not

But now supposing one should find learned divines of the same mind, (and perhaps some may be found more confident than he,) I would ask the considerator, whether he will therefore confess a trinity a possible thing? If not, he deals not fairly, to put the inquirer upon quoting autho rities to no purpose; or that he would have them conclude him, by whom he will not be concluded himself.

He seems indeed himself to have forgot the question (with which afterwards he charges the inquirer) as it is set down, Whether a trinity in the Godhead be a possible thing? This was the question, not what John, or Thomas, or James such a one thought? But while he pretends to think no body else is of the inquirer's mind in the particular point he is now speaking to, i. e. the delicious society the divine hypostases are supposed to have with each other; give me leave freely to discourse this matter. I would know what it is, wherein he supposes the inquirer to have over-shot his mark; or of what makes he here so mighty a wonderment? It can be but one of these two things:

either that there are three divine persons in the Godhead | ber of very pertinent and home quotations, hath proved really distinct; or,-that they have (if there be) a delicious that his explication (I mean that part of it which makes society or conversation with each other. Will he say the the three persons to be so many distinct essences, or subformer is a singular opinion? or, that 'tis novel? Was stances) is the doctrine of the principal if not of all the there never a real trinitarian in the world before? Doth fathers, as well as of the Platonists." And 'tis added, he not, in his own express words, sort the inquirer with" and I, for my part, do grant it." Upon the whole, then, one, whom he will not deny to be a learned divine, p. 43. I reckon that as to this first part, we stand clear not only of these his present considerations, col. 1. "The author of to the rest of the world, but with this author himself, that the 28 propositions, and Mr. H-w," as he calls the inqui- to be a real trinitarian is not so unheard of a thing, or what "are honest men, and real trinitarians." By which no learned divine of any persuasion ever dreamt of before former character he hath, I dare say, ten thousand times the inquirer. But now for the more gratified his ambition, than by calling him learned too. And I believe he will as little think this a novel opinion, as a singular one. Nor shall I thank him for acknowledging it to have been the opinion of the fathers, generally, not only Ante Nicene and Nicene, but Post-Nicene too, for some following ages, unto that of P. Lombard, so obvious it is to every one that will but more slightly search.

rer,

For my part, I will not except Justin Martyr himself, whom I the rather mention, both as he was one of the more ancient of the fathers, and as I may also call him, the father of the modalists; nor his notion even about the Homoousian-Trinity, as he expressly styles it. For though it will require more time than I now intend to bestow, to give a distinct account of every passage throughout that discourse of his, yet his expression of the rpónou únάpfews must not be so taken, as if it were to be torn away from its coherence, and from itself. When therefore he says the τὸ μὲν ἀγέννητον, καὶ γεννητὸν, καὶ ἐκπορευτον, the being unde getlen, begotten, and having proceeded, are not the names of the essence, but (rpórvi vráρšews) modes of subsistence; he must mean they are not immediately names of the essence, but mediately they cannot but be so. For what do they modify? not nothing. When they are said to be modes of subsistence, what is it that subsists? We cannot pluck away these modes of subsistence from that which subsists, and whereof they are the modes. And what is that? You will say the pia soia, the one essence, which he had mentioned before; and that one essence is, 'tis true, as perfectly one as 'tis possible; for what is of itself, and what are from that, to be with each other, i. e. that they are congenerous, as the sun and its rays, (according to that, Heb. i. 3. aranyarpa rns dóžns, the effulgency of glory,) or as mind, and (where there is nothing else but substance) consubstantial thought or word. Therefore this oneness of essence must be taken in so large and extensive a sense, as that it may admit of these differences. For so he afterwards plainly speaks, if “¿ μèv, dyevvýτws exe; if the one (the Father) hath his existence without being begotten, o`yεvvnтws, another (the Son) by being begotten, rò de, exropeurs, but that (the Holy Ghost) by having proceeded, here it befalls us to behold differences (rà rès diapopas) or the things that import difference." There must be a sense, therefore, wherein he understood this essence to be most truly one; and a sense wherein he also understood it to have its differences, and those too not important ones, as being unbegotten, and being begotten, signify no light differences.

Second part. The delicious society supposed to be between (or rather among) the three persons. Is this a dream? and so strange a one? Why, good Sir! can you suppose three persons, i. e. three intellectual subsistences, perfectly wise, holy, and good, coexisting with, inexisting in, one another to have no society? or that society not to be delicious? He says, How can it be? I say, How can it but be? Herein I am sure the inquirer hath far more company than in the former. For whether the three persons have all the same numerical essence, or three distinct, all agree they most delightfully converse. Will he pretend never to have read any that make love (as it were in tercurrent between the two first) the character of the third ? In short, is it the thing he quarrels with as singular, or the word? At the thing, supposing three persons, he can have no quarrel, without quarrelling with the common sense of mankind. For the word, he hath more wit and knowledge of language than to pretend to find fault with that. For let him consult expositors (even the known critics) upon the mentioned place, Prov. viii. (whom, in so plain a case, I will not be at the pains to quote and transcribe,) and take notice whether none read those words fui in deliciis. Therefore I believe the considerator will be so ingenuous, as to perceive he hath, in this part of his discourse, grossly overshot, or undershot, or shot wide of, his own mark, if indeed he had any, or did not (letting his bolt fly too soon) shoot at rovers, before he had taken steady aim at any thing. In short, all this dust could be raised but with design only, because he could not enlighten his readers, to blind them.,

But now, when he should come by solid argument to disprove the hypothesis, by showing that three individual divine natures, or essences, can possibly have no nexus, so as to become one entire divine nature, and, at the same time, (which this hypothesis supposes,) remain still three individual divine natures and essences, he thinks fit to leave it to another to do it for him, who, he says, if he cannot prove this, can prove nothing. And when we see that proof, it will be time enough to consider it.

In the meantime, I cannot here but note what I will neither, in charity, call forgery in the considerator, nor, in civility, ignorance, but it cannot be less than great oversight; his talk of these three, so united as to become one. The inquirer never spake (nor dreamt) of their becoming one, but of their being naturally, necessarily, and eternally so.

Then he comes to put the question, as (he says) it is And in what latitude of sense he understood the oneness between the inquirer and the Socinians. And he puts it of essence, whereof he had before spoken, may be seen in thus: How three distinct, several, individual divine beings, his following explication, when what he said he would essences, or substances, should remain three several indihave be sapiscow, more manifest; he makes Adam's pecu-vidual substances, and yet, at the same time, be united into liar mode of subsistence to be that he was & γεννητὸς, ἀλλὰ danicis, not begotten, but made by God's own hand; but for them that were from him, he intimates theirs to be, they were begotten, not made. If then you inquire concerning the same essence that was common to him and them, you still find that man is the brokeίpevov, the subject, whether of formation, as to him, or of generation, as to them. And who apprehends not in what latitude of sense the human nature is one, which is common to Adam and his posterity? Though the Divine nature is incomparably more one, which is common to the Father, Son, and Spirit; as we have formerly insisted, and shall further show it cannot but be, in all necessary, and continually depending, ema

one divine substance called God? One would have thought, when he had so newly waived the former question, as wherein he meant not to be concerned, he should presently have put a new one, upon which he intended to engage himself. But we have the same over again, even with the same ill look of an equivalent phrase unto becoming united into one, to insinuate to his reader, as if his antagonist thought these three were de novo united, not in but into one. Which he knew must have a harsh sound, and as well knew it to be most repugnant to the inquirer's most declared sentiment. Nor will it be any presumption, if I take the liberty to set down the question according to the inquirer's mind, who hath as much reason to know it as he; and I am sure it will be more agreeable to the Yet I might, if there were need, again (as to this part) tenor of his discourse now referred to, "Whether the quote the considerator to himself. For I suppose he will rò Octov, or the Divine Being, may not possibly, for ought not disown the considerations in 1693, in which, page 15. we know, contain three natures, or essences, under the col. 1. are these words, "Dr. Cudworth, by a great num-names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, so far distinct, as

nations.

Η Εκθ. πις,

is necessary to found the distinct predications or attributes | was obliged to do. What if there be no exact parallel? severally given them in the Holy Scriptures, and yet be eternally, necessarily, naturally, vitally so united, as notwithstanding that remaining distinction, to be one God." And let us now see what he hath to say, first, to the inquirer's illustrations of it, as possible: secondly, what he brings to prove it impossible.

As to the former part, he first falls upon what the inquirer hath said concerning the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective natures in ourselves. And upon this he insists so operously, as if the whole weight of the cause had been laid upon it, and seems to think the inquirer had forgot the question, when he mentioned it; because he says, those are only distinct faculties, not persons, or substances, (though persons were not in his question,) without ever taking any notice of the inquirer's waiving it, with these words, "that he would content himself with what was more obvious." But this is all art: to raise a mighty posse, and labour to seem to those that he believed would read what he writ only, not what the other did, most effectually to expunge what he saw was neglected, though not altogether useless; as we shall see anon.

In the meantime, it is observable how needlessly he slurs himself in this his first brisk onset. He says, " No man ever pretended that the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective faculties (or powers) are so many distinct, individual persons, substances, or essences, we grant," &c. What, did no man ever pretend that these three distinct natures, the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, were in man, three distinct substances, or souls, concurring by a certain subordination in him? What necessity was there, that to heighten his triumph, in the opinion of his credulous followers, he should, with so glorious a confidence, put on the vain and false show of having all the world on his side; and herein either dissemble his knowledge, or grossly bewray his ignorance in the mere history of philosophy; and most imprudently suppose all his readers as ignorant, as he would seem? What, did he never hear of an Averroes in the world? Doth he not know that physician and philosopher, and his followers, earnestly contended for what he says no man ever pretended to? Or that divers other commentators upon Aristotle, have some abetted, others as vehemently opposed, them in it? Not to insist also that some thought the Intellectus Agens, and Patiens, to be distinct substances, belonging to the nature of man, as others had also other conceits about the former? And if he look some hundreds of years back, as far as the time and extant work of Nemesius, bishop and philosopher, (as he writes himself,) of the nature of man, (who lived in the time of Gregory Nazianzen, as appears by an epistle of his writ to him, and prefixed to that little book of his,) he will find that author takes notice there were divers that took man to consist of mind, soul, and body, and that some did doubt whether the mind supervening to the soul as one to the other, did not make the latter intelligent. And in several other parts of that work, easy, if it were necessary, to be recited, he speaks it as the judgment of some,d that the unreasonable nature in man did exist by itself, as being of itself an unreasonable soul, not a part of the reasonable; accounting it one of the greatest absurdities, that the unreasonable soul should be a part of that which is reasonable.

C

Will any man of a sober mind, or that is master of his own thoughts, conclude every thing impossible in the uncreated Being, whereof there is not an exact parallel in the creation? If any man will stand upon this, come make an argument of it, let us see it in form, and try its strength.-Whatsoever hath not its exact parallel in the creation, is impossible in God, &c.-He will sooner prove himself ridiculous, than prove his point by such a medium. 'Tis enough for a sober man's purpose, in such a case as we are now considering, if we find such things actually are (or might as easily be, as what we see actually is) among the creatures, that are of as difficult conception, and explication, as what appears represented in the inquirer's hypothesis concerning a trinity. 'Tis trifling to attempt to give, or to ask, a parallel exact per omnia. It abundantly serves any reasonable purpose, if there be a parallel quoad hoc, viz. in respect of the facility or difficulty of conception. And though the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective natures be not so many distinct substances, a trinity is not less conceivable in the Divine Being, than three such natures, or natural powers, in the one human nature.

And whoever they be that will not simplify the Divine Being into nothing, (as the excellent author of the 28 propositions speaks,) must also acknowledge the most real perfections in the Divine Being, though not univocal, but infinitely transcendent to any thing in us. And are they no way distinct? Let any sober understanding judge, will the same nothing agree to them all? Is his knowledge, throughout, the same with his effective power? Then he must make himself. For who can doubt he knows himself? And is his will the self-same undistinguishable perfection, in him, with his knowledge? Then the pur poses of his will must be to effect all that he can. For doth he not know all that he can do? And the complacencies of his will must be as much in what is evil, as good, even in the most odious turpitude of the vilest, and most im moral evils! For he knows both alike. I know what is commonly said of extrinsical denominations: but are such denominations true, or false? Have they any thing in re correspondent to them, or have they not? Then some distinction there must be of these perfections themselves. If so, how are they distinguished?

And there appears great reason, from God's own word, to conceive greater distinction of the three hypostases in his being, than of the attributes which are common to them, as is said, Sober Inquiry, page 151. In reference whereto, it is not improper or impertinent to mention such differences, as we find in our own being, though they be not distinct substances. Less distinction in ourselves may lead us to conceive the possibility of greater in him, in whom we are wont to apprehend nothing but substance. What he adds concerning the union of soul and body in ourselves, (which he cannot deny to be distinct substances,) is, from a man of so good sense, so surprisingly strange, and remote from the purpose, that one would scarce think it from the same man; but that he left this part to some other of the club, and afterwards wrote on, himself, without reading it over; or this was with him (what we are all liable to) some drowsy interval.

And he carries us yet much further back, referring us to For when he had himself recited as the inquirer's words, Plotinus, in whom any that will, may read much more to or sense, "If there be this union between two so contrary that purpose in many places. It matters not whether this natures and substances, as the soul and body, why may opinion be true or false, but a great mistake (or misrepre- there not be a like union between two or three created sentation) it was, to say no man ever pretended to it. And spirits ?" he, without shadow of a pretence, feigns the inbe that as it will; if all the readers will suspend their quirer again to have forgot the question, because soul and judgments, that a trinity in the Godhead is impossible, till body are not both intelligent substances. And why, Sir, the considerator shall have proved, by plain demonstra-doth this argue him to have forgot the question? 'Tis as tion, the concurrence of three such spirits (a vegetative, sensitive, and intellective) vitally united in the constitution of man, is a thing simply impossible, I believe he will not, in haste, have many proselytes.

I, for my part, as his own eyes might have told him, laid no stress upon it; but only mentioned it in transitu, as I was going on to what is obvious, and in view to every man, the union between our soul and body. Nor was I solicitous to find this an exact parallel, as he fancies I

• Πότερον προσελθων, ο νους τη ψυχη ως αλλος αλλη νοεραν αυτην εποίησεν, ός. cap. 1.

if he expected a man to be at the top of the stairs, as soon as he touched the first step. In a series of discourse, must the beginning touch the end, leaving out what is to come between, and connect both parts? What then serve mediums for? And so farewell to all reasonings, since nothing can be proved by itself. He expected, it seems, I should have proved "three intelligent natures might be united, because three intelligent natures might be united." But say I (and so he repeats) if there be so near union

Η Καθ' εαυτήν είναι ως λόγον ψυχην, • Των αποποτατων, cap. 16. f Enn. 6. lib. 7. cap. 5, 6, 7, &c.