ted from the mere unity of the Godhead, which may be such, as to admit these distinctions in it, for aught we know. A LETTER TO A FRIEND, CONCERNING A POSTSCRIPT. 5. Nothing is more appropriate to the Godhead than to be a necessarily existent, intelligent Being: since all crea- TO THE DEFENCE OF DR. SHERLOCK'S NOTION OF THE TRIN. tures, whether intelligent or unintelligent, are contingent, depending upon the will of the necessary, intelligent Being. 6. If therefore the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do coexist in the Godhead necessarily, they cannot but be God. 7. And if the first be conceived as the fountain, the second as by natural, necessary (not voluntary, promanation from the first, the third by natural, necessary (not voluntary) spiration, so as that neither of these latter could have been otherwise; this aptly agrees with the notions of Father, Son, and Spirit distinctly put upon them, and infinitely distinguishes the two latter from all creatures that depend upon will and pleasure. 8. Whatever distinction there be of these three among themselves, yet the first being the original, the second being by that promanation necessarily and eternally united with the first, the third by such spiration united necessarily and eternally with both the other, inasmuch as eternity and necessity of existence admit no change, this union must be inviolable and everlasting, and thereupon the Godhead which they constitute can be but one. 9. We have among the creatures, and even in ourselves, instances of very different natures, continuing distinct, but so united as to be one thing; and it were more easily supposable of congenerous natures. 10. If such union with distinction be impossible in the Godhead, it must not be from any repugnancy in the thing itself, since very intimate union, with continuing distinction, is in itself no impossible thing; but from somewhat peculiar to the Divine Being. 11. That peculiarity, since it cannot be unity (which because it may admit distinctions in one and the same thing, we are not sure it cannot be so in the Godhead) must be that simplicity commonly wont to be ascribed to the Di vine nature. 12. Such simplicity as shall exclude that distinction, which shall appear necessary in the present case, is not by express Scripture any where ascribed to God; and therefore must be rationally demonstrated of him, if it shall be judged to belong at all to him. 13. Absolute simplicity is not a perfection, nor is by any ascribed to God. Not by the Socinians themselves, who ascribe to him the several intellectual and moral excellencies, that are attributed to him in the Scriptures, of which they give very different definitions, as may be seen in their own Volkelius at large, which should signify them not to be counted, in all respects, the same thing. 14. That is not a just consequence, which is the most plausible one that seems capable of being alleged for such absolute simplicity, that otherwise there would be a composition admitted in the Divine nature, which would import au imperfection inconsistent with Deity. For the several excellencies that concur in it, howsoever distinguished, being never put together, nor having ever exsted apart, but in eternal, necessary union, though they may make some sort of variety, import no proper composition, and carry with them more apparent perfection, than absolute omnimodous simplicity can be conceived to do. 15. Such a supposed possible variety even of individual natures in the Deity, some way differing from each other, infers not an unbounded liberty of conceiving what pluralities therein we please or can imagine. The divine revelation, which could only justify, doth also limit us, herein, mentioning three distinct I's or He's, and no more. 16. The several attributes which are common to these three, do to our apprehension, and way of conceiving things, require less distinction; no more, for ought we know, than may arise from their being variously modified, according to the distinction of objects, or other extrinsical things, to which they may be referred. We that so little know how our own souls, and the powers and principles that belong to them, do differ from one another, and from them, must be supposed more ignorant, and should be less curious, in this. ITY IN UNITY, RELATING TO THE CALM AND SOBER IN- SIR, I FIND a postscript to the newly published defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in Unity, takes notice of the inquiry concerning the possibility of a trinity in the Godhead. He that writes it seems somewhat out of humour, or not in such as it is decent to hope is more usual with him: and I can't guess for what, unless that one, whom he imagines a dissenter, hath adventured to cast his eyes that way that he did his. But for that imagination he may have as little ground, as I to think the dean's defender is the dean; and as little as he had to say the inquirer took great care that no man should suspect that he favours the dean in his notion. Here he is quite out in his guess; for the inquirer took no such care at all, but nakedly to represent his own sentiments as they were, whether they agreed with the dean's, or wherein they differed: and really cares not who knows that he hath not so little kindness either for truth or for him, as to abandon or decline what he thinks to be true for his sake, or (as he expressed himself, p. 29. of that discourse) because he said it. But the defender represents the dean as much of another temper, and that he will thank him for not favouring him in his notions. But yet he says, that though the inquirer doth not in every particular say what the dean says, yet he says what will justify him against the charge of tritheism. And is there any hurt to him in that? What a strange man doth he make the dean! as if he could not be pleased unless he alone did engross truth! Will he thank a man for not favouring his notions, and yet would blame him for not saying in every particular what he says, though he say what will justify him against the heaviest charge framed against him? may one neither be allowed to agree with him, nor disagree? But, Sir, the defender's discourse hath no design (nor I believe he himself) to disprove the possibility of a trinity in the ever blessed Godhead. Therefore the inquirer is safe from him as to the principal design he is concerned for, it is all one to him if it still appear possible in what way it be so represented, that is intelligible, consistent with itself, and with other truth; so that it is hardly worth the while to him, further to inquire whether the dean's hypostasis or his be better, if either be found unexceptionably safe and good. But because the defender hath, to give preference to the one, misrepresented both with some appearing disadvantage to the cause itself, what he says ought to be considered. And the whole matter will be reduced to this twofold inquiry: 1. Whether the inquirer hath said more than the dean, or more than is defensible, of the distinction of the sacred three in the Godhead. 2. Whether the dean hath said so much as the inquirer, or so much as was requisite of their union. 1. For the former, the defender, p. 103. mentions the dean's notion of three infinite minds or spirits; and makes the inquirer to have been proving three spirits, three distinct essences, three individual natures, in the Godhead; and then adds, "for my part, I cannot tell where the difference is, unless it be in the term infinite." "Tis indeed strange the inquirer should have said more than the dean, if there were no difference, unless in the term infinite, wherein he must have said infinitely less. But he at length apprehends another difference, though he after labours to make it none, viz. that the inquirer disputes, but asserts nothing, and he fancies he doth so to shelter himself from the animadverter, of whom he says he seems to be terribly afraid. Here he puts the dean into a fit of kindness and good nature, allowing the inquirer to partake with him in his fears, though not in his notions, as more sacred. But he herein understands not the inquirer, who if he had been so terribly afraid, could very easily have said nothing; and who was really afraid of a greater animadverter, thinking it too great boldness, under his + See Milena, Antit 1 eye, to speak confidently of his own peculiarities, and that lay folded up in so venerable darkness. He thought it enough, in opposition to the daring person (whoever he was) with whom he was concerned, that so peremptorily pronounced the trinity an absurdity, a contradiction, nonsense, and an impossibility, to represent what he proposed as possible for ought he knew. And now the defender will have the dean to have done no more. And with all my heart let him have done no more, if he and his animadverter, and the rest of the world, will so agree it: but he will have the inquirer to have done more, and to be much more exposed to the charge of tritheism, by asserting three distinct essences, three individual natures, and three spiritual beings in the Godhead. This is indeed very marvellous, that the inquirer should expose himself to the charge of tritheism by asserting all this, when but a few lines before, upon the same page, he is said to have asserted nothing! But he may as well make the inquirer in asserting nothing to have asserted all this, as the dean in asserting all this to have asserted nothing. And where the inquirer hath said in express words that the sacred three are three distinct substances I can't find. And we must in great part alter the common notion of substance to make it affirmable of God at all, viz. that it doth substare accidentibus, which I believe the dean will no more than the inquirer suppose the Divine Being to admit. But 'tis true, that there is somewhat more considerable in the notion of substance, according whereto, if the dean can make a shift to avoid the having of any inconvenient thing proved upon him by consequence, I hope the inquirer may find a way to escape as well. But whereas he says, the dean allows but one divine essence, and one individual nature, in the Godhead repeated in three persons, but without multiplication, as he says he had already explained it; this hath occasioned me to look back to that explanation, and if he thinks the allowing but one divine essence, and one individual nature, in the Godhead, will agree with what the dean hath said in his vindication, I shall not envy him, nor now go about to disprove it. But I confess I see not how it can agree with what the defender says in this his explanation itself, when, p. 23. he tells us, the Son is the living subsisting image of the Father, and the image and the prototype cannot be the same, but must be two. No man is his own image, nor is an image the image of itself. And he adds, this is so self-evident, &c. But whereas the distinction all this while might be understood to be but modal, and that appears to be the defender's present (whatever was the dean's former) meaning, that the three subsistences differ only in their different manner of subsisting; yet with this meaning his other words do little agree, for he plainly asserts a real distinction of three in the same individual numerical nature. And who did ever make a real distinction to be but modal? More expressly he had said before, (p. 18.) the Divine nature is one individual nature, but not one single nature, for one single nature can be but one person whe ther in God or man. I shall not here discuss with him the criticism upon which he lays so mighty stress, of one individual nature and one single nature, but take the terms he chooses, and if the Divine nature be not one single nature, it must be double, it must be triple. And what doth this come to less than three natures? unless all ordinary forms of speech must be quite abandoned and forsaken. And wherein doth it come short of what is said by the inquirer? p. 141. "This term individual must (in the case now supposed, as possible not as certain) admit of a twofold application, either to the distinct essence of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost; or to the entire essence of the Godhead, in which these three do concur. Each of these conceived by itself, are (according to this supposition) individual essences, but conceived together they are the entire individual essence of God, for there is but one such essence and no more, and it can never be multiplied nor divided into more of the same name and nature." Duplicity, triplicity, are admitted; simplicity rejected. If simple and single be of the same signification, where is the difference, but that the one thinks absolute omnimodous simplicity is not to be affirmed of the Divine nature, as he often a Letter, p. 24, 25, speaks: the other says downright, it is not single or sim ple without limitation. The one denies multiplication of it, so doth the other. The one indeed speaks positively, the other doth but suppose what he says as possible, not certain. And there is indeed some difference between supposing a thing as possible for ought one knows; and affirming it so positively, as to impute heresy, and nonsense, to all gainsayers. But both bring for proof, the same thing, the incarnation; as in the postscript, the defender takes notice the inquirer doth, p. 102. And so doth he himself in his letter, p. 102.-"The Divine nature was incarnate in Christ, he was perfect God and perfect man; and if there was but one single Divine nature in all three persons, this one single Divine nature was incarnate, and therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost, who are this single Divine nature, as well as the Son, must be as much incarnate as the Son was." He makes the contrary absurd, and brings in (fitly enough) Victorinus Afer teaching, that we ought not to say, nor is it lawful to say, that there is but one substance, i. e. as he paraphrases it, one single subsisting nature (therefore there must be three single subsist ing natures) and three persons. For if this same substance did and suffered all (patri-passiani et nos) we must be Patripassians, which God forbid. And what the defender alleges from the ancients, against the Sabellians, allowing only a trinity of names, and his taking the rpórol inάpews in the concrete not in abstract, fully enough speaks the inquirer's sense, his accounting the contrary too fine and metaphysical for him, was what was writ to Dr. Wallis, (Calm Discourse, p. 147.) too fine or too little solid, &c. In short, till it can be effectually proved, that mind and spirit do not signify somewhat as absolute as nature or essence, (or rather more than the former, which signifies the principle of operation as the other of being,) and till it can be as well proved, that asserting a thing as certain, so as to pronounce it heresy and nonsense to think otherwise, is less than only to propose it as possible, or inquire whether it be so or no, the dean must be judged by every one that understands common sense, to have heightened the dis tinction of three persons at least as much as the inquirer. And whether the inquirer have supposed more than is defensible against the defender's objections, will be considered by and by in its proper place. In the meantime let it, 2. Be examined whether the dean has said as much for salving the unity of the Godhead as the inquirer, or as much as is requisite to that purpose. And here our busi ness will be short, for it all turns upon that one single point, whether mutual consciousness be that union which must be acknowledged, or suppose it only. For which we need only appeal to common reason, whether being do not in the natural order precede even the power of working; and consequently whether being united vitally, precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state: whereupon the inquiry is not concerning actual conscience only, but (as he speaks) consciousness. Is it possible any three persons or intelligent subsistences, should naturally have vital perception of each other's internal motions and sensations, without being vitally preunited? I say naturally, for that God might give to three created spirits a temporary perception of each other without bringing them into a stated union each with other, is little to be doubted; as a spirit may assume a body and animate it pro tempore without being substantially united with it. And if that body were also a spirit, they might pro tempore, for ought we know, extraordinary divine disposition (for within the ordinary course of nature we know of no such intimacy of created spirits to another) be quasi anima to one another. But if naturally they were so to mingle and transfuse sensations mutually into each other, they must be naturally, first, in vital union with one another. Nor therefore did the inquirer mistake the dean's notion as the defender fancies in the passage he quotes, p. 104, as if he took mutual consciousness for mere mutual perspection. For though scre abstractedly taken, doth not signify more than perspicere, yet the inquirer in that passage, speaking of a never so per fect mutual perspection, properly enough expressed there by as great a feeling such spirits were supposed to have of each other, in themselves, as mutual consciousness is apt to signify, or as the dean can yet be supposed to have meant, that perspection being more perfect which produces gusts and relishes suitable to the object, than that which stays in mere speculation only. the being of God," this had been more excusable; besides much said to the same purposed elsewhere. It had been ingenuous in any man not to impute that to another, as his meaning, which in the plainest terms he disavows, as none And upon the whole, it seems very strange the defender of his meaning: and it had been prudent in the dean (or of should say, "If such an internal, vital sensation, be not an his defender) of all mankind not to have done so in the preessential union, he believes no man can tell what it is." sent case, as will further be seen in due time. But he takes it For how can such actual sensation be imagined to be union? for an affront, when he fancies a man to come too near him. As well might the use of sense itself (speaking of any thing He adds, "for this reason he disputes earnestly against singly to which it belongs) be said to be constituent form, the universal, absolute, omnimodous simplicity of the or (consequently) the doing any thing that proceeds from Divine nature, and will not allow that wisdom, power, and reason, to be the form of a man. So the writing a book, goodness, are the same thing in God, and distinguished should be the author. And whereas he says, "it is certain into different conceptions by us, only through the weakthe dean took it to be so, and therefore he did not leave ness of our understandings, which cannot comprehend an out a natural eternal union;" it follows, indeed, that he did infinite Being in one thought, and therefore must, as well not leave it out, in his mind and design, but he nevertheless as we can, contemplate him by parts." I know not what left it out of his book, and therefore said not enough there he means by earnestly, the matter was weighty, and it is to salve the unity of the Godhead, but ought to have insist-true. He was in writing about it in no disposition to jest. ed upon somewhat prior to mutual consciousness, as con- But it's said, "he disputed against the universal, absolute, stituent of that unity, and which might make the three omnimodous simplicity of the Divine nature." I hope one, and not merely argue them to be so. the defender in this means honestly, but he speaks very But now (p. 105) he comes to find as great fault with improperly, for it supposes him to think that the universal, the inquirer's way of maintaining this unity, and because absolute, omnimodous simplicity, so earnestly disputed he is resolved to dislike it, if he can't find it faulty, sets against, did really belong to the Divine nature; but I can himself to make it so. The temper of mind wherewith he scarce believe him to think so, and therefore he should writes to this purpose what follows, (p. 105.) and onwards have said, his disputation tended to prove it not to belong. to the end, so soon and so constantly shows itself, that no If he (viz. the defender, or the dean) did really think it man whose mind is not in the same disorder will upon did, they, or he, must be very singular in that sentiment, trial apprehend any thing in it, but such heat as dwells in I would have them name me the man that ever laid down darkness. And he himself hath given the document, and asserted such a position. Some I know have said of which may be a measure to any apprehensive reader: that sacred Being, that it is summè simplex, or more simple "True divine wisdom rests not on an illnatured and per-than any thing else; but that imports not universal, absoverse spirit;" I understand it, "while the ill fit lasts." But lute, omnimodous simplicity, which is impossible to be a 'tis strange he could write those words without any self-perfection, or therefore to belong to the Divine nature. No reflection. man that ever acknowledged a trinity of persons even modally distinguished, could ever pretend it, for such simplicity excludes all modes. Nay, the antitrinitarians themselves can never be for it, as the Calm Discourse hath shown. And if the dean be, he is gone into the remotest extreme from what he held (and plainly enough seems still to hold) that ever man of sense did. The thing to be revenged is, that the inquirer did freely speak his thoughts, wherein he judged the dean's hypothesis defective, his not taking notice of what he reckoned naturally antecedent and fundamental to mutual consciousness: a most intimate, natural, necessary, eternal union of the sacred three. If the inquirer spake sincerely, as he understood the matter, and him, and it evidently appear the defender did not so, I only say the wronged person hath much the advantage, and wishes him no other harm, than such gentle regrets, as are necessary to set him right with hiraself, and his higher Judge. He says, he (the inquirer) represents this unity by the union of soul and body, and by the union of the Divine and human nature, &c. 'Tis true, he partly doth so, but more fully by the (supposed union of) three created spirits; (to which he that will may see, he only makes them a lower step;) and he says, (with respect especially to the former of these,)" That a union supposable to be originally, eternally, and by natural necessity in the most perfect Being, is to be thought unexpressibly more perfect than any other." But (he adds) "these are personal unions, and therefore cannot be the union of the Godhead." And he very well knew (for he had but little before cited the passage) that the inquirer never intended them so, but only to represent that the union of the three in the Godhead, could not be reasonably thought less possible. What he further adds is much stranger, (and yet herein I am resolved to put charity towards him to the utmost stretch, as he professes to have done his understanding,) for he says-as far as he can possibly understand, and that be should be glad to be better informed, though there is some reason to apprehend that former displeasure darkened his understanding, (and even dimmed his eye-sight,) which yet I hope hath its more lucid intervals, and that this distemper is not a fixed habit with him. And what is it now that he cannot possibly understand otherwise?-that no other union will satisfy him (viz. the inquirer) but such a union of three spiritual beings and individual natures as by their composition constitute the Godhead, as the composition of soul and body do the man; i. e. he cannot understand but he means what he expressly denies. Who can help so cross an understanding? If he had not had his very finger upon the place where the inquirer says in express words, "I peremptorily deny all composition in But for what is added, that he "will not allow that wisdom, power, and goodness, are the same thing in God:" this is not fairly said, civility allows me not to say, uutruly. There is no word in the place he cites, nor any where in that book, that signifies not allowing; 'tis intimated we are not instructed "by the Scripture to conceive of the Divine nature, as, in every respect, most absolutely simple," or that power, wisdom, goodness in the abstract, are the same thing, and that our difficulty is great to apprehend them really undistinguishable. And let me seriously ask himself, doth he in good earnest think it is only through the weakness of our understandings that we distinguish the notions of the Divine wisdom, power, and goodness? Certainly it were great weakness of understanding to define them alike. I believe he never met with the writer yet that distinguished them less, than ratione ratiocinata in contradistinction to ratiocinante, which implies somewhat corresponding to our distinct notions of them (eminently and not formally) in naturâ rei. And whereas he further says, "This prepared his way to make goodness, wisdom, power, a natural trinity in unity," herein the defender is mistaken. This is not the trinity which the inquirer's discourse was ever intended to terminate in, as he himself hath expressly said, and the defender takes notice of it; which makes me wonder how he could think it was so intended, citing the very passage, where the inquirer "professes not to judge, that we are under the precise notions of power, wisdom, and goodness, to conceive of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." But why then were these three so much discoursed of before? They are three most celebrated divine attributes, wherein we have our most immediate and very principal concern. And some have thought the trinity was most fitly to be conceived by them. The inquirer did not think so; but he thought, first, it would be requisite to have our minds disentangled from any apprehended necessity of conceiving them to be in all respects the very same things; nor are they the very same, if they be so distinguished, as is ex pressed in the sixteenth of the summary propositions ;f it, and (which I sincerely believe he never intends) toge where also they are each of them said to be common to ther with it, against all religion. But besides, he hath Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whence therefore it is im- destroyed his own supposition himself (to put us out of possible they should be thought to distinguish Father, that danger) by saying in plain words, p. 10. "We have Son, and Holy Ghost. But that some distinction being no notion of an eternal and necessary existence, but in an admitted even of them, this might facilitate to us our con- absolute perfect and infinite nature.' Now say I, what is ception of the greater distinction which must be, of Father, so perfect, and hath whatever belongs to it necessarily, Son, and Spirit, as is expressed p. 140. Indeed he did not though distinguishable things belong to it, hath no parts; think fit to interrupt his discourse by staying to show for what are parts, but such things as can be parted? Such reasons why he did not rest in that account alone of the things as never were parted, and never can be, (as 'tis nontrinity, though it might seem plausible, or not absurd, but sense to talk of those things being parted that are united proceeded further to what was more satisfying to himself, necessarily, and of themselves,) are no parts, if partiri, and might be so to other men. And (as the intervening whence they are so called, must not (and herein he cannot series of his discourse leads thereto) this is more directly so fool the whole Christian world, as to make it concur with done, &c. especially where he comes to speak of the ne- him) lose its signification to serve a turn. Though the cessary coexistence, and the (as necessary and natural) things be real, their partibility is not real. If any indeed order of the Father, Son, and Spirit, towards each other. will call them parts, because they may be conceived or conThe second being, not by any intervening act of will, but templated apart, as parts merely conceptible are no preju by necessary eternal promanation, from the first, and the dice to the perfection of the Divine Being, so are such third from both. And the true reason why power, wisdom, conceivable parts acknowledged by this author himself in and goodness, were not thought expressive of the distinc-express words; "we cannot comprehend an infinite tion of Father, Son, and Spirit, but common to each of Being in one thought, and therefore must as well as we them (as is said, Summary Prop. 16.) was, that the two can contemplate him by parts." God can as little admit latter cannot but be necessary emanations, most connatural to be a part of any thing, as to have any thing a part of to their original, as is truly suggested by the defender, p. 111. him. And yet 'tis no prejudice to the dignity and perfec If you object, (as the defender brings in the inquirer tion of his being, to conceive of him conjunctly with other saying,) That this gives us the notion of a compounded things, as when we make him a part (subject or predicate) Deity, &c. this, i. e. the supposition that absolute omni- of a proposition. All his disputation therefore against modous simplicity belongs not to it, is the thing which parts and composition in the Deity, is against a figment, may be thought to give us this notion. And he tells us, or no present adversary. For my part I am of his mind, he (the inquirer) answers this difficulty, by giving us a and I should be obliged to thank him that this once he new notion of a compositum. And what's that which he vouchsafes to let me be on his side, when he knows I am, calls a new notion? That a compositum seems to imply pre- if he did not take so vast pains to make others not know existing component, that brings such things together; and it. How hard a thing is it for an angry man (especially supposes such and such more simple things to have pre-when he knows not why) to write with a sincere mind. existed apart, or separate, and to be brought afterwards together into a united state. And indeed is this a new notion? as new as the creation? Let him show me an instance through the whole created universe of beings, (and for the uncreated being the defender (now at this time) disputes against any composition there, and the inquirer denies any,) first, where there hath been a compositum without a pre-existing component, or next, the compounded parts whereof, if substantial, did not in order of nature pre-exist separate; i. e. whether esse simplicitèr, do not naturally precede esse tale, or which is all one, to our present purpose, whether they were not capable hereof if the Creator pleased. Let any man, I say, tell me where was there ever acompositum made by substantial union that did not consist of once separate or of separable parts. But note his admirable following supposition, that is to say, That if a man, suppose, who consists of body and soul, had been from eternity, without a maker, and his soul and body had never subsisted apart, he could not have been said to have been a compounded creature? This is said with design most groundlessly (as we shall see) to fasten an absurd consequence upon the inquirer, and see how it lucks. Did ever any man undertake to reprove an absurdity with greater absurdity? A creature without a maker! what sort of creature must this be? We have a pretty saying quoted in the defender's letter; He that writes lies down; and we are apt enough too, when we write, to trip and fall down, and ought in such cases to be merciful to one another, even though he that falls should be in no danger of hurting his forehead, much more if he be. What was another man's turn now, may be mine next. But let the supposition proceed, and put we being instead of creature, which no doubt was the defender's meaning, for creature he must needs know it could not be that had no maker. And what then? Why he should not" (says he) "have been said to be compounded, though he would have had the same parts that he has now." We have here a self-confounding supposition, which having done that first, cannot hurt him whom it was designed to confound, being taken in season. Grant one, and you grant a thousand. A being made up of a soul and a body, is so imperfect an entity, as could not be of itself. Nothing is of itself which is not absolutely perfect. If he mind to disprove this, let him try his faculty when he pleases against f Calma Discourse, But hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the honour of the Divine Being, (as God forbid I should think he never hath,) what is that he supposes injurious to it? Is it the words, parts and compounds? or is it the things supposed to be united in the Divine Being? The words he knows to be his own, and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how: parts that were never put together, never parted, nor ever shall be the one or other; i. e. that never were or will be parts, and a compound of such parts! But now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words,-three essences, natures, (or if you please, infinite minds or spirits,) signified by the names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in eternal union, but distinct in the being of God.-Let us consider his disputation against them united, or in union, according to its double aspect: First, upon the hypothesis or supposition of them: Secondly, upon himself. First, Consider his disputation as levelled against the hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences, natures, minds, spirits, in necessary, eternal union in the Divine Being. And one of his arguments against it is in those words of his: One principal argument against it (here put out parts and composition which are his own, and we have no more to do with them) is, that God is eternal and unmade, and whatsoever hath parts, (says he,) hath such essences in it, must have a maker. And here let him prove his consequence, and his business is done, viz. both ways, as will be seen by and by. But let him show the incon sistency between a thing's having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it, (as the supposition to be argued against is, and before ought to have been justly stated,) and it's being eternal and unmade. But how that is to be evinced I cannot so much as guess; confident affirmation, against the most obvious tenor of God's own word, is of little account. Who shall ascend into the heavens? or fathom the depths? or can have that perspec tion of God's incomprehensible nature, as without (and visibly against) his own revelation to be able, without great rashness, to pronounce so concerning him? But so toyish an argument as here follows, is worse than the position; i. e. when one shall say, that for ought we know there may be three distinct essences by an eternal unmade union, united into one, in the being of God; any man should say, and be so vain as to expect to be regarded, that because they g His Letter, p. 106, meantime, when we are told so plainly by the divine oracles, of a sacred three, that are each of them God, and of some one whereof some things are spoken that are not nor can be of the others; I think it easier to count three than to determine of infiniteness: and accordingly to form one's belief. But of this more when we come to compare him with himself. And for what he discourses of the aspect this supposition hath upon the Trinity, and the Homoousion; it all proceeds still upon his own fiction of parts, and upon the invidious straining of that similitude of the union of soul and body, as he himself doth tantum non confess; except that he lessens it by saying most untruly that he (the inquirer) doth expressly own the consequence. Therefore if he do not own the consequence, then the defender confesses himself to have invidiously devised it. And what is it? That if all three by this composition are but one God, neither of them by himself is true and perfect God. The divinity is like the English; but both his own. The inquirer denies both antecedent (which he knows) and consequent too. Leave out, by this composition, (his own figment,) and his argument as much disproves any trinity at all as it doth the present hypothesis. are united by an eternal and unmade union, therefore they are not united by an eternal and natural union! If there be not a contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing, by itself, is to say nothing, or is all one with proving a thing by itself. He proceeds, to what hath nothing in it like an argument, but against its own conceit of parts, and that very trifling too: "There can be but one eternal nature in God; but if there be three-there must be three." This 'tis now come to, proving his point by itself. Here he makes sure work to have nothing denied, but then nothing is proved, no advance is made; if there be three, there must be three. But if there be three what? eternal parts ? there must be three different natures, or else they would be the same. (What! though distinct?) But this supposes somebody said the first: and who? himself; therefore he is disproving himself. If I had said so, I would have denied his consequence, for there may be similar parts; whereas by different, he seems to mean dissimilar. He says, "not only distinct, but different natures." Now you have that wonderful thing talked of sometimes, but never brought to view before, a distinction without a difference. 'Tis strange how any things should be distinct, and no way different. What distinguishes them if But wherein doth the inquirer own it? because such a they differ by nothing? This different, applied to this pre-similitude is used (as 'tis often in that discourse) of the sent case, is his own word, coined to introduce a notion union between soul and body, (declared elsewhere to be unthat is not new to Christians only, but to all mankind. If expressly defective,) that therefore the Father, Son, and by different natures he means (as he seems) of a different Holy Ghost, are each of them by himself no more truly kind, who thought of such a difference? But I trow, Lord or God, according to the Athanasian creed, or otherthings that differ in number, do as truly differ, (however wise than in as improper a sense, as the body of a man, essentially cohering,) though not so widely. excluding the soul, is a man, or a human person. Or as His next is, that though we have a natural notion of an if Deity were no more in one of the persons, than humanity eternal Being, we have no notion of three eternal essences in a carcass! Who that looks upon all this with equal eyes, (which again I put instead of his parts) which necessarily but will rather choose as doubtful a notion, than so apcoexist in an eternal union. Doth he mean we are to dis-parently ill a spirit? Are similitudes ever wont to be believe every thing of God whereof we have not a natural alike throughout, to what they are brought to illustrate notion? Then to what purpose is a divine revelation? Is It might as well be said, because he mentions with approthis notion of God pretended to be natural? 'Tis enough, bation such as illustrate the doctrine of the trinity by a if such a notion be most favoured by his own revelation, tree and its branches, that, therefore, there we are to expect who best understands his own nature, and there be not leaves and blossoms. Is it strange the created universe evident natural notion against it. He forgot that he had should not afford us an exact representation of uncreated said, (Defence, p. 5.) "If every thing which we have no Being? How could he but think of that; "To whom do positive idea of must be allowed to contradict reason, we ye liken me?" At least one would have thought he shall find contradictions enough;” adding, “ We must con- should not have forgot what he had so lately said himself. fess a great many things to be true, which we have no idea We must grant we have no perfect example of any such of," &c. He adds, "Once more, we have no notion of an union in nature. What appetite in him is it, that now eternal and necessary existence, but in an absolutely per- seeks what nature doth not afford? A very unnatural one, fect and infinite nature, but if there be" (I here again leave we may conclude. 'Twere trifling to repeat what was out his three parts, because I design to consider if there be said, and was so plain, before, that the union between soul any thing of strength brought against what was supposed and body was never brought to illustrate personal union possible by the inquirer, not against his fiction, which I but essential. The former is here imagined without pretrouble not myself any further with) "three spiritual beings tence, there being no mention or occasion for the mention-neither of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite," ing of persons in the place he alleges. I But to make out (I would rather have said none, or no one, than neither, his violent consequence he foists in a supposition, that since the discourse is of more than two. I thought the never came into any man's imagination but a Socinian's meaning of uter and neuter had being agreed long ago,) and his own:-(which I say, contradistinguishing him to though we could suppose their union to make such a per- them, that the matter may (as it ought) appear the more fect Being, because they are not the same, and (neither) no strange. m) If God be a person, he can be but one. one of them is the whole," &c. God the appropriate name of a person? then indeed there will be but one person; but who here says so but himself? The name of God is the name of the essence, not the distinguishing name of a person. But if three intelligent natures be united in one Deity, each will be persons, and each will be God, and all will be one God; not by parts, other than conceptible, undivided, and inseparable, as the soul and body of a man are not. Which sufficiently conserves the Christian trinity from such furious and impotent attacks as these. And the homo-ousiotes is most entirely conserved too: for what are three spiritual natures no more the same, than (as he grossly speaks) the soul and body are? no more than an intelligent mind, and a piece of clay? By what consequence is this said, from any thing in the inquirer's hypothesis? Whereas also he expressly insists, that the Father, as Fons trinitatis, is first, the Son of the Father, the Holy Ghost from both. Is not the water in the streams the same that was in the fountain? and are not the several attributes expressly spoken of as common to these three? Essential power, wisdom, goodness, (which are denied to be the f ecise notions of Father, Son, and Spirit,) said by more than a repipnois, as that may be This is the only thing that ever came under my notice among the school-men, that hath any appearing strength in it, against the hypothesis which I have proposed as possible for ought I knew. They generally dispute against many sorts of compositions in the being of God, which I am not concerned in: that of matter and form, which is alien from this affair; of quantitative parts, which is as. alien: of subject and accident, which touches us not; of art and power, which doth it as little: each subsistent, being eternally in utmost actuality. And by sundry sorts and methods of argument, whereof only this can seem to signify any thing against the present supposition. And it wholly resolves into the notion of infinity, about which I generally spoke my sense in that first Letter to Dr. Wallis. And as I there intimated how much easier it is to puzzle another upon that subject than to satisfy oneself, so I here say, that I doubt not to give any man as much trouble about it in respect of quantitative extension, as he can me, in this. I think it demonstrable, that one Infinite can never be from another by voluntary production, that cannot by necessary emanation, I think not so. In the à See Calm Discourse. i Ibid. k His Letter, p. 5. 1 Calm Disc. n Is |