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in no case become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the order is made, and then only on the date specified in the order. The Commission may postpone the time of taking effect, to any later period, beyond the thirty days, which it deems reasonable.

§ 36. Orders for Payment of Money — Damages.Orders, which the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to make, are divided into two classes: (1) Orders for the payment of money; (2) Orders other than for the payment of money. Orders for the payment of money are such as contain a direction to the carrier requiring it to pay money to the shipper or complainant, as compensation for damages sustained, arising from any violation of the Commerce Act, and to make reparation to the complainant. The party aggrieved may elect under section 9, either to sue the carrier for damages in a Circuit or District Court of the United States, or complain to the Interstate Commerce Commission, claiming damages. The remedies are not concurrent and the aggrieved party must elect which remedy he will pursue. More delay will be experienced in enforcing an order for the payment of money, awarding damages by way of reparation, for the reason that the lawfulness of the order must be tested in a trial by jury. On writ of error from a judgment for money damages, entered upon a verdict, the Circuit Court of Appeals can review the rulings of the trial court, and can review the evidence, in order to ascertain whether, as matter of law, it is sufficient to sustain the verdict. (New York Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Refining Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 343.) The law, as amended, now allows the shipper to litigate his case without becoming liable for costs. He is not liable for costs, except in case he appeals, and then only for the costs on appeal.

Under section 13 the petitioner may make his complaint. Upon issue joined by the carrier's answer, the Commission may take testimony, and make an award as provided by section 16, and an order directing the carrier to pay the award on or before a day named in the order. If the carrier fails to comply, the complainant must enforce the order by bringing suit upon it in the Circuit Court of the United States.

In the case cited, Western New York Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Refining Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 343, the Circuit Court of Appeals said that the substantial object of an action upon an order for reparation made by the Commission is to obtain the reparation lawfully ordered to be paid. The law allows no appeal from the decision of the Commission denying or awarding reparation, nor does a writ of error lie in such case. The lawfulness of an order of reparation does not necessarily depend upon a sufficiency of evidence, adduced before the Commission, but upon the existence of facts, whether or not disclosed to that body, warranting the reparation ordered; and in an action brought to obtain such reparation, based on the order of the Commission, it is enough that such facts be established by proper evidence. “Hence,says the court, “in such an action the parties are not confined to the evidence adduced before the Commission during the investigation resulting in the order of reparation. They are at liberty, either wholly or partially, to rely upon the ' findings of fact' made by the act prima facie evidence in any judicial proceeding'as to each and every fact found,' or resort may be had by them or any of them to cumulative or other evidence. The cause of action is examined de novo and the proceeding is, in a qualified sense, independent of the investigation by the Commission.” (Western New York Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Refining Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 343.)

The facts were as follows: the Pennsylvania Refining Company, Limited, of Oil City, Pa., on December 4, 1888, made a complaint to the Commission against the Western New York and Pennsylvania Railroad Company and Samuel G. DeCoursey, receiver thereof, and against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company to recover damages for excessive and unlawful transportation charges upon shipments of oil. After a hearing, the Commission, on October 22, 1895, directed the Western New York and its receiver to pay the claimant $8,579, with interest from May 15, 1894, and directed the other defendants, New York, Lake Erie and Western and others, to pay the claimant $343.58, with interest from May



15, 1894. Defendants refused to comply with the orders and plaintiff brought actions thereon in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The cases were tried before a jury, in May, 1902, and plaintiff had a verdict against the Western New York for $12,706.92, including interest, and for $514.30 against the New York, Lake Erie and Western and others. Judgment was entered, and defendants sued out a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Both judgments were reversed upon technical grounds. One of the grounds was that the complainant failed to obtain an order of court for leave to sue the receiver of one of the carrying companies, notwithstanding the fact that the statute expressly makes the receiver primarily liable.

It appeared that in September, 1888, the freight rates on refined oil in barrels, from the Pennsylvania oil regions to New York, was raised by the carrier to sixty-six cents — a prohibitive tariff. Complaint was made to the Interstate Commerce Commission on December 4, 1888, and in May, 1889, a hearing was had before the Commission. On November 14, 1892, the Commission decided against the carriers, holding that they were guilty of unjust discrimination. A rehearing was granted by the Commission in October, 1893. Upon the hearing on October 22, 1895, damages were awarded to the shippers in the orders above referred to. In May, 1896, the petitioners sued in equity upon the orders in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In July, 1897, the court declined jurisdiction on its equity side, holding that the remedy was upon the law side of the court in an action triable by jury. The case was placed upon the calendar, and was tried and resulted in a verdict by the jury in favor of the refiners, which judgment was entered in February, 1903. These judgments were set aside by the Circuit Court of Appeals in May, 1905, in the decision cited above. After the lapse of seventeen years, the shippers found themselves in about the position they were in when the litigation was begun.

These cases were referred to and commented upon during the discussion of the railway rate bill of 1906, in the Senate, and doubtless lead to the distinction, in section 16 of the amended act, between orders “lawfully” made and orders “ regularly” made. That section provides that if the carrier re uses to obey any order of the Commission, other than an order for the payment of money, the order may be enforced in equity by the Commission upon petition setting forth the substance of the order and the respect in which the carrier has failed of obedience. The section declares that such an order, if found to be “regularly” made, shall be enforced by injunction. If, however, the carrier desires to review the facts de novo, and to attack the lawfulness of the order, it must do so in a suit brought in the Circuit Court of the United States against the Commission to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend the order. The difficulty with making this provision applicable to an order for the payment of money arises from the fact that a claim for damages must be tried before a jury. In order to protect the shipper, as far as possible, the law provides that the burden of proof is on the carrier to successfully defeat the order before the jury. It is made prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

§ 37. Order for Damages, how Enforced.- As an order awarding damages is based upon the allegation that the defendant carrier has been guilty of a breach of duty, or a breach of contract, the issue must be tried by a jury, unless jury trial is waived by defendant. An action to recover damages in other words, is an action at law, and not a suit in equity, and section 7 of the Constitution declares that “in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved.” It is necessary, therefore, in order to enforce an order for damages, to sue on the order, and try the case before a jury in the United States Circuit Court for the district where the petitioner resides, or the district in which is located the principal office of the carrier. A petition must be filed stating briefly the facts and the order of the Commission.

The law, however, in such a suit, gives the petitioner a


decided advantage, because he makes his case by putting in -evidence the order and findings of the Commission. With these in evidence he may rest his case, because the law (section 16) makes them prima facie evidence on the trial of the facts therein stated.” If a recovery is had, the petitioner shall be allowed an attorney's fee to be taxed and collected as part of the costs of the suit. If petitioner is defeated no costs can be awarded against him, unless he appeals, and then in case of an affirmance, he must pay only the costs on the appeal. The petition for damages before the Commission must be filed within two years from the time the cause of action accrues. Suit must be brought on the order within one year from its date.

§ 38. Orders Enforced in Equity.-All orders of the Commission, other than orders for the payment of money, must be enforced in proceedings on the equity side of the court, by injunction or other mandatory process, and in such proceedings the court shall have the powers “ordinarily exercised by it in compelling obedience to its writs of injunction and mandamus." An order for damages must be enforced by the party to whom the damages are awarded or for whose benefit the order is made. An order, other than for the payment of money, may be enforced by the Interstate Commerce Commission or by any party injured. It may be enforced either in a Circuit or District Court of the United States. It must be enforced by petition, setting forth the substance of the order, “and the respect in which the carrier has failed of obedience.” The court directs in what manner the facts shall be investigated, and if it appears that the order was “regularly made and duly served,” and that it has been disobeyed, the court shall enforce obedience by injunction or other mandatory process.

This enforcement is summary, for the reason that in such a proceeding the court cannot review the “lawfulness” of the order. It must ascertain only whether the order was “regularly” made. In other words, the inquiry will be limited to the question as to whether the Commission had jurisdiction. If it appears that, in making the order, all

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