Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia DisasterWilliam Starbuck, Moshe Farjoun The book offers important insight relevant to Corporate, Government and Global organizations management in general. The internationally recognised authors tackle vital issues in decision making, how organizational risk is managed, how can technological and organizational complexities interact, what are the impediments for effective learning and how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Managers, organizational consultants, expert professionals, and training specialists; particularly those in high risk organizations, may find the issues covered in the book relevant to their daily work and a potential catalyst for thought and action.
|
Contents
3 | |
NASA THE CAIB REPORT AND THE COLUMBIA DISASTER | 11 |
Part II THE CONTEXT OF THE DISASTER | 19 |
2 HISTORY AND POLICY AT THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM | 21 |
ON SLIPPERY SLOPES REPEATING NEGATIVE PATTERNS AND LEARNING FROM MISTAKE? | 41 |
REVISITING THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAMS RECENT HISTORY | 60 |
A RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF STS107 | 81 |
Part III INFLUENCES ON DECISIONMAKING | 99 |
ONE NASA TWO MODES | 202 |
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING FOLLOWING AMBIGUOUS THREATS | 220 |
LESSONS FROM THE SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA | 246 |
Part V BEYOND EXPLANATION | 267 |
NASA AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE DISASTERS | 269 |
LESSONS FOR ENHANCING RESILIENCE FROM COLUMBIA | 289 |
16 MAKING NASA MORE EFFECTIVE | 309 |
17 OBSERVATIONS ON THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT | 336 |
LANGUAGE AND THE CULTURE OF SAFETY IN NASAS SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM | 101 |
WHEN RIGID AMBITIOUS DEADLINES DONT MAKE SENSE | 122 |
8 ATTENTION TO PRODUCTION SCHEDULE AND SAFETY AS DETERMINANTS OF RISKTAKING IN NASAS DECISION TO LAUNCH TH... | 140 |
Part IV THE IMAGING DEBATE | 157 |
MINDFUL ORGANIZING IN MISSION STS107 | 159 |
STRUCTURALLY INDUCED INACTION | 178 |
Part VI CONCLUSION | 347 |
18 LESSONS FROM THE COLUMBIA DISASTER | 349 |
364 | |
370 | |
Other editions - View all
Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster William Starbuck,Moshe Farjoun Limited preview - 2005 |
Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster William Starbuck,Moshe Farjoun No preview available - 2009 |
Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster William Starbuck,Moshe Farjoun No preview available - 2005 |
Common terms and phrases
Accident Investigation Board action activities Administrator Aerospace agency analysis AWACS bipod budget CAIB report cause Center Challenger disaster chapter cognitive Columbia Accident Investigation Columbia disaster complex components constraints coordination culture damage deadline Debris Assessment Team debris strike decision-making decisions effects employees engineers environment exploration factors failure flight issue foam debris foam loss foam strike focus focused goals Goldin hindsight bias human imagery in-flight anomaly independent interactions International Space Station launch Linda Ham Mars Climate Orbiter Mission Management Team NASA NASA’s O-ring O’Keefe operational orbiter organization’s organizational learning performance personnel potential pressure problems RCC panels recovery window reliability request resilience response result Review safety of flight safety organization schedule SIAT social space flight space shuttle Columbia space shuttle program space station Starbuck structure success system safety technical temporal uncertainty tile tion United Space Alliance Vaughan Weick