own knowledge where an attorney commenced proceedings under the Mechanics' Lien Law as it existed prior to the amendment of 1869. On the publication of the Session Laws of that year, he discovered that his proceedings were void, and the time having expired within which to file a lien, lost his claim. Numerous instances of this kind occur every year. To obviate this difficulty we shall publish in the pages of the LAW JOURNAL all laws of a general nature, directly after their passage.

The reception with which the first number of the LAW JOURNAL met was flattering beyond our expectations, and confirms us in the opinion, with which we began, that a publication of the kind was needed. We shall spare no pains to continue to deserve the same favor. We design to devote especial attention to the digesting of decisions, and have made such arrangements as will enable us to give the earliest possible notice of the decisions of the Courts of every State in the Union. Besides giving an abstract of the Court of Appeals cases, we shall hereafter give a digest of all the decisions of the several general terms of this State, directly after they are pronounced.

The series of articles on "Law and Lawyers in Literature," begun in the first number of the LAW JOURNAL, will be continued for several numbers and until the subject has been exhausted. They are written in a style that cannot fail to interest and please. We would state that these articles are secured by copyright, and will be published in book form after their appearance in the JOURNAL.

BOOK NOTICES.

Criminal Pleadings and Practice: with Precedents of Indictments and Special Pleas, and an Appendix of Special Pleadings and Practical Suggestions. By James Bassett, Counsellor at Law. Chicago: E. B. Myers & Co. 1870.

This book, though mainly based upon the Illinois law, is, nevertheless, adapted to, and will be of use in other

States. The criminal laws of the various States have un

dergone far less change than the civil; and, having a common origin, are more uniform, so that a work of this character may be successfully used "from Maine to Georgia." Precedents of indictments for every indictable offense known to the law are given, in connection with a brief reference to the decisions relating to each fact or statement necessary to be set forth or made in the indictment. Besides these are a large number of special indictments and pleas of defendants, valuable, but not else. where readily accessible. The author has not confined himself to the decisions of the courts of Illinois, but has drawn largely from the decisions of other States, as well as from those of England. A compilation of accurate precedents of indictments was a desideratum, and, as such, we can commend the work before us.

A Treatise on Proceedings in the United States Courts: designed for the use of Attorneys and Counselors Practicing therein; and also for the Deputies of the United States Marshals, and other officers of the United States. With Practical Forms and an Appendix. By James Andrew Murray. Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co. 1869. Mr. Murray has done good service to the profession and to the officers of the United States courts, in the preparation of this little book. It is thoroughly practical, well arranged, and sufficiently full to be a guide in all matters to which it relates. The great beauty of the book is its attention to details; those little, though weighty, matters

of practice that are so apt to escape the attention; the when, and where, and how a thing is to be done. These matters are stated in plain and concise terms, so that one is not compelled to go through a dozen pages to obtain the information sought, and are supported by copious reference to decisions. The Appendix of Forms is unusually full and minute; and, so far as we have been able to examine, accurate. In short, the lawyer practicing in the United States courts will here find a great many things that he ought to know, and which he will find nowhere else, except from experience-a teacher which, in such matters, is not always the best.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. Edward P. Fuller et al., Resp., v. James S. Cone et al., Executors, Apps. Not reported.

The testator of the defendants received a draft from the Genesee Railroad Company, with the understanding that he was to apply the proceeds to the payment of a note made by the plaintiffs for the accommodation of the company. After the collection of the draft, it was levied on by the sheriff, on an execution against the company, but no receipt taken from the sheriff.

The court held that this was a trust operating for the benefit of the plaintiffs, and that the fund was neither subject to levy on an execution against the company, nor could the testator pay the money to the sheriff on any execution under the section of the Code allowing a debtor to make payment to an execution creditor.

The following is the substance of the opinion:

The money sought to be recovered came to the hands of the defendant's testator in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. Accepting the trust was equivalent to an express promise to the beneficiary to pay the money as directed when received. (Weslin v. Barker, 12 J. R. 276.)

After accepting the trust and receiving the money, the trustee could not evade the obligations of the trust, nor escape its responsibilities, short of performance or release by the beneficaries. He must ascertain, before he parts with the trust-fund, who are the parties legally entitled to it. If, through any misapprehension on his part, the trust property is diverted into another channel, he will be responsible to the party to whom it belongs. But the proceeds of said draft were not liable to levy and sale on execution. It was not the property of the execution debtor; it had never come to his hands; there was no pretense that the bills levied upon by the sheriff were the identical bills received for the draft. Even if the sum had been passed to the credit of the company, it then became a debt against the testator, and not liable to levy and sale on èxecution. (Dubois v. Dubois, 6 Cow. 494.)

Nor can the payment be sustained by section 293 of the Code, authorizing any person indebted to a judgment debtor to pay to the plaintiff the amount of said debt. It was not a debt due the company from the testator, and hence, the testator did not occupy the relation specified by the Code.

John A. Canter, Plff. in Error, v. The People, etc., Defts. in Error. To appear in 38 How. Where a defendant on the trial of an indictment against him for a criminal charge is acquitted on the ground of a variance between the indictment and the

proof, such acquittal forms no bar to the trial of a second indictment against him for the same offense. To sustain the plea of a former acquittal it must appear that the party was "put in jeopardy" by the formal trial. Thus, if the indictment upon which he has already been tried was so defective that no judgment could have been given upon it, it would not at common law constitute a bar. (Cases cited, People v. Barrett, 1 Johns. 66; 1 Russell on Cr. 836; Burns v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Rep. 182.) The Revised Statutes provide that an acquittal on the ground of variance between the indictment and the proof shall not bar a subsequent trial and conviction for the same offense. 2 R. S. 725, 24, Edmonds' Ed.

Lee v. Decker. To appear in 6 Abb. Upon a contract which liquidates the amount of a debt and provides that the payments are to be arranged after the consummation of another contract to be made by the debtor with a third person, the creditor may maintain an action for an immediate payment although no such other contract has been made, if it appears that the defendant, on being requested to pay the amount due, or to make some arrangement in reference to the debt, absolutely refused to do anything about it. (Case cited, Hanna v. Mills, 21 Wend. 90-92.) The People ex rel. Inman S. Lowell v. Board of Town Auditors of the town of Westford. To appear in 38 How.

On the 24th of March, 1864, at a town meeting held in the town of Westford, a resolution was passed "That there be paid the sum of $300 to each man drafted and not exempted, and the same be raised by a tax upon the taxable property of the town." The relator was subsequently drafted under the call of the President, of Sept., 1863; he paid $300 as commutation under the act of Congress, and was discharged from further liability under that draft.

In 1865 the Legislature legalized the acts of all legally convened town meetings in the several towns in the counties of Herkimer and Otsego, relating to the payment of bounties to volunteers, substitutes, drafted men, &c. In 1867, the relator presented to the Board of Town Auditors his claim for the sum of $300 as provided by the resolution. The board refused to allow the same; a peremptory mandamus requiring the defendants to audit and allow the claim was granted at Special Term and approved at General Term (53 Barb. 555). An appeal being taken to this Court, it was held that the relator was within the provision of the resolution and was entitled to the sum of $300 therein provided, and affirmed the decision of the Court below.

Slocum v. Freeman. To appear in 6 Abb. The plaintiff had recovered judgment against the defendant, and had afterward agreed to compromise and settle the judgment for a less sum, to be secured by the note of the defendant, payable at a certain time, with interest. To carry out said agreement, plaintiff executed a satisfaction-piece of the judgment, and delivered it to a third party, to be delivered to the defendant on receipt of the said note. The third party delivered the satisfaction-piece to the defendant, on receipt from him of a note, which he supposed to be in conformity to the agreement. The note was drawn without interest, and as soon as the plaintiff

discovered this, he returned the note to the defendant for correction, who refused to correct it or to return the satisfaction-piece. The action was to cancel the satisfaction and restore the judgment. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to have the satisfaction-piece canceled, and the lien of said judgment restored, except as to bona fide purchasers or incumbrancers since said judgment was canceled of record.

Markham v. Jaudon. Not Reported.

The action was brought by Markham against the Joudons, brokers, who had bought stock for him upon margin. The stock fell until the margin was exhausted. The brokers notified Markham that if he did not make his margin good they would sell him out. He did not make it good, and they sold the stock and brought him in debt. They did not give Markham any notice of the time and place of the sale of the stock. The stock afterward rose, and Markham sued the Jaudons for wrongfully selling his stock, and recovered at the trial before Judge Foster. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, the court holding that the brokers could sell without notice when the margin was exhausted. The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court held,

First. That when a broker buys stock for a customer and agrees to pay for it and carry it, on receiving a deposit of a margin of money or stock, he holds the stock so purchased as a pledge for the repayment of the money he has advanced, and cannot sell it even if the value of the stock falls so as to exhaust the margin, without giving notice of the time and place of the sale.

Second. That evidence of the custom of brokers cannot be received to change these rights and relations of the parties to such transaction.

Third. That the broker who sells out his customer's stock after his margin is gone, but without giving him notice of the time and place of the sale, is liable to the customer for the highest price of the stock down to the time of the trial, the customer being the owner of the stock, and the act of the broker a wrongful conversion.

LEGAL NEWS.

Ohio courts divorced 1,003 couples last year.

There are two ladies studying law at the St. Louis Law School; one a resident of St. Louis, and the other of Massachusetts.

Judge Alphonso Taft, of Cincinnati, gave Yale Col·lege a Christmas present of $1,000, to be used in any way President Woolsey might direct.

The Abbott Brothers, of New York, are engaged upon a digest of the laws of Indiana, which is shortly to be published by Messrs. Callaghan & Cockroft, of Chicago.

United States Circuit Judge, will hold the Circuit Court Hon. Lewis B. Woodruff, the newly appointed in Albany on the 18th inst., to dispose of the business on the calendars.

The Philadelphia Legal Gazette says that Callaghan & Cockroft, the enterprising Chicago law publishers, have offered the Morrissons, of Washington, lawbooksellers, $10,000 for a large collection of legal anecdotes and facetiæ, collected by them during their long intercourse with the members of the bar.

The Hon. John Olney, County Judge of Greene county, died on Thursday night, 30th ult. He was a prominent lawyer and a nephew of the Hon. J. Olney, late Controller of Connecticut.

Governor Palmer declined to commission Mrs. Myra Bradwell, of Chicago, a Notary Public, for the reason that an official bond would be necessary, and being a married woman, she is legally incapable of giving the bond required.

Hon. Theophilus Parsons has declined to withdraw his resignation as Professor in the Harvard Law School, saying that he has held the office more than twenty years, and that, even if he might hope his services would continue to be welcome for a short time longer, it could only be for a short time.

Chief Justice Dillon rendered his last opinion in the Iowa Supreme Court on the 31st ult., and retired from the State Bench to accept his appointment to a seat in the United States Court. He has served twelve years, six as District Judge, and six years as Supreme Judge, and was re-elected last fall.

Albert R. Hatch, a lawyer of Portsmouth, N. H., has instituted a suit for libel against Stephen S. Scammon for publishing an advertisement charging that several notes collected of him by complainant were forgeries; also against Frank W. Miller and George W. Marsten, publishers of The Chronicle, for publishing said advertisement.

Among the anecdotes on rings and mottoes given on admission, is the following: On the admission to the United States Courts of James Rock (colored), of Boston, the entry in the docket is as follows: "At this term, on motion of the Hon. Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, James Rock, Esquire, an American gentleman of African descent, was called to the degree of sergeant here, and gave rings with the motto "Hic Niger est." The Troy Daily Press says that Hon. Jacob Hardenburgh, State Senator from the Fourteenth District, has drawn up a bill setting forth specifically the provisions of the Judiciary article, and pointing out the way in which they should be carried out. This bill Senator Hardenburgh will introduce into the Senate, and it will probably pass. The Press adds: "It is proper that these recommendations should come from Mr. Hardenburgh, inasmuch as he was the father of the article in the Convention, and it was owing to his advocacy of it that it passed that body."

It has been discovered, from the experiences of the United States Supreme Court Judges, that the judicial circuits as at present organized are unequal in the amount of business which they produce for adjustment by the justices. The Pennsylvania Circuit, for example, furnishes very little business, as at present organized, while others supply more than can be done. The Southern Circuit, in consequence of the large amount of business arising out of the war, brings forward more business than any two other circuits. In view of these facts, a prominent member of the Judiciary Committee of the House will present a bill proposing a re-assignment of States in the circuits, as follows: First Circuit, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine; second, New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey; third, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina; fourth, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; fifth, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Tennessee; sixth, Ohio, Michigan, West Virginia, and Kentucky; seventh, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin; eighth, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas and Missouri; ninth, California, Oregon and Nevada.

TERMS OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE COMING

WEEK.

January 17-Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, at Ballston Spa, Saratoga county, by Justice Potter; Oswego, Justice not assigned; Orleans, by Justice Talcott.

January 18-Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, at Plattsburgh, Clinton county, by Justice James.

THE EDITOR OF THE CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS.-A

correspondent of the New York World gives the following gossipy description of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, editor of the Chicago Legal News:

"I went to the office of Myra Bradwell-'Our Myra,' the lawyers call her. She is the much-esteemed wife of Judge Bradwell, and the editor of the Legal News. I found her after going heavenward some number of flights in the cosiest nest immaginable-pretty, bright room papered with vines and roses, a Brussels carpet on the floor, a rosewood desk of dainty dimensions, a tete-a-tete sofa, an easy chair, a bird in its cage, and all the attributes of true womanhood about her. She is bright and pretty and piquant; kisses you affectionately-if you are a woman, of course-and does not talk strong-minded a bit. 'I need not be a ghoul if I am for woman's rights,' she says pleasantly. She is of medium size, with huge dark curls, hazel eyes, mobile mouth, and an arch look that is very winning, and is probably twenty-eight years old. In this office hung a mirror-not a bit of quicksilver ten inches square to see a pair of whiskers in, but a good-sizable gilt-edge glass. An interior apartment held the Judge's books and papers, and was used as his study. Mrs. Bradwell has passed examination, and is admitted to the bar to practice law. Judge Hammond, the Principal of the Iowa State Law University, wroto her a very pretty letter, in which he compliments her for doing more for woman than any of her co-laborers. Her paper is of great use to lawyers, on account of the reported decisions of the Supreme Court, which it gets in advance of the reports."

The statement that Mrs. Bradwell has been admitted to the bar is slightly inaccurate. She has passed an examination, and filed her application, but the court has not yet rendered a decision in the matter.

BAR WIT.-The New Haven Register says: "A pungent little incident occurred in an argument before the Supreme Court, on Friday last, between Messrs. H. B. Harrison and T. E. Doolittle, Esqs., counsel in the matter of the Derby Railroad injunction. Mr. Harrison was contending that, inasmuch as the Legislature did, only six days before the expiration of the charter, execute important legislation in reference to the completion of the Derby Railroad, it was ridiculous to argue that its charter could be forfeited by the old terms of non-completion at a certain period, or that the Legislature could possibly expect the railroad to be completed in six days. At this point Mr. Doolittle (who was making a sharp fight on the other side) suggested that 'possibly brother Harrison had read of a little incident in sacred history, in which a work of nearly the size and importance of the Derby Railroad was completed in six days? He referred to the creation of the world.' (Responded Mr. Harrison), 'Ah, yes; that is very true; but brother Doolittle omits to mention a very important fact in that connection. He should remember that during the creation Satan was not hanging around with his pockets full of remonstrances and injunctions, impeding and obstructing the work.'"

DIGEST OF AMERICAN DECISIONS.

[To appear in the following State Reports: 23 Wis.; 59 Penn.; 55 Maine; 48 N. H.; also, unreported New York State decisions. Cases marked N. R. are not reported.]

ACTION.

Where C. has obtained and collected a judgment against X. for damages for the taking and conversion of property alleged to belong to C., D. cannot compel C. to pay over the amount to him, on the ground that the property, in fact, belongs to him. Dent v. Catzhausen, 23 Wis.

AMENDMENT.

Of pleading.-An amendment should not be allowed either at or before trial, which entirely changes the cause of action sued upon. Stevens v. Brooks, 23 Wis.

BILLS AND NOTES.

1. Laches in presentment.- Where a sight draft on New York, indorsed to plaintiff in this State, was not mailed to New York to be presented for payment, until after fourteen days, when it was miscarried, and the second of exchange subsequently sent forward was protested, the delay in mailing the first was prima facie evidence of laches. 23 Wis.

2. Secured by mortgage.-The holder of a mortgage may transfer by indorsement one of several promissory notes secured thereby, without passing any interest in the mortgage, where that is the agreement between the parties in such transfer. Rolston v. Brockway, ib.

3. Such agreement may be evidenced by a memorandum upon the mortgage to the effect that the note negotiated has been "paid in full," and proof that such memorandum was made by the mortgagee at the time of the transfer, in presence of the indorsee, and with his knowledge and assent. Ib.

1. When holder of note protected.-One who takes a negotiable note in extinguishment of an antecedent indebtedness is protected as a holder for value. Kellogg v. Fancher, 23 Wis.

2. Bona fide holder.-One who takes, in payment of the individual note of A for his private debt, notes of third parties running to A, but which are in fact the property of a copartnership of which A is a member, is protected as a bona fide holder for value, if he was ignorant of the existence of such copartnership. Ib.

3. Notice of, pending suit affecting.-In case of commercial paper not due, persons not having actual notice are not bound to take notice of any pending suit affecting it. Otherwise, if it is past due. Ib.

COMMON CARRIERS.

Liability for loss of baggage.-Where the plaintiff having bought a ticket and engaged a state room on board of a steamboat, left a small valise in his state room, locked the door, and went away for a few moments, and on returning found his valise gone, held in an action against the owners of the boat to recover the value of the stolen property; that the defendants were liable as common carriers for their passengers' baggage; and though they have the right to make reasonable regulations as to where baggage shall be left, they must bring such regulations to the knowledge of the passenger to become a defense, and that a regulation preventing passengers from retaining with them articles of daily use would not be reasonable. N. Y. Com. P., Gen, T., 1870; Macklin v. The New Jersey Steamboat Company, N. R.

CONTEMPT.

1. Commitment for.-If a party is held in custody for contempt plainly charged in the commitment, he cannot be

discharged for informality in the drawing up of the precept. In a matter of this kind, a court is not bound to strictly lay down the entire form of a commitment in the very words; if the substantial form of the writ is there, this is sufficient. N. Y. Super. Ct. Sp. T., 1869, Leepsiger v. Castelle, N. R.

2. If the commitment is one which the court would have been authorized to make under any circumstance, all judicial matters of regularity are to be presumed. This is the doctrine entertained in The People v. Nevens, 1 Hill The 154; and also in the case in 2 Johnson's Ch. R., 198. only inquiry that can be raised under a habeas corpus, in cases of contempt is, first, the jurisdiction of the tribunal by which the party is committed; second, the form of the commitment. lb.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Invalidity of local statute.-Chapter 569 of the Laws of 1869, "An act in relation to the fees of the sheriff of the city and county of New York, and to the fees of referees in sales in partition cases," being a local bill, and embracing more than one subject, is within the provision of section 16, article 3, of the Constitution, which provides that "no private or local bill, which may be passed by the Legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title;" and the first section thereof is void. Semble, that the whole act is unconstitutional. Sup. Ct. Sp. T. First Dis. 1869; Gaskin v. Anderson, N. R.

1. Conditional limilation.-Deed granting land to husband and wife, their heirs and assigns forever, with a clause stating that it was made to her on condition that if she should not continue to live with him, not having good cause for a divorce, the land should vest in fee in the husband, his heirs and assigns forever. The habendum clause was to the grantees, their heirs and assigns forever; and there was a covenant of warranty. Held, that there was a valid conditional limitation of the wife's estate. Smith v. Smith, 23 Wis.

2. Cloud upon tille.-After the wife ceased to live with the husband, not having any ground of divorce, the deed, so far as it related to the wife, constituted such a cloud upon his title, that equity will cancel it at his suit; and this, notwithstanding he has obtained a decree of divorce from her for willful desertion. Ib.

EXECUTORY CONTRACT.

To make and deliver goods.-In the case of an executory contract to make and deliver goods, the vendee may receive the goods and retain them long enough to give them a fair examination; and if they prove defective, may retain them, and recover any sum paid thereon, with interest. Woodle v. Whitney, 23 Wis.

EVIDENCE.

1. Parol evidence to contradict village plat.-Where land is marked on a village plat as "reserved for the proprietors," parol evidence is not admissible (in a suit by one succeeding to their title against the owner of an adjoining lot, for an alleged trespass), to show that it was reserved for the use of adjoining lot owners. The plaintiff in such action would not be bound by any statements as to the intended use of such reservation, made by such proprietors to persons purchasing of them such adjoining lots-no dedication to the public use being claimed. Orton v. Henry, 23 Wis.

2. Opinion of witness.—In an action for mason work upon a wall, where the defense was based on the alleged unskillful construction of the wall, a question put on the examination in chief of a witness for defendant (not an expert), "What was the condition of the wall at the time you examined it?" held, not to call for witness's opinion as to the character of the work, but to be admissible. 23 Wis.

3. On sale of goods.-Defendant's brothers, in New York city, wished to purchase goods of plaintiff there on credit, and proposed to give their note at four months with defendant's indorsement; and plaintiff agreed to these terms. Defendant, however, applied to plaintiff to change the arrangement, stating that he did not wish to indorse his brothers' note, because all his dealings were in cash, and proposing that plaintiff should deliver the goods to his brothers and take their note, and that he would call and pay the amount in cash, less the usual cash discount, and would take the note himself, but stating that he did not wish his brothers to know of the arrangement. Plaintiff assented, and delivered the goods to defendant's brothers, and took their note, made payable to their own order, and indorsed by them, the note being so drawn in order that it might be delivered to defendant without plaintiff's indorsement. An entry was made in the sales book as of a sale to defendant's brothers, showing the articles sold, with weights and prices, but not showing any charge against said brothers. Defendant did not call and pay the cash, and plaintiff's clerk wrote a note addressed to him at his brothers' place of business, requesting him to call "and indorse the note," making the request in that form, so that if the letter fell into the hands of defendant's brothers, they would not be informed of the new arrangement. Plaintiff afterward requested defendant either to pay the cash or indorse the note; and, subsequently, having notified defendant that he looked to him for payment, and requested him to remit, and he having neglected to do so, and requested plaintiff to call upon his brothers for payment, plaintiff presented the note to said brothers at maturity, and (payment not being made) notified defendant that it was not paid. Held, that, upon evidence tending to establish these facts, it was for the jury to determine whether the goods were not sold on defendant's credit; and it was error to nonsuit the plaintiff. Oothavt V. Leahy, 23 Wis.

4. In an action upon a note. In such action, under a counterclaim for money had and received, defendant cannot prove payment of usurious interest and have the same allowed, without having alleged specifically the facts showing usury. Martin v. Pugh, 23 Wis.

1. In pais.-In an action to compel defendant to account to plaintiffs for money subscribed and paid by them, and which he, as their agent, was to invest in lands to be owned by the subscribers as a company, the defendant is not estopped from denying that he has received the whole amount of said subscriptions, by the fact that in a report made to the subscribers he stated that he had received the whole; no one of them having advanced any money or changed his position in consequence of such statement. Collins v. Case, 23 Wis.

2. As to boundary line. — To estop A from denying a boundary line orally agreed upon between him and B, it is not necessary that he should have intentionally made false statements to B, by which the latter was induced to put

In actions for trespass.—To authorize an injunction under section 219 of the Code, the complaint must show the plaintiff entitled to an injunction as ultimate relief; and that a present preliminary injunction is necessary to avert intermediate injury. The injury alleged is a mere trespass, and a mere trespass is insufficient to authorize an injunction. "The principle of injunctive relief against a tort is, that whenever damage is caused or threatened to property, admitted or legally adjudged to be the plaintiff's by an act of the defendant admitted or legally adjudged to be an evil wrong, and such damage is not adequately remediable at law, an injunction may issue against the commission or continuance of the wrong." Thus three conditions are essential to injunctive relief against trespass: First, admission or adjudication of plaintiff's right; second, admission or adjudication of the defendant's wrong; and third, inadequacy of a remedy at law. If the trespass amount to an actual ouster, it is remediable by ejectment; if it fall short of ouster, then by trespass; and in neither of these cases will an injunction lie (Thomas v. Oakley, 18 Vesey, 184). There must be some special equity in the case, so as to bring the injunction under the head of quieting possession, or preventing irreparable injury, or inadequacy of compensation in damages (Livingston v. Livingston, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 497). That an injunction will not issue when the injury is remediable by damages, see Marshall v. Peters (12 How. 218); and it well establishes that it will not issue to restrain an apprehended trespass (Mayor of New York v. Conover, 5 Abb). N. Y. Superior Court, Ep. T., 1869, Gentel v. Arnaud, N. R.

JUDICIAL POWER.

Consultation of judges. —At the common law, as well as by the statute, where a power, authority, or duty is confided to three or more persons or officers, and which may be performed by a majority of such persons or officers, all must meet and confer, unless special provision is otherwise made. The rule of the common law was applied only to persons or officers having a public duty to perform; in matters of a private nature, it required the whole body to be unanimous.