C. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has no jurisdiction in
error over a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New
Mexico in a case not in admiralty, nor arising under the criminal,
revenue, or patent laws of the United States, nor between aliens and
citizens of the United States or between citizens of different States.
Aztec Mining Co. v. Ripley, 79.
D. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. When the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court has fully attached against the
tenant in possession in an action of ejectment, the substitution of the
landlord as defendant will in no way affect that jurisdiction, although
he may be a citizen of the same State with the plaintiff. Hardenberg
v. Ray, 112.
2. A domestic corporation, incorporated under the laws of Texas, a State
divided into more than one Federal district is, under the State law
and the Federal laws as to the bringing of suits and actions in Federal
courts, a citizen and inhabitant of that district in the State within
which the general business of the corporation is done, and where it
has its headquarters and general offices. Galveston, Harrisburg and
San Antonio Railway Co. v. Gonzales, 496.
3. A railway company, incorporated under the laws of Texas, in which
there is more than one Federal district, and having its headquarters
and principal offices in one of those districts, is an inhabitant of that
district, and cannot be said to be an inhabitant of the other Federal
district in the State, although it operates its line of railroad through
it, and maintains freight and ticket offices and stations in it. Ib.
4. If an alien desires to commence an action or bring a suit against a citi-
zen of the United States, he must resort to the domicil of the defend-
ant in order to bring it. Ib.
5. In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, distinguished from this case. lb.
6. Southern Pacific Company v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, and Mexican Central
Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, followed in holding that a statute
of a State which makes an appearance in behalf of a defendant, al-
though in terms limited to the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court, a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction by reason of non-
residence, is not applicable, under Rev. Stat. § 914, to actions in a
Circuit Court of the United States held within the State. Ib.
7. Under the act of March 3, 1885, c. 341, 23 Stat. 362, the Federal court
in Wisconsin has jurisdiction to try an Indian charged with murder-
ing another Indian within the limits of section 16 in a township in
that State which is embraced within and forms part of the La Court
Oreilles reservation for the Chippewa Indians. United States v. Thomas,
577.
8. A Chippewa Indian being indicted in the District Court of the United
States for the Western District of Wisconsin for the murder of another
Indian on the Chippewa reservation, it appeared at the trial that the
offence took place in township 16, one of the townships set apart for
the State as a school reservation. The defendant being found guilty,
a motion was made for a new trial. This motion was heard before
the District Judge and the Circuit Judge. They differed in opinion
on the question of jurisdiction and certified the question here. With
it they sent up a transcript of the whole record. Held, (1) That it
was irregular to send the entire record with a certificate of division in
opinion, and that, generally, there could be no such certificate on a
motion for a new trial; but that under the circumstances, this court
would consider the question certified; (2) That the trial court had
jurisdiction, and the motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial must be denied.
See CORPORATION, 2, 3, 4;
COURT AND JURY, 5;
CRIMINAL LAW, 18.
E. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.
See RECEIVER.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 12, 14, 15.
LEGISLATURE.
See EQUITY, 1;
JURISDICTION, A.
1. In Massachusetts, where an action in tort, grounded on fraud of the
defendant, is commenced more than six years after the cause of action
arose, and the general statute of limitations applicable to actions sound-
ing in tort is set up, if the fraud is not secret in its nature, and such
as cannot readily be ascertained, it is necessary to show some positive
act of concealment by the defendant to take the case out of the opera-
tion of that statute; and the mere silence of the defendant, or his
failure to inform the plaintiff of his cause of action, does not so operate.
Bates v. Preble, 149.
2. A claim against the United States whose prosecution in the Court of
Claims was barred by the statute of limitations, was presented to the
Treasury for adjustment and payment. The Secretary of the Treasury
transmitted it to the Court of Claims under the provisions of Rev. Stat.
§ 1063. Held, that it was barred by the statute of limitations. De Arnaud
v. United States, 483.
1. A judgment being filed for record and recorded as required by the
statutes of Colorado, a lien attaches at once upon the real estate of
the judgment debtor. Gottlieb v. Thatcher, 271.
2. The proviso in the Colorado statutes concerning liens, suspending the
running of the statute when issue of execution is restrained by injunc-
tion, applies to a suspension of issue by supersedeas on appeal. Ib.
3. The New Mexico statute of limitations as to real actions, Comp. Laws
New Mexico, 1884, § 1881, operate when the period of limitation has
expired, if set up and maintained, by the defendant in an action of
ejectment, to extinguish the right of the plaintiff, and to vest a com-
plete title in the defendant. Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, 586.
4. It is unnecessary to decide whether under the civil law, as in force in
New Mexico in 1868, a written instrument was not necessary for the
transfer of real estate, (about which quære,) as, if such a provision
had previously existed, it had been supplanted at that time by terri-
torial enactments.
5. Under the most liberal construction of the civil law, a transfer of title to
real estate could not be effected without identification of the land, de-
limitation of the boundaries, and delivery of possession, all of which
were wanting in this case. lb.
Alabama.
California.
Connecticut.
Georgia.
Kentucky.
Massachusetts.
Mississippi.
New Mexico.
Oregon.
Rhode Island.
South Dakota.
See MASTER IN CHANCERY, 5.
See JURISDICTION, B, 14.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 10.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 1.
See TAX, 2.
See LOCAL LAW, 4.
See WILL.
See MARRIED WOMAN.
See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 3, 4.
See CORPORATION, 6.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 5, 6;
JURISDICTION, B, 16.
West Virginia. See ACTION, 2.
1. Under the act of March 3, 1883, c. 97, 22 Stat. 473, an officer in the
Navy, who resigns one office the day before his appointment to a
higher one, is only entitled to longevity pay as of the lowest grade,
having graduated pay, held by him since he originally entered the
service. United States v. Alger, 362.
2. In a suit in the Court of Claims for longevity pay, alleged by the
claimant, and denied by the United States, to be due him, after
deducting all just credits and offsets," a sum previously paid him for
longevity pay to which he was not entitled may be deducted from the
sum found to be due him. United States v. Stahl, 366.
3. A post chaplain in the Army of the United States, commissioned by the
President under the act of March 2, 1867, c. 145, § 7, is entitled, in
computing his longevity pay under the act of July 15, 1870, c. 294.
§ 24, (Rev. Stat. § 1262,) to be credited with his service as a chaplain.
employed by the officers composing the council of administration, at a
military post approved by the Secretary of War, under the act of July 5,
1838, c. 162, § 18, and the acts supplementary thereto. United States
v. La Tourette, 572.
In Rhode Island a married woman holds the real and personal estate,
owned by her at the time of her marriage, to her sole and separate use
after marriage, and may permit her husband to manage it without
affecting that use; and if the husband, without her knowledge and
consent, invests a part of her property in real estate, taking title in
his own name, and, on this coming to her knowledge after a lapse of
time, she requires it to be conveyed to her, and such conveyance is
made after a further lapse of time, the husband being at the time of
the conveyance insolvent, her equities in the estate may be regarded
as superior to those of the husband's creditors, if it does not further
appear that the creditors were induced to regard him as the owner of
it, by reason of representations to that effect, either by him or by her.
Garner v. Second Nat. Bank of Providence, 420.
1. Exceptions to the report of a master should point out specifically the
errors upon which the party relies, not only that the opposite party
may be apprised of what he has to meet, but that the master may
know in what particular his report is objectionable, and may have an
opportunity to correct his errors or reconsider his opinions. Sheffield
& Birmingham Coal, Iron & Railway Co. v. Gordon, 285.
2. The main object of a reference to a master being to lighten the court's
labors, the court ought not to be obliged to rehear the whole case on
the evidence, when the report is made. Ib.
3. If the report of a master is clearly erroneous in any particular, it is
within the discretion of the court to correct that error. Ib.
4. In the absence of a certificate by a master that the entire evidence
taken by him was sent up with his report, it is impossible to impeach
his conclusions upon it. Ib.
5. The proceedings in this case were taken within the time required by
the statutes of Alabama. Ib.
Under the statutes of the United States, a ledge containing gold-bearing
rock, which has formerly been profitably worked for mining purposes,
but all work upon which has been abandoned, and which, at the date
of a town-site patent of the land within which it lies, is not known to
be valuable for mining purposes, is not excepted from the operation
of the town-site patent, although, after the town-site patent has taken
effect, the land is found to be still valuable for mining purposes.
Dower v. Richards, 658.
MUNICIPAL BOND.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.
NAVY, OFFICERS OF.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES;
LONGEVITY PAY.
The station of a railway near a large town contained platforms and other
accommodations on each side of the tracks, with a double track
between them on which many trains were moving both day and night.
There was an underground connection between the two by means of
a public street, which was in a bad condition. It was a rule of the
company that "when a train is standing on a double track for pas-
sengers, trains from the opposite direction will come to a stop with
the engines opposite to each other." A passenger who was in the
habit of travelling on the road and of stopping at this station arrived
there in the rear car, in which a notice was posted, that passengers
leaving the car by the forward end should turn to the right, and that
those leaving by the rear should turn to the left, in each case landing
the passenger on the platform, "and thus avoid danger from trains
on the opposite track." The passenger passed out at the forward end,
where he found the collector, gave up his ticket, and passed out at
the left, on the track, with the knowledge of the collector, and with-
out any objection on his part. In crossing he was struck by an
engine coming from an opposite direction, which had not observed
the rule to stop. He brought suit to recover damages for the injuries
which he had suffered. The company set up the defence of contribu-
tory negligence. Plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, testified
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