A railroad company agreed with a cotton compress company that the
latter should receive and compress all the cotton which the railroad
might have to transport in compressed condition, and that it should
insure the same for the benefit of the railroad company, or of the
owners of the cotton, for a certain compensation which the railroad
company agreed to pay weekly. It was further agreed that the com-
press company, on receiving the cotton, was to give receipts therefor,
and that the railroad company, on receiving such a receipt, was to
issue a bill of lading in exchange for it. Cotton of the value of
$700,000, thus deposited with the compress company for compress
and transportation, was destroyed by fire. That company had taken
out policies of insurance upon it, but to a less amount, in all of which
the compress company was named as the assured, but in the body of
each policy it was stated that it was issued for the benefit of the rail-
road company or of the owners. The various owners of the cotton
further insured their respective interests in other insurance companies,
called in the litigation the marine insurance companies. After the
fire the amounts of the several losses were paid to the assured by the
several marine companies. In an action in the courts of Tennessee to
settle the rights of the parties, the Supreme Court of that State held,
(89 Tennessee, 1; 90 Tennessee, 306,) that the companies so paying
were entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the owners or consignees
against the railroad company under its bills of lading, and that the
railroad company was entitled to have the insurance which had been
taken out by the compress company collected for its benefit. The
railroad company not being party to those suits, the marine insur-
ance companies filed their bill in equity in a state court in Tennessee
against the compress company, the several persons who had insured
the destroyed cotton for it, and the railroad company, to reach and
subject the fire insurance taken out by the compress company for the
benefit of the railroad company, and for other relief set forth in the
bill. The plaintiffs in the suit were, a corporation under the laws of
Pennsylvania, a corporation under the laws of New York, and a cor-
poration under the laws of Rhode Island, on behalf of themselves and
of all other companies standing in like position. On the other side
were two corporations under the laws of Pennsylvania, two corpora-
tions under the laws of Great Britain, a corporation under the laws
of New York, certain residents of Rhode Island, certain citizens of
New York, certain citizens of Tennessee, two aliens, and forty-four
insurance companies of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Alabama, Connecticut, Ohio, Texas, Indi-
ana, and Great Britain. The defendants petitioned for the removal
of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States, on the ground
that the controversy was wholly between citizens of different States,
or between citizens of one or more of the several States and foreign
citizens and subjects, and that the same could be fully determined as
between them. The petition was denied and the cause proceeded to
judgment in the state court. In the course of the trial it was attempted
to be proved that special rates, rebates or drawbacks had been given
in violation of the interstate commerce laws and regulations. A decree
being entered for the plaintiffs, giving relief substantially as prayed
for in the bill, the Supreme Court of the State, on appeal, affirmed the
judgment below, and held that the law making agreements for rebates,
etc., void, did not invalidate the contracts of affreightment. A writ
of error being sued out to this court, it is now held, (1) That whether
the cause be looked at as a whole, or whether it be considered under
any adjustment or arrangement of the parties on opposite sides of the
matter in dispute, there was no right of removal, on the part of the
several plaintiffs in error, or either of them; (2) That there is noth-
ing in the interstate commerce law which vitiates bills of lading, or
which, by reason of an allowance of rebates, if actually made, would
invalidate a contract of affreightment, or exempt a railroad company
from liability on its bills of lading. Merchants' Cotton Press Co. v.
Ins. Co. of North America, 368.
A verdict being returned for plaintiff for $11,000, on suggestion of the
court a remittitur of $6001 was entered. As recorded, the terms of
the judgment were: "It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged by the
court that the plaintiff, Henry Horn, do have and recover of the de-
fendant, the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, the sum of eleven
thousand dollars and all costs in this behalf expended. And it appear-
ing to the court that on this day the plaintiff filed, in writing, a
remitter of $6000.00: It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged by the
court that execution issue for the sum of $4999.00 only, and all costs
herein." The order of allowance of the writ of error declared that the
judgment was rendered for $4999, and the bond and citation so de-
scribed it. Held, that, upon the entire record, the judgment must be
held to be for no larger sum than $1999. Texas & Pacific Railway
Co. v. Horn, 110.
JURISDICTION.
A. GENERALLY.
When an act of the legislature is challenged in a court, the inquiry by the
court is limited to the question of power, and does not extend to the
matter of expediency, to the motives of the legislators, or to the reasons
which were spread before them to induce the passage of the act; and,
on the other hand, as the courts will not interfere with the action of
the legislature, so it may be presumed that the legislature never
intends to interfere with the action of the courts, or to assume judicial
Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
B. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. This court has jurisdiction to review decrees or judgments of the
Supreme Courts of the Territories except in cases which may be taken
to the Circuit Courts of Appeals, or where the matter in dispute, ex,
clusive of costs, does not exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.
Aztec Mining Co. v. Ripley, 79.
2. Congress intended to confer upon this court jurisdiction to pass upon
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in cases involving the
question of the finality of its judgment under section six of the act of
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517. Ib.
3. This writ of error is dismissed because the judgment does not exceed
the sum of $5000, exclusive of costs, and the jurisdiction of the court
below was not involved within the meaning of the act of February 25,
1889, 25 Stat. 693, c. 236, empowering this court to review the judg-
ments of Circuit Courts when such is the fact. Texas & Pacific Rail-
way Co. v. Saunders, 105.
4. A final decree was entered January 7, 1891, and appeal allowed the
same day. A motion for rehearing was made January 10, 1891, which
was argued February 3, 1892, and denied February 17, 1892. An
appeal bond was given April 15, 1892, conditioned for the prosecution
of the appeal taken January 7, 1891, and the record was filed here
April 19, 1892. Held, that, under the provisions of the act of March 3,
1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, the Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdic-
tion of this appeal, and, upon the denial of the petition for a rehearing,
a new appeal should have been taken to that court for the Eighth
Circuit. Voorhees v. John T. Noye Manufacturing Co., 135.
5. A public act of the State of Maryland providing for the condemnation
of land for the use of a railroad company, was held by the Court of
Appeals of that State to require notice to the owner of the land pro-
posed to be condemned, when properly construed. Held, that this
court had no jurisdiction over a writ of error to a court of that State,
when the only error alleged was the want of such notice, which, it was
charged, invalidated the proceedings as repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States. Baltimore Traction Co. v. Baltimore Belt Rail-
road Co., 137.
6. Rulings objected to at the trial, but not stated in the bill of exceptions
to have been excepted to, are not subject to review on error. Tucker
v. United States, 164.
7. At October term, 1892, an order was made appointing commissioners
"to locate and mark the state line between the States of Iowa and
Illinois, pursuant to the opinion of this court in this cause," reported
in 147 U. S. 1. At the same term the commissioners filed a report of
their doings, which was ordered to be confirmed, and it was further
ordered "that said commissioners proceed to determine and mark the
boundary line between said States throughout its extent, and report
thereon to this court, with all convenient speed." At the present
term the State of Illinois moved to set aside the order of confirmation.
The State of Iowa resisted on the ground, among others, that the
decree of confirmation was a final decree, which could not be set
aside at a term subsequent to that at which it was entered. Held,
that the confirmation of the report was not a final decree deciding
and disposing of the whole merits of the cause, and discharging the
parties from further attendance; that the court could not dispose of
the case by piecemeal; and that until the boundary line throughout
its extent is determined, all orders in the case will be interlocutory.
Iowa v. Illinois, 238.
8. In the exercise of original jurisdiction in the determination of the
boundary line between sovereign States, this court proceeds only upon
the utmost circumspection and deliberation, and no order can stand
in respect of which full opportunity to be heard has not been afforded.
lb.
9. Under the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827,
when an appeal or writ of error is taken from a District Court or a
Circuit Court in which the jurisdiction of the court alone is in issue,
a certificate from the court below of the question of jurisdiction to be
decided is an absolute prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction
here; and, if it be wanting, this court cannot take jurisdiction. May-
nard v. Hecht, 324.
10. Following Maynard v. Hecht, ante, 324, this case is dismissed for want
of jurisdiction. Moran v. Hagerman, 329.
11. This case is dismissed on the authority of Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher
Mfg. Co., 145 U. S. 608, (and other cases named in the opinion,) in
which it was held that a judgment of the highest court of a State,
overruling a demurrer, and remanding the case to the trial court for
further proceedings, is not a final judgment. Werner v. Charleston,
12. Two parties claiming title to the same land in California, each under
a Mexican grant made prior to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and
each under a patent from the United States, one of them filed a bill
in equity against the other in a District Court in San Francisco to
quiet title. The cause was transferred to the Superior Court for that
city and county, and being heard there, it was decreed that the
defendant's title was procured by fraud, and the relief sought for was
granted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the judgment
was affirmed, the court saying that the question of the genuineness of
each original grant was a legitimate subject of inquiry, when the issue
was made by the pleadings, and that on the evidence in the case the
finding against the genuineness of the defendant's grant would not
be disturbed on appeal. Held, that this ruling presented no Federal
question for the consideration of this court. California Powder Works
v. Davis, 389.
13. What is necessary to give this court jurisdiction on writ of error to
the highest court of a State again stated. Ib.
14. This court does not deem it necessary to examine the question raised
under the practice in California, allowing separate appeals to lie
from a judgment and from an order granting or refusing a new trial.
Ib.
15. This court cannot take notice of an assignment of error that the dam-
ages found by the jury were excessive and given under the influence
of passion and prejudice. An error in that respect is to be redressed
by a motion for a new trial. Lincoln v. Power, 436.
16. Under the statutes of the Territory of Utah relating to the distribu-
tion of the personal property of a deceased person among those
entitled to share in the distribution, the claims of the distributees
are several, and not joint; and when the claims of each are less than
the amount necessary to give this court jurisdiction, two or more can-
not be joined, in order to raise the sum in dispute to the jurisdictional
amount. Chapman v. Handley, 443.
17. When the Supreme Court of a Territory, in a suit in the nature of an
equity suit, determines that the findings of the trial court were justi-
fied by the evidence, this court is limited to the inquiry whether the
decree can be sustained on those findings, and cannot enter into a
consideration of the evidence. Mammoth Mining Co. v. Salt Lake
Foundry and Machine Co., 447.
18. The admission of evidence, under exceptions, complained of did not
constitute reversible error. lb.
19. This court has jurisdiction over a decision of a state court that a
statute of the State, compelling the removal of grade crossings on a
railroad is constitutional, and a judgment in accordance therewith
enforcing the provisions of the statute. New York and New England
Railroad Co. v. Bristol, 556.
20. Where in an action on a contract a counter-claim to the amount of
$10,000 is interposed by the defendant, and judgment is given for
plaintiff for less than $5000, this court has jurisdiction to review that
judgment when brought here by defendant below. Buckstaff v. Rus-
sell, 626.
21. This court, upon a writ of error to the highest court of a State in an
action at law, cannot review its judgment upon a question of fact.
Dower v. Richards, 658.
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