Statement of the Case. "In the Circuit Court of the United States, Northern District of Florida. "Edward H. Lewis vs. Geo. C. Wilson et al. Libel. Damages, $100,000. "Comes now the plaintiff, by H. Bisbee, his attorney, and moves the court for a judgment on the verdict of the jury in the case, rendered on the 9th day of April, A.D. 1888, nunc pro tunc as of the date when it should have been rendered, according to law and the practice of this court, on the following grounds: "1st. Because said verdict was and is a legal verdict, duly rendered, and has not been set aside or modified by the court, nor in pursuance of any act or order of the court, or any judge thereof acting within its or his jurisdiction. "2d. That all proceedings in this suit had and entered on the files of the court, its minutes, dockets, and records, of the date of said verdict are null and void for want of jurisdiction of the court. "3d. Because the defendants could not make the motion for a new trial, which they did make on the 16th day of April, A.D. 1888, on the ground that the laws of the State of Florida prohibited defendants from making a motion for a new trial after the expiration of four days from the date of the verdict rendered on the 9th day of April, A.D. 1888, and any action had on such motion was not within the jurisdiction of the court. "4th. Because plaintiff cannot apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the court to enter judgment upon a verdict until a motion for such judgment has been refused, nor can defendant take a writ of error until a judg ment on the verdict is entered up. "If the court enter judgment nunc pro tunc on the verdict for $10,000, plaintiff hereby offers and hereby binds himself to credit upon said judgment the sum of $5000, paid by defendants on plaintiff's claim, April 27th, a.d. 1888. "Nov. 29, 1889. H. BISBEE, Att'y for Plaintiff. "To Messrs. A. W. Cockrell & Son, of counsel for defendants." Opinion of the Court. This motion was overruled after argument of counsel, and exceptions taken. Thereupon the record was removed into this court by a writ of error, the writ being signed April 23, 1890, just two years after the date of the judgment. Mr. H. Bisbee for plaintiff in error. Mr. Wilkinson Call for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. This is a most extraordinary case. Nearly two years after a judgment has been formally entered, and after the plaintiff has received payment and acknowledged full satisfaction, he comes in and moves the court to enter a new judgment in double the amount, and on the denial of such motion brings the matter here on error. His contention is that, under the practice in Florida, the court had no power to grant a new trial upon a motion made more than four days after a verdict; that the recital of all that the court said from the bench, as to the amount of damages, and its purpose to grant a new trial unless the plaintiff consented to a reduction, must be disregarded as not properly matter for entry on the journal and not brought into the record by any bill of exceptions, and so a mere memorandum made by the clerk, without any significance in the case, Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354; that no consent to a reduction of the verdict, signed by the plaintiff or his counsel, appears on the record, and that the statement by the clerk is insufficient evidence of the fact. Therefore, the court had no power to enter a judgment for $5000; and the receipt of full satisfaction thereof was only a receipt of half of the amount legally due, and does not prevent the plaintiff from proceeding to recover the other half. It is unnecessary to express any opinion as to the right of a party to file a motion for a new trial more than four days after the verdict; nor to decide whether the court can or cannot in the absence of any motion, of its own volition whenever it sees that a grievous wrong has been done by a Opinion of the Court. verdict, set it aside. For there is nothing which prevents a party having a verdict from consenting to its reduction; and if he does so, though only for the sake of obtaining immediate satisfaction of his claim and to avoid further delay and further litigation, he may not, after the entry of judgment based thereon, the receipt of payment, and an acknowledgment of satisfaction, repudiate the whole transaction, and obtain a judgment for the full amount of the verdict, on the ground that under the law the court had no power to disturb the verdict. A man may continue litigation and stand on his rights, or he may waive some of his rights for the sake of terminating litigation; and when advised that a new trial will be granted, unless he consents to a reduction of the verdict, he may, although knowing that the court has no power to grant such new trial, and that if it be done an appellate court will correct the error, consent to a reduction and let judgment be entered for the amount of the verdict thus reduced. And if he does so, he is concluded by his action in that respect. Here not only was there a consent on his part to a reduction, but also what amounted to a waiver of errors by the defendants, and a promise to pay the amount of the judgment. There was full consideration for the agreement, and judgment was entered in accordance therewith. Thereafter he received payment and acknowledged full satisfaction. The litigation is at an end by his consent, and he cannot reopen it. There is no force in the contention of the plaintiff that no written consent to the reduction of the verdict, signed by himself or attorney, was filed in the case. None was necessary. A party may in open court consent to such reduction, and the noting of his consent by the clerk in the journal entry of the judgment is sufficient evidence thereof, and cannot be questioned. The judgment will be Affirmed. Statement of the Case. NEW YORK AND NEW ENGLAND RAILROAD COMPANY v. BRISTOL. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. No. 917. Submitted January 8, 1894. — Decided February 5, 1894. This court has jurisdiction over a decision of a state court that a statute of the State, compelling the removal of grade crossings on a railroad is constitutional, and a judgment in accordance therewith enforcing the provisions of the statute. The act of the legislature of the State of Connecticut relating to railway grade crossings, (Act of June 19, 1889, c. 220, Laws 1889, 134,) being directed to the extinction of grade crossings as a menace to public safety, is a proper exercise of the police power of the State. A power reserved by a statute of a State to its legislature, to alter, amend, or repeal a charter of a railroad corporation, authorizes the legislature to make any alteration or amendment of a charter granted subject to that power, which will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant or any rights vested under it. Railroad corporations are subject to such legislative control as may be necessary to protect the public against danger, injustice or oppression; and this control may be exercised through a board of commissioners. There is no unjust discrimination, and no denial of the equal protection of the laws, in regulations regarding railroads, which are applicable to all railroads alike. The imposition upon a railroad corporation of the entire expense of a change of grade at a highway crossing does no violation to the Constitution of the United States, if the statute imposing it provides for an ascertainment of the result in a mode suited to the nature of the case. By section one of the act of the legislature of Connecticut of June 19, 1889, c. 220, entitled "An act relating to Grade Crossings," (Pub. Laws Conn. 1889, p. 134,) it was provided: "The selectmen of any town, the mayor and common council of any city, the warden and burgesses of any borough within which a highway crosses or is crossed by a railroad, or the directors of any railroad company whose road crosses or is crossed by a highway, may bring their petition in writing to the railroad commissioners, therein alleging that public safety requires an alteration in such crossing, its approaches, the Statement of the Case. method of crossing, the location of the highway or crossing, the closing of a highway crossing and the substitution of another therefor, not at grade, or the removal of obstructions to the sight of such crossing, and praying that the same may be ordered; whereupon the railroad commissioners shall appoint a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall give such notice thereof as they judge reasonable to said petitioner, the railroad company, the municipalities in which such crossing is situated, and to the owners of the land adjoining such crossing and adjoining that part of the highway to be changed in grade; and after such notice and hearing, said commissioners shall determine what alterations, changes, or removals, if any, shall be made and by whom done; and if the aforesaid petition is brought by the directors of any railroad company, or in behalf of any railroad company, they shall order the expense of such alterations or removals, including the damages to any person whose land is taken, and the special damages which the owner of any land adjoining the public highway shall sustain by reason of any change in the grade of such highway, in consequence of any change, alteration, or removal ordered under the authority of this act, to be paid by the railroad company owning or operating the railroad in whose behalf the petition is brought; and in case said petition is brought by the selectmen of any town, the mayor and common council of any city, or the warden and burgesses of any borough, they may, if the highway affected by said determination was in existence when the railroad was constructed over it at grade, or if the layout of the highway was changed for the benefit of the railroad after the layout of the railroad, order an amount not exceeding one-quarter of the whole expense of such alteration, change, or removal, including the damages, as aforesaid, to be paid by the town, city, or borough in whose behalf the petition is brought, and the remainder of the expense shall be paid by the railroad company owning or operating the road which crosses such public highway; if, however, the highway affected by such order, last mentioned, has been constructed since the railroad which it crosses at grade, the railroad commissioners may order an amount not exceeding one-half of the whole |