Opinion of the Court.

The general equity jurisdiction of the Circuit Court no doubt embraced the authority to hold possession of the property and to determine the rights of all persons who were parties, or who made themselves parties to the proceedings before it; and if the property sequestrated had gone to sale and a fund been realized for distribution, then, upon notice appropriate to proceedings in rem, the defendant in error might have been bound by the disposition thereupon made; yet, not only was there no proof that the notice required by the order was ever given, or any other notice, but the receiver was discharged, his bond cancelled, and the property surrendered, without sale or transfer, so that it is in effect sought to have defendant in error held personally bound by an order to which he was not a party, entered by a court into which he was not brought in any manner. It is impossible to concede that he was in contempt in the recovery of his judg ment or would be in enforcing it against the company's property; but that is the necessary result of the position taken by counsel.

Certainly the preservation of general equity jurisdiction over suits instituted against receivers without leave does not, in promotion of the ends of justice, make it competent for the appointing court to determine the rights of persons who are not before it or subject to its jurisdiction; and the right to sue without resorting to the appointing court, which involves the right to obtain judgment, cannot be assumed to have been rendered practically valueless by this further provision in the same section of the statute which granted it.

The order was not a decree in rem condemning the particular thing seized, but an order providing for the resumption of possession thereafter, if found necessary, to the end that such a decree might then be granted; and we are aware of no principle which would justify us in holding that a court, under the circumstances which existed here, could part with its jurisdiction over property by the complete surrender thereof to its owner, and at the same time constructively retain jurisdiction over such property so as in that respect to bind those who would otherwise be unaffected by its orders.

Opinion of the Court.

The case was not one of a fund in court, and the authorities upon the question of limitation of time for the presentation of claims to share in the distribution of such a fund are not in point. It was not a case of purchase in which compliance with stipulated conditions forms part of the consideration, and the extent of the burdens assumed is defined. It did not present the question of the power of the court in the instance of a sale to deliver the property free from any liabilities whatever incurred in administration. And we do not think the Circuit Court attempted to accomplish the result contended for, or that its order is open to the interpretation put upon it by counsel for the company.

The receiver was about to be discharged and the property redelivered to the company. On the one hand, the receiver was entitled to protection from liability, and on the other, just claims were entitled to be paid. The Circuit Court sought to secure both objects by the terms of the order and the conditions annexed to the acceptance of possession, but did not regard itself as constrained to indefinitely prolong the pendency of the equity proceedings for that purpose. It reserved those proceedings, therefore, for the disposition of pending interventions and such as might be filed within a time fixed, at the expiration of which the court could not be called on to allow further claims and assert control over the property for their satisfaction. They would thereafter be barred from prosecution under those proceedings.

In this way the Circuit Court recognized and relieved itself from the obligation to see that no injustice resulted from the action it was taking, which action operated to withdraw from claimants against the receiver the security of his bond and possibly of the property. But after February 1, 1889, those who had not intervened would cease to be entitled to resort to the Circuit Court in the equity suits, and would be remitted to such other remedies as might be within their reach. If the recovery of defendant in error and the collection of his judg ment had been dependent upon the order or upon any action of the Circuit Court in his favor in the original suits, a different question would have been presented, but as the matter

Syllabus.

stands we perceive no aspect in which that order can be treated as operating in limitation of the rights of defendant in error except in the particular of resort to the Circuit Court as above indicated.

From these considerations we conclude that there was no error in the result arrived at by the Supreme Court of Texas in the disposition of Federal questions, and its judgment is accordingly Affirmed.

TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY 2. GRIFFIN. TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY v. OVERHEISER. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Texas. Nos. 136 and 137. Argued with No. 138, ante, . 81. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER: These cases are reported in 76 Texas, 437, 441, and involve here the same questions as those in the case above decided.

The judgments are, severally,

Affirmed.

Mr. John F. Dillon, (with whom was Mr. Winslow S. Pierce on the brief,) for plaintiff in error.

Mr. H. J. May, (with whom was Mr. C. A. Culberson and Mr. A. H: Garland on the brief,) for defendants in error.

TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY V.

SAUNDERS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

This writ of error is dismissed because the judgment does not exceed the sum of $5000, exclusive of costs, and the jurisdiction of the court below was not involved within the meaning of the act of February 25, 1889, 25 Stat. 693, c. 236, empowering this court to review the judgments of Circuit Courts when such is the fact.

An objection that an action is brought in the wrong district cannot be raised after the defendant has pleaded in bar.

Statement of the Case.

THIS was an action brought by Henry Saunders, June 4, 1888, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas against John C. Brown, the receiver of the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, to recover damages for injuries sustained by Saunders through the negligence of the receiver, his agents, and employés, as he alleged. On February 6, 1889, plaintiff below filed an amended petition making the railway company a party defendant, and alleging the discharge of the receiver and the surrender of its property to the company, without sale, improved by the expenditure of some millions of dollars in betterments paid for out of, and augmented by property, both real and personal, purchased with the earnings during the receivership; and further, that under the order turning over the property, the company took it charged with the receiver's liabilities, which included plaintiff's claim, and that on that account, as well as because plaintiff was entitled to a lien on the betterments and property acquired by the use of the earnings, the company was liable to plaintiff; and he prayed for judgment and for general relief. The death of defendant Brown was suggested and the cause dismissed as to him. The company filed a demurrer and answered on September 12, 1889, assigning as ground of demurrer that the petition showed no cause of action, and answering by a general denial, and the averment of contributory negligence.

On September 23, 1889, the railway company, by counsel and not in its own person, further answered, pleading: (1) "That at the time plaintiff was injured the Texas and Pacific Railway and all its property was in the possession and control of John C. Brown, as receiver, appointed by the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Defendant says that on October 31, 1888, the said John C. Brown was discharged from his trust as receiver by an order made October 26, 1888, in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and he was ordered to deliver all property in his hands to the defendant, and the defendant was ordered to receive said property, and did receive it on October 31, 1888, charged with all traffic liability due by the

Statement of the Case.

receiver to connecting lines, charged with the performance of all contracts made by the receiver, and charged with the payment of all judgments that may be rendered in favor of claimants who may intervene in the cause of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. The Texas and Pacific Railway Company, in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, at New Orleans, prior to February 1, 1889, and free from all other demands or claims arising against the receiver and prior to October 31, 1888. Defendant says that plaintiff did not intervene in said cause prior to February 1, 1889. Wherefore the defendants say they are not liable at suit of plaintiff in this court, and, if liable at all, they are only liable upon due intervention of plaintiff at New Orleans, as is provided by the order of discharging said receiver; which order is hereby attached and made a part of this plea. Wherefore they pray that this cause be dismissed." (2) Defendant "demurs to plaintiff's petition, and says said petition shows no cause of action, if this court has jurisdiction; and this court has not jurisdiction over the parties plaintiff and defendant, nor of the subject-matter." (3) General denial. (4) Contributory negligence. (5) Statute of limitations.

The cause coming on for trial, it appears from the bill of exceptions that the defendant first presented the plea above numbered one, which the court overruled and held insufficient. The defendant then presented its plea or demurrer to the jurisdiction on the ground that Saunders "resided in the Eastern District of Texas, and the defendant Brown resided in the county and city of Dallas, Texas, which is by law placed in the Northern District of Texas, and there was no fact alleged to give this court jurisdiction," which was also overruled. Exceptions were duly saved. The trial then proceeded, and, among other things, the order of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana of October 26, 1888, discharging the receiver and directing the delivery of its property to the railway company was put in evidence; and it was also proved that plaintiff had resided in Dallas, Texas, since May 2, 1888. At the close of the testimony, defendant moved to dismiss the cause because plaintiff must intervene at New Orleans, and,