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with a little more regularity and certainty than those of repose; absolute restraint of movement is not common while there are many and frequent situations where repose cannot be enjoyed when desired. In play, the pleasures of movements are ends in themselves; in work they are intermediate, though work itself may become play from the force of long practice, in which case that which was intermediate becomes also self-sufficient. We sometimes find forms of activity becoming principal ends, but usually only when associated with some other ends. The pleasures of repose, in more or less high degrees of representation, are frequently ends in themselves; or again, they are often intermediate, as when a tired man thinks of rest in order that thereby he may renew his strength for work on the morrow. A large complex of ends in which there is a combination of various pleasures, but of which rest is the prevailing constituent, frequently becomes principal under such descriptions as peace, content, quiet. Movement has for its adjuvants, conspicuously, integrity, heat, respiration, yet in their turn dispositions toward all these ends may be found as antagonistic; repose is prominently so, and repletion when in process of being enjoyed; when desired, the latter is a powerful stimulus to activity. Dispositions toward repose, society, alimentation, and sexuality, seem to run together; nevertheless they may under some circumstances become antagonistic or deterrent. Movement and repose, as regards the matter of opposition and concurrence, are types of all the primary pleasures, and indeed of all pleasures whatsoever. Dispositions toward any two sets of pleasures will be found sometimes assisting and sometimes resisting each other, as circumstances vary.

§ 14. Probably in connection with the alimentary appetite we have the most prominent exhibitions of desire. Food and drink are so necessary at periodic times, and yet often so difficult to obtain, that the desire for them is engrossing. The pleasures of repletion represent the pleasures of possession; those of movement the pleasures of acquisition. Alternately, repletion is an end in itself and a means to an end. Repletion gives strength for more work, and work produces that which brings repletion. With some, as already said, the latter is a principal end; with the most it can hardly be called so. The prominent dispositions in alliance with. dispositions toward these pleasures are those toward vitality, repose,

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society, and sexuality; those connected with activity and movement are most apt to be antagonistic.

§ 15. Ends of sexuality likewise take their place among pleasures of possession most prominently. These ends are very like those last considered, with this difference, that the latter are for the most part more characteristically egoistic, the sexual more altruistic. Like the ends of repletion, the ends of sexuality very largely engross attention and desire; these desires are also periodic, and not altogether easy of gratification. They cannot be satisfied as one satisfies the appetite for air by breathing it in. They are ends of activity and are ends in themselves; they are also means to society and to vitality and even to activity, lessening as they do the sluggishness of the system. On the other hand, they are opposed to vitality because their enjoyment lessens vitality; to heat for the same reason; to activity because they are best satisfied in repose and quiet. Combined with society, they form principal ends, and some times are to be ranked as such when by themselves considered.

§ 16. Ends of society frequently are found to engross a large amount of attention and desire, and not merely as intermediate but also as self-sufficient ends. Most all principal ends have ends of society entering into them largely as an ingredient, and some consist almost wholly of such ends. Ends of society are, as regards self-sufficiency and intermediateness, about equally balanced. Dispositions toward society are ordinarily concurrent with those toward sexuality and with those toward repose. By far the most prominent opposing dispositions are those connected with repletion, that is, with the alimentary ends. Upon the whole, ends of society appear most conspicuous as representative pleasures and as ingredients in the larger masses of compound pleasures. The frequent combination with sexuality has been spoken of; the family pleasures are the main instances. Another group of social ends is that group described by the term 'love of country;' another that indicated by the term 'fame.'

§ 17. After the full illustration of pleasures and pains heretofore given, it is unnecessary to speak more in detail of these ends and their dispositions. A study of the associations and recombinations of pleasures is also a study of the concurrence and antagonism, and strength too, of dispositions leading toward those pleasures; and likewise shows the principal or subordinate character, the intermediateness or self-sufficiency of these same pleasures when regarded as ends.

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CHAPTER LXVII.

DISPOSITIONS TOWARD SECONDARY AND TERTIARY PLEASURES AS ENDS.

§ 1. As we proceed beyond the primary pleasures and pains we always discover an increasing complexity of feelings; the pleasures there found are united and interfused, but are traceable to a plural number of sources; they are the results of compound and constructive association. Around some centre there is a gathering of a large number of representative feelings. The first group of secondary pleasures, it will be remembered, we made to embrace those of material objects around which are clustered in association the primary pleasures and pains in varying relations. Considered as ends the pleasures of this division concentrate about some material object, the acquisition and possession of which is desired for the subjective pleasure afforded by such acquisition and possession. The object desired has at some time when possessed given certain pleasures; its absence has occasioned certain pains. With the idea of the possession of that object, therefore, is associated the enjoyment and the ability to enjoy those pleasures and the ability to avoid those pains; to possess such an object, then, is an end. With its acquisition then are associated intermediate ends, all tending to the same superior end, namely, the possession of the object. But in all these cases, where the object is to be acquired, the acquisition carries with it an independent pleasure of its own, namely, the pleasure of movement and exercise; this is enjoyed in addition to the pleasures connected with the mere possession of the object sought; and sometimes, as has been before noticed in several places, becomes a greater pleasure than the end to which it first was intermediate. The possession of a hare is of some value, but that worth is not comparable to the value of the pleasures of hunting the hare, although the animal was undoubtedly first hunted for the sake of its possession. While presumably the hunting is for the end of possession, really the hunting itself is the superior end.

§ 2. From the nature of the case, primâ facie, all this class of secondary ends is made up of intermediate ends. We desire clothing that we may keep warm, weapons that we may keep our body whole and unscathed by the attacks of men or beasts; fresh air that we may enjoy breathing it; carriages that we may move

without fatigue and more rapidly; tools that we may work; food that we may eat, wine that we may drink. But by the force of association the pleasure of having the thing sometimes becomes itself sufficient without the enjoyment of those pleasures which originally made that possession valuable. The stock illustration of this truth is that found in the miser's gold; and it seems to be the best example. The mere possession of the gold is a selfsufficient end, the advantages which having it would naturally bring being all sacrificed to gratify a desire to have and hold the treasure. In this manner, therefore, some of these intermediate ends become self-sufficient. In a similar manner, where the possession consists in participation, that participation often becomes an end in itself. The pleasures of a city, for instance, we reckon to be the pleasures of living in a city, including society enjoyments chiefly, and increased opportunities for activity; we participate in the advantages of the city; and yet we make living in the city an end in itself, though we reap none of the benefits which make such a residence a thing to be sought. If we are there we are satisfied, whatever betides. In addition to these self-sufficient ends growing out of possession, there is always in this class of ends the possibility that the acquisition may become an end in itself, as gratifying a desire for movement and exercise. §3. As ends of acquisition, pleasures associated with material objects having close relations with the primary pleasures and pains may become principal ends. The acquisition of money frequently is a principal end; so also the getting of goods of all sorts, though generally it is the securing of wealth that is the chief end, and not any specific things that constitute wealth. In the same way the possession of money, gold, silver, or treasure is not seldom a principal end, though the same qualification should be made here also. But for the most part these ends are subordinate.

§ 4. Of course when two objects present themselves to the mind as desirable, but of unequal values, and both are not attainable, dispositions in various degrees of antagonism are formed. On the other hand, when the attainment of one object is an aid to the acquisition and possession of another which is desired, also coalescent dispositions are formed; and when a desire arises to possess two things the possession of which leads to the possession of some third thing beyond, we observe a concurrence of dispositions, as also where two compatible dispositions exist toward two things not connected with a third. I may desire clothing and

also books; if I have plenty of money I may be able to gratify both those desires, and the dispositions to do so may be concurrent. If, however, I have little money, the desire for books may be brought into antagonism with the desire for clothing or the converse, and one may operate as a deterrent upon the other. I may desire brick and lumber and may also desire a house; the disposition toward the former is then coalescent with the disposition toward the latter, and if I desire also carpets and upholstery, the latter disposition will be concurrent with the disposition toward the acquisition of brick and mortar.

§ 5. In the second group of secondary pleasures we advance a few steps in the scale of representativeness, and pass into the region of ideal pleasures. But at the outset let us remark a large number of actions and states which are direct ministers to the primary pleasures. Breathing, walking, riding, lifting, sitting, reclining, eating, drinking, all are terms carrying the mind back at once to the primary ends. We may speak of the pleasures of breathing, referring to the subjective feeling, in which case the pleasures are primary; or we may speak of the same, referring to the muscular action which produces the subjective feeling, in which case the pleasures are secondary; or again, we may speak of the pleasures of air-secondary also. All these are of the nature of intermediate ends, and some of them by repetition become ends in themselves. Beyond these ends, there is no difference which demands notice here between the second and third groups of secondary pleasures. Many of these are ends connected with actions running over an extended period, habits of action indeed. Of these latter temperance affords a fair sample. The pleasures of temperance are the pleasures attending a systematic and regular restraint of imperious appetites; pleasures which are largely representative and imply a considerable amount of forecasting. Here, as before, the end may be an intermediate one or may be self-sufficient. Temperance may be pursued as an end to health or society, or it may be by association exalted in mind to the dignity of something desirable for its own sake. Usually, it is considered in both lights, it is regarded as an advantage for the various reasons of which two have been noticed; besides, temperance is thought to be good in itself. It is hardly ever held to be a principal end, however. Dispositions toward temperance meet with powerful antagonists. The dispositions toward most of the appetitive pleasures are strong enough to carry the individual to

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