hindrance and interference by complexity of movements depends conscious life itself, which passes into unconsciousness, whenever the active determinations proceed to their conclusions unhesitatingly, directly, and certainly. We also see that what is usually called voluntary action, or action the result of choice, is action resulting from a conflict and balancing of volitional determinations, but exhibits the same exercise of automatic activity that occurs in what is termed involuntary action.

§ 46. The influence of the fixed idea on efferent activity will also be apparent. In view of the tendency just adverted to, of an idea to act itself out, when by association and representation quantity of feeling is aroused sufficient to detain the attention and create the state exemplified by the persistence of an idea, the efferent activities related by habit to that state will be put forth, frequently in opposition to the activities allied with other states generated according to the laws of pleasure and pain which are vainly endeavouring to supersede those necessitated by the state of persistence. Thus through the fixed idea a paralysis of all movements is frequently caused, except those which have become inseparable concomitants of the persisting state. The result of this is oftentimes an exercise of efferent activity involuntary, against conscious choice, undesired, undesirable, and even very disastrous.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

§ 47. There cannot fail to be suggested to us, after all that has been said, some final considerations upon the ultimate nature of volition. I have allowed myself in this work to be put in the position of characterising volition as sometimes involuntary, and of comprehending under the term volitional both the voluntary and involuntary, ordinarily so-called. I have done this in preference to excluding volition altogether from the list of independent aspects of states of consciousness. For, obviously, not all states of consciousness exhibit conscious voluntary selection. If we were to confine volition to the exhibition of choice, we should find it to be merely a case of action resulting from the opposition of determinations, and thus not an ultimate fact, since we should still have to refer to the dynamic element for explanation, choice being only a particular case of determination. But all states of consciousness do exhibit some sort of active determination, and the consciousness of this active determination is always present wherever there is feeling and thought. These conscious determinations of energy

human science has preferred to call volition, though, I think, there is much to be said in favour of the term Conation, which Sir William Hamilton employed. If, however, we retain the term volition, as on the whole seems to me to be necessary, I see no alternative but to employ it as inclusive of all conscious active (and counteractive) determinations, both those ordinarily styled involuntary and those called voluntary. In this sense, then, I will means I put forth energy, I move toward action. Under certain circumstances of putting forth energy, namely those before mentioned, I am conscious of giving a preference to one direction of this energy over another which suggests itself, and toward which there is some, though not so great an inclination. This is choice.

§ 48. The unconscious action belonging to motor nerves raises a more serious difficulty still, with respect to the place of volition as an independent phase of conscious experience. It seems to me pretty well established that there is no consciousness of efferent movement, but only of the results of that movement reported by afferent nerves. If this be unqualifiedly the case, our volitions - would seem to be feelings. We may have feelings of outward movement against the environment, and feelings of inward movement against the organism. But what we experience in either case arises when movement along afferent nerves reaches the centres and we are not conscious of the passage of any motor current save by results upon other parts of the organism than the motor nerves Now when we consider redintegration, we find the same situation, we are not conscious of movements outward, but of a succession of results of such movements, the circuit of nervous movement being an inner one and the quantity of motion much less. We experience a representative state which is different from presentative impressions made contemporaneously. By this difference (chiefly of relative vividness) we determine one as having a central and the other a peripheral origin, the one as produced by automatic activity, the other as produced by environment. When attention is directed to anything, our consciousness arises after the motor impulse has gone forth; as also with association and representation. The representative object appears in consciousness as the result of a motor impulse which, starting from the centres, accomplishes a more or less wide circuit, and arrives again at the central region, there to propagate other motor discharges, in their turn to reappear as ideas and feelings (Chap. XL. § 4 ff.).

When, therefore, one state appears which involves certain movements, and this is followed by a state involving opposed movements and the two alternate, if finally the one becomes more persistent and strong while the other grows less resistent, weaker and less frequently recurrent, increased movements outside the centres are reported, and we cognise the mental phenomena we call volition. But we are conscious only of the results of the active movement, not of the movement itself. We are conscious of certain feelings attending a conflict of movements, but only as the consequences of those movements.

§ 49. The bearing of these considerations upon the ultimate nature of volition is plainly to induce the belief that will is nothing more than a mode of feeling. We should then have feeling as homogeneous indefinite consciousness. From this there would be differentiated cognition as definite, integrated consciousness, but volition would be the feeling of representative conflict, representative action and resistance. All consciousness is of motion and resistance. Hence we should have two grand divisions of mental states: Consciousness of Peripheral Action and Reaction (Organism and External Environment), and Conscious ness of Central Action and Reaction (Organism and Internal Environment). Each of these divisions would be subdivided into Feeling or Indefinite Consciousness, and Cognition or Definite Consciousness. Consciousness of Peripheral Action and Reaction would give our knowledge of the External World; Consciousness of Central Action and Reaction, our knowledge of Mind. Behind all Consciousness there would be postulated the Subject Ego, the source of all Consciousness, the Unconscious Automatic Activity, of which we have no consciousness further than that we postulate such a Power inevitably in all exercises of Consciousness.

§ 50. The foregoing thoughts I express, not dogmatically, nor indeed with my own assent to anything more than the possibility of their truth and the consequent possibility of a reconstruction of psychology from further researches into the ultimate nature and connections of the several aspects of states of consciousness. Since such thoughts have entered my mind after careful study, and since they would be of importance if they were shown to have a truly scientific foundation, I deem it my duty to present them, leaving the whole matter for further elucidation to other students of psychology, and perhaps to my own future deliberations.

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CHAPTER XLVII.

ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT.

§ 1. WE have been occupied hitherto in tracing lines of the development of states of consciousness as they proceed, normally evolving the ordinary and common varieties of redintegration, emotional states and volitional exercises. But there are some abnormal exhibitions of consciousness which require treatment at our hands.

§ 2. We need not stop to consider extraordinary developments of mental powers occurring along the course of normal growth. There have been prodigies in respect to memory, reasoning, and imagination-abnormal growths of normal powers. It is not intended to include such under the present head, since these cases do not exhibit any conditions or exercises of consciousness not the outcome of natural and regular exercise of ordinary faculties.

§ 3. Nor is it designed to regard common errors and illusions occurring in the ordinary exercise of mental faculties as instances. of abnormal development. There are illusions of perception arising from confusion of impressions or from misinterpretation of the sense-impression, as in perceptions of distance and solidity, and all kinds of optical illusions; there are illusions coming from vivid expectation; there are errors of memory and erroneous beliefs as to our own experience; there are illusions of all sorts coming from the employment of the reasoning powers and the imaginative also. But all these occur in what may properly be considered normal consciousness. Hence we will exclude them from our present consideration.'

DREAMS.

§ 4. The most common instance of extraordinary consciousness is found in dreams. Indeed, we can hardly call their production a matter of abnormal development at all; but they, nevertheless, show consciousness subsisting under conditions different from those of its ordinary existence. (See Chap. XXXIII. § 5 ff.) Those conditions are chiefly a diminished susceptibility to epi-peripheral stimuli, and a suspension of voluntary attention to a great degree,

1 See Illusions, by James Sully.

arising from the state of interrupted consciousness which we call sleep.

§ 5. The result of such conditions is to induce a form of consciousness in which the automatic activities produce a series of representations, according to the laws of redintegration, which are uncontrasted with and hence uncorrected by present sensational influences from the external world. The dreamer has his sole

conscious life in the things which the automatic activity represents. To the dreamer, what appears in consciousness is real and the only reality; his dream world is the only world.

§ 6. The peripheral sense-organs are not wholly inactive during sleep, but a more powerful stimulus is required to make a conscious impression. A bright light suddenly introduced, a loud or unusual sound, touches upon various points of the surface though not sufficient to awaken, will often affect the dreams of the sleeper. Olfactory and gustatory impressions will usually become transformed into visual percepts in dreams.

Ento-peripheral stimuli have a more marked effect upon dreams than epi-peripheral, for the reason that a greater degree of the former may subsist without waking the sleeper entirely than in the latter case. The influence of indigestion and of turgescence of the reproductive organs are perhaps the two most conspicuous illustrations of the effects of organic conditions. The modifications of dream-consciousness wrought in diseased conditions of the body are also very remarkable.

§ 7. The subject-matter of dreams is thus controlled to a considerable extent by peripheral influences. Aside from these, the course of redintegration in dreams is largely governed by the determinations of activity of the more recent waking hours; we dream of that which was upon our mind on going to sleep. Business cares, perplexing problems, great sorrow, engrossing the attention in the former waking state, continue to occupy the mind in dreams. Unconscious redintegration goes on in profound sleep, and when consciousness is partially roused, the results of these unconscious processes appear in dreams. A man may then dream that he has solved the puzzle over which he has distressed himself, and may solve it in his dream. Instances of this character are abundant. Dr. Carpenter records several. Condorcet saw in his dreams the final steps of a difficult calculation which had puzzled him during the day. Condillac tells us that he frequently developed and finished a subject in his dreams which