ders him the best possible authority on this subject. Mr. Dwight H. Olmstead, is to deliver an essay upon a subject which is properly engrossing a good deal of attention both in this country and in Great Britain, viz., "Land Transfer Reform." In Pennsylvania a company has been chartered to guarantee real estate titles. The New York Chamber of Commerce has called very loudly on the lawyers to simplify the transfer of real estate; and Parliament has had two of its committees report on the subject, with the view to reformatory legislation. It is to be hoped, in view of the eminent character of the speakers (Attorney-General Brewster is to make the annual oration), and the diversity and importance of the subjects to be discussed, that both the bar and laity of Albany, the home of the State Bar Association, will cordially second the committee of arrangements by their attendance, and by courtesies to the distinguished gentlemen who are to visit them. NOTES OF CASES. ́N Burton v. Stratton, United States Circuit Court, IN Button District of Michigan, July 6, 1882, 12 Fed. Rep. 696, it was held that "Twin Brothers" is a valid trade-mark for yeast, in connection with a label showing the figures of two men's heads. The principle declared is that mere words may become valid trade-marks, when purely arbitrary, or when indicative of the origin or original ownership. Brown, D. J., gave the following useful summary: "1. That a court of equity will enjoin unlawful competition in trade by means of a simulated label, or of the appropriation of a name; as where the defendant appropriates the name of a hotel conducted by the plaintiff, or imitates his label upon prepara tions. 5 Phila. 464 (Night-Blooming Cereus case); Cocks v. Chandler, L. R., 11 Eq. 446 (Reading Sauce case); Conwell v. Reed, 128 Mass. 477 (East Indian Remedy case). 3. That no one can extend his monopoly of a patented trade-mark. By the expiration of the patent the public acquires the right not only to make and sell the article, but to make and sell it under the name used by the patentee. Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Stanage, 6 Fed. Rep. 279; In re Richardson, 3 O. G. 120; Tucker Manufacturing Co. v. Boyington, 9 id. 455. 4. A person cannot, by means of a trade-mark, monopolize the name of the place where the article is manufactured. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311 (Lackawanna Coal case); Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. Masury, 25 Barb. 416. Nor the ordinary numerals or letters. Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51 (A. C. A. case); Am. Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599; Avery v. Meikle, 23 Alb. Law Jour. 443. This proposition however has been disputed. See Gillott v. Esterbrook, 48 N. Y. (303 case); Boardman v. Meriden Britannia Co., 35 Conn. 402. Nor can a person monopolize a name expressive of the character or composition of an article. Caswell v. Davis, 35 How. Pr. 76 (Ferro-Phosphorated Elixir of Calisaya Bark case). 5. So where the words used are expressive only of the name or quality of the article, and have acquired that significance in the market. Am. Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599; Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51; Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608; Corwin v. Daly, 7 Bos. 222 (Club House Gin case); Ferguson v. Davoll Mills, 2 Brewster, 314; Choynski v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501 (Antiqua rian Book Store case); Phalon v. Wright, 5 Phila. 464; Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293 (Case of Dr. Johnson's Yellow Ointment); Thomson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214 (Thomsonian Medicine case); Benninger v. Wattles, 24 How. Pr. 204 (Old London Dock Gin ishing Stout case). 6. In order that mere words may be upheld as a trade-mark they must be merely arbitrary, or they must indicate the origin or ownership of the article or fabric to which they are affixed. Am. Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 597; Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 322; Falkinburg v. Lucy, 35 Cal. 52; Brown, Trade-Marks, § 216; Durham Tobacco Case, 3 Hughes, 157; Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R., 5 E. & I. App. 508 (Glenfield Starch case); Ford v. Foster, L. R., 7 Ch. App. 611 (Eureka Shirt case); Hier v. Abrahams, 82 N. Y. 519; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 589 (Pride Tobacco case); McAndrew v. Bassett, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 550; S. C., 12 Week. R. 777 (Anatoleo case); Lee v. Haley, L. R., 5 Ch. 155 (Grimes Coal Co. case); Seixo v. Provezende, L. R., 1 Ch. 192 (Seixo Wine case); Braham v. Bustard, 1 Hem. & M. 447 (Excelsior Soap case). Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. 725 (Irving House case); Woodward v. Lazar, 21 Cal. 448 (What-case); Raggett v. Friedlater, L. R., 17 Eq. 29 (NourCheer House case); Howe v. Searing, 10 Abb. Pr. 264 (Howe's Bakery case); Mc Cardel v. Peck, 28 id. 120 (McCardel House case); Williams v. Johnson, 2 Bos. 1 (Genuine Yankee Soap case); Day v. Croft, 2 Beav. 488 (Day & Martin Blacking case); Davis v. Kendall, 2 R. I. 566 (Pain-Killer case); Meriden Britannia Co. v. Parker, 39 Conn. 450. The ground of interference in this class of cases is fraud; that is, the attempt to palm off the goods of the defendant as the goods of the plaintiff. 2. A court of equity will not protect a person in the exclusive use of a word which expresses a falsehood; as, if the article bears the word 'patented' when in fact it is not patented, or exhibits an untruth as to the place of manufacture or composition of the article. Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. of L. 531; Brown on Trade-Marks, § 72; Flavel v. Harrison, 10 Hare, 467; Partridge v. Menck, 2 Barb. Ch. 101; Pidding v. How, 8 Sim. 477 (Howqua Mixture case); Palmer v. Harris, 60 Penn. St. 156, wherein the trade-mark indicated that certain cigars were made in Havana, when in fact they were made in New York; Fetridge v. Wells, 13 How. Pr. 385 (Balm of Thousand Flowers case); Phalon v. Wright, On the same subject, Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack, United States Circuit Court, Northern District of New York, 12 Fed. Rep. 707, is an interesting case. The plaintiff had adopted as a trade-mark on labels the word "Shawknit," printed in script, with a flourish underneath in connection with the final letter, and the number "830." The defendant had adopted a label of similar size, arrangement and appearance, with the word "Seamless," in a position corresponding to the "Shawknit," in script and with a like final flourish, and the same number. The use of the numerals and of any word in script and with the flourish was enjoined. On the subject of the numerals the court, by Coxe, D. J., observed: "A careful examination of the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the defendants leads to the conclusion that where the courts have refused protection to alleged trade-marks composed of letters or numerals, it has been because on the facts of each case it was determined that the figures or letters were intended solely to indicate quality, etc., and not because figures and letters in arbitrary combination are incapable of being used as trade-marks. It is very clear that no manufacturer would have the right exclusively to appropriate the figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, or the letters A, B, C, and D, to distinguish the first, second, third and fourth quality of his goods, respectively. Why? Because the general signification and common use of these letters and figures are such that no man is permitted to assign a personal and private meaning to that which has by long usage and universal acceptation acquired a public and generic meaning. It is equally clear however that if for a long period of time he had used the same figures in combination, as ‘3214,' to distinguish his own goods from those of others, so that the public had come to know them by these numerals, he would be protected. The courts of last resort in Connecticut, in Massachusetts, and in New York have distinctly held that doctrine. Boardman v. Meriden, 35 Conn. 402; Lawrence Co. v. Lowell Mills, 129 Mass. 325; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 362; and Gillott v. Esterbrook, 48 N. Y. 374; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 553; the numerals sustained being respectively 2340, '523,' and '303.' The defendants concede this, but insist that the case of Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51, affirms a contrary doctrine, and that it should be controlling. Undoubtedly the decisions of the Supreme Court should be followed, but I do not understand the doctrine enunciated by the court in this case as conflicting with the general principle contended for by the complainant.” In regard to the script and flourish, the court held briefly that they "are in a position where, even though intending no wrong, they may work injury to the complainant." The whole decision was put on the ground of a "simulated label." In United States v. Loftis, U. S. District Court, Oregon, July 11, 1882, it was held that a sealed letter deposited in the mail, addressed to some one, is not a writing or a publication within the statute declaring obscene, etc., books, writings, etc., or "other publication of an indecent character," non-mailable. Deady, D. J., observed: "It is contended by the district attorney that the letter in question is a 'writing' within the meaning of that term as used | in the first clause of the section, which reads: 'Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character,' is declared non-mailable. Speaking generally, this letter is a writing; but to bring it within this clause of the statute it must be also a 'publication.' This word 'writing' occurs in an enumeration of things-books, pamphlets, pictures, prints, and papers — which ex vi termini are prima facie publications. The general phrase with which the enumeration ends, or other publication of an indecent character,' impliedly asserts that the things before enumerated are publications. The expression 'John and James and other men' is one in which, by a necessary implication, it is asserted that John and James are men. A publication is something as a book or print — which has been published-made public or known to the world. And a writing, as well as a printing may be published. What constitutes a publication or a making public is a question, and must generally depend upon the circumstances of each case. But a private letter, sent by one individual to another in a sealed envelope, cannot be considered a 'publication' within this statute. But the fact that the statute has expressly provided for the case of a 'letter' in a separate clause, in which the offense that may be committed by means of it is confined to indecent, obscene, etc., language on the envelope in which it is inclosed, is conclusive to my mind that Congress did not intend to include it in the term 'writing,' as used in the clause concerning obscene publications. It never was the intention of the law to take cognizance of what passes between individuals in private communications under the sanctity and security of a seal. And probably the chief reason for making it a crime to put indecent or obscene delineations or language on the envelope inclosing such communications is to prevent the post-office from being used as a means for committing cowardly and indecent assaults at a safe distance, or anonymously, upon the feelings and character of any one, by the use of indecent or immoral and offensive epithets and suggestions openly addressed to him on the envelope of a letter or a postal card. But what is said privately — within the envelope and under the seal the statute does not notice. It could not well do so without establishing an espionage over private correspondence, which would never be thought of in a free country. As the case stands, it is apparent that the matter to be excluded from the mails, and which is made a crime to deposit therein, is such that its illegal character is open to inspection and can be ascertained without breaking the seal of private correspondence." See 21 Alb. Law Jour. 361; and U. S. v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 35, to same effect. -- Unless which exists as to when or where the cloths were taken out, or in whose custody the boxes then were, and the difficulty or impossibility of ever ascertain continuous line of carriers is sued for injury to goods, there is no presumption that he received them in good order, but the fact must be affirmatively proved by the plaintiffs. The court said: "Aing those facts, make the presumption absolutely carrier has no means in a case like this of opening packages and examining their contents. there is some outward token which is suspicious, he may and must take the articles and forward them on the usual terms. He is bound in law to deliver them in the condition in which he receives them. But there can be no further responsibility; and any rule of law which would make him responsible actually or presumptively for the action of previous independent carriers, would be grossly unfair, and subject him to losses against which he could have no protection. He has nothing to do with any of the previous dealings with the property, and no means of informing himself about them. We can not see how this case is different from what it would * * * The Laughlin case was one of stolen goods. Dixon, C. J., observed: "Under these circumstances, the rule or presumption of law which makes the defendant liable for the value of the goods, unless (what seems quite impossible to be done) it shows where the loss actually took place, must be supported by most clear and satisfactory reasons of policy or necessity, or otherwise it should be rejected. It must be shown that greater injustice or more certain injustice will ensue from its rejection than will or may follow from its adoption. I have been, as I have said, in very considerable doubt; but examination convinces me that there are such reasons, and that both principle and authority sustain the presumption. The very uncertainty necessary. What is difficult or impossible for the defendant to find out with respect to the breaking or larceny, is still more difficult or impossible for the plaintiffs. The defendant possesses means and facilities which the plaintiffs do not. To say that the plaintiffs shall not recover because they have not ascertained and proved that the cloths were taken while in the custody of the defendant, is in effect to say that they are without remedy in the law for their loss. If required to make such proof to establish a cause of action against this company, then the same proof would be required in a suit against either of the others, and the plaintiffs could not recover against any, although it is certain that one of them is or should be responsible for the loss. If the plaintiffs knew or could prove in whose custody the boxes were when the cloths were taken, there would be no hardship, perhaps, in requiring them to sue that company. But the plaintiffs do not know, nor is it possible for them to ascertain this, and unless aided by presumption they are without remedy, which is a positive and certain injustice. I know of no more reasonable or proper presumption to apply than that here invoked. In fact, I know of no other fitted to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is true, the defendant may not be the company which ought in very fact to be visited with the consequences of the loss, but it is at the same time true that it may be such company. The cloths may have been taken while the boxes were in its custody. It is not certain that they were not, and therefore not certain that injustice has been done the defendant. On the other hand, the wrong and injustice done the plaintiffs, if they are dismissed without remedy, are certain." The same line of reasoning was adopted in Smith v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 43 Barb. 225, and that decision is noted as affirmed in 41 N. Y. 620. This is the earliest decision of the point in this country, so far as we can learn. The safety of the owner and the access to proof are made the foundations of what is conceded to be an exception to the general rule that "the burden of proof is always upon the party who asserts the existence of any fact which infers legal responsibility." On the authority of the Laughlin and Smith cases was decided Shriver v. Sioux City and St. Paul R. Co., 24 Minn. 506; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 353. The court say: "Although the question is not free from doubt, we think the conclusion reached by the courts in these two cases correct. * * * It is in part because of his superior ability to furnish the proof that the onus of showing the cause of a loss or injury to be within the exceptions to his liability is imposed on the carrier. For the same reason we think that ordinarily a subsequent carrier should be required to show in what condition goods came into his hands, or that their condition did not change while in his keeping." (As to the presumption in case of contract exceptions to the carrier's liability, it is held that the burden is on the owner, in Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; Marsh v. Horne, 5 B. & C. 322; French v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 4 Keyes, 108; Sager v. S. and P., etc., R. Co., 31 Me. 228; and Kallman v. U. S. Express Co., Kans. 205; while it is held that the burden is on the carrier, in Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. 286; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St. 131; Whitesides v. Russel, 3 W. & S. 44; and the Shriver case, supra.) The Laughlin case was followed in Dixon v. Richmond and Danville R. Co., 74 N. C. 538. The court said: "If the contents and condition are unknown, liability may be guarded against by a stipulation, or by an examination. It is important that these precautions should be observed, because by them the shipper will be able to know and prove on which line an injury has accrued, and only in this way can the shipper know, unless he accompany the article all the way. And it is negligence in a receiving line not to take these precautions. And failing to take them, the receiving line is presumed to have received the article in good order. If this were not so, then shippers would be at the mercy of the carriers." GENTLEMEN -The constitution of our association provides that at each annual meeting the president shall communicate "the most noteworthy changes in statute law on points of general interest, made in the several States and by Congress" since the preceding annual meeting. In nearly two-thirds of the States of the Union the regular sessions of their respective Legislatures are biennial only. In these States there has been no regular session of the Legislature, and hence no important changes in their statute law since your last meeting. I have examined the statutes enacted during the past year in the States in which sessions of the Legislature have been held, and also the reports made to me by the members of our General Council from those States; and I do not find that many changes in their statute laws on points of general interest have been made. In Georgia acts have been passed requiring all acceptances of bills of exchange to be in writing, and also that all conditional sales of personal property (except as between the immediate parties) shall be in writing and shall be recorded. In New York a statute has been passed providing that no new promise made by a person duly discharged in bankruptcy from his debts shall revive such debts unless such new promise be in writing signed by the person to be charged thereby. In Brintnall v. S. and W. R. Co., 32 Vt. 665, the plaintiff delivered a box to the defendant at Saratoga for carriage to Boston; the defendant's terminus was Castleton, where it connected with another line; the plaintiff proved the delivery at Saratoga and the non-arrival at Boston; and this was held to put the onus on the defendant. This was based "mainly on the ground that this was really all the proof the nature of the case permitted to the plaint-making such advances any sum to be agreed upon, in iff, and that proof of a delivery by the defendant to the next carrier was a matter that was peculiarly within the power of the defendant, and not at all in the power of the plaintiff," etc.; and that “a plaintiff is only bound to give such proof of the loss as the nature of the case admits of and fairly is in his power to bring." This is not in point, on the facts, but the reasoning is persuasive and analogous. The contrary seems to be held however in Gilbert v. Dale, 5 Ad. & Ed. 543, and Midland Railway v. Bromley, 17 Q. B. 372. The question is purely one of public convenience and policy, and there seems to us to be no answer to Chief Justice Dixon's reasoning on the comparative policy of the two rules. Where the goods are delivered by the owner to the first carrier, of course it is easier for him than for the carrier to prove their condition, but after that, the contrary is the fact. At all events, the succeeding carrier may protect himself by stipulation, as suggested in the North Carolina case. We regard the Michigan case as substantially unsupported by authority, and as inconvenient and dangerous in principle. New York has also enacted that where advances of money to an amount not less than five thousand dollars, repayable on demand, are made upon warehouse receipts, bills of lading, certificates of stock, certifi cates of deposit, bills of exchange, bonds or other negotiable instruments pledged as collateral security for such repayment, it shall be lawful to receive or to contract to receive and collect as compensation for writing, by the parties to such transaction. A statute has been passed in Georgia whereby it is provided that the concurrent verdict of two juries at different terms of the court shall be necessary to authorize a decree of absolute divorce. The same State requires the decree of divorce to restore to the wife her ante-nuptial name where the decree is in her favor. In Georgia, judges now, upon the request of the jury, must, in all civil cases, furnish the jury with written instructions as to the form of their verdict. Massachusetts has authorized women to be admitted to practice as attorneys at law on the same terms as men. In several States acts have been passed directing that seats be provided for car drivers and female employees. Mississippi has passed a law authoring persons charged with crime to testify in their own behalf. Acts have been passed in Massachusetts and other States to prevent the adulteration of food and drugs and making such adulteration a penal offense. In many States stringent license laws have been enacted. In Georgia it is now a penal offense to employ minors in any place where liquors are sold by retail to be drunk on the premises. In New York the chairman of a political caucus, held for the purpose of selecting candidates for office or delegates to a convention, may administer an oath to a person offering to vote at such caucus who shall have been challenged, and interrogate such person under oath as to his name, residence and qualification as a voter; and the person answering shall be liable to conviction for perjury if he intentionally makes false answers. Georgia declares incompetent as election managers all persons unable to read and write; and has also passed an act punishing the purchase and sale of votes at elections. Voluntary assignments by insolvent debtors made hereafter in Georgia for the benefit of creditors are void unless accompanied by a sworn inventory and schedule of all the assets of the assignor. South Carolina and New York have enacted laws in regard to the regulation and management of railroads and providing for the appointment of railroad commissioners. In Connecticut a married woman may now be an executrix, administratrix, trustee or guardian the same as a femme sole. New Hampshire has passed a law declaring that any town in that State may exempt from taxation materials of wood, copper, iron and steel used in the construction of ships and vessels. That State also exempts from taxation as personal estate all ships and vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade, and declares that only their net yearly income shall be taxable. Enactments of this character are worthy of the special consideration of other States as tending to promote ship-building and to increase our merchant marine. The constitutional right of convicts to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences has been recognized and protected by law in New Hampshire. In several States, where there has been no regular session of the Legislature during the past year, spceial sessions have been called and the State redistricted for Congressional representation. Such action is in marked contrast with those States in which regular sessions have been held and adjourned without redistricting the State. Acts for the registration of voters have been passed in Maryland and other States. In Virginia punishment by stripes has been abolished, and the right of a prisoner to testify in his own behalf in criminal cases has been extended from assault and battery to felonious and malicious assault. In the city of Baltimore jurors to the number of seven hundred and fifty are hereafter to be annually selected by the five judges of the Supreme Bench of that city; and from the jurors so selected the judges shall select the Grand Jurors, and the sheriff shall draw the other jurors. Maryland and New Hampshire have appointed commissioners to examine and report as to the destruction of forests. In Rhode Island it is provided that the board of persons imprisoned on original writ, mesne process or execution, shall be paid in advance at the rate of three dollars a week by the party at whose suit such person is imprisoned, and the amount so paid shall become part of the costs of the proceedings. In case of default of such payment the prisoner is to be discharged. That State has provided for the appointment of a commissioner to inspect dams and reservoirs, with power to orders repairs and alterations therein and to cause the water to be drawn therefrom, and with whom must be filed plans and specifications for all new dams and reservoirs. In that State a general act has been passed in reference to supplying towns with water. An act has also been passed by that State providing for administration on the estates of persons who have been absent from the State and not heard from for seven years. Wisconsin has repealed the "anti-treat law" referred to by your president a year ago. In that State deceptive advertisements by insurance companies are prohibited under penalty of a revocation of their license to transact business in the State. In Wiscon sin it is also provided that the friends or relatives of a person adjudged insane may execute the warrant of commitment and be paid fees therefor in the same manner as if executed by the sheriff. In Georgia the penalty for taking or reserving usurious interest is the forfeiture of the excess of such interest above legal interest. In West Virginia a divorce a mensa et thoro may now be had where either party after marriage becomes an habitual drunkard. That State also gives statutory forms of indictments for murder and certain other offenses. In that State damages to the extent of ten thousand dollars may now be recovered by the representatives of a person whose death has been caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another. That State also declares that if a devise be made to two or more persons jointly, and one or more of them die without issue, the part of the estate so devised to him shall not go to the other joint devisees, but shall descend and pass to the heirs-at-law of the testator as if he had died intestate, unless the will otherwise provide. Ohio has enacted the following law: Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That section seven thousand and fourteen of the revised statutes of Ohio be amended so as to read as follows: Section 7014. Whoever assigns or transfers any claim for debt against a resident of this State for the purpose of having the same collected by proceedings in attachment in courts outside of this State, or whoever, with intent to deprive a resident of this State of a right to have his personal earnings exempt from application to the payments of his debts, sends out of this State any claim for debt against such person for the purpose aforesaid, where the creditor and debtor and the person or corporation owing the money intended to be reached by such proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, shall be fined not more than fifty nor less than twenty dollars; and the person whose personal earnings are so attached shall have a right of action, before any court of this State having jurisdiction, to recover the amount attached and any costs paid by him in such attachment proceedings, either from the person so assigning, transferring, or sending such claim out of this State to be collected as aforesaid, or the person to whom such claim is assigned, transferred, or sent as aforesaid, or both, at the option of the person bringing such suit. The assignment, transfer, or sending of such claim to a person not a resident of this State, and the commencement of such proceedings in attachment, shall be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this section. Section 2. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage. Passed March 8, 1882. In that State it has been enacted that whoever publishes any false or malicious libel imputing unchastity to any female of good repute shall be punished by fine and imprisonment. Under the new Criminal Code of New York new trials can be granted by an Appellate Court even where no objections to evidence were taken. An appeal on the part of a prisoner under sentence of death in New York, while pending, operates as a stay of the execution of the sentence. In New York justices of sessions or side judges no longer form a part of the Court of Oyer and Terminer. In Ohio the following is now the law: An act to supplement section 6934 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio. Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That the following be enacted as |