BANKS AND BANKING (Continued).

7. PAYMENT OF CHECKS ON FORGED INDORSEMENTS NEGLIGENCE IN DRAWING OF CHECKS IMMATERIAL TO LIABILITY OF BANK.-Negligence of the depositor in the signing of checks upon fraudulent demands will not relieve the bank of liability for paying them on forged indorsements, since the negligence of the depositor in such particular is not a proximate cause of the bank's failure to ascertain the nongenuine character of the indorsements. (Id.) 8. INDORSEMENTS ON CANCELED CHECKS-MAKER NOT CHARGED WITH DUTY. A depositor is not bound to examine the indorsements on returned checks, since he has the right to assume that the bank has ascertained the fact that the indorsements are genuine. (Id.) 9. RENDITION OF SEMI-MONTHLY STATEMENTS - ACCOUNT STATED RIGHT TO OPEN FOR FRAUD OR MISTAKE.-While the rendition of semi-monthly statements by a bank to a depositor and his failure to object thereto constitute an account stated, the account may be opened upon a showing of fraud or mistake. (Id.)

10. AGREEMENT IN PASS-BOOK GENUINENESS OF INDORSEMENTS ON CANCELED CHECKS-WHEN NOT BINDING UPON DEPOSITOR.-A statement printed in the front of the commercial pass-book of a bank depositor to the effect that the latter shall be concluded as to the genuineness of indorsements on returned and canceled checks unless he makes an objection thereto in writing within ten days after their receipt, is not binding on the depositor, where not signed by him, or shown to have been called to his attention, or otherwise to have been agreed to by him. (Id.)

11. RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID ON FORGED CHECKS-TENDER OF CHECKS -WHEN UNNECESSARY.-In an action by a depositor against a bank to recover the amount paid out by the bank on checks of the plaintiff on forged indorsements, it is not necessary to tender back the checks before the commencement of the action where the bank from the time it was notified of the forgeries absolutely repudiated liability. (Id.)

BILL OF EXCHANGE. See Debtor and Creditor, 2.

BONDS.

1. SURETIES-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-EXCEPTION-PUBLIC BONDS.The general rule that the liability of sureties cannot be extended beyond the fair import of the express undertaking in the bond has an exception in the case of bonds given in pursuance of a governmental law for a public purpose. (Milliron v. Dittman, 443.) 2. EXCEPTION-WHEN IN APPLICABLE.-Such exception to the general rule has no application where its undoubted effect would be to impose a liability necessarily and absolutely inconsistent with the

BONDS (Continued).

unequivocal intent of the parties as disclosed by the express terms of the bond itself. (Id.)

3. NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF JITNEY BUS

INJURY TO PASSENGER PLEADING-PARTIES-JOINDER OF INDEMNITY COMPANY AS DEFENDANT.—In an action for personal injuries arising out of the negligent operation of a jitney bus in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger, the casualty company on the indemnity bond of the operator of the bus, was properly joined as a party defendant, notwithstanding the bond, which was executed pursuant to the requirements of a city ordinance, did not expressly obligate the company to pay to injured third persons such sums as they might be entitled to recover as damages from the negligent operation of the bus. (Id.)

See Mechanics' Liens, 6; Street Law, 16.

BOUNDARIES.

1. LAND BORDERED BY RUNNING STREAM-SHIFTING BOUNDARY.-Where land is bordered by a running stream, a boundary marked by a water line is a shifting boundary, going landward with erosion and waterward with accretion, and express statutory declaration to this effect is found in section 1014 of the Civil Code. The rule is the same in this state as to lands bordering tidal waters. (City of Oakland v. Buteau, 83.)

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CITY OF OAKLAND-LEGISLATIVE GRANT OF WATERFRONT LANDS-"SHIP CHANNEL" AS BOUNDARY-MEANING OF TERM.-Under the act of the legislature of May 4, 1852 (Stats. 1852, p. 180), incorporating the town of Oakland and granting to the town the waterfront lands lying within certain limits "between high tide and ship channel," the true interpretation of the term "ship channel" is the line of low tide, as affected by such gradual and imperceptible changes as may from time to time take place in the location of that line. (Id.)

3. DOCTRINE OF AGREED LINE-ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS-OMISSION OF ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO TRUE LINE.-In an action in ejectment in which the controversy was over a disputed boundary line, instructions on the doctrine of an agreed boundary line which do not contain the necessary element that there must be uncertainty as to the location of the true line before the coterminous owners can agree upon a boundary, are erroneous. (Weringer v. Rutledge, 566.)

CHARTERS. See Municipal Corporations, 10.

CHECKS. See Agency, 4, 5; Banks and Banking, 3, 11.

CITIES. See Municipal Corporations.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.
POSSESSION OF HOUSEHOLD

FURNITURE-TRANSACTION

BETWEEN

FATHER AND DAUGHTER-UNWARRANTED SEIZURE UNDER ATTACHMENT.-In this action to recover the possession of household furniture seized under a writ of attachment in an action against the daughter of the plaintiff, it is held the finding on sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was at all times the owner of the property and that the daughter was only entitled to the possession is conclusive, and, therefore, there was no intention to defraud creditors in the transaction by which the daughter redelivered the possession to the plaintiff. (Bufkin v. Cline, 381.)

CLAIMS. See Judgments, 20.

COLLATERAL ATTACK. See Estates of Deceased Persons, 10, 31, 32.

COMPROMISE. See Appeal, 15; Estates of Deceased Persons, 29.

CONDEMNATION OF LAND.

1. EMINENT DOMAIN-ACQUISITION OF SITE FOR HIGH SCHOOL GYMNASIUM-PLEADING-PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATION BY TRUSTEES-UNNECESSARY ALLEGATION.-In a proceeding by a high school district to condemn a tract of land for the site of a gymnasium or athletic building, it is not essential to the sufficiency of the cause of action pleaded that the complaint should contain an allegation that the plaintiff was empowered by a valid or any resolution of its board of trustees to proceed in condemnation, since section 1244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the essentials of a complaint in eminent domain proceedings, does not require a statement of the adoption of such a resolution. (Union High School Dist. v. McDonald, 7.)

2. CODE REQUIREMENT STATEMENT OF RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF MEANING OF.-' .—The requirement of subdivision 3 of section 1244 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the complaint must contain a statement of the right of the plaintiff has reference only to a statement of the legal right or authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain, and, as against a general demurrer, the complaint complies with the mandate of the statute by alleging, in effect, that the taking was sought pursuant to the provisions of Title VII, part III, of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Id.)

CONDEMNATION OF LAND (Continued).

3. RESOLUTION

AUTHORIZING PROCEEDING-MISRECITAL

OF SOURCE

OF LEGAL AUTHORITY-PREAMBLE-VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION.-The right of a high school district to condemn land for the purpose of acquiring a site for an athletic building is neither restricted nor restrained by the fact that in the preamble of the resolution authorizing the proceedings the right to institute the proceedings was based upon an act of the legislature which had not then gone into effect, since it was unnecessary to the efficacy of such a resolution that it should have a preamble, or that the resolution or preamble should state the statutory authority permitting the proceeding. (Id.)

4. CODE AUTHORITY ΤΟ INSTITUTE PROCEEDING.-Section

1238 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a school district to exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring public buildings and grounds for the use of any school district, when read in conjunction with various other sections and provisions of the code and of the statute law relative to and regulating the public school system, empowers a high school district, if not expressly, by necessary implication, to proceed to condemn land for a site for an athletic building. (Id.)

5. PLEADING AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT INCREASE IN QUANTITY OF LAND-DISCRETION NOT ABUSED.-In an action by a high school district to condemn a strip of land for a site for an athletic building, where the original complaint prayed for the condemnation of a strip eighty feet in width by three hundred and forty-four feet in length, there was no abuse of discretion in permitting the filing of an amended complaint on the day of trial praying for the condemnation of a strip one hundred feet in width and three hundred and forty-four feet in length, notwithstanding the resolution authorizing the proceeding provided for a strip of eighty feet in width, it appearing from the answer that the strip described in the amended complaint was all that defendants owned. (Id.)

CONDITIONS. See Contracts, 12.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS. See Deeds, 7.

CONSIDERATION. See Assignments, 2, 3; Negotiable Instruments, 11.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Contempt, 4-6; Corporations, 1, 2; Criminal Law, 16; Municipal Corporations, 1; Taxation, 1, 2; Workmen's Compensation Aet, 17.

CONTEMPT.

1. AFFIDAVIT SUFFICIENCY.-An affidavit charging the commission of a contempt need not be more specific in its averments of the facts constituting the contempt than a complaint or an informa tion charging a crime. (Selowsky v. Superior Court of Napa Co., 404.)

2. VIOLATION OF INJUNCTION-USE OF PREMISES FOR PROSTITUTIONAFFIDAVIT SPECIFIC ACTS OF LEWDNESS-UNNECESSARY ALLEGATION. In a contempt proceeding for violation of a decree perpetually enjoining the use of premises for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, a general allegation in the affidavit that the affiant knows of his own knowledge that the premises were being used for such purpose, is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the proceeding, without an allegation of the commission of specific acts of lewdness. (Id.)

3. FINDING ULTIMATE FACT.-In such proceeding a finding that the defendant did, in violation of the decree, conduct the premises for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, and prostitution is a sufficient finding of the ultimate fact in issue, and no finding as to particular acts of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is essential. (Id.)

4. RED-LIGHT ABATEMENT ACT-PENALTY FOR CONTEMPT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Section 6 of the Red-light Abatement Act (Stats. 1913, p. 20), providing a different and more severe penalty for contempt than the penalties prescribed in the general code provisions relating to contempts, is not violative of section 11 of article I of the constitution which provides that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, since there is much in the nature of the contempt contemplated and condemned by the seetion of the act which differentiates it from other possible acts of contempt and justifies the imposition of a different and more severe penalty.

(Id.)

5. TITLE OF ACT-PENALTY FOR CONTEMPT-PROVISION COVERED.The provisions of the Red-light Abatement Act fixing a penalty for the violation of the decrees provided for therein are sufficiently covered by the title of the act reading as follows: "An act declaring all buildings and places nuisances wherein or upon which acts of lewdness, assignation or prostitution are held or occur or which are used for such purposes, and providing for the abatement and prevention of such nuisances by injunction and otherwise." (Id.) 6. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. PREVIOUS AUTHORITY UNDER CODE - PROVISION OF ACT UNAFFECTED BY.-The Red-light Abatement Act in so far as it purports to confer authority to grant injunctive relief is not nugatory because the court had previous to the enactment general power to enjoin nuisances under the Code of Civil Procedure, since it is competent for the legislature to provide two or more