Complete Art Stenciling Outfit. Beautify your home or make money with our latest and most complete Stenciling. Outfit. You can make the most artistic Pillow Tops, Doilies, Portieres, Curtains, etc., in colors, for yourself or for sale, with the aid of our up-to-date outfit, without having any knowledge of painting. The outfit illustrated consists of: 6 Artistically Cut Stencil Designs, 6 tubes of Assorted Stenciling Colors, 2 Stencil Brushes, 4 Thumb Tacks to hold Stencils in place, and full directions for how to use and blend the various colors to the desired shades. The designs are cut on heavily olled boards and may be used an unlimited number of times. These Stencils are especially suited to the needs of the beginner. No drawing or tracing necessary. Order now. The complete outfit will be sent prepaid anywhere for the special price of $1.25.

Shirtwaist Set.
1580.

There is no shirtwaist to be had more beautiful than this pretty and attractive design, which can be executed in either solid or eyelet embroidery, very popular this season. Stamped on 3 yards imported Irish linen, $1.75.

Stamped on 3 yards Persian lawn, $1.00.

Perforated pattern, 25c.

Paper pattern, sizes 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42 inches bust measure. Price, 10C

Shirtwaist Set.
1581.

This is one of the newest designs in the ever popular braiding used so extensively this season.

Stamped on 3 yards imported Irish linen, $1.75. Stamped on 3 yards Persian lawn, $1.00. Perforated pattern, 25c. 8421.

Paper pattern, sizes 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42 inches bust measure. Price, 10c.

8547

This is a very charming and simple pattern for a baby's kimono in leaf design.

Lingerie Hat. 582.

This fashionable and attractive bow-knot and daisy hat design should be worked in solid and eyelet embroidery. When stamped, the crown and rim are on separate pieces and not one inside of the other, as shown in the cut. Stamped on fine quality flannel, The large part of this design may be used for

30c.

Perforated pattern, 25c.

Transfer pattern, 10c.

a centerpiece, while the center of design may be used for a small doily.

Perforated pattern of hat, 25c.
Design stamped on linen, 60c.
Design stamped on lawn, 40c.

The special edition of the Survey, edited by Bernard Flexner of Louisville, refers us to the Boston Juvenile Court as the ideal court. It recommends all persons wishing to organize juvenile courts to adopt this court as their model.

The JUVENILE COURT RECORD feels in duty bound to point out wherein this advice should not be followed. The fact is the Boston Juvenile Court is one in name only. It is a criminal court of limited jurisdiction. It has no civil nor chancery jurisdiction. The procedure of the court is wholly illegal and not conducted in accordance with the law. The rights of parents are not safeguarded under the law. We should bear in mind at all times the fact "that the American system of government is controlled and directed by laws not men. It cannot be too often nor too strongly impressed upon those who administer a branch of the government. Where a proper spirit and good judgment arc followed as guides, oppression can and will be avoided."

The law which the Boston Juvenile Court administers is de

fective. It deals, so far as the delinquents are concerned, solely with the child. The parent is not made a party to the proceeding, nor his rights adjudicated. He is simply notified of the proceeding. The Massachusetts law, so far as the wayward and delinquent children are concerned, reverses the common law and refuses in a great measure to follow the rule in other states, which is that the child must first be found wayward or delinquent, and, second, that the parent must be found unfit, unable and unwilling to properly provide for his child. The rights of the parents are only incidentally recognized. The general rule is that parents have the right to the custody of their children, which the law should not only recognize but enforce. It should be of equal value as property rights and of the right of life and liberty. No parent should be deprived of his child until he is proven to be unfit or unable to properly care for the child. These general principles are recognized in Massachusetts where parents are able to protect their rights. Where they are not able to do so, then the State in its majesty and power should

apply with greater care the same rules and laws that apply to the person of intelligence and financial standing,

The Guardianship Act of Massachusetts provides that:

"The father of a minor, if living, and in case of his death the mother, they being respectively competent to transact their own business, shall be entitled to the custody of the minor and to the care of his education."

(Sec. 4, Chap. 145.)

"The rights of parents in divorce proceedings are held to be equal, and the happiness and welfare of the children shall determine their custody or posession."

(Sec. 28, Chap. 152, Divorce.) Construing this latter section, Justice Field, of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, says in case of Haskell vs. Haskell,

"We know of no absolute rule of law that the father is entitled to the custody of the children when he obtains a divorce from the bonds of matrimony on the grounds of bigamy and adultry committed by the wife."

152 Mass., Page 16. The Massachusetts law relating to neglected children, as amended in 1903, Chap. 334, provides that any child under 16 years of age, by reason of orphanage, or neglect, crime, drunkenness or other vice of his parents, etc., may be declared neglected by the Court. Summons shall be directed to the father of the child if living, and resident within the Commonwealth, if not to the mother, etc. The Court must find that the parent has been summoned and that the allegations in the complaint are proven. The child may then be placed with some person or charitable corporation, or may be committed to the custody of the State Board of Charities, until it arrives at the age of 21 years or a less time.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Farnham vs. Pierce, 141 Mass., 203, held that the rights of the parent were not bound by these proceedings if the parent had not been summoned to court, and in the case of Re Kelly, 152 Mass., 432, the court held that:

"The parent of a neglected child duly committed is not precluded by such adjudication during the term of the commitment, but may show at any time, upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the custody of the child, that the object of the commitment has been accomplished, and the child may be properly restored to his custody." The same court in a subsequent proceeding, wherein a petition was filed November 17, 1893, for a writ of habeas corpus, held that where the parent had been summoned to court and the commitment was made in accordance with the law, the court was bound by such commitment, and the mother's only remedy was to apply to the institution to which the child had been committed. The Court in this case says:

"As between the parent on one side and the child on the other, it may be safely left to the boards and officers to whose custody courts and magistrates are authorized to commit children, situated as described in the statutes, to decide, after hearing the parties, whether, in view of all the circumstances, the object of the commitment has been accomplished and the child should be discharged and restored to its parents. Where no error in law or neglect or unfaithfulness in the discharge of their duty is alleged, against the Board or officers having custody of the child, their action will not be reviewable on a writ of habeas corpus.

(In re Wares, 161 Mass., Page 72.) The same court in a recent case held:

"It is not the rights of the parent that are chiefly to be considered. The first and paramount duty is to consult the welfare of the child. The wishes of the parent as to the religious education and surroundings of the child are entitled to weight; if there is nothing to put in the balance against them, ordinarily they will be decisive. . The court will not itself prefer one church to another but will act without bias for the welfare of the child under the circumstances of each case."

Purington vs. Jamrock, 195 Mass., 187. (1907.) This latter case, authorizing the adoption of a child without the consent of its parents where the child has been suffered to be supported by the State as a pauper, appears to go further than

any other decision in permitting a parent to be deprived of the custody and control of a child against the will of such parent. The State Board of Charity, having placed this child with a family, subsequently passed a resolution removing the child from the family of the petitioners, and providing for its board in the home of a family of the same religious faith as that of her mother. The action of the State Board of Charity was not followed by the Court, and the child was allowed to remain with the petitioners and a decree of adoption entered by the Court.

It will thus be seen from the foregoing decisions that the State of Massachusetts does not recognize the rights of parents with that regard and sacredness as other states. The courts seem to be impressed with the immediate welfare of the particular child and not its entire future. Such narrow and restricted rules fortunately do not prevail, throughout the country. The Supreme Court of Mississippi in announcing a different rule,

says:

"There is much loose talk in the books about the best interests of the child and more as to the rights of the father. In the effort to escape from the arbitrary rule laid down by the common law as to the father's rights, the danger is lest the pendulum swing too far under modern decisions the other way, and too much disposition is manifested in some cases to consult not the permanent wellbeing of the child so much as its immediate enjoyment, to stand not at the center of the whole circumference of the facts making up the life of the child from childhood to manhood or womanhood, but in that segment of those facts relating merely to what will make the child happy at the age he may be at when the custody s determined."

Hibbet vs. Bains, 51 L. R. A., p. 843.

In the light of the foregoing authorities, and in view of the fact that a child may be taken from its parents and its care, custody and education transferred to strangers, who at best can only supplement that parental love and affection that is imbedded in the hearts of all true fathers and mothers, it would seem that the law should be safeguarded in such a way as to protect the rights of both parent and child. Notwithstanding these great principles and questions involved, the Massachusetts laws which are administered by the Boston Juvenile Court are so loosely drawn that only one parent need be notified of a case that is pending in court, and then only where such parent resides within the city or town where such child is found. (Sec. 4, Chap. 413, Acts of 1906, Mass.)

The Act of 1903, relating to neglected children, Chap. 334, which provided for notice to be served on the father of the child, if living, etc., was amended in March 1909, to read:

"Summons shall be issued to at least one of the parents of the child, if either of them is known to reside within the Commonwealth, and after reasonable search no such parents can be found within the Commonwealth, then to the lawful guardian."

The law nowhere makes the parent a party to the proceeding, nor does it make provisions for adjudicating as to his ability or inability to provide for a wayward or delinquent child. Fortunately for the parents of such children, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts does not recognize such proceedings as binding on the parents. It would seem that the lawyers of Massachusetts should read the authorities bearing on this question and prepare a bill that would be enacted, which would be so broad and comprehensive as to avoid all Constitutional questions. One thing is evident, the laws of Massachusetts relating to neglected, wayward and delinquent children, while satisfactory to some people, are not good laws to recommend to other states contemplating adopting Juvenile Court Laws.

The question of the delinquent children, wherein a child is accused and found guilty of crime, and then adjudged deliquent by the judge, not as a court but as a judge, and committed to an institution where children are committed that are found guilty of crime, is so serious that it necessitates our treating it in a subsequent article.