its value, had been performed partially by establishing mints in many proper places; but for much of the period of our national existence, a Bank of the United States was in operation, and for the whole period there were numerous State bankswhich institutions had been in the constant habit of issuing paper as money, the extensive circulation of which produced the expulsion of gold and silver from the United States nearly as fast as it was coined. The Sub-Treasury, adopted in 1837, corrected to some extent this great error; but the practice of all the separate States in treating bank bills as money so counteracted the beneficial effects of the Sub-Treasury, as to prevent the accumulation in our country of a sufficient amount of gold and silver for all financial purposes. The United States, however, possessed some advantages in favor of an independent system of finance in war, not common to other nations. The States of Europe, in comparison with our country, are small in extent, and their industry and productions are less varied. A people who do not produce all the material relied upon for the equipment and support of armies, must purchase more or less extensively from neighboring States, and in the regulation of its finances must conform, with more or less of servility, to the financial arrangements of those which supply the means of conducting war. It is our fortunate condition to be much more independent in this respect than any other people on the globe of equal power, the result of our diversified climate, rich lands, extensive coal fields, mines of every necessary metal, unparalleled means of inter-communication, and the extent of our industry, which embraces all the material of war, and is sufficient to supply all the wants of man.

The disadvantage, however, resulting from the long-continued expulsion of the precious metals from the United States, due of late chiefly to those State banks which the writer of the pamphlet represents, was one of the controlling facts which the financial officer of the government had to take into view in considering how the necessary means should be raised. Indeed, the want of the precious metals here in sufficient abundance, and the jealous feeling of other powers, left him no

alternative but to devise a financial system of our own, and independently in part of the precious metals, keeping constantly in view the truth that any system of finance was wholly inferior in importance to the great object of our national preservation.

The writer in question informs us that the Secretary of the Treasury borrowed from the banks one hundred and seventy millions of coin, and on the assumption that this gross sum was at one time in the coffers of the Treasury, treats it as being an adequate reserve for issues of paper payable on demand in gold and silver, which system he presents as the true one. That sum was the aggregate of the various sums borrowed from time to time, and paid out as convenient by the banks, and again by the Treasury, to be returned to the banks; but to call it one sum of one hundred and seventy millions would be like counting and adding the links of an endless chain on every new revolution of the wheel. I well recollect when publishing some articles in favor of the policy of making the Treasury notes lawful money, in January, 1862, that there was then not enough gold and silver in our banks to furnish the government with over a half a month's supply for its whole expenditure in that time. Assuming that there was not enough gold and silver for the purpose of conducting a great war, it follows, as a consequence, that the policy resorted to was the true one. It is a fundamental principle, that they who receive protection from government owe that high allegiance which compels them to serve in armies in its struggles for national life, and consequently to perform the inferior duty of providing the government with whatever other means are required, on such equitable apportionment, as to deprive the scheme of particular hardship. A draft in the one case, and general taxation in the other, without favoritism, constitute such reasonable apportionment in lieu of impressment and particular confiscations, both of which latter are arbitrary and despotic. This right in the government to compel service and fairly adjusted contributions in war lies at the foundation of government power and credit, enabling it to maintain a paper

system, for the redemption of which the whole property of individual citizens is liable. It pained many, doubtless, to notice in the pamphlet referred to, an attempt to influence the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse the loyal and not less legal decision made by the Court of Appeals of this State, sustaining the financial policy of the government in making its issues a legal tender for debts. The effect of such a reversal, made in the midst of war, would be disastrous in the extreme. No greater service to the Confederate States could be rendered or sought by the Confederate government. The policy of making those issues a legal tender is an essential part of the foundation of our system of finance, and to take this away would bring down the whole structure of government credit, and expose the country to difficulties never surpassed in the history of any people engaged in war. The writer in question, affecting to present a perfect scheme of national finance, conducts us through many pages of irrelevant truths (which do but little more than overturn his boasted State bank paper system) to the precipice of the government issues thus discredited and destroyed by a decision of the Supreme Court. Here his wisdom terminates. What shall be substituted is not mentioned, but there can be no scheme in his mind in that dilemma except the collection of all debts after that period in gold and silver. He could not have bestowed any reflection on the difficulties and hardships that would then arise. Most of the current debts of the great trading interest of the Union have been incurred with direct reference to the legal-tender clause. Their obligation, however, is to pay in lawful money, which, if the decision he invokes were rendered, would mean gold and silver, and not the "lawful money" mentioned in the act of Congress of 1862. The process of collecting debts not voluntarily paid is one of force. Behind the sheriff or marshal ever stands the public power to enable those officers to execute the decrees of tribunals. We have been accustomed, such has been the steady and mild action of these executive officers, to look upon them. as parts merely of the most quiet machinery; but if debts

were now to be collected in gold and silver, the army required to support these functionaries of the law would need to be quite as efficient as the forces engaged with the rebellion. An army paid in that case with what? Does the writer of the pamphlet suppose that in the scramble for gold and silver that would arise between the debtor class for gold to pay their debts, and the government for its then manifold uses, the latter could obtain a sufficient sum to pay this double army in the precious metals? Certainly not. The army which is expected to support the sheriffs and marshals in bringing unexampled ruin to millions, would be paid in paper, not a tender, and such as could not be used to supply the families of soldiers nor pay their individual debts. What a reliance for such collections! What a reliance for putting down the rebellion! The paper currency would become exactly that of the Confederate States, requiring a year's pay to purchase the smallest article of clothing.

Such is the dilemma to which a financier conducts himself, who from the stand-point of supporting the State bank paper system attacks a system free from its grave difficulties. The course of those banks, in continuation of the expansion commenced by Mr. Biddle in 1833-4, gave to the crisis of 1836-7 that extreme malignancy which overwhelmed such vast numbers in that unparalleled storm. The miseries of that time are scarcely now felt, for most of the unfortunate actors of that day were either buried in the bankrupt act, or now repose in their silent graves. But their miseries were due wholly to the vicious system of issuing paper which answered no other purpose than to involve thousands in debt. The legal tender notes of the government, if they induce speculations, which they unfortunately do from the quantity issued (an unavoidable evil), furnish with certainty the means also to pay debts, which the State bank currency never did and never can. The clause that no State shall make anything but gold and silver a tender for debts, prevents the States, in their separate capacity, from imparting to the issues of banks what is the chief function of money, that of being used compulsorily for this purpose. This

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weit if the government, and for at ul against those State instrations, vei ore than all other anses nur av lemonstrate-i he tanger of a paper The thickest nemar interest of those who any wiser in the United States, is now, and must continue to be, Jouni mwith the nati nal system, and they must standi mgetier, or all ether in one mimon run. An adverse decision by the Supreme Court on the gestion of leral tender knot to be thought of as desirable or even possible; and more particularly not far as concerns entrets made since the passage of the act of Congress declaring the issues of the overnment to be lawful money.

That act of Congress has the warrant of the Constitution. The sent to exercise this power is apported by the practice of the most pulent nations of the world in their great condiets. The act of the British Parliament in 1797, making the bills of the Bank of England in effect a tender for debts, was passed from the direst necessity, and within seven years after the promuigation by Barke of that greatest of his works, Lis eondemnation of the French Revolution, and the policy the French pursued of issuing what he said they would be, and what the assignats turned out to be, vast quantities of irredeemable paper. The criticism of that great writer, which had the effect to unite the then important powers of Europe against the French, had scarcely become widely known before his own government was compelled, from motives of self-preservation, and against the most powerful promptings of pride, to follow partially in the steps which France had taken. That memorable act of Parliament remained in force till about 1822, somewhat modified. The question presented to the minds of