the place of the one they hold, and to provide that the arrangement
shall be binding on all the holders of obligations secured by the same
mortgage when it shall have received the assent of the majority, pro-
vision being made for the protection of the minority in the enjoyment
of rights and privileges in the new security identical with those of
the majority. Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard, 527.

2. When the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada authorizes a corpora-
tion, existing under its authority, to enforce upon its mortgage cred-
itors a settlement by which they are to receive other securities of the
corporation in place of their mortgage bonds, and the scheme is
assented to by a large majority of bondholders, and goes into effect,
and the right of citizens of the United States who are bondholders to
participate in the reorganization on the same terms as Canadians or
other British subjects is preserved and recognized, the settlement is
binding upon bondholders who are citizens of the United States, and
who sue in courts of the United States to recover on their bonds. Id.

DOWER.

In Pennsylvania, as in other States, dower is not barred by an assignment
of the husband's estate under the Bankrupt Act of the United States,
and a sale by the assignee in bankruptcy under order of the court.
Porter v. Lazear, 84.

EAST RIVER BRIDGE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.

ELECTIONS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. The power to take private property for public uses, in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, is an incident of sovereignty, belonging
to every independent government, and requiring no constitutional
recognition, and it exists in the government of the United States.
Boom v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 406, cited and approved. United States v.
Jones, 513.

2. The liability to make compensation for private property taken for pub-
lic uses is a constitutional limitation of the right of eminent domain.
As this limitation forms no part of the power to take private property
for public uses, the government of the United States may delegate to
a tribunal created under the laws of a State, the power to fix and de-
termine the amount of compensation to be paid by the United States
for private property taken by them in the exercise of their right of

eminent domain; or it may, if it pleases, create a special tribunal for
On this point Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, cited
and approved. Ib.

that purpose.

EQUITY.

1. In a serious conflict of testimony, a bill in equity may be dismissed on
the ground that the complainant failed to establish the facts on
which he claimed relief. Hewitt v. Campbell, 103.

2. A defendant, against whom a judgment has been rendered on default
by a circuit court of the United States in an action at law, cannot
maintain a bill in equity to avoid it, upon the ground that the plain-
tiff at law falsely and fraudulently alleged that the parties were citi-
zens of different States, without showing that the false allegation was
unknown to him before the judgment. Cragin v. Lovell, 194.
3. A marshal of the United States, who, under a provisional warrant in
bankruptcy, has, after receiving a bond of indemnity under General
Order No. 13, in bankruptcy, seized goods as the property of the
debtor and been sued for damages for such seizure, in an action of
trespass in a State court, by a third person, who claimed that the
goods were his property at the time of the seizure, cannot maintain a
suit in equity in a circuit court of the United States, for an injunc-
tion to restrain the further prosecution of the action of trespass, the
parties to the suit in equity being citizens of the same State.
Leroux v. Hudson, 468.

4. Such marshal having delivered the goods seized to the assignee in
bankruptcy appointed, after an adjudication of bankruptcy, in the
proceeding in which the provisional warrant was issued, and the as-
signee having sold the golds, under the order of the court in bank-
ruptcy, without giving to the plaintiff in the action of trespass any
notice, under § 5063 of the Revised Statutes, of the application for
the order of sale or of the sale, and such plaintiff not having brought
any action against the assignee to recover the goods, or applied to
the bankruptcy court for the proceeds of sale, and the assignee not
being sued in the action of trespass, he cannot bring a suit in equity
in a circuit court of the United States, joining the marshal as plain-
tiff, against the plaintiff in the action of trespass, to have the title to
the goods determined, on the allegation that they were transferred
to such plaintiff in fraud of the bankruptcy act, and for an injunc-
tion restraining the prosecution of that action. Id.

5. When an heir at law brings a suit in equity to set aside the probate
of a will in Louisiana as null and void, and to recover real estate;
and prays for an accounting of rents and profits by an adverse party
in possession, who claims under the will, this court will refuse to en-
tertain the prayer for recovery of possession, if the complainant has
a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at the common law. Hipp
v. Babin, 19 Howard, 271, affirmed. Ellis v. Davis, 485.

6. Where, in a suit in equity several defendants have independent rights
in the subject-matter of the controversy, and one defendant, having
answered setting up his particular right, files a cross-bill to enforce it,
and the causes proceed together and are heard together, and an inter-
locutory decree is entered to protect and enforce the rights thus set
up, entitled as of both suits, the complainant in the original suit can-
not, unless upon consent, dismiss his bill and thus deprive the de-
fendant of the right acquired by the decree. Chicago & Alton Rail-
road Company v. Union Rolling Mill Co., 702.
7. When one defendant in a suit in equity pleads to the jurisdiction, and
another defendant answers setting up independent rights in the sub-
ject-matter of the controversy, and no notice is taken of the plea to
the jurisdiction, and a decree is entered sustaining the rights set up
in the answer, the complainant cannot have his bill dismissed under
the 38th Rule for failure to reply to the plea: especially when appeal
has been taken and the defendant pleading to the jurisdiction is not
party to the appeal. Id.

8. Under the statutes of Illinois, Rev. Stat. Ill. ch. 82, § 51, a person who

contracted to deliver rails to a railroad company for use in the con-
struction of its road, the deliveries to extend over a period of time,
and who complied with his contract, and who commenced pro-
ceedings within six months after the date of the last delivery to en-
force a lien therefor under the statute, had a valid lien upon the
property superior to that acquired by a trust created between the
date of the last delivery of the rails and the commencement of the
proceedings to enforce the lien; and such lien was not affected by
a special agreement that the contractor should have a lien on the
rails till payment, and that the possession of the railroad should be
the possession of the contractor; nor by any agreement to give credit
to the purchaser beyond the time within which the statutory lien
should be enforced, when the purchaser failed to perform the con-
ditions upon which that credit was agreed to be given. Id.

9. Under the circumstances in this case there was no error in rendering a
personal decree against the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, and
awarding execution against it in favor of the contractor. Id.

1. The court will not review an alleged error respecting the proof in a
railroad foreclosure suit and the allowance of amounts due to holders
of mortgage bonds, if the evidence presented before the master is not
before it, and if no objection to the proof was taken below. Indi-
ana Southern R. R. Co. v. Liv., London, & G. Ins. Co., 168.

2. A judgment, rendered on default, upon a declaration setting forth no
cause of action, may be reversed on writ of error, and the case re-
manded with directions that judgment be arrested. Cragin &
Lowell, 194.

3. No error in law can be predicated of a finding of fact by the court be-
low in a case submitted without the intervention of a jury. Booth v.
Tiernan, 205.

4. When the court below finds generally for a defendant, and also makes
special findings on the issues, no error can be assigned on the special
findings. Meath v. Board of Mississippi Levee Com'rs, 268.

See WRIT, 1.

ESTOPPEL.

1. The doctrine that a dismissal of a suit for want of jurisdiction is no
bar to a second suit for the same cause of action reaffirmed and the
authorities cited. Smith v. McNeal, 426.

2. The plaintiffs claimed as heirs of R. They showed a deed by R to S
of an estate in the premises for the life of M, but without covenants
by S to surrender to R or his heirs, or as to any further interest in R.
They also showed that the life estate of S passed by mesne convey-
ances to the defendants. Held, That the defendants were not estopped
from setting up an adverse superior title. Robertson v. Pickrell,
608.

See JUDGMENT, 1, 2, (4), (5), 3.
MUNICIPAL BOND, 5, 6.

EVIDENCE.

1. The court will take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge,
and of things in common use. King v. Gallun, 99.

2. It being proved that a deed had been lost, and not intentionally de-
stroyed or disposed of for the purpose of introducing a copy, it is
competent under the statute of Illinois to use in evidence a certified
copy of the deed from the proper recorder's office in the place of the
original, although it was admitted that there was an error in the
copy. Booth v. Tiernan, 205.

3. It is competent to prove the error in such case by evidence of witnesses
who had read the original deed; or by a copy of the registry of the
original deed as entered in the file book.

Id.

4. Records and judicial proceedings of each State affecting property or
estate within it have in every other State the force and effect which
they possess in the State of origin; but as to similar property or es-
tate situated in another State they have no greater or other force

than similar records or proceedings in the courts of that State. Rob-

When the head of an executive department is required by law to give
information on any subject to a citizen, he may ordinarily do this
through subordinate officers in his department. Miller v. Mayor, &c.,
of New York, 385.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

See ADMINISTRATION;

ADMINISTRATOR;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 4.

EXPRESS BUSINESS.

The idea of regularity, as to route or time, or both, is involved in the
words"
express business," under § 104 of the act of June 30th, 1864,
c. 173, 13 Stat. 276, and those words do not cover what is done by a
person who carries goods solely on call and at special request, and
does not run regular trips or over regular routes. Retzer v. Wood,
185.

FEES.

See MORTGAGE, 4.
PRACTICE.

FLORIDA.

The legislature of Florida, acting under the Constitution of the State,
passed an improvement act, exempting from taxation the capital
stock of railroad companies accepting its provisions. The Alabama
and Florida Railroad Company was organized, and constructed a
railroad within the State limits, and became entitled to enjoy the ex-
emption. In 1868 the State of Florida adopted a Constitution which
provided for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, and that the prop-