certify the same in writing, "the conduct of any member, either in or out of the club, be injurious to the character and interest of the club," with provisions for enforcing resignation if the request be not complied with, sometimes with an appeal to a general meeting of the club, sometimes without. The power of expelling a member from a corporation belongs only to the society at large, unless the charter or some by-law founded on it transfers this power to a select few. A religious society incorporated by voluntary association is a temporal body, and distinct from the church organized from it, and the society is not liable for damages sustained by one expelled from the church. Where charges are preferred against a member, who is apparently of unsound mind, his failure to appear and answer is not excused by his insanity, and the association may regularly proceed, according to its laws, to convict and punish him by expulsion. An unjust resolution of expulsion spread upon the corporate books is a libel, and any member offering a resolution of that nature for adoption at a corporate meeting is liable in damages for libel.5 § 84. Power of expulsion determined by constitution and by-laws.- Members being bound by the constitution and bylaws of the organization, their rights are to be measured in accordance therewith; and a member may be bound by 1 Leach's Club Cases, 15, 16. 2 Hassler v. Philadelphia Musical Assoc., (1884) 14 Phila. 233. 3 Hardin v. Detroit Baptist Church, 51 Mich. 137; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 555. 4 Pfeiffer v. Weishaupt, 13 Daly, 161. 5 Fawcett v. Charles, (1835) 13 Wend. 473. Cf. Adley v. Whitstable Co., (1815) 19 Vesey, 304; Chase v. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., (1880) 5 Lea, 410. (N. S.) 162, 193; Fischer v. Raab, 57 How. Pr. 87, 95; Fitz v. Muck, 62 How. Pr. 69, 74; Elsas v. Alford, 1 City Ct. Rep. 123; Leech v. Harris, 2 Brewst. 571; Maxey's Appeal, 9 Week. N. Cas. 441. "The first case," says Mr. Leach (Leach's Club Cases, 17), "where the power of expulsion from a club was discussed in a court of law was in Hopkinson v. Marquis of Exeter, 17 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 368; s. c. L. R. 5 Eq. 63, which was a suit against the committee of a club, from which H. had been expelled by the vote of a general meeting, praying a declaration that so long as he should conform to the rules of the club (which he offered to do), he was amendments to and changes of the rules subsequently made in accordance with existing rules. So that a member can not complain of an expulsion fairly conducted under the rules of the association unless they be against natural justice.2 $85. Assent of members to constitution, by-laws and rules. It is necessary, however, that a member should have assented to the rules of the association before he will be bound entitled to participate in the use and enjoyment of the property and effects of the club, and in its rights, privileges and benefits, and also that the defendants might be restrained from excluding the plaintiff from such rights and benefits, and from removing his name from the list of members. The expulsion clause provided that it was the duty of the committee, in case any circumstances should occur likely to endanger the welfare and good order of the club, to call a general meeting, and in the event of its being voted at that meeting by two-thirds of the persons present that the name of any member should be removed, he should cease to belong to the club. The general principles were strongly asserted that the rules were the governing contract of the association, and that a judicial or quasi-judicial office was vested by the rules in the committee and the general meeting, from which in ordinary cases there was no appeal. The only limitation on the power of the committee or meeting, being, that it must be bona fide, and not arbitrarily exercised." 1 Note to Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dec. 674; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 49. 2 Hopkinson v. Exeter, L. R. 5 Eq. 63; s. c. 37 L. J. Ch. 73; s. c. 16 Week. Rep. 266; Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. Div. 615; s. c. 44 L. T. 557; s. c. 29 Week. Rep. 511; Richardson-Gardner v. Freemantle, 24 L. T. 81; s. c. 19 Week. Rep. 256; Lyttleton v. Blackburn, 33 L. T. 641; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly, 329; s. C. 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 162; Olery v. Brown, 51 How. Pr. 92; Fitz v. Muck, 62 How. Pr. 69; Sperry's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 391; Leech v. Harris, 2 Brewst. 571. "A man who becomes a member of a club, binds himself by a written contract, which is to be found in the rules of the club. Those rules are the laws from and by which his rights and duties as a member are to be ascertained and governed. If those rules give (as all club rules do give) an unlimited power of expulsion to the committee or to the general body of the club, the exercise of that power is not a matter for the interference of the law courts, provided that the power be exercised (i) in accordance with the letter and spirit of the rules; (ii) in a bona fide manner and not capriciously or oppressively; (iii) in a fair and impartial manner in accordance with the ordinary principles of justice." Leach's Club Cases, 45, 46. See also Lambert v. Addison, 46 L. T. 20; Robinson v. Yates City Lodge, 86 Ill. 598, 599; Anacosta Tribe v. Murbach, 13 Md. 91; s. c. 71 Am. Dec. 625; Osceola Tribe v. Schmidt, 57 Md. 98; Karcher v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 137 Mass. 36, 372; Burt v. Grand Lodge F. & A. M., 44 Mich. 208; People ex rel. Corrigan v. Young Men's Father Matthew Ben. Soc. 65 Barb. 357. thereby; and while ordinarily a member in joining an association is presumed to know and to assent to its rules, yet it has been held that where the ceremony of expulsion involved a battery, it could not be lawfully performed against the will of the member to be expelled.3 4 § 86. Grounds of expulsion.-At common law there are two sufficient causes for the expulsion of members, to wit, the commission of an indictable offense or a violation of the duties of membership. But a member does not forfeit his membership by failing to pay an assessment not made in accordance with the constitution of the order, and the fact that the assessment was made in accordance with a custom of which he is not Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112; s. c. 69 Am. Dec. 665, and note, 673; Leech v. Harris, (1869) 2 Brewst. 571. Note to Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dec. 665; s. c. 16 N. Y. 112; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly, 329; s. c. 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 162. 3 State v. Williams, 75 N. C. 134. 4 Bagg's Case, (1816) 11 Coke, 94, 99; Rex v. Town of Liverpool, (1759) 2 Bur. 723, 732; State v. Chamber of Commerce, (1865) 20 Wis. 63; People v. New York Commercial Assoc., (1864) 18 Abb. Pr. 271; People v. Chicago Board of Trade, (1867) 45 III. 112. Cf. Smith v. Smith, (1813) 3 Desaus. Eq. 557; Woolsey v. Independent Order &c., (Iowa, 1883) 1 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 172; Fisher v. Keane, (1878) 11 Ch. Div. 353; Gardner v. Freemantle, 19 W. R. 256; People v. New York Cotton Exchange, (1876) 8 Hun, 216; Dean v. Bennett, L. R. 6 Ch. 489. The right of expulsion from associations of this character may be based and upheld upon two grounds: 1. A violation of such of the established rules of the association as have been subscribed or assented to by the members, and as provide expulsion for such violation. 2. For such conduct as clearly violates the fundamental objects of the association and if persisted in and allowed would thwart those objects, or bring the association into disrepute. Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, 159. As the words of the usual expulsion clause- "conduct either in or out of the club" —imply, the conduct for which the member of a club is expelled, need not have any direct connection with the club. It may, indeed, be a circumstance suggesting malice, if the conduct which forms the ground of expulsion is not of such a nature as to give “reasonable and probable" cause for the interference of the committee or club. But this is a question for the jury or judge sitting as a jury, in each case; and in the absence of proved malice, the fact that the action complained of, neither took its origin in the club, nor had any connection or reference to a club, is not a reason against the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the committee by an expulsion clause. Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346; s. c. 28 W. R. 367; s. c. 41 L. T. 638; see review of this case in Canada L Jour., Oct. 15, 1881, 381. shown to have had knowledge, is not sufficient to justify his expulsion for non-payment thereof.1 § 87. Sufficiency of grounds of expulsion not to be questioned judicially. Where the constitution or by-law of a voluntary association provide for expulsion, a court will not interfere unless it appears that the rules were immoral, contrary to public policy, or in contravention of the law of the land, that the rules were not observed, that there was mala fides or malice in arriving at the decision, or that the decision was made without notice and an opportunity to be heard;" nor except in case of the rules being against natural justice, will the court pass upon their reasonableness.3 In the matter of expulsion, the society acts in a quasi-judicial character, and so far as it confines itself to the exercise of the powers vested in it, and in good faith pursues the methods prescribed by its laws, such laws not being in violation of the laws of the land or any inalienable right of the member, its sentence 1 Underwood v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 66 Iowa, 134. 2 Note to Hiss v. Bartlett, 63 Am. Dec. 776; note to Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dec. 677; Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, §§ 59-62; Hutchinson v. Exeter, L. R. 5 Eq. 63; s. c. 37 L. J. Ch. 173; s. c. 16 Week. Rep. 266; Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. Div. 615; s. c. 44 L. T. 557; s. c. 29 Week. Rep. 511; Gardner v. Freemantle, 24 L. T. 81; s. c. 19 Week. Rep. 256; Karcher v. Supreme Lodge K. of H., (1884) 137 Mass. 368, 372, where Field, J., delivering the opinion of the court said, the plaintiff's intestate was suspended by the tribunal which he had chosen to determine the question according to the rules to which he assented in becoming a member, and he received notice of the proceedings. The action of this tribunal, according to its rules, on a question which it had authority to decide, honestly taken, after the requisite notice to him, can not be collaterally reviewed in this suit, on the ground that facts existed, which, if brought to the notice of the tribunal, would have warranted a different decision. Grosvenor v. United Soc. of Believers, 118 Mass. 78; Dolan v. Court Good Samaritan, 128 Mass. 437." Lyttleton v. Blackburn, 33 L. T. 641; s. c. 45 L. J. Ch. 219; Lambert v. Addison, 46 L. T. 20; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly, 329; s. c. 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 162; Olery v. Brown, 51 How. Pr. 92; People ex rel. Corrigan v. Young Men's Father Matthew Ben. Soc. 65 Barb. 367; Sperry's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 391; Leech v. Harris, 2 Brewst. 571; Burt v. Grand Lodge F. & A. M. 44 Mich. 208; Karcher v. Supreme Lodge K. of H., 137 Mass. 368, 372. 3 Note to Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dec. 672; Hirschl on Fraternities, 63; Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, § 25; Kehlenbeck v. Logeman, 10 Daly, 447-448; Elsas v. Alford, 1 City Ct. Rep. 123. is conclusive like that of a judicial tribunal. The decision of the members of a beneficial society, or of a tribunal provided for by its laws, as to the claim of a member to benefits, is within the general rule above considered, conclusive, if made in good faith. The courts will, however, decide whether the ground for expulsion is well taken. Accordingly a member of an unincorporated association who is expelled therefrom, nominally for an offense which would warrant expulsion, but in reality for an offense which, by the rules of the association, is punishable only by fine, will be re-instated by the courts.* In an important case in New York, an expelled member of the Union Club of New York City brought an action to have the resolution of expulsion declared null and void. The gov ernment of the club was in charge of a committee which had power to expel members from the club by ballot. A rule declared that the proceedings of the meetings of this committee 1Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, 159, citing Commonwealth v. Pike Benevolent Society, 8 Watts & S. 250; Burt v. Grand Lodge, F. & A. M., 44 Mich. 208; Robinson v. Gates City Lodge, 86 Ill. 598. "It is clear that every member has contracted to abide by that rule, which gives an absolute discretion to two-thirds of the mem-bers present to expel any member. Such discretion must not be a capricious or arbitrary discretion. But if the decision has been arrived at bona fide without any caprice or improper motive, then it is a judicial opinion from which there is no appeal. None but the members of the club can know the little details which are essential to the social well-being of such a society of gentlemen, and it must be a very strong case that would induce this court to interfere." Hopkinson v. Exeter, 17 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 368. "Proprietary Clubs," 7 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 438. The question of whether the moral conduct for which a member is expelled was such as to justify his expulsion cannot be reviewed by the courts, unless the action of the expelling committee appears to have been capricious or corrupt. Loubat v. Le Roy, 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. 2 Fitz v. Muck, 62 How. Pr. 69; Torrey v. Baker, 1 Allen, 120; and see, where the society is incorporated, Anacosta Tribe v. Murbach, 13 Md. 91; s. c. 71 Am. Dec. 625; Osceola Tribe v. Schmidt, 57 Md. 98. The right of different persons claiming to represent a subordinate lodge of an order are to be determined by the constitution of the grand lodge. Chamberlain v. Lincoln, 129 Mass. 70. 3 Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, 159, citing Hirschl on Law of Fraternities, 55; Savannah Cotton Exchange v. State, 54 Ga. 668. 4 Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156. |