26, 1884, known as the Dingley bill, applies to the shipment of seamen in foreign ports, as is claimed by the counsel for the libelants. Section 10 of that act provides "That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful, in any case, to pay any seaman wages before leaving the port at which such seaman may be engaged, in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person, or to pay any person, other than an officer authorized by act of congress to collect fees for such service, any remuneration for the shipment of seamen. Any person paying such advance wages, or such remuneration, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than four times the amount of the wages so advanced or remuneration so paid, and may be also imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or remuneration shall in no case, except as herein provided, absolve the vessel, or the master or owner thereof, from full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel, suit, or action for the recovery of such wages: provided, that this section shall not apply to whaling vessels: and provided further, that it shall be lawful for any seaman to stipulate in his shipping agreement for an allotment of any portion of the wages which he may earn to his wife, mother, or other relative, but to no other person or corporation. And any person who shall falsely claim such relationship to any seaman, in order to obtain wages so allotted, shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. This section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States, and any foreign vessel, the master, owner, consignee, or agent of which has violated this section, or induced or connived at its violation, shall be refused a clearance from any port of the United States." The language of this section is doubtless broad enough to embrace the shipment of seamen in foreign ports, as well as in ports of the United States; but statutes must be interpreted and applied according to their intention. The act, it will be perceived, is penal, as well as remedial. Whatever the act prohibits may, if committed, be punished by six months' imprisonment. There seem to me to be controlling reasons why the shipment of seamen in foreign ports cannot be considered as within the intention, and hence not within the proper construction, of this act. 1. Statutes have no extraterritorial force. The shipment of seamen in a foreign port, and the payment either of advance wages or of bills previously incurred, as in this case, as an advance of wages, are acts done and completed wholly upon foreign soil; and therefore wholly beyond the jurisdiction of this country. If American vessels be treated as a part of the territory of the United States, and within its jurisdiction, though in foreign ports, still, acts like the present, that are not done upon shipboard, but, as I have said, are completed upon land prior to the seamen's coming aboard, and as a means of procuring them to do so, would not be done within the territorial jurisdiction of this country. Every presumption is against the supposition that congress had any intention to legislate in reference to acts done and completed wholly beyond its jurisdiction. And while congress might, perhaps, subject the masters of American vessels, upon their return to this country, to punishment for acts done upon foreign soil, though such acts were lawful there, still, such an intention would not be presumed. Nor is such an intention sufficiently indicated by mere general language, that can be fully satisfied by its application to all such acts committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The intention to include acts done on foreign territory would only be inferred from some specific provisions, showing an indisputable intention to make the statute applicable to acts committed beyond our territorial jurisdiction. The provisions of this statute are not of that specific character. 2. The general purpose of this act is indicated by its title. Its various provisions, as well as the well-known circumstances which led to its passage, show that it was passed in order to correct certain practices and to reform certain abuses to which seamen were subject in the ports of this country. It is scarcely credible that in passing this act congress intended to undertake to correct similar evils in all parts of the world, if they everywhere exist. It had in view the reforms which were deemed necessary in our own ports, over which it had control; and there, presumably, its intention ends. 3. Having no power to carry out any such reforms in foreign territory, it is, again, scarcely credible that congress intended by this section to place American ships at a great disadvantage as compared with other ships in foreign ports, by preventing their obtaining seamen upon the same terms available to foreign vessels. This section, if applied to our vessels in foreign ports, would be wholly futile as regards the correction of any similar abuses there; and it would have no other practical effect than to cripple and disable our own shipping in foreign ports. This is a result clearly foreign to the purposes of this act. "All laws," say the supreme court in U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 486, "should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." Carlisle v. U. S. 16 Wall. 153. 4. The final clause of section 10, which declares that "this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States," and that in case of violation a clearance shall be refused them, furnishes a specific indication that congress did not in this section refer to the shipment of seamen in foreign ports, but had in view acts done in this country alone. For it is manifest that, as against foreign vessels in foreign ports, not only would this whole section be mere brutum fulmen, but the specific provision just referred to would be wholly inapplicable. Its only possible legal application to foreign vessels would be as regards their acts while within the ports of this country. And as the intent of the section is clear to make no dis crimination between foreign vessels and domestic vessels, and as the section as to foreign vessels cannot possibly be applied as regards their acts done in foreign ports, it follows that the whole section must be deemed intended to apply to the ports of this country only. For these reasons I must consider the act in question inapplicable to the present case. I am obliged to discredit the testimony of the seamen in this case, who deny their signatures to the vouchers and testify that they did not owe the debts stated. The handwriting of each is peculiar, and corresponds so entirely with their signatures to the depositions; and their testimony in regard to some other circumstances is discredited to such an extent, that I am obliged to consider their testimony as unworthy of belief. The circumstances of their attesting these bills, and the delivery of the vouchers to the consular agent, satisfy me that these bills were paid by their procurement and assent, and should stand charged against them. The seamen will be allowed, therefore, only the amounts due to them according to the master's account, deducting these advances. As these amounts were offered to them before suit and were refused, no costs will be allowed. THE ROSEDALE, etc. SMITH, as Ex'r, v. MCKILLOP. (District Court, 8. D. New York. December 20, 1884.) 1 COLLISION-STEAMER AND SAILING VESSEL-CHANGE OF COURSE-RULE 23SAILING VESSEL IN FAULT-OFF COURSE, Where a sloop was beating up the East river past Blackwell's island, and the steamer R., coming down, undertook to keep out of the way by passing very near the westerly shore, leaving abundance of room for the maneuvers of the sloop, and the sloop, when upon her starboard tack, ran into the steamer, being, at the time, at least from three to five points off her course, which was by the wind, held, that the sloop was wholly to blame for the collision, for either intentionally changing her course by paying off in the direction of the steamer, or for negligently allowing the sloop to pay off much in excess of what was necessary in tacking, and that this fault was the direct cause of the collision 2. SAME-STATE STATUTE. The state statute requiring steamers to keep in the middle of the East river does not apply above the southerly end of Blackwell's island. The course of the steamer close to the westerly shore held prudent and justifiable. In Admiralty. Hyland & Zabriskie, for McKillop. Butler, Stillman & Hubbard and W. Mynderse, for Smith and the Rosedale. BROWN, J. On the thirteenth of April, 1883, as the steamer Rosedale was coming down the East river, abreast of Blackwell's island, at the rate of from 16 to 18 miles an hour, the sloop Alida was seen v.22F,no.12-47 beating up with a strong flood-tide, the wind being about N. E. The course of the river there is about N. N. E., and the channel only from 600 to 800 feet wide. When in the vicinity of Seventieth street, the sloop, being then upon her starboard tack, and heading towards the New York shore, struck the steamer on her port wheel-house, causing some damage to both vessels, for which these cross-libels were filed. The sloop, when first seen from the Rosedale, was heading towards the New York shore. Shortly afterwards, she tacked and headed towards the Blackwell's island shore, when the Rosedale, according to her own testimony, ported and went as near to the New York shore as possible, shaping her course within less than 100 feet of the shore; and, according to her witnesses, she kept within that distance of the west shore, expecting thereby to keep out of the way of the sloop. After reaching near the Blackwell's island shore the sloop again tacked towards the New York shore, and ran upon the steamer, as above stated. The sloop's witnesses say that the place of collision was not more than one-third of the distance across from Blackwell's island. A disinterested witness, who was in the pilot-house of the steamer, confirms the steamer's testimony; and I must hold that the steamer, at the time of collision, was near to the western shore. They state, also, that the sloop, at the time of the collision, was heading a little down river; while the sloop's witnesses say that she was heading about directly across the river. There was a good sailing breeze, and the sloop was going at the rate of at least four knots. She could easily sail within from five to six points of the wind. Her witnesses say that in coming about, the sloop is liable to pay off from one to two points from her true course. Admitting this, it does not explain why the sioop should have been suffered to head directly across the river, as her own witnesses admit, or somewhat down river, as the steamer's witnesses assert. This was at least from three to five points off from her course, and much in excess of her liability to pay off in tacking. Besides, as the collision was on the western side of the river, the sloop, if properly handled, would have picked up and reached her true course some time before coming to the place of collision. I cannot find any explanation of the course and heading of the sloop prior to the collision compatible with ordinary care or skill in navigation on her part. Had she kept her proper course on her starboard tack, as required by rule 23, no collision would have happened. The captain of the steamer supposed the sloop would go astern; she would have done so had she been kept up to the wind on her proper course, as she might and ought to have kept, and as the steamer had a right to suppose she would be kept. The statutory rule that requires steamers to keep in the middle of the East river applies only "between the Battery and Blackwell's island." 4 Edm. St. 60. In going very near to the west shore, the steamer violated no rule or regulation of navigation, and I am inclined to * think adopted, as she claims she did adopt, the most prudent course. She left plenty of room for the sloop, and had a right to assume that the latter would keep her proper course in beating. As the sloop's failure to do so was the real cause of the collision, and no definite fault contributing to the collision appears on the part of the steamer, I am constrained to dismiss the libel with costs in the first case, and to decree for the libelants with costs in the second. THE THOMAS P. WAY, etc. (District Court, S. D. New York. December 20, 1884.) COLLISION-RULE 23-CHANGE oF Course-DepartuRE IMMATERIAL. Where a steamer ran into a yacht sailing on the wind, the steamer having first proposed to go astern of the yacht, but afterwards changed and undertook to go ahead of her, alleging that the yacht changed her course by luffing, and the libel also stating that the yacht did what she could to keep out of the way, held, upon the facts, that the yacht did not luff, but paid off; that though this was a departure by the yacht from rule 23, requiring her in such a case to keep her course, yet such departure was, in this case, immaterial, because it did not contribute to the collision, but tended to avert it, and that the steamer was wholly in fault, through lack of promptness in taking measures to keep out of the way. In Admiralty. Howard A. Sperry and J. A. Hyland, for libelant. Butler, Stillman & Hubbard and W. Mynderse, for claimants. BROWN, J. On the eleventh of September, 1883, as the yacht Ariel was beating up the Kills off West New Brighton, Staten island, she came in collision with the steam-boat Thomas P. Way, bound down, on her way from New York to Newark. The Kills at this point is about one-third of a mile wide. The collision was about 200 feet from the Jersey shore. The port bow of the Way struck the starboard bow of the yacht, carrying her along under her guards for some little distance, when, by backing, the steamer cleared and passed astern. The Way was going down the middle of the Kills at the rate of about 12 miles an hour. The yacht, having previously neared the Staten island shore, was seen to tack, come about, and make nearly across the Kills towards the Jersey shore. When about 600 to 700 feet distant from the Way, the latter, without changing her wheel, slowed down in order to pass under the stern of the yacht, which was then on the steamer's port bow. The captain of the steamer testifies that after this slowing, and while the Ariel was still upon his port bow, and when about 500 or 600 feet off, she came up into the wind, apparently designing to tack again towards the Staten island shore; and that he thereupon ported his wheel, and started up full speed in order to pass ahead of the yacht, but that soon afterwards, when the yacht was about 400 feet away, she paid off again, |