The defendant should have an opportunity to answer and reduce the recovery claimed. It is ordered that the case be remanded to the district court, with directions to affirm the judgment, with costs, unless the defendant pays the costs of the demurrer and writ of error, withdraws the demurrer, and answers within 30 days. COLLINS COMPANY v. COES and others. (Circuit Court, D. Mass chusetts. July 30, 1884.) PATENT-COES WRENCH-COLLINS COMPANY v. COES, 5 BAN. & A. 548, Over RULED. The application to the bar of the Coes wrench, for the purpose of securing and supporting the step and resisting the strain, of a nut already in use for the same purpose on the Hewitt or Dixie wrench, lacks the novelty of invention requisite to support a patent, within the decisions of the supreme court at the last term, which, in effect, overruled the decision of this court in the suit of the Collins Company v. Coes, 5 Ban. & A. 548. In Equity. Thomas H. Dodge, (of Worcester, Mass.,) for defendants. GRAY, Justice. This is a bill in equity for the infringement of the first claim in the specification of the second reissue to the complainant, dated February 25, 1873, of letters patent originally issued to Lucius Jordan and Leander E. Smith, on October 10, 1865, for an improvement in wrenches. The wrench, as described, both in the original patent and in the reissue, has the following parts: The wrench-bar, A, the upper part of which is of the usual shape, and has attached to it the movable jaw, B, and the lower part of which is of convenient form to receive upon it the wooden handle; a screw-rod, C, parallel to the main bar; a rosette, D, at the lower end of the screw-rod, by means of which the movable jaw is worked; a ferrule or step, E, having a hole through it for the admission of the bar, and a recess in its upper face as a bearing for the lower end of the screw-rod; a nut, F, screwed on a thread in the bar, under the step, and having a recess in its under face to receive the top of the wooden handle, G; and the wooden handle secured at its lower end to the main bar by a nut in the usual way. Both the original patent and the reissue state that the object of the invention is to make the strain come upon the nut F, instead of coming upon the wooden handle. The original patent states that the nut F is, and the reissue states that it may be, screwed up firmly against the step E. The reissue affirms and repeats that the distinguishing characteristic of the invention is that the step can be readily removed and replaced at pleasure. There is no hint of such a distinction in the original patent. The first claim in the original patent is for "the step E, made substantially as described, and for the purpose set forth." The corresponding claim in the reissue is for "the step, combined with the wrench-bar, and supported by the nut F, or its equivalent, at the place where the step is connected with the bar, in such manner that the step can be removed from the bar without cutting or abrasion of parts." The parallel screw-rod, with a rosette thereon to work the movable jaw, and resting upon a ferrule or step, had been introduced in the original Coes wrench, patented in 1841; and, long before the issue of the patent to Jordan and Smith in 1865, large numbers of the Hewitt or Dixie wrench had been made and sold, in which there was no separate screw-rod, and the screw that worked the movable jaw revolved on the main bar, but that screw rested on a ferrule or step, which was secured sometimes by driving it on under heavy pressure, and sometimes by a nut screwed under it on the bar. The application to the bar of the Coes wrench, for the purpose of securing and supporting the step and resisting the strain, of a nut already in use for the same purpose on the Hewitt or Dixie wrench, lacks the novelty of invention requisite to support a patent, within the decisions of the supreme court at the last term, which have, in effect, overruled the earlier decision of this court in the suit of this complainant against Loring Coes and others, reported in, 5 Ban. & A. 548. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Locomotive Engine Safety Truck Co. 110 U. S. 490; S. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Bussey v. Excelsior Manuf'g Co. 110 U. 131; S. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38; Double-pointed Tack Co. v. Two Rivers Manuf'g Co. 109 U. S. 117; S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Phillips v. Detroit, 111 U. S. 604; S. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580. The complainant's patent being void for want of novelty, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other defenses. Bill dismissed, with costs. THE FIRE-EXTINGUISHER CASE. GRAHAM, Adm'r, etc., and another v. JOHNSTON and another. (Circuit Court, D. Maryland. July 26, 1884.) PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-GRAHAM FIRE-EXTINGUISHER-SPECIAL ACT OF CONGRESS OF JUNE 14, 1878, GRANTING PATENT TO HEIRS-CONSTITUTIONALITY -EFFECT OF-PATENT SUSTAINED. The act of congress approved June 14, 1878, relieving the heirs of William A. Graham from all disabilities preventing them from renewing or reviving an application filed by Graham in 1837 for a patent for a novel method of extinguishing fires, held to be a constitutional exercise of the power of congress; and held, that the patent No. 205,942, granted July 9, 1878, to Graham's administrator, was properly issued in pursuance of the authority given by that act of congress. Held, that the intention of congress was to allow the original application of Graham to be revived, and that this intention is sufficiently expressed in the act, and that the novelty of the invention for which the patent was granted is to be tested as of the date of original application filed in 1837. Held that, at the date of his application, Graham was the first discoverer that carbonic acid gas and water, when condensed in a sufficiently strong vessel, would propel itself by its own elasticity in a sufficient stream to a sufficient distance to be a useful agent for extinguishing fires, and that he described ooth a portable and a fixed apparatus by which his method could be applied with beneficial results. Held, that the claim in the patent granted to his administrator for this method or process of extinguishing fires is valid. Held, that the defenses set up against the patent-that it was granted for several distinct inventions, that the specifications are deceptive and misleading, and that it covers a different claim from that set forth in the application-are not valid objections. In Equity. Rufus W. Applegarth and L. L. Bond, for complainant. I. F. Williams, Abraham Sharp, and R. K. Evens, for respondents. MORRIS, J. This is a suit in equity for alleged infringement of patent No. 205,942, granted July 9, 1878, to Archibald Graham, administrator of William A. Graham, deceased, for a new method and an improved apparatus for extinguishing fires. The claims are as follows: "I do not claim to have discovered a new element in nature, nor do I claim to have discovered the abstract principle that carbonic acid gas will not keep up combustion. What I claim as new, and desire to secure by letters patent, is (1) the method or process of extinguishing fires by means of a properly directed stream of mingled carbonic acid gas and water projected by the pressure or expansive force of the mingled mass from which the stream is derived; (2) the combination of a strong vessel for containing the mixture of carbonic acid gas and water under pressure, with a stop-cock, flexible hosetube, and a nozzle, substantially as and for the purpose specified; (3) the combination of fixed pipes or tubes, arranged by or through a building, with a stationary or fixed fountain or tank, for forcing mingled carbonic acid gas and water, by its own elasticity, through such pipes, substantially as specified; (4) an improved method of extinguishing fires, consisting-First, in condensing carbonic acid gas by artificial pressure or in generation; second, controlling it by a suitable vessel; and, finally, in directing its flow to the desired place, substantially as specified." The original application of William A. Graham, of Lexington, Virginia, was filed in the patent-office, November 23, 1837, over 40 years prior to the grant of the patent. In his application and specifications, Graham claimed that he had discovered that carbonic acid gas compressed in water in the proportion of ten or more volumes of gas to one of water, in portable fountains or fixed reservoirs, could be usefully applied to extinguishing fires, and that he had devised suitable apparatus by which a stream of gaseous water, by the elastic force of the gas, would be projected a distance of 40 feet, so as to quickly, cheaply, and effectually subdue the fire. He fully described what he claimed as his invention, and accompanied his specifications with diagrams and descriptions of his apparatus. The commissioner of patents refused to grant him a patent, upon the ground that the specifications were not found to contain any practicable device for carrying the alleged discovery into operation, and because it did not appear that it admitted of being carried into operation. Graham made many unsuccessful efforts to convince the commissioner that his plan was useful and practicable, but want of means and ill-health prevented his exhibiting in Washington the apparatus with which he expected to demonstrate its efficiency, and he died in 1857 without obtaining a patent. In 1869 a patent was granted by the United States to Carlier & Vignon, of Paris, France, (No. 88,844, April 13, 1869; reissued, No. 4,994, July 16, 1872,) for "an improvement in the art of extinguishing fires, by throwing upon the fire or conflagration a properly directed stream of mingled carbonic acid gas and water by means of the pressure or expansive force exerted by the mass of mingled gas and water from which the stream is derived." Carlier & Vignon had previously obtained patents in France and England, but the date of their invention was not shown to have been earlier than 1861. The portable apparatus described by them was substantially identical in principle and operation with the apparatus described by Graham. Suit having been brought on their reissued 'patent in the circuit court for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, it was tried in April, 1874, before Circuit Judge MCKENNA. To show want of novelty in the patent, the respondent in that suit put in evidence the identical apparatus constructed and used by Graham, and Judge MCKENNA, in a carefully considered decision, held that it was clearly proved that Graham, as early as 1852 or 1853, had made a public trial of this very apparatus in Lexington, Virginia. He held that it was proved that Graham was, as he claimed to be, the first inventor "of an original method of extinguishing fires by the combined agency of carbonic acid gas and water, and that he perfected and adopted his invention by embodying it in the form of mechanical appliances, capable of operative and successful use." Northwestern Fire-extinguisher Co. v. Phila. Fire-extinguisher Co. 1 Ban. & A. 177. After the decision of this case the administrator of Graham, in 1876, filed in the patent-office another application for a patent for Graham's invention, but was refused upon the ground that in conse quence of the long delay the invention had gone into public use. These facts being brought to the attention of congress, an act was passed, approved June 14, 1878, for the relief of Graham's heirs. By that act the heirs of Graham were relieved from all disabilities. preventing them from renewing or reviving an application by his administrator for a patent for a novel method of extinguishing fires. The administrator was authorized to renew the application, conforming it to present rules, and the commissioner of patents was authorized to issue letters patent for the invention or inventions set forth in the application, to have the same force and effect from its date as though no delay had occurred; provided, that all persons having machines, containing the inventions, in use should have the right to continue to use them without being liable for any infringement. Under the authority given by this act the patent on which this suit is based was issued, founded upon the original application of Graham, filed November 23, 1837. It is contended by the respondents that this patent is void because congress had no constitutional power to pass the act; that as, by the general acts of congress on the subject of patents in force during the time between the filing of the original application and the passing of the special act, the applications of Graham and his administrator were declared abandoned, and all right to prosecute them was denied, it resulted that the public had acquired the right to use the inventions, and that right could not be taken away without the law being repugnant to the declaration of the constitution that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The theory of the encouragement given to inventors is that by disclosing under the regulations of law their discoveries they benefit the public, and the constitutional power of congress for securing to them the exclusive right to their inventions has only one restriction, viz., that it shall be for limited. times. With regard to the terms upon which the exclusive right shall be granted, the time when the application for the original grant or for any renewal or extension of it shall be made, it has been frequently held that the regulations in these matters are merely selfimposed restrictions on the constitutional power of congress, which it can at its pleasure disregard in any particular case. Walker, Pat. § 255. Special acts for the relief of particular inventors have often been passed by congress. Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454. In the case of Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, the supreme court sustained a patent which had been extended in pursuance of a special act of congress, passed more than 20 years after the original patent had expired, and the invention had been free to the public. The act of congress in that case was quite similar to the one under consideration in that it authorized the commissioner to entertain the application for extension as though it had been made within the time prescribed by the general law. In Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 170, Mr. Justice STORY, speaking of the right of congress to grant a patent to an |