H. OF R.]

Ratio of Representation.

[NOVEMBER, 1791.

and establish their confidence in their fidelity | he had not borne that character, and he could and disinterestedness; had that number been not suppose himself yet infected, unless he had much smaller, it is probable France would never caught the disorder since he became a member have been delivered from oppression by their of the present House. Much has been said exertions. about the influence of the bank, and that bank I know, sir, that many friends of our consti- directors are members of the House of Repretution thought that the convention did not pay sentatives. The bank (said he) is public proa sufficient attention to the interests of their perty, and therefore he could not see the force constituents, when they restrained them from of the gentleman's arguments respecting the having more than one Representative for every dangerous influence of that institution, unless it thirty thousand citizens. I know that there is was that he was displeased at the distribution a report that the people are indebted to their of the shares, so much of the stock being held President, even for this share in their Govern- at New York and to the eastward, and so little ment; and I believe, sir, if this report be true, at Conococheague. In the same predicament that whatever has been so justly said of him, he viewed the other objections respecting the as compared to Fabius, to Hannibal, to Alex-influence of speculators; for he did not know ander, may be forgotten, when this instance of that any members of the House were speculahis wisdom, disinterestedness, and attachment tors, neither could he see any danger from brito the interests of his fellow-citizens, will be bery. more and more known and applauded, and be for ever engraved on the hearts of their posterity. Shall we, then, Mr. Chairman, the direct Representatives of the people, be less attentive to their interest, and that too respecting their share in the deliberations of their own House of Representatives, than the President of their convention was? I trust not.

I will not pretend to say, however, whether in an Assembly where attempts are frequently made to carry into effect the projects of monarchical or aristocratical juntos, the virtuous struggles of patriotic members may not produce mob-like disorders; but in an Assembly like Congress, where I should suppose no such question can be agitated; none which may not be discussed with temper and decency, such disorder need not be apprehended. I should suppose there would be less danger of animosities and disorderly debates in Congress, amongst twelve hundred members, than in the British Parliament, if it consisted but of one hundred. Where we have all but one and the same great object in view, the happiness of our country, (not the interests of a particular body of men born with privileges insulting to the feelings and rights of freemen, nor the whims of an individual, born to trample on his fellow-creatures,) we can have no cause to be dissatisfied with one another.

Surely, sir, unless these gentlemen suppose the members of Congress void of sense, or of every idea of decency and propriety, they cannot suppose that even five hundred members would not be easily restrained within the bounds of order.

Mr. CLARK said, he did not rise to trouble the House with a lengthy discourse, for he had always believed that long speeches answer no valuable purpose. He meant only to offer a few remarks on what had been said in opposition to his former observations, and he hoped that, although the gentlemen contend for the ratio of 30,000 as the only basis whereon to found the liberties of the people, he should not be stigmatized with the name of an aristocrat for voting in favor of a large ratio. Hitherto

In reply to Mr. FINDLAY's observation, that more wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the ratio, he asked whether this would not also bring in more folly? For the probability is, that the ratio of both wisdom and folly will increase with the increase of numbers, and likewise of honesty and dishonesty; and with respect to the smallness of the district, or that it was safer for a small number to send a member than a greater, he was of a different opinion, as he believed that if ever the practice of bribery should come into play in America, it would be easier for a Representative to purchase a small district than a large one. If ever the liberties of the people are endangered, it will not be by the smallness of the representation, but by the corruption of electors and elections. This is the door which Congress should guard in the strictest manner, and that will secure the people against corruption in the House.

A gentleman from Georgia has observed, that the disposition of a great many millions of dol lars has been in the hands of a quorum of this House, of whom it requires only seventeen to form a majority. On this Mr. C. observed, that the old Congress, which was composed of a much smaller number, were intrusted with the disposal of larger sums, although there were sometimes only two members from the largest State, Virginia, and no complaints were heard of their conduct.

But there is an argument which ought to have weight in the present question. The Senate, although a much smaller body than this House, are fully competent to judge of our proceedings, and of the safety of the country. Indeed, (said Mr. C.,) it appears very evident to me that we are not in want of a larger number in the House of Representatives to debate any question, if it be considered how much has already been said on the subject now before us.

Mr. VINING expressed much surprise that the subject, which to him appeared perfectly definable, should have occasioned the debate to travel so widely from the line marked out by the con stitution. The pendulum seems to vibrate be

tween the numbers 81, 96, and 113; and should that pendulum rest on any one of them in preference to the others, he could not suppose that it would affect the liberties of America. Why, therefore, all this extraneous argument about a point of so easy decision? We are sent here to administer the Government, the first principles of which are already fixed, so that neither branch can encroach on the other. The Senate, the House of Representatives, the President, have each defined powers; and whilst those remain, I shall always believe the liberties of America are invulnerable.

Under this impression, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for striking out 30,000, in order to accommodate the question to a medium. But I shall do this on different principles from some other gentlemen; notwithstanding, I at the same time confess that the ratification of the first amendment to the constitution ought to govern us in deciding this question. The spirit of the amendment appears to me clearly to imply that we should not suffer the number of Representatives to exceed one for 30,000. I am here, not as a person who shall exercise discretionary opinions, but judge by the letter of the constitution. And in this case we may increase the number, but we cannot make it less after the enumeration. In the mean time, until that enumeration is complete, the representation remains as it has been hitherto, which I believe may be about one member to every 40,000 or 41,000.

[H. OF R.

funds; for it is their interest to have a wise
and good representation. The people who are
employed in the more simple path of agricul-
ture, removed at a great distance, are not more
interested in the security of the Government
than the more informed stockholder.
As an
example of the discernment of the great com-
mercial people of London and Bristol, I need
only mention their choice of a Fox and a Burke,
for until a late day Mr. Burke was the cham-
pion of the people and the friend of liberty.

If our Senate should take any unwarrantable stride towards aristocracy, have we not the power to check them? No President can very well attempt it at any time hereafter; and we are perfectly secure in the present time from all suspicion of corruption.

Mr. HILLHOUSE said he had ever been a friend to a Republican form of Government, and God forbid, that he should ever give his vote for any measure that should endanger the liberties of his country. He was in favor of an energetic government, as that alone can secure the blessings of liberty. As to the dread of corruption in this House, which some gentlemen appeared to entertain, he thought there was no foundation for such an apprehension; at least as the idea refers to one or two hundred Representativestwo hundred he contended, were as easily corrupted as one. But the corruption contemplated was a mere matter of opinion; no facts, he presumed, existed in this country to justify a posiIf we go upon theory only, I would enlarge tive assertion; and as to foreign countries, it the representation to its greatest extent, and seems to be conceded that a larger number than hand down the principle to futurity, in letters any that has been mentioned is susceptible of of gold, that a very great representation-that undue influence. He then adverted to the Democracy is the very best Government that restrictions on the President of the United can possibly be devised, provided it were prac- States, and the Senate, in respect to the means ticable to give it stability. Next to a govern- of corrupting the Legislature. The constitution ment as free as theory could extend, we have has also made provision to secure the independthe freest in the world-a Government of rep-ence of the members, &c. He then urged some resentation, which will increase with the population of the country, and the ten new States will always preserve an equilibrium; but if you increase it to an extreme, you may render it tumultuous, although it may be safe.

difficulties which would be occasioned by a small ratio. He observed that the population of some of the States is nearly stationary: if a small ratio is now established, the consequence will be, when it is augmented, that the repreI cannot, however, see the propriety of com- sentation of those States must be diminished. paring this to the Government of Great Britain, This would be a measure that would be greatly although that is called a Government of Repre- disliked. With respect to the proposed amendsentation, consisting of two Houses of Parliament, he thought it was entirely out of the ment, one of which is elective, the Lords are hereditary, and the King can do no wrong; and it has hitherto been, I believe, the next best Government, after our own, in the world. And yet we know with how much reluctance Ireland obtained a participation of the trade and commerce of Great Britain; although a FLOOD bellowed forth with the voice of liberty like a Demosthenes, still nothing could induce the British Ministry to give way, until the volunAnd have we not the volunteers, sir, in this country to protect our rights? Yes, sir, the American volunteers are perfectly competent to this service.

teers effected it.

question, till it was ratified by three-fourths of the States. A very numerous representation would tend to weaken, if not destroy the State Governments, and, in the issue, would destroy the General Government. For, said he, they mutually depend on each other for support.

Mr. KITCHELL was in favor of a numerous representation. He thought the amendment proposed to the constitution ought to be the guide to the House on this occasion. He did not draw his ideas of what should constitute a proper representation, from the examples cited from foreign countries; nor was he actuated by an apprehension of corruption, as more appliI am under no apprehensions from the stock-cable to a small number than to a large one; but bolders of the bank, or the speculators in the when he considered the various objects, views,

denominations, professions, callings and interests of the citizens of the United States, he was fully convinced that a large representation was necessary to embrace the wishes and answer the expectations of the people. He should, therefore, vote against the motion for striking out thirty thousand.

[NOVEMBER, 1791.

Thomas Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell,
Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah
Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, Alexander White, and
Francis Willis.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. PAGE, Mr. MURRAY, and Mr. MACON do prepare and bring in the same.

TUESDAY, November 22.

A memorial of the committee of the counties of Washington, Westmoreland, Fayette, and Alleghany, in the State of Pennsylvania, was presented to the House and read, stating their objections to an act, passed at the last session, imposing a duty on spirits distilled within the United States, and praying that the same may be repealed. Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for his information.

NAYS.-Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Robert Barnwell, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Nicholas Gilman, Mr. GERRY took a general survey of the argu-Hillhouse, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, James ments against the proposed ratio of one to thirty Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, thousand. In noticing the objection from the Israel Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Jonathan instability of the State Legislatures, he said it Sturges, George Thatcher, John Vining, and Artemas was not owing to their numbers, but to the Ward. mode in which they are elected. Were the Senates and Executives of the several States chosen as those of the General Government, there would have been as much stability and consistency in their transactions, as in those of the Government of the Union. A gentleman had said that the proposed amendments to the constitution had been adopted with reluctance by some of the States which had accepted them. He called on the gentleman to produce his authorities for this assertion. A relative proportion between the members of the House and the Senate had been suggested; this idea had no foundation in the constitution. And he further observed, that the constitution has so completely guarded and secured the rights and independence of the Senate, that he could not conceive of the apprehensions of gentlemen, who appear to think that an increase of the members of this House will overwhelm that branch of the Legislature. In all events, the privileges of that body will remain the same. The States, it is said, have reduced their Representative Assemblies. This, so far from being an argument against the proposed ratio, was directly in favor of it. The diminution of the State Legislatures has been occasioned by the idea which the people entertain of the increasing importance of the General Government. The objects of legislation to both Governments are nearly similar; they relate to those important concerns which interest the feelings of every citizen of the United States; all the difference lies in the magnitude of their respective spheres of action. Hence, it must evidently be the wish and ex-accepting the report, pectation of the people, that their interests in every point of view, should be fully and adequately represented in this House.

The resolution being again read, in the following words:

66

Resolved, That the number of Representatives shall, until the next enumeration, be one for thirty

thousand."

The question was taken thereupon and agreed to by the House; yeas 35, nays 23, as follows:

YEAS.-Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, John Brown, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Daniel Heister, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine,

Representative from Maryland.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the report of the standing Committee of Elections, to whom was referred the Letter from the Executive of the State of Maryland, containing the resignation of WILLIAM PINKNEY, a member returned to serve in this House for the said State; and also a certificate of the election of JOHN FRANCIS MERCER, in the room of the said WILLIAM PINKNEY.

The law of the State of Maryland regulating elections being called for, was produced and read; by which it appeared that the Governor and Council of that State were authorized to fill up vacancies in the representation of that State in Congress.

Some objections having been offered against

Mr. SENEY observed, that the case appeared to him to be so plain that he was surprised to find gentlemen objecting to an acceptation of the report of the committee. He then stated the whole process of the business, in the resignation of Mr. PINKNEY and the election of Mr. MERCER, in which the law of the State had been strictly adhered to. He concluded by saying, that two cases in point had already occurred in the State of Connecticut, and no difficulty respecting them had taken place in the House.

Mr. GILES said, that he was a member of the select committee which had made the report; and from an accurate attention to all the circumstances of the case, he was led to think the report a very improper one. From recurring to the constitution, he was of opinion that a resignation did not constitute a vacancy. The

NOVEMBER, 1791.]

Representative from Maryland.

[H. OF R.

constitution speaks only of vacancies in general, | various causes by resignation, by death, or by and does not contemplate one as resulting from expulsion-the Executive of the State is the a resignation. Adverting to the British House proper judge in the first case. He stated certain of Commons, he observed that in that body there differences between a resignation after a person could be no resignation. This is an established has taken his seat, and a resignation before that principle. The people having once chosen their event. In the former case Congress will of representatives, their power ceases, and conse- course give notice to the Executive of the quently the body to which the resignation ought State; in the latter, the Executive alone can to be made no longer exists. From the experi- take cognizance of the resignation. He stated ence of the British Government in this respect, the extreme inconveniency which would result he argued against a deviation from this rule. from the ideas of the gentleman from Virginia, He showed from the constitution, that the Ex- as it would respect the State of Georgia. He ecutives of the States who are empowered to then stated several particulars to show that Mr. fill vacancies, are not at all authorized to de- PINKNEY was not a member of the House agreeclare the existence of such vacancies; for, if ably to the constitution, and therefore the House they are to judge in the case, the whole power cannot proceed with him as one. He said that is invested in them of determining the whole we ought to be willing to derive information business of vacancies-an idea that materially from the experience of every country; but he and essentially affects the privileges of the mem- conceived that no precedents could be drawn bers of the House. He remarked that, even that would apply in the present case from a by the law of Maryland, the requisite steps had country which had none, to one which had a not been pursued by the Executive of that State. constitution that so clearly defined and guarded He concluded by saying that, if the principles the rights of the citizens. The custom which he had advanced were just, he hoped the report had been mentioned as obtaining in that counwould not be accepted. try, arose from a wish to prevent a frequency of elections. From what had been offered by the gentleman from South Carolina, and the ideas he had suggested, he hoped the committee would be induced to accept the report.

Mr. WILLIAMSON said, that it appeared to him that the constitution contemplates that a member may resign. He read the clause, which says that no member of the Legislature shall accept of an office made during the time for which he was chosen-from hence he inferred that resignations were clearly contemplated.

Mr. SMITH (S. C.) had had his doubts on the report; but on more mature consideration he was convinced that on account of the inconvenience which would result from rejecting it, and from other considerations, it was proper to adopt it, but not without a full discussion. He then stated some particulars to show that the vacancy which had occurred on this occasion could not properly be called a resignation. Mr. PINKNEY had never taken his seat, nor the requisite oath. He said that there was no analogy between the Parliament of Great Britain and this House; the mode of issuing the writs originally, and of filling up vacancies, is essentially different. No part of the constitution prohibits a member from resigning, and for convenience it ought to be concluded that he may resign. The public interest may suffer extremely in cases of sickness or embarrassments, which may prevent a member from attending. This argument from the body's no existing to whom the resignation ought to be made, will apply to the President of the United States, whose resignation is expressly mentioned in the constitution. The objection urged from the Executives of the States judging of vacancies, he conceived had no great force, for Congress would finally judge in every case of election. It is uncertain how the practice of the British Parliament originated. Blackstone says nothing of resignations. When a member wants to resign in that Legislature, Mr. SENEY observed upon a distinction made he gets appointed to some fictitious office which by Mr. GILES between a resignation on the part disqualifies him from sitting in the House. He of a Senator and a Member of the House, he thought it best to establish some precedent, supposed a resignation in either would equally rather than oblige members who may wish to vacate a seat, and that no difference did really resign to have recourse to some familiar method, exist. by accepting of some appointment in the State which is incompatible with a seat.

Mr. MURRAY said he was in favor of accepting the report, both on account of propriety and conveniency. Vacancies may happen from

Mr. GERRY said that he had heard nothing to show that Mr. PINKNEY had ever accepted of his appointment, and therefore it ought to have been expressed that he had declined; but, granting he had resigned after accepting his appointment, he asserted that nothing had been offered to prove that resignations might not take place in one House as well as in the other; and the constitution plainly expresses that a Senator may resign. The House of Commons originated with the Kings, who formed that body to control the Lords; and hence arose the prohibition against resignations, as they would weaken the body, and the expense of a new election would fall on the King. With respect to the Executive declaring improper vacancies, he observed that Congress was invested with full power to control the Executives of the States in respect to such declarations.

Mr. SEDGWICK observed that, if a power of adjudication was vested in the Executives of the States to determine on a vacancy in cases of resignation, it would involve this consequence, that a power of judging of vacancies

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