hundred and ninety-seven, to make a final report to the legislature, and submit therewith, such bills as will, upon their enactment into laws, provide a government for the municipal corporation, the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York as by this act enlarged, and, among other things for attaining an equal and uniform rate of taxation, and of valuation. for the purpose of taxation, throughout the whole of the territory of the said municipal corporation as so enlarged, and that said commission shall cease to exist on the first day of March, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven. Said commission may, in and for the performance of said work, employ counsel and such other persons as it may deem necessary, and fix their compensation; subpoena witnesses, compel the production before it of any public record or document of any of the bodies politic or corporate aforesaid, administer oaths, and examine thereunder any person touching the subject-matter hereby committed to its charge; and each of the said bodies politic and corporate its agents and servants, is hereby directed, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act, to furnish to the said commission, or its representative, free access at all reasonable hours, to all such records and documents, and all information, within its possession or under its control. The said commission shall proceed as continuously as may be with the work aforesaid, and shall from time to time, report to the legislature its progress therein, and its recommendations, and shall prepare and submit to the legislature, bills in proper form for enactment, embodying such recommendations with a proposed charter, or bills for the government of such consolidated municipality, and providing further for the election of a mayor and the other municipal officers therein provided for, at the general election to be held in the year A. D. eighteen hundred and ninety-seven.

4. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act, each of the cities of New York and Brooklyn shall raise such proportion of the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars as the value. of all its real property, as fixed by the board of state assessors for the purpose of state taxation, bears to the aggregate value, as so fixed, of all the real property in both cities. Upon the requisition of said commission upon the board of estimate and apportionment of either of said cities, such board shall raise the whole or any part of the proportion of said sum to be raised by such. city, from any unexpended balance or appropriation in such city, for any year prior to the year eighteen hundred and ninety-seven,

or by the issue of revenue bonds of such city in the manner provided by law, or by the inclusion thereof in the annual tax levy upon real and personal property liable to taxation in such city. Payments shall be made by the comptroller of each of said cities, from the respective proportions of said sum so to be raised by each of said cities, for the expenses incurred by the said commission in carrying out the provisions of this act, upon vouchers certified by the said commission, or by such officer or officers thereof as it may designate for that purpose, in form to be approved by the comptroller making such payment.

$5. Nothing in this act contained shall be construed as attempting or intending to affect, in any way, the boundaries, governments, rights, powers, duties, obligations, limitations or disabilities of any county, or officer thereof, as fixed by the constitution or otherwise.

§ 6. Section one of this act shall take effect on the first day of January, in the year eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; sections two, three, four and five of this act shall take effect immediately."

Pursuant to the act of consolidation, the Governor (Levi P. Morton) appointed on June 9, 1896, the following members of the commission to draft the proposed charter, viz.: Seth Low, Benjamin F. Tracy, John F. Dillon, Ashbel P. Fitch, Stewart L. Woodford, Silas B. Dutcher, Wm. C. De Witt, George M. Pinney, Jr., Harrison S. Moore.

Mr. Fitch having resigned from the commission, the Governor appointed Thomas F. Gilroy in his place.

By virtue of the act, the following gentlemen were members of the commission: Andrew H. Green, president of the commission, appointed by L. 1890, ch. 311; Campbell W. Adams, State Engineer; Theodore E. Hancock, Attorney-General; William L. Strong, Mayor of New York; Frederick W. Wurster, Mayor of Brooklyn; and Patrick Jerome Gleason, Mayor of Long Island. City.

The commission organized on June 25, 1896, appointed Benj. F. Tracy as president and George M. Pinney, Jr., as secretary, and named William C. De Witt, John F. Dillon, Thomas F. Gilroy, Seth Low, Andrew H. Green, Benjamin F. Tracy, and George M. Pinney, Jr., as a committee on draft of proposed charter. This committee presented a draft charter to the commission with the following report:

"TO THE GREATER NEW YORK COMMISSION:

Gentlemen:

The established rule of law which prescribes that a charter granted to a municipal corporation must be construed so strictly that nothing may pass by hare inference, but every substantial power must be found in the express terms of the grant, has added greatly to the labors of your Committee. It would have been comparatively easy to have drawn a charter in general terms, with concise sections, comprehensive in character. This, however, would have left to the varying and uncertain rulings of the courts the extent and sufficiency of the powers conferred, and would have led to special legislation, when anything new or doubtful pertaining to the general grants arose for municipal action. To confer upon The Greater New York a charter which should render the city selfgoverning, it became, therefore, prudent and necessary to endow it, in general and in detail, with every right, power and privilege essential to municipal independence, subject to the sovereignty of the State. This method was further enjoined by the chief duty devolved upon the Commission, which is to effect a consolidation of the various municipalities so that there may be no break or jar in the unity and integrity of the single corporation, and no lack of power and supremacy in its central government.

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

We have constructed, as the Lgislative Department of the new city, a Municipal Assembly, to consist of two houses - a Lower House of 104 members, elected from senatorial districts, and an Upper House of 37 members elected from council districts designated in the Charter. The Upper House is to be presided over by a President elected by the people at large. All of the members of both Houses are elected for the term of two years, and all retire at once. In view of the extent and multiplicity of powers proposed for the legislative branch of the city government, we deemed it inadvisable to adhere to a single body, or Board of Aldermen alone. The plan of two houses has been adopted in the hope that it will act as a check upon hasty legislation, will attract to every ordinance the most extensive scrutiny and discussion, both from the membership and the public press; and that it will therefore render every piece of legislation a subject of interest and of consideration to a people adequately enlightened upon their municipal affairs.

The Committee have decided that the entire membership of both houses of the Municipal Assembly shall be changed at the same time, not because they look upon this as an ideal system, but because it seems to be the best that is possible under the conditions prevailing in The Greater New York. The political majority throughout this territory, whether it is considered as a whole or in detail, has been in the past so one-sided that only in occasional years the political minority have been able to gain control. The sentiment is indeed growing which tends to persuade the population of our American cities to vote at municipal elections on city issues, rather than on State or National issues. Nevertheless, the great

body of the American people still go to the polls in cities on election day animated by partisan sentiments. Habits are slowly changed, whether by individuals or by communities, and it must be inferred that the political habits of the American elector in this particular will yield only slowly to the discipline and instruction of events. Under these circumstances, it is clear that elections at large and terms of office that make it impossible to change the political complexion of the Municipal Assembly at a stroke, would tend to place the city under the dominion of one political party quite uninterruptedly. For this reason, rather than because we deem the system itself inherently better than a more gradual change in the composition of the two Houses, the Committee have adopted the plan submitted in the draft.

It would have been a satisfaction to a majority of the Committee if, in connection with the election of members of the Municipal Assembly, it had seemed to them possible to provide in some way for proportionate or minority representation. A very careful study of the question, however, has convinced the Committee that under the present Constitution of the State of New York all desirable plans for securing proportionate or minority representation are of such doubtful validity that the Commission would not be justified in framing a charter that might prove to be defective on so vital a point. It is, however, respectfully proposed for the consideration of the Commission that a constitutional amendment, dealing with this question, may be transmitted to the Legislature in connection with the Charter, if the Commission so determine.

As already suggested, the Committee have assumed that The Greater New York must have a charter which will give the city all the powers that are necessary to conduct its own affairs. The natural and ultimate repository of the most of these powers is the Municipal Assembly. And we do not think we can have failed in alloting to this body every right, power and privilege which the history of cities and the conditions of The Greater New York suggest as needful to the enjoyment of self government within appropriate limits. We have considered in this respect the charters of European and American cities, especially those of Paris, Berlin and Budapest upon the continent; of Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham and London in Great Britain, and those of St. Louis, Brooklyn and New York in this country. We have conferred upon the Municipal Assembly legislative authority over the usual subjects of municipal jurisdiction. We have gathered and preserved all the legislative powers heretofore vested in New York and Brooklyn, and, in addition, have entrusted the new city with the original power to build bridges or tunnels over or under the rivers within its domain; construct parks, school-houses and public buildings; and generally to exercise those higher and more expensive functions needful to meet the wants arising from the rapid growth of population and the advancing greatness of the metropolis; with the proviso, however, that when any new enterprise shall exceed in cost the sum of a million dollars it shall in the first instance have the approval of the people at an election after the project shall have undergone the scrutiny and discussion of the people and of the press.

The Municipal Assembly is a conspicuous feature in the plan of the draft charter. The extent and variety of its powers, as well as

its size, mark our sense of its dignity and importance. Its rule will embrace from the start a population of over 3,000,000 of people and a yearly budget of nearly $60,000,000. It ought to attract men of (the highest character and intelligence. If it shall do so, the problem of successful municipal administration for Greater New York will have been solved. While we have conferred power upon the Municipal Assembly with a free hand, we have also interposed a variety of strict checks and safeguards against hasty and ill-advised action on its part as respects powers which involve the raising and expenditure of money and the creation of debt.

We have, however, respecting the mode of exercise of the powers of the Municipal Assembly effected a radical and far-reaching distinction between those powers which, in a judicial sense, are political, and those powers which, in the same sense, are proprietary in character.

As to everything concerning the rights, privileges and liberties of the citizen respecting municipal rule, the Legislative Department is subject to no restraint. But in respect to the large and costly range of works and properties comprised in the general term "Public Improvements, we have determined that the initiative, in general, shall be with the Board of Public Improvements, and that the action of the Municipal Assembly shall be further subjected to the concurrence of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. When the multitude and magnitude of the public works and properties of The Greater New York, at present and in the future, are duly considered the bridges over the East River and the Harlem River, the Croton and the Ridgewood Water Works, Central Park and Prospect Park and the other parks, boulevards and driveways, the number of streets and avenues paved or to be paved, or to be repaired and repaved; the vast extent of the sewer system, etc.— it is quite obvious that these works should be primarily controlled by expert and administrative authority, so that they may be developed and distributed upon a fixed plan yielding the greatest service to the city as a whole; producing co-operative uniformity; and should be designed and constructed obediently to the highest attainable scientific agencies. For this reason, we think that in the institution of new works or properties of the character described, or in the development of such as may be old, the action of the Municipal Corporation, on its proprietary side, should in general originate with the Board on Public Improvements. From a like consideration of the enormous outlay of money to be constantly required by the Municipal Corporation in its capacity as proprietor, we think the action of the Municipal Assembly should, in the main, be dependent upon the concurrence of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, who should always be familiar with the volume of taxation and the extent of the city debt, and whose highest function will be to guard the solvency of the corporation and to lighten the burdens of taxation. These checks and safeguards against extravagance and corruption, we trust, will meet with general approval.

Nor are they in any sense an abridgement of the sovereignty of the people. The officers of the executive and administrative branches of government spring no less from the people than the members of the Legislature, and it is therefore, in principle, merely a question as to which method will be most conducive to economical