His difcovery was, that as we can not think upon any abstract fubject, without the use of abstract terms; and as in general we subftitute the terms themselves, in thinking, as well as fpeaking, in the room of the complex ideas for which they stand; it is impoffible we can think with precifion, till we first examine whether we have precife ideas annexed to fuch terms: and it is equally impoffible to communicate our thoughts to others with exactness, unless we are first agreed in the exact meaning of our words.

ACCORDINGLY, this acute philofopher, entered into a fcrupulous examination of all the terms he used, for his own purpose, in private meditation; and afterwards gave clear definitions of those terms,. for the benefit of others, in communicating to them his thoughts. His labours were attended with fuccefs. It must be evident to all who examine his works with care, that he has treated his subject with the utmost precision, and perfpicuity; and that all who are properly qualified to read his effay, will, with due attention, agree in comprehending his meaning exactly in the fame way.

BUT in this age of fpeculative philofophy, they who turn their thoughts to writings of that fort, feem to have no other object in view than that of merely acquiring knowlege; without once confidering how that knowlege may be rendered useful to society. From the mastery of one fpeculative point, they run to another, with the fame kind of avidity, that mifers pursue the accumulation of wealth; and much to the fame end: the one, rejoicing in his hoard of concealed knowlege; the other, in his heaps of hidden gold; tho' both are equally useless to themselves, and to the world.

EVEN Mr. Locke himself seems to have been fo totally abforbed in pursuits of that fort, that he has not in any part of his works pointed

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pointed out to us, how his discoveries might turn out to the benefit of mankind, by any practical plan to try their effects. And accordingly, little or no advantage has hitherto refulted from them, excepting the fatisfaction they have given, to men of a speculative turn.

AFTER having fhewn that most errours in thinking arose from an abuse of words; and that most controverfies and disputes, which have been carried on without coming to any conclufion, were owing to the want of clear and precise ideas being affixed to the terms used by the difputants; the only remedy Mr. Locke fuggests, is, that men should carefully examine the meaning of each word, and use it steadily in one sense. And that upon any difference of opinion, the parties should define fuch terms as are capable of ambiguity, or are of most importance in the argument.

BUT he might have judged from the great difficulty which he himself found in accomplishing this point, and from his own experience of the great care and pains it coft, to feparate ideas from words to which they were early affociated, and cemented by long use; that this was a task not likely to be performed by many. One would imagine that a philofopher, before he prescribed a cure, would have traced the disorder to its fource. Nor had he far to feek for the fource of our impropriety in the use of words, when he should reflect that the study of our own language, has never been made part of the education of our youth. Confequently the use of words is got wholly by chance, according to the company that we keep, or the books that we read. And if neither the companions with whom we converse, nor the authors whom we confult, are exact in the use of their words, I can not see how it is to be expected that we should arrive at any precision in that respect.

IF then irregularity and diforder, in this cafe, as in all others, muft neceffarily follow from neglect, and leaving things to chance; regularity and order, as in all other cafes, can proceed only from care and method. The way to have clear and precise ideas affixed to the use of words, would be to have mankind taught from their early days, by proper mafters, the precise meaning of all the words they use.

THE rifing generation, so instructed, would be uniform in the ufe of words, and would be able to communicate their ideas to each other, with eafe and perfpicuity. Nor would their understandings be clouded, in private meditation, by the mifts of obscurity; nor their fentiments, when delivered in converfation, perplexed by the intanglements of verbal disputation. And this might easily be effected, if only a fourth part of that time were dedicated to the study of our own tongue, which is now wafted in acquiring a smattering in two dead languages, without proving either of use or ornament to one in a hundred fo inftructed.

Ir is true, Mr. Locke, in his Effay on Education, grievously complains of our neglect of studying our mother-tongue. But he lays the fault at the wrong door, when he imputes this neglect to the mafters of grammar fchools, and tutors at the universities. This is not part of their province. They neither profess to teach it, nor do they know how. Nothing effectual can be done, without making that a distinct branch of education, and encouraging proper to follow it as their fole employment, in the fame way as the feveral mafters in the other branches do. And certainly whether we confider the difficulty of the thing, or the great ends which might be answered by it, the masters in that branch, ought to meet with as any other. great encouragement, as thofe in

masters

To

To the want of an institution of this fort is it owing, that Locke's: noble Effay on the Human Understanding, has hitherto proved of fo little benefit to the world. It has indeed afforded such a gratification to men of a fpeculative turn, as mathematical ftudies do to thofe, whofe enjoyment is bounded by the mere contemplation of truth. But do men think, or reafon more clearly, than they did before the publication of that book? Have we a more precife ufe of language, or are the number of verbal difputes leffened? Let thofe who have examined the many controverfial writings fince published, fay, whether the chief cause of these endless difputes be not still the fame, an abufe of words..

UPON the clofeft examination, indeed, it would appear, that littleor no benefit in point of practice, has refulted from a difplay in theory,. of the only part of the human mind, which has hitherto been laid open with accuracy, upon principles of true philofophy..

BUT ftill there are two other parts of the human mind, with regard to which the world is at this day, as much in the dark, as they were with respect to the whole, previous to the publication of Mr. Locke's effay: The one, the feat of the paffions; for which we have no name as existing in the mind, unphilofophically referring it to the organ of sensation, the heart: the other, the feat of the fancy; which is called the imagination.

UPON a right regulation of thefe parts of the mind, and the faculties belonging to them, all that is noble and praise worthy, all that is elegant and delightful, in man, confidered as a focial being, chiefly depends. Yet fo far are we from having any just view presented to us of those important parts of our internal frame; or any wellfounded knowlege of the principles by which the faculties belonging

to them ought to be regulated; that every day we see some new hypothefis advanced upon that fubject, defigned to overturn all that went before, and laying in the fame claim, which all that preceded it had done, that of being the only right one.

THE variety of treatifes which have lately been published on the paffions, and the number of effays on tafte; in which the writers widely differ from each other in their principles, and are far from agreeing in their definitions or descriptions of them; fufficiently fhew, how far we are ftill, from having any certain knowlege of that part of our nature, to which thefe belong. And in this state must the world for ever continue, whilft the vanity of ingenious men fhall prompt them to think, that they can do that by writing, which is beyond the power of writing to accomplish; and whilst readers fhall continue to fearch for that in books, which it is beyond the power of books to teach. Nor are the writers of such treatises employed about a work lefs abfurd, than would be that of endeavouring to communicate new fimple ideas by definitions; or that of attempting to paint founds.

ALL writers feem to be under the influence of one common delufion, that by the help of words alone, they can communicate all that paffes in their minds. They forget that the paffions and the fancy have a language of their own, utterly independent of words, by which only their exertions can be manifefted and communicated. Now if this language be wholly neglected by us; if we have taken no care to regulate its marks, or fettle the use of them with any precision; it will follow that the difficulty will at least be as great, to treat with accuracy of those parts of the mind to which that language belongs, as it was of the understanding, previous to the proper adjustment of words. But when added to this, it is confidered that